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STATE OF ISRAEL
DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY
OF ISRAEL, 1952

COMPANION VOLUME

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ISRAEL STATE ARCHIVES

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FOREWORD

This volume is the seventh in the series relating to the foreign policy of Israel, covering the period from January to December, 1952. The editorial policy followed in the present volume is the same as that which governed the preparation of the previous volumes; however, due to the growing volume of documentation and the variety of subjects, more strict selection of documents had to be employed, focusing on the main subjects dealt with by Israeli policy makers — namely, bilateral relations with the United States, the signing of the reparations agreement with Germany, and relations with the Arab states. In order to get a complete picture of the foreign relations of Israel, it is advisable to read concurrently with this book the official publications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant official publications, such as *Divrei Ha-Knesset* (Knesset Report), as well as the official publications of the United Nations.

Most of the documents published in this volume derive from the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, now in the custody of the Israel State Archives. A few come from the files of the Prime Minister Office, also in the Israel State Archives, and from files kept in the Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives. One document comes from the British Public Records Office in London. In writing the notes and the introduction, the editors relied on additional material filed in other departments in the Israel State Archives as well as on other material in the Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives, on documentation in the British Public Records Office, and on U.S. Department of State documents as published in the series *Foreign Relations of the United States*. The editors also had access to the minutes of the Government meetings, which are still not available for research purposes.

Arrangement of documents. The documents are arranged chronologically. Documents composed or set out in parts, over a number of days, are placed according to the earliest date. The position of telegrams in the chronological sequence is based on the earliest known date among the following: date of composition, date of dispatch, or, where neither of these is known, date of receipt. Reports of discussions and meetings appear under the date of writing rather than the date when the conversation or meeting was held. When the date of writing is not known, the location of the document is determined by the date of the event reported on (this date always appears in the editorial heading).

The text. The text printed here is that of the original document, except for the following editorial changes and emendations:

(a) Addresses of senders and addressees, as well as dates in their original form, have been deleted. In some of the reports, memoranda, and minutes,

the original headings have also been omitted. The deleted information is incorporated in part in a standard format (see below) or in a note.

(b) A number of passages that are of a personal nature, repetitive, or of no direct relevance to foreign policy have been omitted. All such omissions are indicated in the text and as a rule are explained in the footnotes.

(c) Minor errors have been corrected silently. No attempt has been made beyond that to correct style, syntax, or grammar.

(d) Common abbreviations and abbreviations whose meaning is not in doubt have been expanded to full form in square brackets on their first appearance in the document. Subsequently, the abbreviations have been retained in the text. Abbreviations of proper names have always been expanded to full form in square brackets. However, abbreviations commonly pronounced as such and acronyms (e.g., UN, IDF, U.S. etc.) have not been altered.

(e) Missing words have in some cases been added, either conjecturally (within square brackets) or on the basis of a parallel text of the same document (in square brackets and with an explanatory note).

(f) Original punctuation and capitalization, as well as British or American spellings, have been retained to the extent possible. Corrections have been made only in cases of obvious mistakes or to avoid misunderstandings. In telegrams, where the original punctuation is partial, the editors exercised much greater liberty in determining capitalization and punctuation.

(g) The outgoing text of telegrams has been used when extant.

Signatures. Signature appended in the writer's own hand are printed in bold type.

Editorial headings. The heading includes, *inter alia*, the file reference of the document and its destination, except where the addressee is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or some other agency of the Government of Israel. The origin of the document and the date of its composition or transmission are given in standard format in the heading.

Editorial notes. These provide information on important events or developments. They precede the earliest document that contains a reference to the subject or appear according to the date on which the event took place.

Footnotes. The annotations consists mainly of numbered footnotes, explanatory notes, and cross-references, intended to illuminates topics that might otherwise be unclear and to indicate other documents that contain additional information. The cross-references occasionally are to files and documents that remain classified, on the assumption that they will eventually be made available to scholars.

Biographical notes have been provided when necessary for a proper understanding of the text. Information on most persons mentioned in the text is provided in the index. The index does not provide information on persons mentioned only in the footnotes, or on well-known historical or literary personalities.

Index and list of documents. A list of documents and editorial notes, indicating their main subjects, appears at the beginning of the volume; a index of persons and subjects is in the end of this volume. References in the index are to documents numbers.

Companion Volume. This companion volume consists of English summaries of the Hebrew documents, a translation of the editorial notes, footnotes, introduction, list of documents, and the index.

We would like to thank all the individuals and institutions who helped in the preparation of this volume: Ambassador Michael Elitzur of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who read the manuscript and made many useful comments; Dr. Zehava Ostfeld, director of the Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives, and Dr. Tovia Friling, director of the Ben-Gurion Archives, for their assistance in locating additional documentation; Ms. Adina Drechsler, who technical-edited the notes, the editorial notes, and the introduction; Mr. Joseph Elron, who copy-edited the main and companion volumes and supervised the proofreading; Dr. Nana Sagi, who prepared the index; Mr. Lenn Schramm and Ms. Ruth Morris, who translated the summaries of the Hebrew documents, the notes, and the introduction; Mr. Yohai Goel, who reviewed the English translation of the summaries; Prof. Yehoshua Porat, for his guidance in the transliteration of Arabic names; and Ms. Vera Eden, who typed the manuscript.

We would like to thank all those who provided biographical information about themselves or others mentioned in the documents.

Finally we wish to offer special thanks to Prof. P. A. Alsberg, State Archivist from 1971 until 1990, who initiated the publication of this series, headed the editorial board for many years, and contributed his knowledge and experience to the publication of these volumes.

INTRODUCTION

The 522 documents in this volume set out the political and diplomatic story of the State of Israel in 1952. The essence of this story is Israel's consolidation in the Middle East as a democratic country with a pro-Western orientation, marked by closer ties with the United States; its attempts to be included in a Middle East security organization or pact supported by the West; its gradual abandonment of the pretense of non-alignment, in light of its difficult relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the antisemitic and anti-Zionist campaigns in these countries. In the arena of relations with Arab countries, 1952 saw the relinquishing of the orientation based on negotiations with the Hashemite kingdom and an attempt to open a new path through contacts with Egypt, especially in light of the political changes in Egypt during this year. One of the year's main stories is the reparations negotiations with Germany, which reached a successful conclusion with the signing of the reparations agreement. In addition to the above, Israel's foreign policy continued in its routine track—with the annual United Nations debate on the Palestine question, the recurrent preoccupation with the problem of Jerusalem, diplomatic activity dealing with violations of the cease-fire agreements along the frontiers, and day-to-day contacts with foreign representatives. All of these events took place in a year marked by domestic instability, coalition crises, and economic and budgetary travails. The situation at home naturally had a bearing on the deliberations and course of Israel's foreign policy.

Israel and the World

At the cornerstone of Israel's foreign policy stood its relations with the United States. In 1951 there had already been an important breakthrough in this regard, when Israel was granted $64 million in economic assistance. This assistance, granted under the terms of the Mutual Security Act, was intended principally for immigrant absorption. It was agreed that the funds would be earmarked for industrialization and development projects; but the deterioration in Israel's financial situation, and its inability to repay foreign debts and finance current imports of raw materials and food, compelled it to ask that some of the aid package funds be released to cover current obligations.[1] The Americans agreed, on condition that they receive detailed information on Israel's foreign exchange account and other economic affairs and that to this end Israel accept the dispatch of a special U.S.

1. See No. 110.

emissary. Israel had no choice but to accede to this arrangement.[2] Even this gesture, however, proved insufficient to solve Israel's foreign-exchange problem. Particularly low revenues by the United Jewish Appeal and Israel Bonds—largely on account of serious in-fighting between the two bodies—as well as public criticism in the United States of the size of the foreign-aid package in general, which ruled out any increase in the amount of assistance (ultimately the amount for 1952 was similar to that for the previous year), brought the captains of the Israeli economy to the conclusion that the only way out of the crisis was a special loan to consolidate the country's short-term debts. Action in this direction was begun in mid-1952; but it was only in subsequent years, when Israel's foreign-exchange account had in any case improved, thanks to the reparations agreement and better budget management, that there were significant achievements on this front. In summary, the United States, anxious to preserve Israel's stability, came to its aid in its time of need, but Israel paid for this assistance by forfeiting some of its economic freedom of action, by a less favorable rating as a borrower on international markets, and, obviously, by impairment of its political standing.

No less important were Israel's attempts to obtain military assistance from the United States. Two paths were open to Israel: to purchase arms, after recognition of its eligibility to do so, or to request non-reimbursable assistance in the framework of the Mutual Security Act, with all of the political implications thereof. Israel submitted a request for reimbursable aid at the end of January and was recognized as eligible for such in early July[3]; unfortunately, Israel lacked the financial means to take advantage of its eligibility and certainly was unable to match the purchasing power of the Arab countries, which had also been recognized as eligible for reimbursable military aid. Towards the end of the year it became clear to Israel that the Americans, in concert with the British, were about to sell significant quantities of arms to the Arab states, especially to Egypt. Israel made concerted efforts in London and Washington to prevent such sales and requested that weapons deliveries be linked to progress towards peace. Great Britain and the United States declined to do so, rejecting the Israeli thesis of a link between arms sales and peace talks and stressing the need to bolster the regimes in the Middle East, particularly the new regime in Egypt. As for Israel, they merely reaffirmed the commitments made in the Three-Power declaration of 1950.[4]

The request for non-reimbursable military assistance was much more complicated. After no little hesitations on the part of the Israeli military, which was afraid it would have to lay bare its secrets to foreigners, and significant doubts among the politicians, who were apprehensive as to the

2. See Nos. 129 and 130.
3. See Nos. 33 and 220.
4. See Nos. 368 and 436.

domestic and global implications of such a clear identification with the West, it was nevertheless decided to submit to the State Department an official request for non-reimbursable military aid.[5] The responses were not encouraging. Initially it was said that the matter would be discussed after a Middle East mutual security organization had been set up, as part of that organization.[6] Later it was explained that the issue exceeded the competence of the State Department and required a decision by the President and his advisors.[7] During the course of the year it became clear to Israel's representatives that it was the State Department that was erecting obstacles to military assistance, whereas the Department of Defense, Congress, and especially the White House were inclined to favor it. The way to overcome these impediments was of course a direct appeal to the President, but Israel's representatives lacked the inner conviction and sense of urgency to take action in the White House. Only towards the end of the year, when the dangers of Arab armament became clear, did they approach the President; but this was already in the waning days of the Truman administration and produced no immediate results.[8]

The partial successes in the realm of economic and military assistance came against the backdrop of a positive routine in the bilateral relations between the two countries. Ambassador Abba Eban, in a mid-year survey delivered to Israeli diplomats in the United States, noted that there had not been a single case in which Israel had requested vital assistance from the United States and been turned down, whereas the Arabs had been turned away empty-handed on many occasions.[9] Indeed, during 1952 cooperation with the Americans was continuing and effective. Among the many manifestations of this, we need only note the consistent U.S. support in frustrating Arab initiatives at the United Nations and the American support for Israeli efforts aimed at direct negotiations with the Arab states, at the United Nations and outside it, the friendly atmosphere and the willingness to help Israeli efforts to raise funds in the United States, and the diplomatic assistance extended by the Americans during the difficult reparations negotiations with Germany. All the same, ominous cracks in the relations between the two countries appeared during the course of the year. Israeli diplomats noted, and not for the first time, the divide of temperament and mentality separating them from their American counterparts; in Israel concern was expressed about the Americans' exaggerated and tireless attention to violations of the armistice agreements, border incidents and infiltration, an attention out of all proportion to what seemed to be required by the situation; and above all, by the snippets of information, conversations,

5. See Nos. 16 and 43.
6. See No. 16.
7. See No. 47.
8. See Nos. 212 and 428.
9. See No. 167.

and echoes, especially those following the visit of Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade in Israel during the summer, which made it clear to the Israelis that the Americans did not adequately comprehend the democratic, progressive, peace-loving, and development-oriented nature of Israel and pictured Israel as a demanding, overarmed country, quick on the trigger, and unable to manage its own economy. More than anything else, the November presidential elections made tangible the vulnerability of the fabric of Israeli-American relations. Israel made great efforts and succeeded in obtaining declarations of support from both parties. But when the Republican Eisenhower was elected the Israelis found it difficult to hide their disappointment and misgivings. Ambassador Eban calmed his superiors with the assertion that revolutionary changes in U.S. policy towards Israel were not to be expected. But to him too it was clear that the network of relations and contacts that had borne such great fruit rested in large measure on the ties between American Jewry and the Democratic Party, and that now it would be necessary to rebuild the entire structure on new foundations.[10]

During the course of the military assistance negotiations, the Americans more than once made it clear to the Israelis that the supply of arms was dependent on Israeli participation in some sort of Middle East defense arrangement and acceptance of the fact that chief responsibility for defense of the Middle East would rest with the British. Indeed, the major story in Anglo-Israeli relations were the negotiations on the form of Israeli participation in regional defense. These negotiations had begun in 1951; even then it was clear that the two sides did not see eye to eye as to the form of Israeli participation. The British were of the opinion that the Israeli contribution should consist mainly of the granting of right of transit and encampment for Western armies during wartime, while the Israelis aspired to the practical incorporation of their own forces in the regional defense system. Egypt's refusal to join such a system delayed the entire process, but when it was resumed in 1952 the British proposed dispatching a military delegation to Israel in order to move ahead. The delegation arrived in early October; during the course of the two-day talks the two countries' differing views came to the fore again. The Israeli representatives were open and direct and made practical suggestions for military and strategic cooperation; the British, for their part, were reticent; they tended to ask questions rather than offer information. In particular they refused to relay details of their defense plans and how these incorporated Israel.[11] The fact was that by the time the talks were held they had lost most of their significance. Because of obstacles raised in the path of establishing a command, principally on the part of Egypt, London and Washington had decided to re-examine

10. See No. 420.
11. See No. 385.

the entire concept of Middle East defense. The two powers settled on abandoning the idea of bases and military cooperation in a regional organization and replacing it with a weaker association based on planning and coordination (the so-called Middle East Defense Organization).[12] During 1953 this idea, too, faded into oblivion, and the Israeli desire to be included in a Middle East alliance or pact and through it to establish correct relations with the Arab states was not realized.

In addition to the negotiations on Middle East defense, Israel and Great Britain had other contacts on a whole series of bilateral issues. Israel purchased most of its fuel requirements in Britain, but when Israel found itself in a financial crisis that threatened to totally paralyze fuel supplies, the British, whose financial situation was also parlous, found no way to help. Only later was a solution arrived at, in which the British agreed to a three-way deal whereby Israel purchased fuel in Britain to be paid for by surplus British currency held by the Germans, and the sums were debited from the amounts due Israel under the German reparations agreement. In the field of arms purchases from Britain, relations were also full of ups and downs. The British were willing to supply weapons and to train Israeli crews and officers, but did not accede to the Israeli request, which had been pending for quite some time, to purchase jet aircraft. Only towards the end of 1952 did the British announce that they would permit Israel, and in parallel each of the other countries of the Middle East, to acquire a certain number of Meteor warplanes, a solution which would have placed Israel in an inferior situation vis-à-vis the Arab countries as a whole. Israel's ambassador in London offered a rather pessimistic summary of relations with the British. In his opinion, Great Britain had firmly decided to base its Middle East policy on cooperation with the Arab countries. For Britain, the key country was Egypt and the path it had chosen was liberal provision of arms to the Middle East. In light of this change of direction, Israel would have to increase its efforts to join a Middle East defense pact, abandon its opposition in principle to the arming of Middle East countries, take advantage of the possibilities of acquiring armaments available to it, and submerge its desire for contractual peace agreements with the Arabs, settling for non-aggression pacts instead.[13] These thoughts coincided with similar ideas prevailing in the Foreign Ministry, whose implication was that some of the old concepts about ending the state of war with the Arabs, relations between Israel and the Great Powers, and the centrality of the 1950 Three-Power declaration as the cornerstone of Israeli security were gradually losing their status.

The third signatory to the 1950 declaration was France, but its involvement in Middle Eastern affairs was limited and its relations with Israel ten-

12. See No. 284.
13. See Nos. 386 and 440.

uous. By contrast, its ever-increasing problems in North Africa put it on a collision course with the member states of the Arab League and opened the door for cooperation with Israel in the future.[14] Israel's relations with the other countries of Western Europe were similarly characterized by treading water; an example was relations with Italy. In March, Foreign Minister Sharett paid an official visit to Italy, the first official visit by an Israeli foreign minister to any foreign country. Sharett was received with full ceremony and protocol and met with the country's leaders, but the practical results were disappointing.[15] It became clear that Italy, like the other countries of Western Europe, lacked substantial programs for cooperation with Israel; in the absence of such, and in the face of the counter-pressures exerted by the Arab countries, relations between Israel and Italy, as well as those with the other countries of Western Europe, did not extend beyond the bounds of diplomatic correctness.

Relations with Eastern Europe, by contrast, deteriorated. Underlying this process, which had begun in 1951, was the heightened East-West polarization and the changes in the Soviet bloc countries — essentially an increased dependence on Moscow and the replacement of the veteran leadership (in part imported from outside, and including many Jews) by a new, home-grown and less independent leadership. The opinions of various Foreign Ministry staffers notwithstanding,[16] Israeli acts of commission or omission had little influence on events and processes. The results were not long in coming. *Aliya* from these countries dried up, trade relations were frozen, and diplomatic ties became purely formal. In the middle of November the dam burst, with the opening in Prague of the great purge trial of former Foreign Minister Rudolph Slanský and thirteen other defendants, most of them Jews. The trial and everything connected with it were accompanied by a fierce antisemitic and anti-Israeli campaign; among the prosecution witnesses were Mordechai Oren and Shimon Orenstein, Israeli citizens arrested at the beginning of the year and who would themselves be haled into court, in 1953, against a pronounced anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli background. Israel found it hard to digest these events and was helpless in the face of this reversal. Efforts to resolve matters through diplomatic channels failed, as did the attempt to hold contacts in a sympathetic forum such as the International Peace Congress.[17] There remained the United Nations,[18] but Israel was already cognizant of the limits of this organization and of its inability to rouse itself to meaningful action on any issue that was part of the interbloc conflict. Things reached a crisis point at the beginning of December. Arieh Kubovy, Israel's minister in Prague and

14. See Nos. 354 and 357.
15. See No. 80 and Editorial Note, p. 63.
16. See, for example, No. 40.
17. See No. 502.
18. See No. 469.

Warsaw, came home for consultations against the background of the Slanský trial, and was soon declared *persona non grata*, first by the Czechoslovaks and shortly thereafter by the Poles. Some weeks later Moscow would announce the arrest of nine Jewish doctors accused of plotting the assassination of Soviet leaders, and on 11 February, after an attack on the Soviet embassy in Tel Aviv, the U.S.S.R. would break off diplomatic relations with Israel. This put an end to the relations between Israel and the Eastern bloc, begun in the autumn of 1947 with military and diplomatic support for the establishment of the State of Israel and continuing through formal diplomatic relations and limited economic ties, including the possibility of emigration from behind the Iron Curtain by a number of groups of Jews, now terminated by the rupture with Moscow and its satellites.

The friction with the Soviet bloc effectively put an end to the protracted domestic debate over Israel's place in the world, what in those days was termed Israel's "international orientation." Israel had been rejected by the Eastern bloc but was not considered part of the West; the proof was its inability to be included in the system of treaties sponsored and set up by the United States. The idea floated by the Foreign Ministry of establishing a "progressive bloc" at the United Nations, to include the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and the like, who shared similar interests and working methods with Israel,[19] was not practical. What remained, therefore, was the old idea of integration into Asia. Prevalent in the Foreign Ministry was the conception that great efforts should be invested in developing ties with the countries of Asia, as a substitute for the disappointing relations with the countries of the Old World and perhaps also at the expense of relations with them. This view had become so dominant that the Foreign Minister had to intervene and enumerate the disappointments that Israel had experienced in its relations with Asian countries, reminding his subordinates that bilateral relations between countries depend on more than merely good will on the part of one side; also required are a common background and real mutuality of interests.[20]

Among the proofs listed by the Foreign Minister was the painful history of Israel's relations with India. During 1952 another chapter was played out in the ongoing sequence of misunderstandings between the two countries. After great efforts by Israel, the Indians agreed to permit a visit by Walter Eytan, director-general of the Foreign Ministry, in New Delhi. The visit was successful; at its end it seemed that the obstacles for the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries had been eliminated.[21] But the understandings reached during the visit were never put into practice. At the end of the year India was the only non-Arab and non-

19. See No. 102.
20. See No. 335.
21. See No. 71.

Muslim state to vote at the UN with the Arabs against the resolution passed by the Ad Hoc Political Committee calling for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states; the reasons it advanced for its stand were weak and unconvincing.[22]

In summary, in 1952 a number of painful truths as to Israel's place among the nations were once again laid bare. The basic facts were irksome: a country located geographically in Asia, but tied historically and culturally to the West; economically dependent on the United States and Western Europe, but ingathering its diaspora from Eastern Europe and the Arab countries; and, what is more, surrounded by hostile states that saw it as an alien growth in their midst. In the past Israel had escaped these straitened circumstances through strong identification with the United Nations. In 1952, however, there were clear signs that the international organization's special status in Israeli foreign relations was weakening. To some extent this stemmed from the failure of the United Nations to deal with international crises and from Israel's inability to establish or be included in a bloc of non-aligned states within the organization. The primary source of the disappointment with the United Nations, though, was the loss of faith in its ability to normalize relations between Israel and the Arab states.

Israel and the United Nations

Since its establishment Israel had seen the United Nations as having a special relationship to the Jewish state and particular responsibility for resolving the dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The United Nations agency charged with dealing with this issue was the Conciliation Commission. No real progress was made at the Commission session held in Paris in the autumn of 1951. Israel brought with it a proposal for direct negotiations with the Arab states, including, as a first step, the conclusion of non-aggression pacts between the sides. The Arab states, on the other hand, demanded that the issue of the refugees be settled first, by repatriation and payment of compensation. The Commission's deliberations failed to bridge the gap between the two sides, and ultimately produced a document signed by its chairman. This document was close to the Arab position, in that it called on Israel to repatriate an unstated number of refugees and to compensate refugees for their lands; and to the Israeli position, in that it called on the sides to meet under United Nations auspices and draft changes in the cease-fire agreements, such as border rectifications, accords concerning water sources, the future of the Gaza District, border arrangements enabling access to the holy places, economic development, and commercial relations. The two sides were also asked to reciprocally abrogate their

22. See No. 500.

demands for war damages and to unblock accounts left behind by refugees who had fled Israel and by *olim* who had left the Arab countries.[23]

This document was the basis of the report submitted by the Conciliation Commission to the sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly and of the Palestine debate conducted at the beginning of January, 1952, first in the Ad Hoc Political Committee and thereafter in the General Assembly plenum. Israel's basic line was that the Conciliation Committee had failed in its mission and was now a stumbling block to relations between Israel and the Arab states because it hindered direct contacts between the parties; hence it should be disbanded. But Israel's representatives, led by Sharett, realistic enough to understand that such a fundamental change was beyond their power, focused on neutralizing the Commission by relocating its headquarters outside the region, maintaining its original composition, and redefining it from a commission charged with bringing about reconciliation between the parties to a good will agency that would operate only at the initiative of the parties themselves and deal with any practical problems that might arise during the course of direct negotiations between the parties.[24] The Arabs, by contrast, wanted to turn the commission into a more active agency, transfer its headquarters to the Middle East, and expand its membership. The deliberations over the Commission's report went through various stages and a number of draft resolutions and amendments to them were submitted.[25] Ultimately, though, the resolution adopted was closer to the Israeli position. The Commission's headquarters were relocated to New York, its composition was not changed, and it henceforth dealt with practical matters, such as the release of blocked accounts and assessments of refugee property. The Commission's role as an intermediary between the two parties came to an end.

Israel's changed evaluation of the United Nations was reflected at the seventh session of the General Assembly, in the fall of 1952. Initially Israel tried to prevent any discussion of the Palestine issue at the General Assembly. When it became clear, however, that the Arabs had already inscribed the topic on the agenda, Israel responded with its own move; in cooperation with a number of Western European and South American countries it sponsored a draft resolution calling on the parties to the conflict to enter into direct negotiations as soon as possible.[26] To strengthen this initiative, Abba Eban, Israel's representative at the United Nations, delivered a forceful programmatic speech advocating direct negotiations between the parties and offered detailed plans for cooperation between Israel and the Arab states in the fields of economics, regional development, transportation,

23. See Vol. 6, No. 454.
24. See No. 1.
25. See Editorial Notes, pp. 9–10, 17–19, 26–27.
26. See Editorial Note, p. 306–307.

education, and the like.[27] But the Israeli initiative came to nought. During the course of the debate and balloting Israel's representatives realized that the plan had failed to kindle any enthusiasm. The Americans even complained that the Israeli program went too far; it would have been preferable, they asserted, to approach the issue of relations with the Arabs through a series of small and practical steps "in the field" rather than with a demand for full peace.[28] At the end of the debate, the Israeli suspicions that the United Nations had lost all effectiveness as an agency for Arab-Israeli rapprochement were confirmed. The draft resolution calling for direct negotiations did indeed win a simple majority in the preliminary debate in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, with most of the ayes coming from the traditional reservoir of support in Latin America and Western Europe; but in the plenum the resolution failed to muster the two-thirds majority required for "important" resolutions, and the General Assembly adjourned without passing a resolution on the Palestine problem.

Israel and the Arab States

The UN debates during 1952 seemed to buttress the Israeli argument that only direct negotiations, preferably with each country separately, could lead to peace between Israel and the Arabs. If we scrutinize the direct contacts that did take place between Israel and the Arabs, however, we find that this track too was full of obstacles and devoid of significant results. In previous years, contacts had been mainly with Jordan. The assassination of King 'Abdallah in July, 1951, had called these relations into question. During 1952 Israel endeavored to preserve its ties with the Jordanians, but the instability in Jordan following 'Abdallah's murder was not conducive to this attempt; contacts were limited to declarations of intent, exchanges of assessments, and low-level meetings. Nevertheless there was one major accomplishment: at the beginning of February Israel and Jordan signed a local commanders' agreement aimed at preventing cross-border infiltration. True, this agreement had a military and local character, but it allowed a certain measure of coexistence along the frontiers throughout 1952. The agreement was renewed several times for short periods, but attempts to raise the level of contacts beyond the military and local, such as the effort to revive cooperation on the future of Jerusalem, did not bear fruit.[29]

Contacts with Syria took place in a different setting and moved in a different direction. The stormy period in Israel-Syrian relations, accompanied by sporadic hostilities, came to an end in May, 1951, after intervention by

27. See No. 467.
28. See No. 428.
29. See Editorial Note, p. 33, and Nos. 150, 437, and 521; see also No. 236.

the Security Council. This was followed by a period of calm, encouraged by Israel's decision to limit drainage work in the Hula to Israeli-owned lands, by the consolidation of the new regime in Syria, where Shishakly assumed power following the military coup of November, 1951, and by increased U.S. influence over Syria. This time the initiative came from the Syrians, who wanted to anchor the arrangements and *de facto* control that had developed on the ground in a formal partition of the demilitarized zones. After prolonged haggling over the level of the negotiations and their agenda, the parties convened in Rosh Pina on October 9. The discussions opened officially as a meeting of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, with United Nations representatives present — in accordance with vigorous Syrian demands; but after a short conversation, the UN representatives left and the talks continued between the parties themselves. The Syrians' starting position was that any arrangement should be part of and amendments to the Israel-Syria armistice agreement. In practice, they proposed partitioning the demilitarized zone along a line running east of the water line along the Jordan and the lakes. Israel did not reject the partition proposal out of hand, but stood firm that such an agreement must be part of a peace agreement, a non-aggression pact, or some other accord that would mark progress towards a peace agreement. The delegations parted without reaching an agreement, but with an understanding that the talks would be resumed at a later date.[30]

The Rosh Pina meeting was followed by internal consultations and debates in Israel. Sharett asserted that Israel's representatives had been mistaken to stick to formal and legalistic fine points concerning the framework of the negotiations and the nature of the agreement. He believed that the talks could be continued in the context of the mixed armistice commission. Israel's insistence on a non-aggression pact between the two states made no sense; it was rather the Syrian proposal to expand the scope of the armistice agreements into a *de facto* non-aggression pact that was logical. In Sharett's interpretation, Israel's military representatives had agreed to a partition of the demilitarized zone; if this was the case, the implications of the proposal for arable lands and irrigation projects should be studied and the Syrians informed without delay of Israel's willingness to continue the talks.[31] Ben-Gurion, too, did not attribute great importance to the procedural and formal aspects of the discussions and was equally ready to conclude an agreement within the framework of the armistice accords; but he rejected the evaluation that the Syrians had displayed flexibility and good will. The Syrians, he held, were demanding that Israel make real concessions in land and water without offering any meaningful *quid pro quo*; the prospects for such concessions did not strike him as realistic.[32] Following

30. See Nos. 245 and 384.
31. See No. 462.
32. See No. 403.

this exchange, and some encouragement on the part of the United Nations,[33] it was decided that Israel should continue the talks, but only after doing its homework on the political and land and water aspects. The next meetings with the Syrians took place during 1953.

Whereas the contacts with the Jordanians were in large measure the sequel to the long history of previous years, and those with the Syrians were not at Israel's initiative, contacts with Egypt constituted the main thrust of Israel's diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis the Arabs in 1952. Here Israel was the initiator and promoter, and its actions were influenced by the events and major political changes that occurred in Egypt during the year. The first moves were actually made by the Egyptians. At the end of February, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Egyptian Parliament, Yassin Sarraj al-Din, met with the Israel minister in Paris, Maurice Fischer, for a discussion of Israel-Egypt relations. Sarraj al-Din said that resolution of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute depended on improved relations between Egypt and the United States; and, he believed, Israel held the key to improved relations with the United States. This meant that the Israeli-Egyptian conflict should be settled. The time was ripe for this now, he felt, because Egyptian public opinion was preoccupied with the dispute with Great Britain. Sarraj al-Din requested Israeli funding; in return he would work to develop a sympathetic press and supportive parliamentary bloc.[34] This was not the first meeting with Yassin, who had made similar suggestions in the past.[35] This time, however, the conversation took place against the backdrop of a whole slew of reports, newspaper articles, and declarations that together created an overall impression of a real change of political direction. Israel asked the United States to ascertain the nature of the changes in Egypt, and in the interim took no practical steps other than recommending that Yassin continue his efforts to engender a favorable climate in public opinion and the media.[36] This initiative died very quickly when it became clear that the State Department placed little credence in the reports and declarations, while in Egypt all foreign affairs were still decided by the king, who maintained his unyielding hostility towards Israel.[37]

The Free Officers' coup of 23 July, the junta's seizure of power, and the elimination of King Faruq's influence led to a revival of the process, this time at Israeli initiative. On 18 August the Prime Minister told the Knesset, during a debate on defense matters, that there were no grounds for the dispute between Egypt and Israel. Cooperation between the two countries, he added, would help Egypt overcome its political and social problems.[38] In

33. See Editorial Note, p. 274.
34. See No. 57.
35. See Vol. 6, pp. 548–549.
36. See Nos. 59 and 61.
37. See Nos. 70 and 73.
38. See Editorial Note, p. 204–205.

the wake of this statement, the first secretary at the Israel legation in Paris, Shmuel Divon, delivered to the Egyptian chargé d'affaires in France an official request that representatives of the two countries meet for peace talks, or, should Egypt prefer, for preliminary talks to clarify the possibility of a peace agreement or to lay the groundwork for this.[39] Subsequently Divon held a number of conversations in Paris with official and unofficial Egyptian representatives. Only some of the material related to these talks has survived; from what remains it is clear that the Israeli proposal was considered by the highest echelons of the Egyptian regime, but the only practical result was the transmission of signals that Egypt wished to continue the talks.[40] But the positive signals from Cairo had no impact on Egypt's day-to-day policy towards Israel. When the UN General Assembly convened, Egypt yoked itself to the anti-Israel campaign; Egypt also stood in the forefront of the Arab efforts to frustrate the reparations agreement. These Egyptians responses led some Israeli diplomats, including Abba Eban in the United States and Eliahu Sasson in Ankara, to the conclusion that the ambiguous signs emanating from Cairo were meant to give the new regime the benefit of a more favorable reception in the international arena, facilitating its domestic consolidation and acquisition of weapons, but without having to make any real steps towards rapprochement with Israel.[41] This ambivalent position, combining clandestine contacts with overt alignment in the anti-Israel front, continued throughout 1953.

Although the time span covered by the present volume is short, it can nevertheless teach us a number of important lessons about the conflict between Israel and Egypt. It becomes clear that the roots of the conflict between the two countries—and in many respects between Israel and the Arab states in general—did not lie in the type of negotiations, direct or indirect; nor in its framework, whether through the United Nations or outside it; nor in the personality of Arab rulers, Faruq or Naguib; rather, they lay in substantive issues, related to security, territory, and demography. Serious problems divided Israel and Egypt, including the future of the Gaza District and its refugee population, Egypt's demand for a corridor to Jordan through the Israeli Negev, and Israel's demand for free passage through the Suez Canal. Some of these issues were raised in the internal consultations held in Israel in advance of or simultaneous with the contacts with Egypt, but no decisions were taken.[42] On the bilateral level, these issues did not even reach the stage of preliminary discussions.

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39. See Nos. 310 and 312.
40. See Nos. 367 and 403.
41. See Nos. 445 and 451.
42. See, for example, the interesting discussions concerning the Egyptian demand for an overland link to Jordan, Nos. 455, 459, and 468.

Israel and Germany

A significant portion of Israel's diplomatic efforts in 1952 was devoted to the reparations negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany. This entire affair goes beyond the normal context of Israel's foreign relations and has aspects associated with the status of the State of Israel vis-à-vis world Jewry and with the network of internal and parliamentary relations within Israel. The starting point for the negotiations was Chancellor Adenauer's statement to the Bundestag, on 27 September 1951, that "indescribable crimes were committed in the name of the German people" and that by virtue of this fact there was an obligation to make restitution to individual claimants and to pay reparations to the Jewish people and the State of Israel, which had absorbed most of the Jewish refugees.[43] In the aftermath of this statement and following preliminary talks with the Germans, on 6 December 1951 Chancellor Adenauer sent a note to Nahum Goldmann, chairman of the Conference of Jewish Organizations for Material Claims from Germany, notifying him that the Federal Republic was willing to begin negotiations on reparations and that it recognized the claims raised by Israel in its note of 12 March 1951[44] as the basis for the negotiations.

The imminent opening of negotiations with the Germans provoked an unprecedented public storm in Israel, culminating in the stormy Knesset debate of 7–9 January 1952. At the start of the session, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion announced that the State of Israel saw itself obligated to demand that the German people return the stolen Jewish property, both the property for which there were living claimants and heirs, as well as the immense amount of heirless property left by the millions murdered, returning the latter to the State of Israel, which was duty-bound to rehabilitate the survivors and had already absorbed the vast majority of those who survived the Holocaust. At the conclusion of the debate the Knesset voted to empower the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee to make a final determination of the action to be taken, in accordance with circumstances and conditions."[45] Two days later this committee authorized the Government to act as it saw fit. In this way the Government was granted a free hand to begin negotiations with Germany without there having been an explicit Knesset decision to this effect.

The discussions with the Germans began on 21 March in Wassenaar, near The Hague. The participants were a delegation representing the government of Israel, a delegation representing the Jewish organizations

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43. See Vol. 6, Editorial Note, pp. 665–666.
44. Ibid., No. 84.
45. See *Divrei ha-Knesset*, First Session of the Second Knesset, Vol. X, meetings 38–40, pp. 895–964.

that constituted the Claims Commission, and a delegation on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany. Israel submitted a claim for $1.5 billion, basing itself on the expense of absorbing some 500,000 refugees from Germany and countries that had been under German occupation. One billion dollars of this amount was allocated as the responsibility of West Germany, and the balance as that of East Germany. The Jewish organizations did not demand a fixed sum, but stressed the expenses of absorbing and rehabilitating Jewish refugees and the need for Germany to continue and even expand its legislation dealing with individual claims. The atmosphere, cold and formal in the opening sessions, gradually changed and became practical and to the point. Soon, however, the negotiations ran into snags, as it became clear that the Germans wanted to link the question of reparations to the course and results of the German debts conference then convened in London, whose agenda included all of Germany's debts from before the Second World War, and that they gave the Jewish claim a status similar to that of the demands submitted by other countries at the London conference. Another point in dispute was the Germans' refusal to define a global amount for the reparations and to commit themselves to a payment schedule. After about two weeks of discussions, when it became clear that what had begun as a noble gesture on the part of Chancellor Adenauer had turned into bargaining accompanied by delaying tactics on the part of the Germans, the Israeli delegation suspended the talks.[46]

The hiatus in the negotiations gave the Israelis time to better evaluate the forces opposing them in Germany. It became clear that there were two defined camps in Germany. On one side stood the Chancellor and his staff, whose broad international perspective and moral outlook made them committed to the success of the talks; public support for this camp came almost exclusively from the ranks of the Social Democratic Party. They were opposed by the other members of the government, led by the financial and economic managers, who were worried about the heavy financial burden that Germany would have to bear as a result of financial commitments to the Jewish people and other creditors. Israel directed its efforts in a number of directions: pressure through the Western powers, influence in the public arena, chiefly through Social Democratic leaders, and direct work on Hermann Abs, the head of the German delegation to the London claims conference, who was considered to be the most stubborn opponent to a reparations agreement.[47] Although these actions bore fruit, there was still a need for direct intervention by Chancellor Adenauer before a binding agreement could be concluded. The general lines of the reparations agreement were sketched out in early June and the draft was approved by the two governments in early September. At the signing ceremony, held in

46. See Nos. 101 and 104.
47. See No. 122.

Luxembourg on 10 September, Israel was represented by Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, while Chancellor Adenauer signed on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany. The negotiations were done; what remained was merely the formal procedure of its ratification by the German parliament, as required by the German constitution. To Israel's distress this was delayed, *inter alia* by the Arab states' opposition; final ratification took place only in March 1953.

The course of the negotiations, the agreement,[48] and the reactions to it among the Israeli public and world Jewry require a balanced and cautious assessment.[49] From the pragmatic economic perspective, the agreement was a breakthrough and constituted a breath of life to the economy of the State of Israel, which in 1952 stood on the brink of the abyss. The total amount of the reparations, three billion German marks (around $715 million), was not far below the original demand for one billion dollars. The twelve-year payment schedule was a disappointment to Israel, but the possibility remained of shortening this period if Germany could obtain international credit. The form of the payments, in essential goods rather than luxury items, guaranteed that the agreement would be used for essential building and infrastructure needs. The clause that made it possible to purchase fuel in Great Britain against German sterling surpluses in the European Payments Union freed Israel from a pressing problem. Internationally, the agreement brought Israel closer to the West and paved the way for normalization of its relations with West Germany. From the Jewish perspective it consolidated the position of the State of Israel as the representative of all world Jewry. There was excellent cooperation with the delegation of the Conference of Jewish Organizations, and the decision that the reparations funds to be paid to the organizations (in the amount of 450 million marks) would be transmitted through the State of Israel, with a large proportion earmarked for investments in Israel, strengthened the position of Israel vis-à-vis the Diaspora. On the domestic front, the internal debate strengthened Israeli democracy. The stormy and even violent debate ended with a decision by the Knesset. Thereafter the negotiations were conducted by the authorized representatives of the government, without disruption, although Israeli public opinion was taken into account. After the negotiations were concluded the debate died down and the public accepted the government's statement that the reparations agreement did not mean forgetting or pardoning the crimes of the Nazi regime.

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48. The full text of the agreement was published in *Reshumot*, Treaties, III, No. 69, pp. 75–120.
49. Compare also Sharett's assessment, No. 345.

On 1 October 1952 a consultation was held at the Prime Minister's office, dealing with Israeli policy towards the Arab states in view of the changes that had taken place then in the Middle East and the prospects opened by the military coup in Egypt. The participants, in addition to the Prime Minister, were the Foreign Minister, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and senior Foreign Ministry officials dealing with Arab affairs. Similar consultations were a matter of routine and had been held at the Foreign Ministry for a number of years (and, even earlier, in the foreign relations department of the Jewish Agency). The arguments, rationales, and solutions raised at this meeting reflected the changing times, but there were no major innovations. The diffuse debate and the insistence on the need for peace with the Arabs and the efforts required to attain this led to decisive intervention by the Prime Minister. "There are limits to our desire for peace with the Arabs," he stated. "That is one of our most important interests, but not the foremost and *sine qua non*." Israel's priorities should be as follows: (1) its vital interests; (2) its relations with American Jewry and with the United States, home to these Jews; (3) and only third, peace with the Arabs. In fact, anyone who surveys Israel's history during 1952 will discover (and increasingly in the years that followed) that this scale of priorities underlay the Government's policy. During 1952—a year characterized by relative quiet along the borders—Israel was preoccupied chiefly by domestic matters, by stabilizing its economy, and by the reparations issue; later, it devoted most of its attention to relations with the United States and American Jewry, including financial assistance, the relations between the United Jewish Appeal and the Israel Bonds organization, and guaranteeing U.S. military assistance—and only after all of these did it have time for the issue of peace talks with the Arabs.[50]

Yehoshua Freundlich

50. See No. 395.

List of Documents, Editorial Notes and Main Subjects

11.	10 January	**M. Comay to A. Eban** The Suez Canal blockade.
12.	13 January	**D. Goitein to D. Acheson** President Weizmann's request from President Truman in the matter of the Iraqi death sentences.
13.	14 January	**M. Sharett to D. Goitein** (Telegram) Request for military aid from the United States.
14.	14 January	**A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram) Draft resolution on the Palestine Conciliation Commission report.
	15 January	**Editorial Note** Resolution of the Ad Hoc Political Committee concluding the debate on the Conciliation Commission's report.
15.	16 January	**A. Eban to P. Jessup** Cooperation with the American delegation to the UN to defeat hostile passages in the Ad Hoc Committee draft resolution.
16.	16 January	**Ch. Herzog to B. Gibli and the United States Division** (Telegram) Military aid from the United States.
	16 January	**Editorial Note** Debate on the Arab refugees in the Ad Hoc Political Committee
17.	17 January	**A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram) Assessment and prospects regarding UN resolutions on the Palestine Conciliation Commission report and the Arab refugees.
18.	18 January	**D. Goitein to A. Eban** (Telegram) Meeting with Hickerson of the State Department: American leadership to amend the UN resolution on the Palestine Conciliation Commission report.
19.	18 January	**A. Eban to E. Elath** (Telegram) Request for a British initiative to thwart hostile passages in the resolution on Arab refugees.
20.	18 January	**M. Comay to the Israel Embassy in Washington** (Telegram) American-British coordination in the Middle East; Egyptian cooperation with the Middle East Command.

145.	9 May	**M. Keren to M. Sharett** (Telegram) British pressure on Germany to expedite the reparations negotiations.
146.	[11 May]	**M. Sharett to A. Eban** The Suez Canal blockade.
147.	11 May	**M. Sharett to W. Eytan** Meeting with the Czechoslovak chargé d'affaires: Detention of M. Oren in Prague.
148.	12 May	**M. Comay to A. Eban** (Telegram) Oil supplies to Israel.
149.	12 May	**A. Eban to M. Sharett and the Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations** U.S. intervention in the reparations negotiations.
150.	13 May	**Agreement between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan** Local commanders' agreement to curb infiltration.
151.	13 May	**Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** (Telegram) Progress in the negotiations towards an Adenauer-Goldmann meeting.
152.	15 May	**A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram) Meeting with Hickerson: Release of refugees' blocked accounts.
153.	15 May	**J. M. Berncastle to W. Eytan** Compensation to Arab refugees.
154.	16 May	**Note from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Israel Legation in Prague** Detention of the Israeli citizens Oren and Orenstein.
155.	19 May	**A. Eban to Sh. Bendor** Transfer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem.
156.	19 May	**Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations to A. Eban** (Telegram) Advance knowledge about German suggestions to end the deadlock in the reparations negotiations.
157.	19 May	**Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations to A. Eban** (Telegram) Meeting with Abs: German suggestions to end the deadlock in the negotiations.
158.	19 May	**N. Goldmann to K. Adenauer** The reparations crisis.

200.	17 June	**A. Levavi to M. Fischer** The Middle East Command.
201.	17 June	**E. Elath to M. Comay** (Telegram) Israel-Britain relations.
202.	17 June	**M. Fischer to A. Eban** (Telegram) French activities against the transfer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem.
203.	18 June	**M. Sharett to W. Eytan** (Telegram) Sharett's meeting with Acheson: Economic aid to Israel.
204.	18 June	**N. Goldmann to D. Ben-Gurion** Administrative framework of the reparations agreement.
205.	19 June	**Meeting: A. Eban–H. Byroade** Economic and financial aid to Israel; Byroade's impressions of his Middle East tour.
206.	20 June	**W. Eytan to M. Fischer** (Telegram) French activity against the transfer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem.
207.	20 June	**M. Sharett to the United States Division** (Telegram) U.S. financial aid to Israel.
208.	21 June	**M. Sharett to the United States Division** (Telegram) Meeting with Byroade: Direct contacts between Israel and Syria, Israel's retaliatory activities.
209.	21 June	**M. Sharett to W. Eytan** (Telegram) Convening of a special session of the UN General Assembly to discuss the Tunisian issue.
210.	22 June	**Sh. Bendor to A. Eban** Diplomatic activities regarding the transfer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem.
211.	24 June	**G. Rafael to W. Eytan and M. Fischer** (Telegram) The Tunisian issue; transfer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem.
212.	25 June	**Ch. Herzog to A. Eban** U.S. military aid to Israel.
213.	25 June	**A. Eban to A. Lourie** (Telegram) The Suez Canal blockade.
214.	25 June	**M. Fischer to M. Sharett and A. Eban** (Telegram) The positions of France and the Vatican regarding Jerusalem.

358. 17 September **M. Comay to the Israel Embassy in Washington** (Telegram)
Discussion of the Jerusalem question at the UN General Assembly.

359. 18 September **A. Eban to the United States Division** (Telegram)
Israel's line in the forthcoming Palestine debate at the UN.

360. 18 September **G. Rafael to M. Comay** (Telegram)
Meeting with Johnson of the Canadian delegation to the UN: Removal of the Palestine item from the General Assembly agenda.

361. 18 September **A. Eban to the United States Division** (Telegram)
Abe Feinberg's meeting with President Truman: Military aid to Israel.

362. 18 September **Sh. Eliashiv to M. Sharett**
Demand for reparations from East Germany.

363. 19 September **Meeting: A. Eban–J. Hickerson**
Palestine items on the agenda of the UN General Assembly; Israel's candidacy for the vice-presidency of the General Assembly; dispatch of an Israeli contingent to South Korea.

364. 19 September **M. Comay to M. Sharett**
Syrian membership on the advisory committee of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees.

365. 21 September **Sh. Eliashiv to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** (Telegram)
Meeting with Shchiborin, deputy director of the department of Middle Eastern countries: Demand for reparations from East Germany, free passage through the Suez canal.

366. 22 September **Meetings: A. Eban–D. Acheson and H. Byroade**
Israel's peace initiative; relations with Arab states; military aid to Israel; compensation of Arab refugees; reparations agreement with Germany; financial aid to Israel.

367. 22 September **M. Sharett to A. Eban** (Telegram)
Contacts with Egypt.

368. 23 September **Israel Minister in London to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs**
British arms supplies to the Arab states.

369. 23 September **E. Elath to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** (Telegram)
Supply of jet aircraft to Israel and to Middle Eastern states.

425. 7 November **A. Eban to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
The Jerusalem question at the UN General Assembly.

426. 8 November **A. Eban to the United States Division** (Telegram)
Meeting with Byroade: Arms supplies to Israel and to the Arab states.

427. 9 November **W. Eytan to the Israel Embassies in Washington and London** (Telegram)
Arab efforts to obstruct the reparations agreement.

428. 10 November **A. Eban to the United States Division** (Telegram)
Feinberg and Jacobson's meeting with President Truman: Military and economic aid, U.S. support of the UN draft resolution on direct negotiations.

429. 10 November **W. Eytan to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations** (Telegram)
The Jerusalem question at the UN General Assembly.

430. 10 November **A. E. Levin to the United States Division** (Telegram)
Israel's request for economic aid in the forthcoming year.

431. 10 November **E. Elath to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Meeting with Bowker: Arms supplies to Israel and the Arab states.

432. 11 November **J. Bowker to E. Elath**
British arms supplies to Israel and the Arab states.

433. 12 November **W. Eytan to A. Eban and E. Elath** (Telegram)
Arab activity against the reparations agreement.

434. 12 November **E. Herlitz to the United States Division** (Telegram)
Arab activity against the reparation agreement.

435. 13 November **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Israel's position on the Korean crisis.

436. 13 November **Oral Message by the United States Ambassador in Israel**
U.S. reply to Israel's note on Arab rearmament.

437. 13 November **Agreement between Jordan and Israel**
Agreement to reduce and solve incidents along the Israel-Jordan border.

438. 13 November **A. Aroch to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** (Telegram)
Israel's demand for reparations from East Germany.

439. 14 November **United States Division to the Israel Embassy in Washington** (Telegram)
Meeting with the U.S. ambassador: Draft resolution on direct negotiations, Israel-Egypt relations, Jerusalem issue, military aid to Israel.

440. 14 November **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
British policy of arms supplies to the Middle East.

441. 15 November **A. Eban to the United States Division and E. Elath** (Telegram)
Unsatisfactory U.S. and British positions on arms supplies to the Middle East.

442. 15 November **E. Elath to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Arab pressure to prevent conclusion of the reparations agreement.

443. 15 November **Sh. Divon to R. Shiloah** (Telegram)
Israel-Egypt contacts.

444. 16 November **Sh. Bendor to W. Eytan**
The Suez Canal blockade.

445. 18 November **A. Eban to the Unites States Division** (Telegram)
Assessment of Naguib's policy.

446. 19 November **G. Rafael to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Meeting with the U.S. delegation to the UN on strategy in the forthcoming Palestine debate at the UN.

447. 19 November **A. Eban to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Rounding up sponsors for the direct-negotiations resolution at the UN.

448. 19 November **A. Eban to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Meeting with Byroade: Compensation to Arab refugees.

449. 20 November **British Commonwealth Division to the Israel Embassy in Washington** (Telegram)
Britain's decision to sell jet aircraft to Egypt.

450. 20 November **G. Rafael to R. Shiloah**
Palestine issue at the General Assembly.

451. 20 November **E. Sasson to R. Shiloah**
Extremism of Naguib's regime in Egypt.

452. 21 November **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Israel's initiative to pass a resolution calling for direct negotiations with the Arab states.

453. 21 November **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Eban's meeting with Byroade: Compensation to Arab refugees.

468. 25 November **E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Indirect contact with the Egyptian ambassador in London: Egyptian conditions for an agreement with Israel.

469. 25 November **M. Sharett to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations** (Telegram)
Request that Eban condemn the Prague trial at the General Assembly.

470. 27 November **Y. Tekoah to M. Sharett**
Next stage of Israel-Syria negotiations.

471. 30 November **United States Division to the Israel Embassy in Washington** (Telegram)
Sharett's meeting with U.S. ambassador Davis: Arms supplies, Jordan's Yarmuk River project.

472. 30 November **W. Eytan to the Israel Missions Abroad**
Relations with German diplomats abroad.

473. 2 December **M. Sharett to the Israel Embassy in London** (Telegram)
Meeting with Ross, director of the Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office: Supply of jet aircraft to the Middle East.

474. 3 December **A. Eban to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Passage through the Suez Canal of a Norwegian ship bound for Israel.

475. 3 December **G. Rafael to A. Eban**
Meeting with Mahmud 'Azmi: Naguib's standing in the U.S., Naguib's efforts against the reparations agreement.

476. 3 December **W. Eytan to K. P. S. Menon**
Israel-India relations.

477. 4 December **Sh. Eliashiv to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** (Telegram)
Position of the Soviet delegation at the UN on the Palestine matter.

4 December **Editorial Note**
Announcement by the Government of Israel on the release of blocked accounts of Arab refugees.

478. 4 December **M. Sharett to N. Goldmann** (Telegram)
Arab opposition to the reparations agreement.

479. 4 December **N. Goldmann to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Arab opposition to the reparations agreement.

LIST OF ARCHIVES AND ABBREVIATIONS IN REFERENCES

Israel State Archives

43. *Record Group: Prime Minister Office, Prime Minister's bureau*

93. *Record Group: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Missions Abroad*

93.01	Coded telegrams
93.02	Paris
93.03	New York
93.04	London
93.08	Washington

130. *Record Group: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head Office*

130.02	Office of the Minister and the Director-General
130.09	Coded telegrams
130.10	West European Division
130.11	East European Division
130.13	British Commonwealth Division
130.15	Middle East Division
130.16	Armistice Affairs Division
130.20	United States Division

Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives (Abbreviated reference: IMDEA)

Public Record Office (Abbreviated reference: PRO)

FO371 *Foreign Office, General Correspondence, Political*

Abbreviations in Editorial Headings and References

Inc.	Incoming text
Orig.	Original
Outg.	Outgoing text
Recd.	Received
Tel.	Telegram

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS IN REFERENCES

Note: The list includes only books and publications mentioned in the annotations.

A. General

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A. Shalev, *Cooperation under the Shadow of Conflict: The Israeli-Syrian Armistice Regime 1949–1955*, Tel Aviv 1989 [Hebrew].

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B. United Nations Publications

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United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Records of Meetings*, November [1951] to February 1952, Paris (Abbreviated reference: *GAOR, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*)

United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Records of Meetings*, 19 October 1952–28 August 1953, New York (Abbreviated reference: *GAOR, Seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*)

United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, First Committee, Political and Security Questions ... Summary Records of Meetings*, 17 October [1952] to 27 August [1953], New York (Abbreviated reference: *GAOR, Seventh Session, First Committee*)

United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Summary Records*, 14 October to 19 December 1952, New York (Abbreviated references: *GAOR, Seventh Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee*)

NOTES
AND SUMMARIES OF
HEBREW DOCUMENTS

All summaries of Hebrew documents and all notes are arranged chronologically, i.e., according to the numbers of the documents in the Main Volume. The notes are translated in full, even those pertaining to passages that are omitted in the summaries; in this case, the call numbers to notes are also omitted in the summaries.

Editorial headings of Hebrew documents are reproduced in full, while headings to translations of notes to documents in English or French are given in a shortened version. Where no notes are appended, the English and French documents are represented by headings only. Editorial Notes appear in the same order as in the Main Volume, preceding the relevant document.

Editorial Note

The Palestine Issue in the Sixth Session of the UN *General Assembly*

The Sixth United Nations General Assembly convened in Paris on 6 November 1951 and continued, following the Christmas and New Year's recess, until 5 February 1952. During the first part of the session Israel's delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett. The session, which was dominated by the East-West conflict and the Cold War, dealt mainly with the global issues on the international agenda, such as the question of Chinese representation at the United Nations, the Korean War, and disarmament.

Matters relating to Palestine were discussed during the latter part of the session. On the agenda were the reports of the Conciliation Commission and of UNRWA. These were discussed in the Ad Hoc Political Committee and led to two resolutions passed by the Assembly plenum on 26 January. See Editorial Notes, pp. 17–19, 20, and 26–27.

1. Memorandum by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 2 January 1952

Information to Israel Missions Abroad: 130.02/2404/11

Sharett[1] outlines the major tasks and problems facing the Israel delegation in preparation for the second part of the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly. He bases himself upon a list of principles he had set forth in a document dated 10 December 1951[2] and upon the conclusions he had drawn from conversations with the British and U.S. delegations to the General Assembly as well as talks between Israel Embassy personnel in Washington and State Department officials.

The main assignment of the Israeli representatives is to persuade other delegations and UN agencies of the need to terminate the work of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. Although Israel does believe that the United Nations has important and beneficial roles to play in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as dealing with the problem of the Arab refugees, relations between the Arab states and Israel are a matter involving sovereign states, and as such best dealt with through direct negotiation. Thus far the Conciliation Commission has merely provided the Arab states with an excuse to refrain from taking practical steps towards the normalization of relations, and the Commission's annual report, together with the ensuing UN debates, have only opened the way for verbal sparring at the UN. This argument has been accepted in principle by the delegates with whom Israeli representatives have spoken; they agree that significant modifications should be made in the Commission's terms of reference, but without prejudicing its continued existence.

After several conversations it became clear to the Israelis that their interlocutors were not to be budged on this matter, so that it is preferable to accept the continued existence of the Conciliation Commission, providing it is reformed. Israel's retreat from its earlier position is dictated by the circumstances. Furthermore, Israel itself has always assumed that should peace negotiations get under way some United Nations agency would be needed to help mediate and deal with concrete problems that might arise between the parties, especially should negotiations on compensation of the Arab refugees ensue.[3]

When it became clear that the existence of a mediating body was inevitable, Israel suggested that it be an absolutely new organ with a different name, composition, and authority. It should be known as the "Good Offices Committee," authorized only to respond to requests from the parties involved for assistance in negotiations on a peace agreement and compensation. It should be relieved of the obligation to submit an annual report to the General Assembly, as this had caused internal tension in the past and spurred it to take action solely for the record. As to the body's composition, Israel's objective is to replace Turkey with Great Britain or, alternatively, add Britain to the three current members. These suggestions, too, did not meet with an avid response, primarily due to fear of upsetting the *status quo*.[5]

In light of the above, it is all but certain that the draft resolution that will be submitted, with the endorsement of the United States, will call for maintaining the Conciliation Commission—at least outwardly—but with the following changes: its offices would be transferred to United Nations headquarters in New York; the Commission would not be composed of special representatives, but rather of the permanent UN delegates of the member states; and the Commission would be obliged to act as mediator only if one or both parties so request.

A second matter that arose in the discussions was the Arab refugees. From conversations with John Blandford, director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), it was understood that the Agency will limit its activities to supplying the refugees' physical needs in their places of residence and will avoid serving as an instrument for negotiations with Israel about compensation or repatriation. These topics will remain within the purview of the Conciliation Commission, although it is not clear precisely how the Commission will address them; it may establish a special committee for this purpose, or let the existing Refugee Office headed by Andersen[8] deal with them.

On this issue, Israel made a far-reaching concession by stating that it is ready to discuss immediately compensation for abandoned property, with no linkage to the totality of outstanding problems with the Arab states and without making such compensation conditional on the conclusion of a final and comprehensive peace accord with its Arab neighbors.[9] This shift in policy has significantly reduced the pressure on Israel regarding the issue without obliging it to take any immediate action, since Israel has stated that it cannot bear this burden without outside assistance and the United States has no present intention of assuming any additional commitment.

In this matter, the Americans made two requests of Israel: to release refugees' blocked accounts in Israel, and to absolve UNRWA of responsibility for the 21,000 Arabs living in Israel and currently receiving United Nations aid. Sharett notes that on the question of the blocked accounts Israel must be flexible and augment the concessions already made in 1950,[10] although it must insist upon its right to deduct from the blocked accounts the amount that the Jews of Iraq left behind in a similar situation. As for the absorption of refugees living within its borders, Israel has stated that it is ready to assume the financial burden involved.

Repatriation is one of the matters left open. Israel made prodigious efforts to explain its opposition in principle to the wholesale repatriation of the Arab refugees. During the talks it repeatedly raised all the familiar rationales[11] and stressed a new reason as well: the change in the composition of Israel's population due to the immigration from Arab countries. These new immigrants have fled from Arab countries, and it would be undesirable to create a new focus of tension by renewed contact between these two antagonistic groups. At the same time, Israel reiterated that it would continue to deal with the problem of individual refugees who wished to return.

The British and the American responses on the repatriation issue were encouraging. The British agreed that the subject should be shelved for the moment. The Americans, too, agreed that repatriation should not be stressed; however, they cannot ensure that this issue will disappear from United Nations debates during the current General Assembly. Their intention is that the draft resolution refer to the resolutions passed by the

United Nations in previous years, without explicitly reconfirming them. In this way, they will fulfill their obligation towards the supporters of repatriation. Sharett notes that it is not unreasonable to assume that at the crucial moment the Americans will try to persuade Israel that explicit mention of repatriation is inevitable; Israel can expect another difficult campaign on the matter.

In summary, Sharett notes that all of the above reflects conversations held and conclusions reached before the Arabs embarked on significant activity at the United Nations. Thus far they have not taken any special initiatives on the Palestine question, being absorbed in internal affairs and the problems of Egypt, Morocco, and Libya. Arab pressure, if exerted, is liable to bear some fruit. Sharett adds that the Americans will not act directly on the floor of the General Assembly; rather, they will ask delegations that are not involved in the dispute to submit the draft resolutions. This means that changes in wording and emphases are to be expected, although not to a major extent.

Notes

1. Moshe Sharett, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2. The document is in file 130.02/2424/24.
3. On Israel's activities towards ending the work of the Conciliation Commission see the conversation between Sharett and the Secretary-General on 27 November 1951 (Vol. 6, No. 509).
4. John Bennett Blandford, director of UNRWA.
5. See Vol. 6, Nos. 527 and 531.
6. See Vol. 6, No. 531.
7. Edwin A. Locke, special representative of the U.S. Secretary of State for coordination of economic and technical assistance in the Near East and U.S. representative on the Advisory Commission of UNRWA.
8. Holger Andersen, director of the Refugee Office of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
9. See Vol. 6, No. 509, paragraph 4; ibid., Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 324–26.
10. On this issue see Vol. 5, No. 52, and n. 8 there.
11. See the Guidelines to Israel Missions Abroad, by Moshe Sharett, No. 18, 26 October 1951, 93.03/3061/7.

2. Note for the Record in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 January 1952

130.02/2453/3

Outline of Israel's Response to Tawfiq Abu al-Huda[1] (to be relayed orally through Ahmed Touqan)

Israel welcomes the desire of the Jordanians to continue direct contacts for the benefit of both sides.

Israel expresses its satisfaction with Jordan's announcement that the death of King Abdallah has not altered Jordan's policy towards Israel.

The Government of Israel notes with satisfaction the decision of Jordan to continue opposing the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Government of Israel wishes to make clear that any change in the Jordanian position on this subject will oblige Israel to reconsider its current opposition to the internationalization of both sectors of the city.

Merger of Jordan and Iraq: The Government of Israel calls the attention of the Jordanians to the continued existence of pro-Iraqi sentiment in Jordan. Israel expects the Government of Jordan to act against these irresponsible elements.

Territorial exchanges in the Qalqiliya area: Israel is willing to demonstrate good will in this matter, on condition that the Jordanians consent to solve other problems that are vital to Israel. In this context, Israel wishes to be apprised of the Jordanian position on the implementation of Article 8 of the Armistice Agreement.[2]

Notes

1. On 28 December, Moshe Sasson, an official in the Middle East Division of the Foreign Ministry, met with Ahmed Bey Touqan, the Jordanian representative on the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission. Touqan sought to inform Israel, on behalf of the Jordanian prime minister, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, of the following: (1) The death of 'Abdallah and accession of Talal had not changed Jordanian policy towards Israel in any regard, and in particular with regard to observance of the armistice agreement. (2) Jordan continues to oppose the internationalization of Jerusalem. (3) Jordan is opposed to union with Iraq. Another matter raised in the conversation was the possibility of a territorial exchange between Jordan and Israel, as part of which the agricultural lands of Qalqiliya would be returned to their owners. For the full conversation, see Vol. 6, No. 536.
2. Article 8 of the Israel-Jordan armistice agreement deals with the establishment of a special committee, comprising representatives from each side, to draft, expand, and improve the armistice arrangements on those matters that had remained the subject of disagreement, including, *inter alia*, freedom of access to the holy places.
3. See No. 8.

Editorial Note

Negotiations on Reparations from Germany

On 27 September 1951, the West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, informed the Bundestag that the German government was prepared to

begin negotiations with representatives of the Jewish people and the Government of Israel on the payment of compensation to the victims of the Nazis. In the wake of this declaration, a public debate broke out in Israel and the Jewish world concerning the very demand for reparations and the means and method for conducting the negotiations. At the end of October, 1951, the Conference of Jewish Material Claims against Germany convened in New York to discuss the form of the negotiations with the Germans and how to coordinate Israel's claims with those of world Jewry. The conference decided, as a matter of principle, to accord priority to the claims of the State of Israel and appointed from its ranks an Executive Committee to monitor developments in the negotiations. In November-December of 1951 there were a number of unofficial contacts between this Executive Committee and German officials, aimed at arranging a preliminary meeting or meetings to determine the framework for the negotiations. At the beginning of December, Nahum Goldmann, chairman of the Conference of Jewish Material Claims against Germany, met with Chancellor Adenauer. At the end of the meeting the Chancellor sent a letter inviting the Claims Conference and the Government of Israel to negotiate an agreement with Germany. During the course of these unofficial contacts Goldmann expressed his fears about the expected public reaction in Israel and was concerned at the Israel Government's procrastination in deciding upon its official position on contacts with Germany. The Knesset was scheduled to debate the issue of negotiations with Germany on 9 January 1952. See Vol. 6, Nos. 500, 515, and 518, and No. 10 below.

3. N. Goldmann (New York) to M. Sharett. 3 January 1952

Notes

1. Nahum Goldmann, chairman of the American section of the Jewish Agency Executive, and chairman of the Conference of Jewish Material Claims against Germany.
2. The Conference of Jewish Material Claims against Germany.
3. Konrad Adenauer, chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.
4. David Horowitz, director-general of the Ministry of Finance.
5. Simon H. Rifkind, Jewish jurist, formerly advisor on Jewish affairs to Gen. Eisenhower (1945–1946); deputy commissioner of the New York Police Department, 1951–1952.
6. Sharett responded that the Knesset debate would take place in the near future; the Prime Minister would lead off, and he himself would speak during the debate or at its end. There was great anxiety among his colleagues, but he himself was confident that a majority would be obtained. The resolution to be submitted to the Knesset by the coalition would not request approval of direct negotiations, but would authorize the Government to pursue the matter as it saw fit. He asked for Goldmann's comments and advice, especially concerning the idea of preliminary meetings with Adenauer.

(See telegram from Sharett to the Israel Legation in London, 346, 3 January 1952, 130.09/2318/9.) See also No. 9 below.

4. M. Shalit [Washington] to R. Shiloah. 3 January 1952

Notes

1. Meir (Memi) Shalit, first secretary at the Israel Embassy in Washington.
2. Reuven Shiloah, Advisor on Special Affairs in the Foreign Ministry and the permanent liaison between the Foreign Ministry and the IDF General Staff.
3. Shiloah reported on the arrest and trial of Zionist activists in Iraq, including Yosef Basri and Shalom Sallah Shalom. (See Vol. 6, No. 534.) As was reported in London, their death sentences were still pending before the Court of Appeals. He requested details on the application by Israeli representatives to the State Department. (See Shiloah to Shalit, 1 January 1952, 93.01/2208/1.)
4. 'Abd al-Ilah, the Iraqi regent.
5. David Goitein, Israel minister in Washington.
6. See No. 7 below.

Editorial Note

The Draft Resolution on the Conciliation Commission Report

On 7 January, the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the UN General Assembly began its debate on the report of the Conciliation Commission. Before the Committee was a draft resolution submitted by the three members of the Conciliation Commission — the United States, Turkey, and France — supported also by Great Britain. The draft resolution expressed regret that the Commission had been unable to reconcile the parties and called on them to continue their efforts to reach an agreement and to rely on the Commission to that end. The Soviet Union, for its part, submitted a draft resolution that called for the discontinuation of the Conciliation Commission, since it had failed to fulfil its task. Israel submitted its own draft; it too called for discontinuing the Commission, but proposed the establishment in its place of a "good offices committee" with an identical membership. This committee would be based at UN headquarters in New York and would be available to help the parties, at their request, resolve the pending problems between them. The text of the original draft resolution submitted by the members of the Conciliation Commission follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194(III) of 11 December 1948 and 394(V) of 14 December 1950,

Having examined the report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/1985),

Noting that agreement has not been reached between the parties on the final settlement of outstanding questions,

Recognizing that in the interests of the peace and stability of the Near East efforts to achieve such a final settlement should be continued,

Considering that the governments concerned have the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences,

1. *Urges* the governments concerned to seek agreement with a view to an early settlement of their outstanding differences in a spirit of justice and realism and on the basis of mutual concessions; and for this purpose to make full use of United Nations facilities;

2. *Expresses* its appreciation to the Conciliation Commission for Palestine for its efforts to assist the parties to reach agreement on their outstanding differences;

3. *Notes* with regret that, as stated in paragraph 87 of the report, the Commission has been unable to fulfil its mandate;

4. *Considers* nevertheless that, in the light of paragraph 86 of the report the Conciliation Commission for Palestine should continue to be available to the parties to assist them in reaching agreement on outstanding questions;

5. *Authorizes* the Conciliation Commission for Palestine in its discretion to designate a representative or representatives to assist it in carrying out its functions;

6. *Decides* that the headquarters of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine should be transferred to the Headquarters of the United Nations, a representative of the Commission being maintained in Jerusalem;

7. *Requests* the Conciliation Commission for Palestine to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities for carrying out the terms of the present resolution.

(See UN Document A/AC.53/L.22, 5 January 1952.)

5. A. Lourie [Paris] to M. Sharett. 5 January 1952

Notes

1. Arthur Lourie, Israel Consul-General in New York, Deputy Permanent Representative at the United Nations, and a member of the Israel delegation to the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
2. Gideon Rafael, member of the Israel delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly.

3. Trygve Lie, UN Secretary-General.
4. Philip C. Jessup, a member of the U.S. delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly.
5. James W. Barco, alternate representative of the United States on the Palestine Conciliation Commission; advisor to the U.S. delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly.
6. See the preceding Editorial Note.
7. Pablo de Azcárate, principal secretary of the Conciliation Commission.
8. See above, No. 1.
9. Paragraph 86 of the Conciliation Commission Report states that all efforts made to resolve the Palestine problem should be based on the principles submitted by the Commission to the parties at the meeting in Paris in 1951.

6. Meeting: M. Sharett–A. Vyshinsky (Paris, 22 December 1951, document dated 6 January 1952)

Report: 130.13/2549/1

The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy in Paris, where Vyshinsky was staying during the General Assembly session. Sharett was accompanied by David Hacohen; Vyshinsky was alone. Sharett immediately got down to business and asked when the U.S.S.R. would open its gates to permit emigration to Israel. Sharett spoke at length about the meaning of *aliya* for Israel; Vyshinsky made sure to note down the angry expression on his face. When Sharett finished, Vyshinsky replied that the Soviet Union is not hostile to Israel, and the proof is its support for the establishment of the State of Israel. In the future, too, Israel can count on its support; the problem is that Israel is making matters difficult for his country by adopting a one-sided foreign policy, whereas it is well known that international relations are based on reciprocity. Only yesterday Israel supported the U.S. in the vote on the Mutual Security Act, which is a blatant anti-Soviet action. Why couldn't Israel have abstained, at the very least?[4] Hence Israel has no right to make demands. It is true that there have been conversations with him in the past about the emigration of relatives, and he has been unable to deal with the issue, due to illness; but when he returns home now he will attend to the matter. He asks, however, that it be recalled that these are isolated cases, on humanitarian grounds. As for substantial numbers of emigrants—there is nothing to talk about. The Soviet government will not permit mass emigration; nor is there any Jewish problem in his country, whose Jews enjoy full rights and freedoms.

After Vyshinsky had spoken, with unmistakable tension, Sharett responded. He explained that Israel had had no choice but to vote against the Soviet-sponsored resolution condemning the U.S. Mutual Security Act, because Israel is among the beneficiaries of that law. U.S. financial assistance

is vital for Israel, and help by American Jewry, too, depends on the American government's good will towards Israel. Israel is strongly interested in maintaining a balance in its international relations, but the Soviet Union is not making this any easier for it. The U.S. has an important card to play in this respect, namely, the free contacts between American Jews and Israel, whereas the Soviet Union, which also has a large Jewish community, makes such contacts difficult, does not permit emigration, and erects obstacles to reciprocal tourism. A discussion ensued as to the status of the Jews in the Soviet Union as an ethnic group, including the attempt at settlement in Birobidzhan. The conversation then returned to the issue of *aliya*, with each side holding fast to its position. The leave-taking was cordial, and Vyshinsky even had a broad smile on his face.

Notes

1. Andrei Vyshinsky, Soviet foreign minister and head of the U.S.S.R. delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly.
2. David Hacohen, member of Knesset (Mapai) and member of the Israel delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly.
3. See Vol. 6, No. 383.
4. Vyshinsky's remarks refer to Israel's vote against the Soviet motion in the First Committee of the General Assembly to condemn the American Mutual Security Act, which allocated $100 million for aid to refugees from the Soviet zone, for activities in this area, and for supporting persons resident in the zone.
5. See Vol. 5, No. 443.
6. Lazar Kaganovich, deputy prime minister of the Soviet Union.
7. This paragraph was added by Sharett as a marginal note after the report was written. The letter to Vyshinsky mentioned in it has not been traced in the Foreign Ministry files.
8. Yakov Malik, joint deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union and the U.S.S.R. Permanent Representative at the United Nations.
9. Arkadi Sobolev, Soviet ambassador to Poland, member of the U.S.S.R. delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly.
10. See also No. 40 below.

7. M. Shalit [Washington] to A. Eban (Paris). 7 January 1952

Notes

1. Abba Eban, Israel Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative at the United Nations.
2. See No. 4 above.
3. William O. Douglas, associate justice of the United States Supreme Court.
4. Shmuel Eliashiv, Israel Minister to the Soviet Union.

5. Shmuel Bendor, head of the United States Division in the Foreign Ministry.
6. Eleanor Roosevelt, member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations and its representative on the Human Rights Committee.
7. Ralph Bunche, head of the Trusteeship Department in the UN Secretariat.
8. Lieut. Gen. William E. Riley, chief of staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Force in Palestine and chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commissions.
9. Samuel Klaus, an advisor in the U.S. State Department.
10. Emir Zaid ibn al-Hussain, Iraqi ambassador in London.
11. The changes were not implemented and the regent, 'Abd al-Ilah, remained in power until 1953.
12. Burton Y. Berry, U.S. acting assistant secretary of state.
13. See below, No. 12.

8. Report by M. Sasson. 8 January 1952

130.02/2453/3

Sasson reports on his meeting with Ahmed Touqan, at which he conveyed Israel's reply (document 2) to the démarche by the Prime Minister of Jordan, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda. Touqan recorded the precise wording of the answers and promised a response within a week. In the interim, Touqan wished to present his personal opinion on several of the issues touched upon in Israel's response:

(1) With regard to the contacts themselves, Touqan believes that Abu al-Huda desires no more than to keep open a second, diplomatic line of communication in addition to the existing channel of the Armistice Commission, which is of an essentially military nature. This will allow the sides to discuss and explore, in a cordial and unofficial manner, various proposals for the solution of outstanding issues.

(2) Continuing the policies of King Abdallah: Touqan commented that Abu al-Huda may indeed have the same objectives as the late king; he assumes, however, that al-Huda will employ different ways and means to achieve them. Al-Huda may seek to reconvene the Special Committee empowered by Article 8 of the Armistice Agreement. This assessment also relates to Israel's question about Jordan's position on implementation of Article 8. Touqan believes that if Jordan and Israel adopt a gradual, step-by-step approach to solving the problems the chances of success are good. As an example, he cited the idea of partitioning the no-man's-land at Latrun, which would benefit both sides, and mentioned the blocked accounts of the refugees. He also expressed his opinion that it might even be possible to resume operation of the Naharayim power plant.

Sasson expressed his pleasure with Touqan's broad grasp of the issues in dispute; all the same, Israel would like to receive an authoritative response from Prime Minister al-Huda himself. Sasson's general impression is that

Touqan is favorably disposed and interested in cooperation, but is inexperienced and fails to appreciate the complexity of the problems he raised. However, should the response of the Jordanian Prime Minister be similar to Touqan's, it will be necessary to revive the Special Committee and begin discussions about Latrun.

Notes

1. See above, No. 2.
2. Rav-Aluf Yigael Yadin, Chief of the General Staff.
3. Segan-Aluf Shaul Ramati, General Staff officer in charge of Israel delegations to the Mixed Armistice Commissions and senior Israeli representative on the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission.
4. See above, No. 2, n. 2.
5. See above, No. 1.
6. The hydroelectric station on the Yarmuk and Jordan rivers, near Naharayim.
7. Col. Bennett de Ridder, deputy and acting chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine.
8. On 14 January, Israel received the response of Jordanian Prime Minister Abu al-Huda. Abu al-Huda expressed his appreciation of Israel's reply but wished to note the following:
(a) With regard to Jerusalem he reiterates and confirms the decision of the Jordanian government to oppose internationalization of the city.
(b) Jordan is firmly resolved to fight against those circles demanding union with Iraq.
(c) With regard to the implementation of paragraph 8, Jordan has appointed its representatives to the Special Committee and has full confidence in them. Jordan has authorized them to renew meetings with Israeli representatives and hopes that these meetings will lead to a solution of the pending problems.
Moshe Sasson, who received the response, reacted with disappointment to the lack of specificity with regard to implementation of paragraph 8 and noted that Israel had absolutely no inclination to renew the sessions of the Special Committee without some minimal guarantees that its work would be crowned with success. (See Moshe Sasson to the Foreign Minister's Bureau, 21 January 1952, 130.02/2408/13.)

9. A. Lourie [Paris] to M. Sharett. 9 January 1952

Notes

1. Lourie reported by telegram on the debate in the Ad Hoc Political Committee concerning the report of the Conciliation Commission (see Editorial Note, pp. 9–10). In light of the Arabs' intention to submit amendments to the four powers' draft resolution and also perhaps to propose a substitute resolution, Israel had informed the United States of its intention to submit its own draft, whose main point is the discontinuation of the Conciliation Commission and its replacement by a "good offices"

committee. (See telegram to Sharett, 8 January 1952, 93.02/182/11.) See also Editorial Note, pp. 17–19.

2. See above, No. 1.
3. The Division for International Organizations. See Lourie's telegram, PNU334, 9 January 1952, 130.02/2404/11.
4. In his reply, Sharett referred chiefly to the matter of the blocked accounts. He argued that he would find it difficult to defend a unilateral concession on this matter in the Government and to the general public; it would be better for Israel to hold onto this bargaining chip for the future. Alternatively, it could demand in return a favorable resolution on the Conciliation Commission, whereby the Commission would be empowered to act only at the initiative of the parties and would not maintain a permanent representative in Jerusalem. As for the Soviet draft resolution, Sharett had instructed the delegation to abstain. (See his telegram, TP379, 13 January 1952, 130.09/2345/1.)

10. N. Goldmann [New York] to M. Sharett. 9 January 1952

Notes

1. On 9 January, the Knesset conducted a comprehensive debate on the reparations issue. The Prime Minister presented the Government's decision and stressed that the State of Israel had to return to the Jewish people most of the property that had been stolen in order to assist the absorption and rehabilitation of the survivors. The debate, which took place in the midst of a storm of emotions both inside the Knesset and without, was summed up by a motion that authorized the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee to make a final determination of how to act in the matter of the demand for reparations from Germany, "in accordance with circumstances and conditions." Several days later the Committee delegated this authority to the Government, giving the latter full freedom of action with regard to negotiations with Germany.
2. Sharett responded that the decision of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the Knesset was a foregone conclusion; it would authorize the Government to continue negotiations. The advantages of a preliminary meeting with Adenauer were clear to him, but he wanted to consult his colleagues on this matter. The date proposed by Goldmann for the official opening of the negotiations, the end of February, seemed too far off to him; one should strike while the iron was still hot. (See telegram Y231, 10 January 1952, 93.01/2204/1.)

11. M. Comay [Tel Aviv] to A. Eban (Paris). 10 January 1952

Notes

1. Michael Comay, head of the British Commonwealth Division in the Foreign Ministry.

2. The question of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal for ships en route to Israel was on the agenda of the Security Council in the summer of 1951. On 1 September of that year the Security Council passed a resolution calling upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound.
3. Walter Eytan, director-general of the Foreign Ministry.
4. At that time Egypt was engaged in a confrontation with Great Britain concerning the future and status of the British forces based in the Canal Zone, and was experiencing a cabinet crisis whose background was also control of the Canal Zone. At the end of January, the king dismissed Prime Minister Mustafa Nahas, of the Wafd Party, and asked 'Ali Māhir to form a new government.
5. Eliahu Elath, Israel Minister to Great Britain.
6. Maurice Fischer, Israel Minister to France.
7. See below, No. 26.

12. D. Goitein [Washington] to D. Acheson (Washington). 13 January 1952

Notes

1. Dean Acheson, U.S. Secretary of State.
2. Chaim Weizmann, President of Israel.
3. Harry S Truman, President of the United States.
4. See above, Nos. 4 and 7. This letter was sent after intensive efforts during the preceding days, including the dispatch of a letter to the president of the UN General Assembly, aimed at having the sentences commuted. (See A. Eban to L. Padilla Nervo, President of the General Assembly, 10 January 1952, 130.02/2387/5.)
5. When this letter was delivered at the State Department, the Israeli representatives were told that State Department officials had met informally with the Iraqi deputy foreign minister and asked him to recommend that the regent not confirm the death sentences. The State Department also requested that President Weizmann's letter not be made public (see M. Shalit to R. Shiloah, W766, 14 January 1952, 93.01/2208/2). See also below, No. 22.

13. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to D. Goitein (Washington). 14 January 1952

Notes

1. Goitein had sent a telegram concerning military assistance and the arms purchase from the United States. With regard to the latter, the procedures are simple and there is no need for any special action, such as sending a delegation. With regard to the supply of arms in accordance with the Mutual Security Act, the procedure is extremely complicated and requires an application to the State Department and the

dispatch of an American survey mission to Israel to determine its needs. He proposed beginning negotiations for arms purchases immediately, even on a small scale, in order to establish the principle of reimbursable military aid. As for military assistance, action should be accelerated; an immediate application should be made to the State Department with a general request for aid, with the details to be submitted at a later date. (Telegram WPT37, 8 January 1952, 93.01/2208/2.)

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 was passed by Congress on 31 October 1951. Three sections of the Act were relevant for Israel: Section 202 allocated some $40 million to Near Eastern states (except for Turkey, Greece, and Iran, which received special allocations) for military assistance; the decision whether to implement this allocation, and in what proportions, was left to the President. Section 203 authorized the President to extend economic and technical assistance to the Near East and Africa; about $15 million was allocated for Israel. Section 205 granted Israel $50 million to aid in immigrant absorption.

2. See below, No. 16.

14. A. Eban (Paris) to M. Sharett. 14 January 1952

Notes

1. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 9–10.
3. Goitein answered that in the absence of Hickerson, who was ill, he had met with one of the senior officials in his department, David Popper. Popper explained that the United States was working to pass the Afghan amendments in order to avoid defeat of the entire resolution and passage of the draft resolution submitted by Colombia or Pakistan, which was much worse. (See telegram WP130, 15 January 1952, 93.01/2208/2.)
4. See the Editorial Note that follows; see also No. 18 below.

Editorial Note

Resolution of the Ad Hoc Political Committee Concluding the Debate on the Conciliation Commission's Report

On 15 January, the Ad Hoc Political Committee wound up its discussion of the Conciliation Commission's report. In the voting, the draft resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union, by Israel, and by Pakistan were rejected and several amendments initiated by Colombia and Afghanistan, of which the most important aspects were a reference to previous General Assembly resolutions on Palestine and an increase in the membership of the Conciliation Commission to seven, were approved. Finally, the resolution based on the original draft submitted by the Four Powers (see Editorial Note, pp. 9–10 above), as amended, was passed. The text follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling all the resolutions adopted at previous sessions of the General Assembly on the Palestine problem,

Having examined the progress report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/1985),

1. *Expresses* its appreciation to the Conciliation Commission for Palestine for its efforts to assist the parties to reach agreement on their outstanding differences;
2. *Notes* with regret that, as stated in paragraph 87 of the report, the Commission has been unable to fulfil its mandate and that the above-mentioned resolutions have not yet been implemented, in particular with regard to the repatriation of refugees wishing to return to their homes and also with regard to the just and equitable evaluation of and compensation for the properties of those not wishing to return;
3. *Considers* that the governments concerned have the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine;
4. *Urges* the governments concerned strictly to observe the resolutions of the General Assembly and to seek agreement with a view to an early settlement of their outstanding differences in a spirit of justice; and for this purpose to make full use of United Nations facilities;
5. *Considers* that the Conciliation Commission for Palestine should continue its efforts to secure the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine and accordingly should be available to the parties to assist them in reaching agreement on outstanding questions;
6. *Decides* that the Conciliation Commission shall consist of seven members; the four additional members shall be designated by the General Assembly before the end of the present session;
7. *Requests* the Conciliation Commission for Palestine to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General; for transmission to the Members of the United Nations;
8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities for carrying out the terms of the present resolution.

Voting for the resolution were the Arab and Asian countries and most Latin American countries, along with Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Greece. The four sponsors of the original resolution — the United States, Great Britain, Turkey, and France—voted against. After the vote, Eban contended that the American delegation had made a tactical error when it hastily agreed to the Afghan amendments, thereby opening the way to a whole series of other amendments. He estimated that there was no great hope of amending the resolution when it came up for vote in the General Assembly plenum; hence efforts should be focused on avoiding a two-thirds majority and, thereafter, on introducing significant changes in

the text. (See UN Document A/AC.53/L.33; Eban's telegram to Sharett, 46, 15 January 1952, 93.02/182/11.)

15. A. Eban [Paris] to Ph. Jessup (Paris). 16 January 1952

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 17–19.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 20.
3. See above, No. 14.
4. Jessup replied that his conversation the day before with Eban had indeed been extremely useful, but "it is perhaps somewhat too formal to describe our frank exchange of views as an 'understanding.'" With regard to the matter at hand, he said that the United States would consult with the other sponsors of the original draft resolution before deciding on its course of action (Jessup's letter, dated 17 January, in file 93.03/3055/13).

16. Ch. Herzog [Washington] to B. Gibli and the United States Division. 16 January 1952

Notes

1. Chaim Herzog, Israel Military, Naval, and Air Attaché in the United States.
2. Benjamin Gibli, head of the Intelligence Department in the General Staff.
3. See above, No. 13.
4. Teddy (Theodor) Kollek, Israel Minister in Washington.
5. George Lewis Jones, director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
6. The reference is evidently to George Holland Emery, a State Department political officer, posted from February 1952 in Ankara.
7. Averell H. Harriman, head of the U.S. Mutual Security Agency.
8. John A. Waldo, an official in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department.
9. On this, see below, No. 25.
10. Winston S. Churchill, prime minister of Great Britain.
11. On Churchill's visit to the United States, see below, No. 20.
12. The reference is to the plan to establish a Joint Middle East Command with the participation of the three Western powers, Turkey, and Egypt. In the autumn of 1951 there were talks with the Israeli Government about joining this framework. The role of the Middle East Command was to include coordination, training, and joint command in times of emergency. Egypt, invited to be among the founding members of the organization, announced that it was not interested in joining. (See Vol. 6, Nos. 426 and 477.)
13. Israel's offer to serve as an emergency depot for food and raw materials, see Vol. 6, No. 6.

14. Col. Adib Shishakli, Chief of the General Staff and *de facto* ruler of Syria.
15. Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary.
16. Monnet B. Davis, U.S. Ambassador to Israel. On the conversation with Davis, see Vol. 6, No. 434. See also No. 28.

Editorial Note

Debate on the Arab Refugees in the Ad Hoc Political Committee

On 16 January, the Ad Hoc Political Committee began to debate the question of the Arab refugees. Before the Committee was the report by UNRWA, whose recommendations focused on transferring the center of gravity of the Agency's activities from welfare and relief to rehabilitation, resettlement, and employment for the refugees, by means of detailed development plans for economic cooperation, but without intruding upon the political questions between Israel and the Arabs and between the refugees and the Arab states, and without infringing upon the refugees' interests with regard to compensation and repatriation. At the beginning of the debate, the three members of the Conciliation Commission, along with Great Britain, submitted a draft resolution to adopt the recommendations of the UNRWA report and approve the budget required for this. Before the Committee had begun to discuss the draft, however, the Egyptian representative asked that it be struck from the agenda, on the grounds that it infringed upon the sovereignty of the countries of the Middle East. In the wake of this motion, the Committee recessed for informal consultations. When it reconvened on 21 January, the four countries submitted an amended version of their draft, which still called for adoption of UNRWA's development and rehabilitation plans, but without impinging upon certain provisions contained in earlier UN resolutions with regard to the refugees and with the idea that the countries of the Middle East would take it upon themselves to implement these plans as soon as possible. The amended resolution was passed by the Ad Hoc Political Committee. (See UN Document A/AC.53/L.36.)

Israel did not participate in the debate in protest against the execution of the two Zionist activists in Baghdad (see No. 23).

17. A. Eban [Paris] to M. Sharett. 17 January 1952

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 17–19.
2. See the preceding Editorial Note.

3. Sharett approved Eban's line of argument with regard to the refugees and noted that this was the line accepted by Israel throughout recent years. He asked that Eban stress that with regard to approving, in certain cases, the repatriation of individual refugees, the consideration would be humanitarian, and that nothing in this process should be seen as making a significant contribution to a comprehensive solution of the problem. (Telegram TP387, 18 January 1952, 130.09/2345/1.)

18. D. Goitein [Washington] to A. Eban (Paris). 18 January 1952

Notes

1. See No. 14 above; Editorial Note, pp. 17–19.
2. James M. Ludlow, an official in the Political and Security Affairs Branch of the Bureau for United Nations Affairs of the State Department.
3. Pinhas Eliav, Second Secretary at the Israel Embassy in Washington.

19. A. Eban [Paris] to E. Elath (London). 18 January 1952

Notes

1. With regard to the resolutions summing up the debate on the Conciliation Commission's report and the question of Arab refugees, see Editorial Notes, pp. 17–19 and 20.
2. On the talk with the sponsors of the resolution, see Lourie's telegram to the Israel Embassy in Washington, PW5, 18 January 1952, 93.01/2208/1.

20. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 18 January 1952

Notes

1. James Bowker, Assistant Under-secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.
2. See above, No. 16.
3. See Vol. 6, No. 513.
4. Sir Francis Evans, British Minister to Israel.
5. See below, No. 38.

21. Resolutions adopted by the Policy Committee of the Conference of Jewish Organizations on Jewish Claims against Germany. [20 January 1952]

Notes

1. The resolutions were passed at a meeting of the Conference of Jewish Organizations that took place in New York on 20 January. See the report prepared by the representatives of the Israel Embassy, 25 January 1952, 130.10/2543/8.
2. See Vol. 6, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 317–18.
3. See above, No. 10.

22. Statement by A. Eban in the Ad Hoc Committee of the UN General Assembly [Paris]. 22 January 1952

Notes

1. See above, No. 12, and n. 4 there.
2. Muhammad Fadil Jamali, head of the Iraqi delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly.
3. See below, No. 23.

23. A. Eban [Paris] to M. Sharett. 22 January 1952

Notes

1. See above, No. 22.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 20.
3. No. 22.
4. Selim Sarper, Turkish permanent representative at the United Nations, chairman of the Ad Hoc Political Committee.
5. Emile Najar, counselor in the Israel Legation in France, member of the Israel delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly.
6. The resolution concerning the report of the Conciliation Commission and the resolution on aid to Arab refugees.

24. Sh. Divon (Paris) to the Head of the Israel Delegation to the United Nations (Paris). 22 January 1952

Copy: 130.02/2384/21

Divon summarizes a meeting in Paris between the Israel delegation to the United Nations and representatives of Asian countries: Thailand, India, Indonesia, Burma, and Iran. The Pakistani delegate apologized, explaining that he could not attend without the approval of his foreign minister, who was not in Paris at the time.

Eban explained that the peoples of Asia, because of their proximity and friendly relations with the Arab states, could play an important role in breaking the deadlock between Israel and the Arabs. He asked them to convey this idea to their governments, so that perhaps even next year the Asian nations would be able to try their hand at mediation.

The Asian representatives listened attentively, but most of them commented that precisely because of the proximity of the Asian countries to Israel and the Arab states and due to their friendly relations with the Arabs, any intervention on their part would be difficult and complicated. All of them stated, however, that they would convey his message to their governments.

Divon concludes that he came away with the impression that no illusions should be harbored as to any practical outcome from the meeting, which should be viewed only as a forum for raising ideas to be nurtured and encouraged with care and perseverance, particularly in light of the danger of the coalescence of a united Asian-Arab front against Israel.

Notes

1. The list is in the file but has been omitted here.
2. Ahmed S. Bokhari, permanent representative of Pakistan at the United Nations.
3. Prince Wan Waithayakon, Thai ambassador to the United States and permanent representative at the United Nations.
4. Hardit Singh Malik, Indian ambassador to France.
5. Ali G. Ardalan, member of the Iranian delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly.

25. Meeting: M. Sharett–M. B. Davis (Tel Aviv, 23 January 1952)

Notes

1. Also present was Michael Comay, who recorded the protocol.
2. Israel Rokach, member of the Knesset (General Zionists).
3. See Editorial Note, pp.17–19.
4. This report was also denied by the Israel mission at the UN. See Eban to Sharett, telegram 71, 20 January 1952, 93.02/18/11.
5. See Editorial Note, p. 20; No. 17 and n. 3 there.
6. Erwin P. Keeler, First Secretary and Consul in the United States Embassy.
7. The last part of the sentence has been omitted.
8. See No. 23.
9. The text of the agreement, dated 19 January, is in file 130.02/2454/9.
10. The reference is to the residents of the demilitarized zone, who had been moved by Israel to the village of Sha'ab in the Galilee and returned after UN intervention. (See Vol. 6, No. 256.)

26. A. Eban [Paris] to M. Sharett. 23 January 1952

Notes

1. H. M. Gladwyn Jebb, British permanent representative at the United Nations.
2. Ernest A. Gross, United States deputy permanent representative at the United Nations.
3. See No. 11.
4. State Department officials strongly advised Israel not to raise the question of freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal, but first to make unofficial inquiries with the three Western powers and Turkey (see the telegram from the British Commonwealth Division to the Israel Legation in London, IL411, 28 January 1952, 130.09/2318/9). After that they stated that they were considering approaching the new Egyptian government and attempting to persuade it to permit the passage of Haifa-bound vessels. In any case, they requested that Israel refrain from public statements, because quiet diplomacy represented the only hope for progress. (See the telegram from Herlitz to the United States Division, W813, 7 February 1952, 93.01/2208/3.)
   The British representative advised his government not to raise this question in the Security Council, since he did not think it would be possible to mobilize a Council majority for action to guarantee freedom of navigation, and the renewed debate would only increase tensions in the Middle East and make it more difficult to obtain Arab support for plans to resolve the refugee problem. (See Jebb to Selwyn Lloyd, 23 January 1952, PRO FO371/96996.)
5. Ahmed Shuqairy, deputy secretary-general of the Arab League, member of the Syrian delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly. His remarks were made at the Ad Hoc Political Committee on January 22—see No. 35.
6. Of the Israel-Syria Armistice Agreement.

7. Sharett agreed that Eban would act in accordance with paragraph (a) and stated that he himself would work in accordance with paragraph (b). With regard to paragraph (c), he preferred to make an oral approach, and would do so or give instructions that this be done in various capitals. (See telegram 91 to Eban, 24 January 1952, 93.02/182/12.) See also No. 35.

27. U.S. Secretary of State (Washington) to the Israel Ambassador in Washington. 24 January 1952

Note

1. See Vol. 6, No. 510.

28. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 25 January 1952

Notes

1. See No. 16.
2. See Nos. 20 and 38.
3. See Vol. 6, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 337–38.
4. See Vol. 6, No. 498. See also No. 43 below.

29. Sh. Bendor [New York] to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 25 January 1952

Coded Tel. NWTA15; Inc.: 93.01/2204/1

Bendor reports on a session of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Claims Conference. Nahum Goldmann relayed Sharett's opinion on the format of the negotiations with Germany.[1] The ensuing discussion reached the following major conclusions: (1) A preliminary meeting with Adenauer is essential so as to ascertain whether there is any basis for negotiations at the experts' level. The meeting must take place outside of Germany and a senior Israeli official must attend. (2) The Government of Israel must be urged to send an official representative to this meeting; if it does not agree to do so, the situation will have to be reconsidered. (3) There must be a meeting between representatives of the Claims Conference and the Foreign Minister to coordinate claims and activities.

Notes

1. On 25 January, the Executive Committee of the Conference of Jewish Material Claims against Germany met in New York. The chairman of the Executive Committee, Nahum Goldmann, reported on a telephone conversation with Sharett in which the latter had stated the following: (a) The Government of Israel could not send a representative to Germany and advised the Claims Conference to refrain from doing so. (b) The Government of Israel saw no need for a preliminary meeting with the Germans and advised beginning negotiations in the middle of February. (c) The Government of Israel would not be represented at the negotiations by a minister or senior government official, but by a public figure assisted by experts. (d) Before the start of negotiations it would be advisable to hold consultations between representatives of the Claims Conference and the Foreign Minister and David Horowitz of the Finance Ministry. (See report, 1 February 1952, 130.10/2543/8.)
2. The need for a preliminary meeting was discussed at the Government meeting of 27 January. Sharett reported on his exchanges with Goldmann and defended his position that there was no need for a preliminary meeting; he suggested forming a committee to appoint the Israeli delegation and prepare it for negotiations. After Sharett's remarks a general discussion ensued, but no decision was taken. (See stenographic record, 27 January 1952, and compare also No. 34.)
3. Rabbi Abraham Cohen, president of the Jewish Board of Deputies in Great Britain.
4. Leo Baeck, president of the World Union for Progressive Judaism and formerly president of the National Union of Jews in Germany.

30. Israel Embassy in Washington to the United States Division. 26 January 1952

Notes

1. Esther Herlitz, First Secretary at the Israel Embassy in Washington.
2. Maj. Ghasan Jadid, head of the Syrian delegation to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission.
3. The Syrians took over al-Hamma in the demilitarized zone in March of 1951 and had occupied it since. An Israeli retaliation raid in the area, in April of that year, had been condemned by the Security Council on 18 May 1951.
4. Col. Fawzi Selo, Syrian head of state, prime minister, and defence minister.
5. As part of this process, the U.S. ambassador visited Jordan and Syria (see Comay's letter, 6 February 1952, 130.20/2475/1), but evidently his contacts did not bear significant fruit (see No. 49).

Editorial Note

Resolution on Palestine Adopted by the UN General Assembly

The plenum of the General Assembly debated issues related to Palestine on 26 January 1952. Before the plenum was the report of the Ad Hoc Political

Committee and the draft resolutions adopted there with regard to the Conciliation Commission and aid to Arab refugees (see Editorial Notes, pp. 17–19 and 20). In the course of the debate, a number of amendments to the Committee drafts were moved and approved. The most important of these was the amendment to paragraph 2, deleting the references to compensation to and repatriation of Arab refugees. The Committee's proposals, with the amendments, were approved by a large majority. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union, which called for discontinuing the Conciliation Commission, was rejected. The final text of the resolution on the Conciliation Commission follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling all the resolutions adopted at previous sessions of the General Assembly on the Palestine Problem;

Having examined the progress report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;

1. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Conciliation Commission for Palestine for its efforts to assist the parties to reach agreement on the outstanding differences;

2. *Notes with regret* that, as stated in Paragraph 87 of the report, the Commission has been unable to fulfil its mandate under the resolutions of the General Assembly;

3. *Considers* that the governments concerned have the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine;

4. *Urges* the governments concerned to seek agreement with a view to an early settlement of their outstanding differences in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine; and for this purpose to make full use of United Nations facilities;

6. *Requests* the Conciliation Commission for Palestine to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities for carrying out the terms of the present resolution.

(See UN document A/2070; *GAOR, 6th Session, Plenary Meetings*, 364th–365th meetings, 26th January 1952.)

31. G. Rafael (Paris) to M. Sharett. 27 January 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2404/11

Gideon Rafael summarizes the proceedings and developments at the second part of the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly.

(I) The Palestine Question

The resolutions adopted concerning Palestine should be considered as an important success for Israel and as an Arab failure, especially in light of the events and démarches that preceded the General Assembly session. In the autumn of 1951, the State Department began a vigorous campaign aimed at putting an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The background for the U.S. initiative was the decision by the NATO countries to add Turkey and Greece to the organization and to integrate the Middle Eastern countries, including Israel, into a common regional defense pact. These steps came to naught when it became clear, at the Paris session of the Conciliation Commission, that the parties were unyielding in their stands and that Egypt—the backbone of the planned Middle East Command—was going through a period of political instability.

At this juncture, as the Sixth Session of the General Assembly got under way, the United States decided that the Palestine question should be placed in abeyance and that the Conciliation Commission should be disbanded. This was reflected in the Conciliation Commission's report, particularly in paragraph 87.[2] Due to considerations of parliamentary procedure at the United Nations, however, and after having second thoughts, the Americans—with French support—decided not to dismantle the Commission but merely to curtail its activities and reduce its authority.

At first, the Arabs were not particularly active on the Palestine question; as the deliberations progressed, however, it became clear that not only had they not moderated their stance, they had in fact adopted a more extreme position and were now openly demanding the destruction of the State of Israel. Particularly noteworthy for his extremism was the Syrian representative, Ahmed Shuqairy, who spoke of the Arab refugees as the vanguard for the conquest of Israel.[3]

The Arab extremism influenced the United States and other sponsor countries of draft resolutions on the Palestine question. They invited the Arab delegations for discussions aimed at clarification of their position. Eban requested that parallel talks be held with Israel.[5] As a result, from the approval of the resolutions by the Ad Hoc Committee until their rejection by the General Assembly plenum the Israeli delegation was in constant contact with the sponsors.[6]

In the final tally, those sections that were deleted from the text of the resolution—rather than what was included in it—are critical, and constitute an improvement over the resolutions adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee:

(1) Riley's authority was not expanded.

(2) The Conciliation Commission was not given authority to appoint special representatives.

(3) No mention was made of refugees, repatriation, or compensation.

(4) The original intention that the Commission be headquartered in Jerusalem was dropped.

(5) Five proposals by the Conciliation Commission, presented in paragraph 86 of its report, were not adopted.

(6) The Commission has been relieved of the obligation to present a report to the next session of the UN General Assembly; thus the Palestine question will not automatically be placed on the Assembly's agenda.

In addition to the foregoing, the resolution in its present form incorporates basic contradictions and thereby contributes to the disbanding of the Conciliation Commission.

Rafael wishes to add three comments:

(1) Throughout the activity surrounding the resolutions, Blandford acted consistently in the best interests of the Arabs, arguing that the Arab states would not cooperate on the refugee problem if the resolution on the Conciliation Commission were not to their liking.

(2) Even though the Jerusalem question was not on the agenda, it was borne in mind by the Catholic countries; their support of the Arabs was intended primarily to undermine Israel's status with regard to the holy sites. The representative from El Salvador, for example, stated this explicitly.[8] The conclusion to be drawn is that Jerusalem is still an important issue for the Catholic countries and must be taken into account in dealing with them.

(3) The Soviet Union adopted a stance of opposition to the activities of the Western powers in the Middle East, but has not in fact altered its neutral stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It worked actively against the passage of the pro-Arab clauses inserted in the draft resolution.

(II) Global Issues

On global issues, the Israel delegation adopted the following positions:

Collective security measures: Israel supported the resolution but took the opportunity to warn against recognizing regional organizations, such as the Arab League, as frameworks for regional defense.

Treatment of Indians in South Africa: The Israel delegation successfully introduced a palliative amendment that enabled several delegations to vote in favor of the Indian motion.[12]

Decolonization: Israel took an ambiguous position. In the case of Morocco, Israel adopted a negative stand, which earned it criticism from several delegations, in particular Guatemala. However, it managed to amend this impression by its unqualified support for Libyan independence and proposal for a Mediterranean family of nations.[13]

The General Assembly is still in session, but it can already be stated that the problems that defined its character were not those debated in public, but rather those discussed in the corridors, such as the Korean talks, events in Egypt and Tunisia, the situation in Iran, the German question, and Middle Eastern defense. The solution of these issues will determine the nature of the United Nations and the fate of peace.

Notes

1. See the previous Editorial Note.
2. Paragraph 87 states that the Commission had not succeeded in fulfilling its mandate due to the unwillingness of the parties to implement UN resolutions, as well as to the changes that had taken place in Palestine over the last three years; this factor should be taken into account in any further attempt to solve the Palestine problem.
3. See No. 26 and n. 5 there.
4. See No. 22.
5. See Eban's letter to S. Sarper, 17 January 1952, 93.03/3055/13.
6. See, for example, Eban to Jessup, 20 January 1952, *loc. cit.*
7. Andrew W. Cordier, executive assistant to the UN Secretary-General.
8. Semen Tsarapkin, Soviet permanent representative at the United Nations.
9. Constantin Zinchenko, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Security Council Affairs.

32. A. Eban [Paris] to M. Sharett. 28 January 1952

Note

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 26–27.

33. Chargé d'Affaires of Israel in Washington to the United States Secretary of State (Washington). 28 January 1952

Note

1. See No. 13. In a conversation at the State Department, the Israeli representatives were told that their request was likely to meet with a positive response, making Israel the third country in the Middle East eligible for reimbursable military aid. (See Goitein to the United States Division, W815, 8 February 1952, 93.01/2208/3.) See also Nos. 47 and 220.

34. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to N. Goldmann (New York). 28 January 1952

Notes

1. See No. 29 and n. 2 there.
2. See Vol. 6, No. 515.
3. Noah Barou, chairman of the European Executive of the World Jewish Congress; member of the British Board of Deputies.

35. A. Eban [Paris] to the President of the Security Council (Paris). 29 January 1952

Notes

1. See Tawfiq Abu al-Huda to the UN Secretary-General, 22 January 1952, UN Document S/2486.
2. For details of the complaints, see No. 25.
3. See No. 26.
4. The Foreign Ministry eventually decided not to submit a complaint to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, because Israel's complaint to the Security Council had obtained its objective, as was clear from the Arabs' reservations at Shuqairy's remarks, and also so as not to harm the only channel of contact between Israel and Syria, the Mixed Armistice Commission. (See note dated 31 January 1952, in File 130.02/2433/10.)

36. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Paris). 29 January 1952

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 26–27, and No. 32.
2. On 4 February, the Knesset held a political debate. The debate was opened by Sharett's survey of the United Nations debates on the questions of Palestine and the Arab refugees. Sharett's main conclusion was that the center of gravity in the relations between Israel and other countries should be transferred from the UN to direct ties with other states, while preserving the vital interests of the State of Israel. Sharett's statement was followed by a debate; at its end, three concluding resolutions submitted by the opposition parties were voted down. (See *Divrei Ha-Knesset*, First Session of the Second Knesset, Session 50, 4 February 1952, Vol. XI, pp. 1161–1189.)
3. Pablo de Azcárate, principal secretary of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
4. In his reply, Eban again enumerated all the perils and snares from which Israel had been saved, some of them after they had already been inserted into the resolution (for most of them, see No. 31). As for the reference to prior resolutions of the General Assembly, he noted that it is possible to see in them "careful provisions for insuring [the] futility [of the] PCC"; Israel can rest confident that the Conciliation Commission will stagnate in New York, unless the parties seek to activate it at their own initiative. During the course of the current year Israel must conduct its peace initiatives by means of direct contacts or via the Mixed Armistice Commissions; this will pave the way for the abolition of the Conciliation Commission after a year of inaction. As for the appointment of a representative in Jerusalem, Eban said that he would approach the UN Secretary-General and attempt to dissuade him from the idea; in any case, he would at least attempt to have someone less senior than Azcárate appointed. (Eban to Sharett, No. 108, 30 January 1952, 93.02/182/11.) See also No. 41.

37. G. Rafael (Paris) to the Head of the Israel Delegation to the United Nations (Paris). 29 January 1952

Copy: 130.02/2387/13

Rafael reports on his conversation with Sobolev, the Soviet ambassador to Poland and a member of the Soviet delegation to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly in Paris. Sobolev told him about the reconstruction activities being conducted in Warsaw, including the erection of apartment buildings on the site of the destroyed Ghetto. When Rafael commented that this construction is being done on the ruins of Polish Jewry, Sobolev responded with surprising candor that, indeed, the situation of the surviving Jews is not good and that antisemitism is still deeply rooted in Poland. He believes that this stems from the disproportionately strong influence of Jews in the government. Rafael notes that he was astonished to hear such frank and dangerous statements from Sobolev. Although he did not seem to endorse the phenomenon or its cause, the very fact that this was his interpretation of the situation bodes ill for the Polish Jews connected with the regime.

The conversation then turned to the Jews of the Soviet Union. Sobolev denied the existence of antisemitism in his country and stressed that in no other country in the world is the status of the Jews so secure. Rafael responded that Israel is aware that Soviet Jews are not discriminated against; however, Israel requests that more Jews be given permission to emigrate to Israel. Sobolev answered that he is unaware of any such desire on the part of Soviet Jews. Rafael commented that as long as Soviet policy opposes *aliya*, public expressions of this desire are unlikely.

Note

1. Arkadi Sobolev, Soviet Ambassador to Poland, member of the U.S.S.R. delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly.

38. F. Evans (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion. 30 January 1952

Notes

1. See Vol. 6, No. 513, and No. 20 above.
2. See No. 39.

39. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (London). 31 January 1952

Notes

1. See No. 38.
2. See No. 48.

Editorial Note

Israel-Jordan Agreement to Prevent Infiltration

On 1 February 1952, an agreement between Israel and Jordan on cooperation to prevent cross-border infiltration came into effect. The main points of the agreement were as follows:

1. Those crossing the armistice lines will not be fired upon unless they resist arrest.

2. There will be daily meetings of local commanders at various points along the border for immediate attention to each infiltration incident.

3. Stolen property will be returned immediately.

4. Fire will never be opened in the direction of the border except for purposes of self-defense; ambushes will be located in such a way that there will be no firing in the direction of the border.

5. Complaints will not be submitted to the Mixed Armistice Commission; each incident will be dealt with in the framework of the meetings of local commanders.

The agreement had only limited success. After a number of days of adjustment, regular meetings between local commanders began, and these were generally conducted in a good spirit. The two sides returned stolen property, but the Jordanians did this only partially. Israel also handed back infiltrators who had crossed the border. At a number of points in the Triangle, problems of trespassing and illegal cultivation of land were solved by surveying and marking the border. Nevertheless, there was no significant change in irregular activities along the borders, especially on sensitive fronts such as Latrun, Jerusalem, and the Triangle. Nor was there any progress in solving pressing problems, such as Mount Scopus and Qalqiliya. (See the undated report, 130.02/2432/2; R. Dafni to W. Eytan, 4 February 1952, 130.16/2948/12.)

40. Sh. Eliashiv (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 1 February 1952

Orig.: 130.11/2507/2

Eliashiv read with great interest the report of Sharett's conversation with Vyshinsky, the Soviet foreign minister.[1] He responded immediately by telegram,[2] but wishes to expand upon his comments because of their importance.

In Eliashiv's opinion, Sharett acted wisely in adopting an aggressive and severe tone and in immediately raising the main problem that is of concern to Israel—the emigration of Soviet Jews. It is best that the Russians know that Israel views this question as the central issue in relations between the two countries. At the same time, Vyshinsky's response was worrisome and disappointing. He repeatedly claimed that Soviet Jews have no interest in emigration and that individual requests would be considered on their own merits. Even more serious than the content of his response was his rationalization, which he repeated at least twice—namely, that Israel, because of the political line it has adopted, has no right to request support or assistance from the Soviet Union.

Indeed, if one examines Israel's actions and voting pattern at the last session of the General Assembly it becomes apparent that there has been a significant shift away from the official stance of non-alignment previously displayed. From his experience at previous sessions, Eliashiv knows the full range of considerations and pressures operating on those at the scene; however, in his view this time Israel took the path of least resistance and did not ignore unilateral pressures as in the past. In any event, if Israel's concern for Soviet Jews is genuine, it must also take into account the interests of the Soviet Union, especially since Israel's political positions and votes at the United Nations are closely studied, not only by Soviet statesmen, but also by important segments of Soviet Jewry. Some Jews have integrated into Soviet life; they are loyal citizens of their homeland, like Jews in other countries, and the estrangement between Israel and the Soviet Union upsets them and tends to sever their Jewish affiliation. Some Jews feel that as the gap between Israel and the Soviet Union widens, the prospect that emigration will ever be permitted or that their links with Israel will become stronger diminishes. These Jews hope and pray that Israel will not be depicted here as an enemy; they receive with apprehension every unfriendly report or news item about Israel. Eliashiv requests that just as Israel takes into account the interests of the Jews in other countries, for example in formulating its policy with regard to South Africa, so too it should be mindful of the lot of Soviet Jews—a dejected and mute Jewish community that will be lost to us should we continue to act as we have in the past.

From a practical standpoint, he intends to put to the test Vyshinsky's qualified promises, by presenting him with a file of special cases and requesting, as a first step, a positive response thereto.

Notes

1. See No. 6.
2. Dated 26 January 1952, in File 130.09/2325/6.
3. See Vol. 6, No. 383 and n. 5.
4. Ibid., No. 521.
5. See Eliashiv to Levavi, 9 December 1951, 130.11/2492/17.
6. See No. 55.

41. A. Eban [Paris] to M. Sharett. 2 February 1952

Note

1. See No. 36 and n. 2 there.

42. Sh. Divon (Paris) to A. Eban (Paris). 5 February 1952

Copy: 130.02/2410/9

Divon summarizes a discussion with Gideon Rafael about Israel's Arab policy.

Hypotheses:

(1) The growing extremism and unrest in the Arab countries will worsen their relations with Israel and spawn aggressive ideas and plans.

(2) The refugee problem will be exploited by the Arab states to make Israel's international situation more difficult.

(3) A situation may arise in which Egypt or another Arab country is interested in directing domestic public opinion against Israel.

(4) The Middle East crisis is commonly viewed as a clash between Western interests and Arab national aspirations. No one seriously considers the interests of Israel.

Conclusions:

(1) The situation demands alertness, intensive contacts with the Western countries, and swift reaction when necessary.

(2) Steps should be taken to ensure that Article 8 of the Israel-Jordan armistice agreement and the Security Council resolution on free passage through the Suez Canal are implemented.

(3) Political intelligence work should be organized more efficiently. A special operative should be dispatched to London to set up a modest base whose function will be to keep abreast of events and to maintain contact with Arabs and the leading diplomatic missions.

(4) An attempt should be made to bypass the Conciliation Commission through direct contacts with Arab states or by means of the armistice commissions.

Note

1. The demand for implementation of the Security Council resolution relating to free passage through the Suez Canal and implementation of Article 8 of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement.

43. The Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of Israel in Washington to the United States Secretary of State (Washington). 7 February 1952

Notes

1. See Nos. 16 and 28.
2. See No. 47.

44. M. Sharett (Paris) to the Israel Consulate-General in New York. 7 February 1952

Coded Tel. PNA259; Inc.: 93.01/2204/1

Sharett relates to the request for another preliminary meeting with Adenauer.[1] The Government is opposed to such a meeting, since it would mean time wasted. Israel has in its possession a letter accepting its claims as a basis for negotiations[2] and will not receive a better formulation; additional negotiations create the possibility of an Israeli retreat or of restrictive interpretations. A government cannot participate in unofficial meetings. As there exists authorization to open negotiations, these should be initiated without further delay.

Notes

1. See No. 29 and n. 1 there; No. 34. Despite the recommendations of the Government of Israel, the Claims Conference still wanted a preliminary meeting with Adenauer. (See Bendor to the Foreign Ministry, XA102, 5 February 1952, 93.01/2204/1.)

2. See Vol. 6, No. 515.
3. The question of a preliminary meeting with Adenauer was discussed again in the middle of February at a meeting between Sharett and the heads of the Claims Conference. Sharett repeated the argument against participation by the Government of Israel in the preliminary negotiations, but was forced to accept the opinion of the Jewish organizations that wished to conduct preliminary conversations in order to sound out Adenauer. It was decided that the format would be a personal meeting between Adenauer and Goldmann, as representative of the Jewish organizations (see report by Sharett at the Government session, 17 February 1952; No. 52).

45. E. Ben-Horin[1] (Washington) to the United States Division. 12 February 1952

Orig.: 130.20/2460/5

Ben-Horin reports on his talks with Waldo and Lewis Jones of the State Department. Esther Herlitz also participated on the Israeli side in the conversation with Waldo, at which the problem of Middle East defense was discussed. Waldo explained that his government is working in both London and Cairo to speed up the negotiations between Britain and Egypt over the Suez Canal, since it views their successful completion as a precondition for progress on the subject of Middle East defense. When asked by Ben-Horin and Herlitz for his view of the regional defense negotiations once the Anglo-Egyptian issue is resolved, Waldo said that he is aware that the Arabs will attempt to wring concessions from the Western states with regard to territory and the refugees as the price of their participation in a regional defense pact, but the United States "won't buy such ideas." Waldo added that the State Department is considering another approach to Egypt, requesting that it re-examine the question of permitting passage through the Suez Canal for Israel-bound shipping. The United States is seeking to accomplish this discreetly and without publicity.[3]

Teddy Kollek was also present at the talk with Lewis Jones. Jones warned the Israelis against what he termed the imperialistic tendencies of the American public, by which he meant the growing inclination to dictate to smaller countries how they should behave, and against the danger of the Republicans' winning the White House in November. In his opinion, even a Republican president with the most liberal views on international affairs would be bound by his party's isolationist majority. He criticized the Israeli practice of describing the state as the West's representative in the region and argued that Israel's future depends on its ability to integrate into the Middle East while at the same time identifying with the ideals of Western democracy. He repeated his suggestion that Israel permit free passage of Arab vehicles on a special highway between Gaza and Hebron,

without relinquishing its sovereignty over the highway. He related that the new Māhir government in Egypt dissociates itself from the policy of the previous government on free passage through the Suez Canal, but urged Israel not to initiate a public campaign on this issue.

Notes

1. Eliashiv Ben-Horin, First Secretary at the Israel Embassy in Washington.
2. See No. 11 and n. 4 there.
3. See No. 28 and n. 4 there.

46. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 13 February 1952

Notes

1. The Collective Security Agreement had been discussed by the Arab states since 1949. An amended version thereof was signed by the members of the Arab League in February 1951. Jordan, which had reservations, adhered to the pact in mid-February 1952. The role of the alliance was military cooperation for regional defense; its chief organ was a Mutual Defense Council. During the negotiations between Egypt and Great Britain, it was suggested that the pact be relied on as a substitute for British forces in the Middle East, in cooperation with NATO; see No. 48.
2. Nuri al-Sa'id, Iraqi prime minister and interior minister.
3. Ibn Saud, king of Saudi Arabia.
4. See n. 1 above. For details, see the telegram from Elath to Comay, 2 January 1952, 130.09/2319/1.
5. The Security Council resolution, introduced by the United States, Great Britain, and France, calling on Egypt to remove all restrictions on shipping through the Suez Canal.
6. The proposal to transfer British bases and forces from the Canal Zone to Gaza was raised a number of times during the negotiations between Egypt and Great Britain; see No. 50.
7. No other protocol of this conversation could be found in Foreign Ministry files; but see No. 47.

47. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 13 February 1952

Notes

1. See No. 33.
2. See No. 13 and n. 1 there.
3. Robert A. Lovett, U.S. Secretary of Defense.
4. Abe Feinberg, a businessman and president of Israel Bonds.

5. Eban again raised the matter of military aid in a conversation on 15 February with Undersecretary of State James Webb. He again asked that the Mutual Security Act of 1952 be modified so as to contain an explicit allocation for military assistance to the countries of the Middle East, including Israel. Webb's response was negative, but he noted that this time the intention was to implement the title of the law authorizing military assistance to countries of the region not specifically mentioned in the Act. He advised Israel to be less interested in the wording of the law and more in what could be obtained in its framework. (See Eban to the United States Division, telegram W844, 15 February 1952, 93.01/2208/3.)

48. E. Elath (London) to M. Comay. 13 February 1952

Notes

1. See No. 39.
2. See No. 46.
3. Foreign Minister Sharett came to London to represent Israel at the funeral of King George VI, held on 15 February.
4. Archibald Ross, head of the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office.

49. Meeting: W. Eytan–M. B. Davis (Tel Aviv, 13 February 1952, document dated 14 February 1952)

Notes

1. Also participating was Michael Comay, who recorded the protocol.
2. See No. 45.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 33.
4. See No. 25.
5. Owen T. Jones, first secretary in the United States Embassy.
6. Oliver Troxel, second secretary and vice-consul in the United States Embassy until December 1951.
7. See No. 30.
8. See No. 60.

50. M. Sharett (London) to W. Eytan. 15 February 1952

Notes

1. See No. 48.
2. The ninth session of the NATO Council was scheduled to open in Lisbon on 20 February.

3. The proposal to concentrate the British forces to be evacuated from the Suez Canal Zone in the Gaza Strip.
4. Ralph Stevenson, British ambassador to Egypt.
5. Sir Roger Allen, head of the African Department of the British Foreign Office.

51. A. Kubovy[1] (Prague) to the East European Division. 15 February 1952

Coded Tel. 404; Inc.: 130.09/2343/1

Kubovy addresses himself to the East European Division's telegram on the Oren affair.[2] Kubovy doubts the accuracy of the information. A proposal for releasing the prisoners has arrived from an unofficial source. The source spoke of three Israelis, probably referring to Oren, Orenstein, and Formand. Kubovy interprets the proposal as an attempt by Czechoslovakia to rid itself of the three prisoners now so as to avoid harming its prestige. The proposal is yet another sign indicating a retreat from the insane plan to exploit the Slanský trial to denounce Israel and Zionism. In Kubovy's opinion, the turnabout was caused by the crushing blow dealt the Soviet Union's international policy by the 'Ali Māhir government in Egypt, with the swift arrest of the local Communist leaders. Still, one must not discount the possibility that the proposal is a mere provocation. In any case, the Czechs continue to deny that anyone was arrested.

Kubovy also refers to the domestic ramifications of the affair in Israel. He suggests that Oren's arrest be exploited to mend fences within the Israeli public. It should be explained that Oren had fallen victim to his Zionist courage and his refusal to support the allegations of those among the top political echelons in Czechoslovakia who hate Zionism and Israel.

Notes

1. Arieh Leon Kubovy, Israel Minister to Czechoslovakia and Poland.
2. Telegram from the East European Department to the Israel Legation in Prague, 14 February 1952 (File 130.09/2342/18), reporting on an article in the evening newspaper *Hador*, according to which Mordechai Oren had conducted negotiations concerning the adherence of Mapam to the Cominform, in place of Maki (the Israel Communist Party); Maki itself would join Mapam.

   In late 1951, three Israeli citizens were arrested in Czechoslovakia: Shimon Orenstein, a businessman who had formerly served as the commercial attaché in the Israel Legation; Shimshon Formand, an Israeli commercial agent who was in Czechoslovakia to purchase textile machines; and Mordechai Oren, the representative of the Mapam Party in Czechoslovakia. The arrest of Oren and Orenstein was evidently linked to the great show trial then being prepared against 14 Czechoslovak leaders,

headed by Rudolf Slanský, the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, on charges of treason, espionage, and collaboration with Zionism and imperialism to undermine the regime in Czechoslovakia. Eleven of the accused were Jews; see Editorial Note, p. 299.

From the day of Oren's and Orenstein's arrests the Israel Legation strove to obtain official information or at least to establish contact with the detainees, but the Czechoslovak authorities ignored all appeals. Oren and Orenstein were tried in the summer of 1953; Oren was sentenced to 15 years and Orenstein to life imprisonment. Formand was released without trial after being detained for a year.

3. The telegram has not been located.
4. A complete protocol of the conversation is in File 130.11/2494/3.

52. N. Barou (London) to M. Sharett. 19 February 1952

Notes

1. The letter has not been found. For the circumstances leading up to these meetings, see No. 44 and n. 3 there.
2. The reference is to Herbert Blankenhorn, director of the Political Department in the West German Foreign Ministry.
3. Not identified.
4. Heinrich Brüning, formerly chancellor of Germany (1930–32); from 1939, professor of political science at Harvard University.
5. Walter Hallstein, secretary of state in the German Foreign Ministry.
6. Franz Böhm, jurist, dean of Goethe University in Frankfurt; from March 1952, head of the German delegation to the reparations negotiations.

53. Memorandum by M. Sharett. 19 February 1952

130.02/2414/1

Sharett deals with the forthcoming visit to India by the director-general of the Foreign Ministry. Dispatching the director-general to India is not the first step Israel has made to improve relations with that country. In the early autumn of 1950 Sharett suggested to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion that Israel propose that the latter visit India to make the personal acquaintance of Nehru. The Prime Minister agreed and authorized Sharett to pursue the necessary exploratory contacts. It was also decided that should for any reason the Prime Minister be unable to leave Israel, the Foreign Minister would go in his place. The idea was to endow this first direct contact between Israel and India with a stately nature and to try to find a dignified, although one-time, alternative to regular bilateral diplomatic relations between the two countries, which India was clearly not yet prepared to institute.[1]

Sharett took upon himself to put out feelers about the visit. In the fall of 1950, during the UN General Assembly session, he met the Indian deputy minister for external affairs, Keskar,[2] and raised the idea of the visit. Keskar's reaction was enthusiastic, but he asked that the matter be broached informally before any official approach was made. After that meeting no further response was received from the Indians, despite two reminders from Sharett.

In the spring of 1951 Sharett met with India's ambassador to Washington, Mme. Pandit, at her request, but the conversation dealt with generalities, the ambassador taking no initiative and making no statement. Sharett supposes that she had intended to take some step, apparently in accordance with instructions from New Delhi, but that in the interim between the invitation and the meeting her instructions had been modified.

Following his talk with Mme. Pandit, Sharett concluded that the Israeli initiative for a visit to India by the Prime Minister was over-ambitious and had apparently alarmed Nehru. He therefore thought of proposing, after a certain cooling-off period, a lower-level visit, during which the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries could also be investigated. The opportunity for this came about at his meeting in Paris at the end of 1951 with the Indian ambassador to Peking, Pannikar. This time the reply was an affirmative one.

Sharett is setting down these events for the record and in order to explain the sequence of developments. Nehru's agreement to the visit should be seen as an improvement in his attitude towards Israel and as a desire to make up for the ungracious utter disregard of the previous proposal, as well as emphasizing that this time agreement is forthcoming because Israel has made an acceptable proposal.[4]

Notes

1. India recognized Israel on 16 September 1950, but at the same time made it known informally that it did not intend to exchange diplomatic representatives; the reason cited was budgetary limitations. See Vol. 5, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 201.
2. See Vol. 5, No. 396.
3. V. Patel, a leader of the Congress Party in India and deputy prime minister, died in December 1950. Evidently Sharett is here confusing a number of separate meetings.
4. See No. 71.

54. Statement of the United States Ambassador M.B. Davis. 22 February 1952

Note

1. These remarks were made at a ceremony in the Foreign Ministry to mark the beginning of negotiations concerning grants to Israel in accordance with the Mutual Security Act. At the beginning of the ceremony, Foreign Minister Sharett stated: "The Zionist movement always believed that the return of the Jewish people to its land solves a generations-old world problem, and hence was deserving of international assistance. This belief has been proven true in our day, thanks to two changes that occurred at the same time: the birth of the State of Israel, which has the authority to receive international aid; while, at the same time, the generous democratic power, the United States, adopted a system of aid to nations that need it in order to repair their economic life." The reply by U.S. Ambassador Davis appears below.

   On the Mutual Security Act, see No. 13 and n. 1 there. In accordance with an interim agreement signed in December 1951 (see Vol. 6, No. 517), $25.7 million was paid to Israel in accordance with Section 205 of the Act, while the balance of the sum was held for payment upon final signature of the agreement and determination of specific projects for immigrant absorption. To oversee and manage the funds appropriated, the United States established an assistance administration in Israel, headed by Bruce MacDaniel. The final agreement on the grant, pursuant to the Mutual Security Act, was signed in Tel Aviv on 27 February 1952. See also Nos. 47 and 56.

55. A. Levavi [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett. 25 February 1952

Orig.: 130.11/2507/2

Levavi raises several reservations concerning Eliashiv's evaluation of Sharett's talk with Vyshinsky.[1]

He does not believe that Vyshinsky is likely to be influenced, on so basic an issue as the Jewish question, by external considerations such as Israel's votes at the UN. In general, Vyshinsky has limited freedom of action and faithfully executes his master's instructions.

As long as Israel is outside the Soviet bloc, and as long as the Jews of the Soviet Union feel an attachment to Israel, the Soviets will look with suspicion on any manifestation of Jewish nationalism. Consequently, oscillations in Israel's foreign policy should not be assumed to have any particular impact on the Soviets' Jewish policy.

Levavi considers that Eliashiv's conclusion and assessment of the attitudes of Russian Jews towards Israel are one-sided. He does not accept that "simple and primitive Jews" see Israel through the looking-glass of *Pravda*; if such individuals do exist, they are certainly not representative of the whole. In general, he advises caution when relating to statements by Soviet

Jews, which are truncated, spoken in fear and suspicion, and are frequently no true expression of their inner sentiments.

Quite a few Soviet Jews tend to blame the State of Israel for the deterioration of their position. This is a psychological and emotional process over which Israel has no control, and which cannot be resolved by a few votes at the United Nations. Only direct contacts with Russian Jewry can do so.

In conclusion: There was an anti-Jewish tendency in the Soviet Union even before the establishment of the State of Israel. There is no clear evidence to prove that Israel's foreign policy has any effect on it. The primary factors affecting the fate of Russian Jewry are the international situation and domestic developments within the Soviet Union. Oscillations in Israel's foreign policy can be no more than a secondary element. In the meantime, Israel must continue its current policy, as follows: (1) keeping the question of *aliya* open; (2) striving, cautiously but energetically, to achieve any kind of direct contact; and (3) bearing in mind that *aliya* by individuals may have major reverberations among their brethren trapped in the Soviet Union.

Note

1. See No. 40.

56. Meeting: M. Sharett–M. B. Davis (Tel Aviv, 27 February 1952)

Report: 130.02/2415/1

The U.S. ambassador requested a meeting with Sharett a few minutes before the signing of the Grant-in-Aid agreement.[1] He had come to stress two points. First, it must be clear to Israel that the agreement requires full exchange of information, meaning full information on Israel's economic situation, as has heretofore been the case in meetings between Israeli representatives and McDaniel and Jones. Second, it should be stressed that the Grant-in-Aid funds are earmarked for specific programs that the parties have agreed upon, and this should be clear not only to the government, but to the Israeli public as well.

The conversation switched to the likelihood of progress towards peace in the light of the reports emanating from Egypt.[2] Sharett said that Israel was trying to find out what lay behind the Egyptian initiatives.

The ambassador returned to his favorite topic, the damage that Israel's retaliatory operations against Jordan caused to the situation on the borders.[3] As in the past, Sharett disagreed with Davis, but this time Davis

broached a new argument—in his view, Israel's actions have led to a change in the Jordanian position on the collective security pact of the Arab League. He said that this is the interpretation relayed to him by Washington. Sharett disagreed with this assertion and ascribed Jordan's adherence to the pact to be the result of the change in its policy under the Abu al-Huda government, which seeks to identify itself with Arab League foreign policy. The ambassador maintained his view, even after Sharett informed him that in recent meetings between Israeli and Jordanian representatives there had been no anger or resentment—they were even displaying a peaceable attitude.[5]

Notes

1. See No. 54 and n. 1 there. The full text of the grant accord pursuant to the Mutual Security Act is in File 93.03/3063/11.
2. See Nos. 57 and 64.
3. See No. 49.
4. See No. 46 and n. 1 there.
5. See No. 8 and Editorial Note, p. 33.

57. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 27 February 1952

Notes

1. Evidently Israel Leviant, a French engineer and businessman, general secretary of the Israel-France Chamber of Commerce.
2. The reference is to a statement by Yassin Sarraj al-Din, published in *Al Ahram* of 17 February, to the effect that negotiations with Israel did not necessarily constitute recognition of it, but were an attempt to resolve long-standing problems between the two countries in the framework of the Armistice Agreement and UN resolutions; see No. 64.
3. See No. 59.

58. Sh. Divon (Tel Aviv) to the Bureau of the Foreign Minister. 27 February 1952

Copy: 93.08/356/18

Divon reports on his conversation with Ahmed Touqan, held at the latter's request to discuss political matters. Touqan said that Prime Minister Abu al-Huda had spoken to him of the possibility of raising the Arab-Israeli problem at the forthcoming meeting of the Arab League

council, scheduled to convene in Cairo on 29 March. The question had become relevant in light of recent press reports about Israeli-Egyptian negotiations,[1] which had not aroused negative reactions in Jordan. Ahmed Touqan believes that the climate is right for an attempt to move towards a solution of the Arab-Israeli problem; the Arab League council session could provide an opportunity for discussions in this direction. Touqan himself currently has no specific plan, but considers it important to renew contacts and exchange opinions.

On other matters, Touqan indicated that Jordanian army circles are inclined to agree to the partition of the Latrun no-man's land, and there is a possibility that the political echelons will also accept it. In contrast, there is no inclination to be flexible with regard to Mount Scopus, and he does not believe that the Jordanians will agree to the Israeli proposal.[2]

Notes

1. See Nos. 57 and 64.
2. See No. 8.
3. Sulaiman Touqan, Jordanian defense minister until June 1952.

59. M. Sharett [London] to A. Eban (Washington). 29 February 1952

Coded Tel. FA42; Inc.: 93.01/2208/4

Sharett reports to Eban on information and initiatives originating in Cairo about negotiations with Israel.[1] He asks him to request the State Department to instruct the U.S. ambassador in Cairo to ascertain whether these reflect a change in position and, if so, to determine its significance. If the Americans agree to do this, their inquiries must reflect a positive interest in the possibility of progress towards peace, in accordance with their declared policy. This approach is made at the request of Yassin Sarraj al-Din himself, in a talk with Maurice Fischer.

Notes

1. See Nos. 57 and 61.
2. See No. 58.
3. The remarks were made at a press conference held by Zafrulla Khan, Pakistani foreign minister, in Cairo on 27 February, at the end of a tour of Middle East countries, and concerned the establishment and composition of the Middle East Command (see *New York Times*, 28 February 1952).
4. See No. 65.

60. Meeting: E. Herlitz–J. Waldo (Washington, 27 February 1952, document dated 29 February 1952)

Report: 130.20/2460/5

The conversation, which took place at Waldo's initiative, was intended to examine the different evaluations of U.S. Ambassador Davis and State Department personnel concerning the possibility of improved relations between Israel and Syria.[1] Waldo ascribed Davis's coolness to the ambassador's innate caution, while the State Department enjoys greater freedom of action and can take bolder steps. On the matter itself, the Department is still recommending that Israel sit down with the Syrians to resolve the question of the demilitarized zones once and for all, even if this means that Israel must yield al-Hamma. Solving even a small problem in the demilitarized zones will improve the atmosphere and lay the foundations for progress on a larger scale.

Waldo then turned to a more general solution of the water problem and again raised the idea of setting up a Water Commission, this time in connection with the Jordanian plan to utilize the Yarmuk River. In this instance the Jordanians do not need Israeli agreement, but cooperation is desirable, in the form of a Water Commission responsible to UNRWA. The Americans believe that the commission should include Israel, Jordan, and Syria, and would first of all examine existing irrigation projects, including the Yarmuk plan. Subsequently, UNRWA might carry out part of the work, in the course of which it would become possible to settle refugees east of the Jordan. Waldo excluded Lebanon from the countries to be involved, but Herlitz noted that if rational exploitation of water resources is the objective, it would be desirable for that country to be part of the scheme.

The next topic of discussion was free passage through the Suez Canal. Herlitz asked for an authoritative clarification of the American position. In response, Waldo formulated the Department's position as follows:

"It is all a question of shading; we constantly bear the question of the Suez passage in mind in connection with the settlement of the Suez question, and feel that it would fall into place when the larger issue is solved."

In response to Herlitz's question as to whether this had been discussed with the Egyptians, Waldo replied that the American ambassador in Cairo[7] had recommended that the issue not be raised. On the basis of this and other talks, Herlitz concludes that the Americans are not undertaking to resolve the problem in conjunction with all the other Suez Canal issues, but assume that if the major problems of the area are solved so too will this one. Herlitz told Waldo that for the moment Israel will refrain from raising the question itself and will determine its position in light of future developments.

Notes

1. See No. 49.
2. See No. 30.
3. John Buchanan Hays, a water engineer, visited Palestine after the Second World War and drew up a plan for exploiting the waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk, in accordance with Lowdermilk's guidelines.
4. Edwin A. Locke, special representative of the U.S. Secretary of State for coordination of economic and technical assistance in the Near East and U.S. representative on the Advisory Commission of UNRWA.
5. See No. 49.
6. See No. 46.
7. Jefferson Caffery, United States ambassador in Cairo.
8. No. 50.

61. M. Comay to the Israel Embassy in Washington and the Israel Legation in Ankara. 3 March 1952

Coded Tel. IWA131; Outg.: 130.09/2309/5

Comay reports on Fischer and Divon's meeting with Yassin Sarraj al-Din. The latter explained that he made his statement because he felt that the time had come to achieve a rapprochement between Israel and Egypt. He noted that his remarks had been received with reservations but had not aroused the traditional vehement objections. Egypt's shift in policy was a result of its desire to put an end to its involvement in the Palestine problem, which was impeding the struggle against the British, of its recognition that a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a prerequisite for Middle Eastern security, of its disappointment at the position adopted by the Arab states, and of the fact that Israel has not taken advantage of Egypt's conflict with the British. Yassin said explicitly that the Americans had encouraged him but the British had not interfered.

It was agreed that Yassin would concentrate on studying Israel-Egypt relations and the creation of favorable sentiment, but would not take any initiative on behalf of Israel unless specifically asked to do so.

In the meanwhile, a change of government has taken place in Egypt[2] and it is not clear how this will affect the matter. In the interim, no steps are to be taken.

Notes

1. See No. 57.

2. On 1 March there was a government crisis in Egypt, and 'Ali Māhir's non-party government resigned. On 2 March a new non-party government was established, headed by Ahmad Nagib Hilāli Pasha. The Hilāli government instituted steps against members of the Wafd party, including placing Fuad Sarraj al-Din, general secretary of the Wafd party, under house arrest.

According to information that later reached Israel from sources in the Egyptian Embassy in Paris, Hilāli's new government intended to concentrate more on domestic matters and less on the negotiations with Great Britain and relations with Israel. (See Comay to the Israel Embassy in Washington, 9 March 1952, 130.09/2309/5.) See also No. 70.

62. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett (London). 3 March 1952

Coded Tel. WEA8; Outg.: 93.01/2208/5

Eban dispatches a general review of events and developments in conjunction with the Grant-in-Aid for fiscal 1952/53. The president's message to Congress on foreign aid, which will be made public this week, recommends an appropriation of $80 million for Israel. This should be seen as a great achievement. All those involved in the decision made positive recommendations, including all sections of the State Department. Israel also took energetic action in accordance with the lines laid down in telegram WPT10.[1] It is clear that Israel should accept the decision and not lobby in Congress to increase the sum.[2] At the same time, efforts are continuing to ensure a real prospect of receiving military aid in the coming year. As for this year, military aid is out of the question.[3]

In the meanwhile, the Embassy has taken action in anticipation of the Congressional debate. There have been meetings with the Jewish members of Congress and representatives of Jewish organizations. The following picture emerged from the two meetings: (1) The Administration's recommendation is a convenient starting point but there is no certainty that it will be adopted. (2) Two dangers loom large: an intentional campaign against the grant to Israel and a general curtailment of the foreign-aid package. (3) Israel can expect an attack on two fronts: its ostensible responsibility for the refugee situation and the argument that the United States is losing Arab friendship because of its excessive support for Israel.

The first stage in the campaign will be waged in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the main effort will be directed at its members. Unexpected support has come from the shift by Representative Bolton,[5] previously hostile to Israel, who has now come around to our side.

Israel should refrain from an official pronouncement when the president's message is published, but official circles should express satisfaction

and Ambassador Davis should be asked to convey Israel's gratitude to the president.

Notes

1. Eban's telegram to Sharett, 16 November 1951, 93.01/2207/23, sketches out a plan of action vis-à-vis the U.S. Administration and Congress aimed at increasing Israel's share of the American foreign aid program for fiscal 1952/53.
2. Telegram from Teddy Kollek to the United States Division and Ehud Avriel, director-general of the Prime Minister's Office, 8 February 1952, 93.01/2208/3. Kollek reported that President Truman had given instructions to allocate $80 million to Israel in the framework of the Mutual Security Act for 1952/53; he would do his utmost to protect this amount against slashes, but at the same time expected Israel not to lobby Congress that the amount is insufficient and should be increased.
3. See No. 47.
4. Evidently Louis A. Novins, general counsel of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.
5. Representative Frances Bolton (Republican of Ohio), member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

63. M. Sasson (Tel Aviv) to the Bureau of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 4 March 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2410/1

Sasson reports on his conversation with Ahmed Touqan. At their previous meeting Touqan had agreed to ascertain what lay behind the reported change in the Egyptian attitude towards Israel.[1] He now notified Sasson that Jordan had received no confirmation of the reports about a change in Egyptian policy, neither from the Egyptians directly nor through the Jordanian envoy in Cairo. Touqan believes it to be all rumors and feelers, and that no concrete change has as yet occurred in Egypt.

With regard to the rumors that the next session of the Arab League Council will discuss Arab-Israeli relations, Touqan notes that the session was scheduled a considerable time ago and that no item on its agenda deals specifically with Arab-Israeli relations, although the matter may be discussed as part of the report on the recent UN General Assembly session in Paris. Touqan is of the opinion that there is a close linkage between Egyptian-British relations and changes in Egypt's attitude towards Israel. Since this matter is not likely to be resolved before the League convenes, he sees no prospect for a substantive discussion of Arab-Israeli relations at the meeting.

In any case, if there is to be genuine progress, it will result from an Egyptian initiative. In that case, Jordan will coordinate its policy with the Egyptians, and Lebanon will also join in. He supposes that Syria will not raise obstacles; the only country likely to do so, in Touqan's estimation, is Iraq, which, since it is geographically distant from the arena of conflict as well as from domestic considerations, is liable to adopt an extreme nationalist position. Nevertheless, Touqan is not concerned about the Iraqi reaction, since both Egypt and Britain will be able to restrain it.

Notes

1. See No. 58.
2. Samir al-Rifa'i, prime minister of Jordan from December 1950 to July 1951.
3. See No. 8.

64. *Aide-Mémoire* by the Ambassador of Israel in Washington. 5 March 1952

Notes

1. The memorandum was delivered at a conversation with Secretary of State Acheson on 6 March; see No. 65.
2. See Nos. 57 and 59.
3. See No. 59 and n. 3 there.

65. A. Eban (Washington) to M. Sharett (London). 6 March 1952

Notes

1. See Nos. 59 and 64.
2. See No. 87.
3. This alludes to problems in transferring the balance of the economic assistance to Israel. These difficulties arose chiefly from the demand by McDaniel, the head of the aid administration in Israel, that the assistance funds be allocated for specific rehabilitation programs, and from planning and budgeting problems in Israel. (See Comay's telegram to the Israel Legation in London, IL553, 6 March 1952, 130.09/2318/9.)
4. See No. 47.
5. See Goitein to Comay, 7 March 1952, 130.20/2460/5.

66. M. Sharett (London) to M. Comay. 9 March 1952

Note

1. See Nos. 46, 50, and 65.

67. Cabinet Committee on Reparations from Germany [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations. 10 March 1952

Memorandum: 130.02/2417/4

The committee drafts instructions for the delegation after two joint meetings.

In the initial phase of the negotiations, the delegation must clarify the following three principles: (1) the total sum of reparations; (2) the payment period; (3) principles for implementation of the sum agreed upon.

Israel's reparations claim totals one billion dollars. Since this sum represents only a portion of the Nazi depredations, no smaller amount is acceptable.

The duration of payment must not exceed three to five years, given the considerable delay thus far in reaching an arrangement.

The principles for implementing the arrangement must be as follows: (1) a considerable portion (preferably up to one-third) will be paid in cash during the first two years; (2) the balance will be paid in part in consumer goods (including durables such as prefabricated housing, vehicles, and so forth), and part in capital goods.

During the first period Israel should receive primarily consumer goods. The details will be worked out by the committee in Israel.

The delegation is requested to consult with the Cabinet Committee on all important matters that may arise during the negotiations.

— D. Horowitz

68. M. Sharett (London) to M. Comay. 12 March 1952

Notes

1. See No. 48.
2. This refers to Israel's proposal to strengthen its industrial potential and transportation infrastructure, improve harbors and airports, and renew the equipment and

improve the training of the IDF in order to make it ready to defend the Middle East whenever necessary; see Vol. 6, No. 503.

3. The Security Council resolution of September, 1951, concerning freedom of passage through the Suez Canal.
4. See No. 50.
5. R. A. Butler, British chancellor of the exchequer.
6. Compare also the report prepared by the British Foreign Office, 11 March 1952, PRO FO371/96996.

   The meeting with Churchill took place on 20 March 1952. The atmosphere was excellent, and Churchill went on and on with recollections of his visits to Palestine, but Sharett was unable to get him to discuss practical matters. (See Sharett to Eytan, L1419, 21 March 1952, 93.04/40/14.)

69. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 14 March 1952

Notes

1. General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. A full report on the conversation, bearing the date 21 March 1952, is in File 130.02/2456/6. See also No. 124.

70. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 17 March 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2410/2

Rafael reports on his talk with Dr. Mahmud 'Azmi, who arrived in New York to represent Egypt on the UN Committee on Freedom of Information. The conversation focused on events in Egypt and the reports of a change in Egypt's attitude towards Israel.

In 'Azmi's opinion, Israel is attaching too much significance to all of the hints and reports about a change in attitude. The key figure is the king, who remains steadfast in his hatred for Israel; as long as there is no change in his outlook, no one will dare take any steps towards Israel. The Arab League, too, continues to be a hostile factor. Immediately after the declaration by Zafrulla Khan,[2] 'Azzam Pasha, the secretary-general of the League, issued a telegram to the effect that the Arab countries will never make peace with Israel. The League has also warned India against establishing diplomatic ties with Israel — apparently in conjunction with the visit to India by the director-general of the Israel Foreign Ministry.[3]

As for the change of governments in Egypt,[4] the king's main objective is to destroy the Wafd party. It may be expected that in the next few weeks many instances of corruption by party leaders, especially Yassin Sarraj al-Din, will be brought to light. 'Azmi nevertheless believes that the Wafd

has a strong public following and is likely to recover and return to full activity.

Egypt's international crisis is not related to the questions of Suez and the Sudan. As a matter of fact, both the previous and present governments would accept a compromise. The problem is whether to join the Western defense structure; given the domestic situation, no serious political actors in Egypt dare lead it into an official framework together with the West.

'Azmi believes that the political imbroglio into which Egypt has stumbled by abrogating the Anglo-Egyptian treaty will not be resolved in the near future. The situation will remain fluid for a long time, although in the interim the king will attempt to calm things down and reinforce his control, relying primarily on the army.

At the end of the conversation, 'Azmi expressed a desire to remain in contact with Rafael throughout his stay in New York.

Rafael draws two conclusions: (1) The prevailing outlook in the State Department and Whitehall, that under certain conditions Egypt can be induced to enter into some sort of pact with the West, must be exposed as erroneous. It should be explained that Egypt will maintain its traditional policy of non-alignment—as during the Second World War—until it is sure which side will come out on top. (2) Steps must be taken to counter the tendency in the American press, which may also have some currency in the State Department, to believe that King Faruq is the keystone of a possible solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. If it is American policy to rely on the king, more pressure should be exerted upon him to modify his attitude towards Israel. One should not hesitate to tell him through the American press that Egypt's involvement in the Palestine war, and its results, are his doing and his direct responsibility.

Notes

1. Abd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha, secretary-general of the Arab League.
2. See No. 59 and n. 3 there.
3. See No. 71.
4. See No. 57 and n. 2 there.
5. Muhammad Salah al-Din, Egyptian foreign minister, 1950–January, 1951.

71. Report by W. Eytan. 18 March 1952

Information to Israel Missions Abroad: 130.02/2414/1

Eytan reports on his visit to India, from 27 February to 9 March. His objective was to bring about the establishment of diplomatic relations be-

tween the two countries. According to the instructions he received before his departure, if the Indians refused to establish full and reciprocal relations he was to seek at least their agreement to have the Indian envoy in Ankara accredited to Israel and, if this too was rejected, to obtain their agreement to the establishment of an Israeli mission only in New Delhi. In the last case, the question of whether to open a mission in New Delhi without reciprocity would remain open and be discussed further after his return to Israel.

His initial talks with officials and ministers were not encouraging. All of the difficulties were explained to him—the lack of funds and of personnel, the fears of Arab reactions, and the unwillingness to upset its forty-million-strong Muslim minority. In addition, he was given to understand that Israel is not particularly well thought of in India; it is considered to be an American satellite and criticized for not implementing UN resolutions, especially with regard to the Arab refugees. This unpromising beginning was followed by a certain improvement, which Eytan ascribes to three factors. (1) Israel's position vis-à-vis the People's Republic of China: The Indians consider the China question to be the key to all international problems, and Israel's positive stance on this issue helps bring Israel and India closer together. (2) Israel's relations with Turkey: India's recognition of Israel was considerably accelerated by Turkey's recognition and the fact that Israel and Turkey have conducted normal relations and diplomatic ties for two years was of major importance. (3) The presence of a large number of Oxonians in the leadership and in the senior echelons of the Indian Civil Service: This facilitated personal relations (Eytan himself is a graduate of Oxford) and made for a cordial atmosphere in the talks.

Eytan's most important conversation was with Nehru, who decides all matters, large and small, in India, so that his stand is what counts. Nehru indicated at once that on the question of relations there is no disagreement per se. He dismissed all of the arguments cited by Eytan's previous interlocutors and indicated that the only problem bothering him was the reaction of India's Muslim minority. He explained at length that this is a large minority that had remained leaderless after the establishment of Pakistan, and that the Indian government is making every effort to assist its integration into the Indian state and to avoid offending its sensibilities. The establishment of relations with Israel is likely to distress the Muslims and could also become an excuse for a Pakistani provocation. Nevertheless, the time has come to establish relations and he will raise the subject in the new government he will form after the upcoming general elections. Though Nehru did not make an explicit positive commitment, the impression received by Eytan, from talks with senior officials in the Ministry of External Affairs after his session with Nehru, and from other sources, is that the decision has been taken and the establishment of relations can be expected sometime in May. He proposes that nothing be made public in the interim,

since the decision still requires final government approval and premature publicity would embarrass the prime minister.

Notes

1. See No. 53.
2. Armit Kaur, Indian minister of health.
3. A. P. Jain, Indian minister of rehabilitation.
4. See Weekly Survey No. 3, 12 March 1952, 93.08/413/3.

Editorial Note

Opening Meeting of the Reparations Negotiations

On 21 March the negotiations on reparations from Germany opened in Wassenaar, near The Hague. The participants were a delegation from the State of Israel, a delegation from the Conference on Jewish Material Claims, and a German delegation. The Israeli delegation was headed by F. E. Shinnar and Giora Josephthal; Gershon Avner of the Foreign Ministry was the delegation spokesman. The delegation from the Jewish organizations was led by Moses A. Leavitt. The head of the German delegation was Franz Boehm, dean of Goethe University in Frankfurt. At the opening session each delegation read a prepared statement. Israel's was based mainly on the note sent to the Western powers on 12 March 1951 (see Vol. 6, No. 84), and also noted the statement by Adenauer to the Bundestag concerning his letter to Nahum Goldmann (ibid., Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 287–88, and No. 515). Israel's financial claim, to cover the costs of absorbing immigrants who had been persecuted by the Nazis, estimated to number 500,000, amounted to $1.5 billion, with $1 billion of this attributed to the account of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the rest to that of East Germany. The opening statement of the Jewish organizations related to the global demands of the Jewish organizations for caring for Jewish survivors and their rehabilitation and stressed the need to maintain and even expand the legislation dealing with individual claims. The Jewish organizations did not mention a particular sum. The German opening statement also referred to Adenauer's statement, but linked the reparations negotiations to Germany's limited financial ability and the results of the London debt conference that was taking place at the same time. The atmosphere of the first meeting was extremely cool and correct. (For a full report, the text of the opening statements of the delegations, and full lists of delegation members, see File 130.02/2417/5.)

72. F. E. Shinnar and G. Josephthal (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 21 March 1952

Coded Tel. HIA36; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

Shinnar and Josephthal report on the opening session of the reparations negotiations.[1] The meeting was held in a cool, correct atmosphere, and no one shook hands. Following formal introduction of the participants, the opening statements were read out. The German statement gives cause for concern, because it indicates that their intention is to clarify the details and substance of the claims and then return to Bonn to draft their replies. They are also trying to link their answers on reparations with the results of the London Conference on German External Debts, as well as with Germany's economic ability, which they declare to be limited.

Note

1. See the preceding Editorial Note.

73. Résumé of a Joint Meeting of the Israel Embassy in Washington and the Israel Delegation to the United Nations. 21 March 1952

130.02/2382/22

The ambassador announced his intention to hold such meetings every two weeks, in order to jointly summarize issues and draw conclusions, as well as to examine problems and issues whose significance goes beyond routine matters.

Egyptian peace feelers:
The ambassador reported on growing signs that the Americans believe that there is something in the Egyptian initiative.[1] The president told Senator Brewster[2] that he is very hopeful of a gradual move towards an Arab-Israeli settlement, and Berry spoke in a similar vein in his meeting with Shind, director-general of the Israel Ministry of Defence. Reports were also presented on the ambassador's meeting with Col. Hoskins,[3] who offered his services as an intermediary with the Syrians, and on the Kopper proposal to send a special emissary to the Middle East to probe the situation.[4] It appears, however, that the British are not happy about any Israel-Egypt accord at this moment. Esther Herlitz, on the other hand, believes that the State Department tends to take a more moderate view of the value of such

feelers, and its personnel advise the Israelis to concentrate on contacts in the Mixed Armistice Commission. G. Rafael reported on his talk with 'Azmi,[6] from which he concludes that King Faruq's enmity towards Israel is unswerving and that there is public opposition in Egypt to joining the West.

On the Middle East Command, Eban reported on his talk with Bradley.[7] The latter feels that the Command will be established, even without the participation of Egypt or other Arab countries as founder members. The Command will be prepared to make *ad hoc* arrangements with any interested state. In the opinion of M. Shalit, the Command is today more a political and formal matter than a substantive military issue, because of the faint chances of a British-Egyptian accord.

The ambassador advanced the following policy line:

1. Peaceful tendencies in the Arab world should receive serious consideration. It must be understood that the process is a slow one, and hasty and premature attempts to mediate must be resisted. The United States government must be made to accept its responsibility to encourage this movement towards peace. The message must be conveyed through the press that peace with Israel is a necessity for the Arabs, and not merely an Israeli desire.

2. The Americans should be asked to help arrange a meeting with Mahmud Fawzi, who has become one of the pillars of Egyptian diplomacy.[8] The Pakistani position should also be clarified, as well as what lies behind the statement by Zafrulla Khan.

3. At some point, it should be suggested to the United States that, given the lack of progress towards a British-Egyptian accord, efforts should concentrate on an Egypt-Israel agreement, which does not require mutual concessions or a solution to thorny strategic problems. The Egyptians should be encouraged to expect that an improvement in their relations with Israel would have a positive effect the United States and help them in their confrontation with the British.

4. Continued pressure should be exerted on the Arabs to resolve the outstanding armistice agreement issues, such as Mount Scopus and the demilitarized zones. The Government should put the Egyptian position on free passage through the Suez Canal to the test, either by the transport of non-military goods in foreign bottoms or passage of an Israeli-flagged vessel. Shipping to Eilat should be renewed. A meeting should be held with the sponsors of the Security Council resolution on passage through the Suez Canal for a fundamental discussion of the problem.

5. The West should be told that the current murky situation with regard to security arrangements in the Middle East is likely to prove advantageous, since it makes it possible for all countries in the region to organize

in an informal but practical and effective fashion around a Western nucleus, in the framework of a series of parallel bilateral agreements.

Grant-in-Aid

The ambassador reported on the bills sent to the appropriate Congressional committees. This year's bill was drafted as amendments to that of the previous year and authorizes an increase in appropriations over last year. Another proposed amendment would permit the use in the following year of any funds not spent during the current one.

Notes

1. See No. 65.
2. Sen. Owen Brewster, Republican of Maine.
3. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, a State Department consultant.
4. This refers to the conversation between Shalit and Goitein of the Israel Embassy and Samuel Kopper, deputy director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department. Kopper proposed sending an emissary, ostensibly a businessman, to the Middle East to meet with leaders in Arab countries and Israel and to attempt to bring the sides closer to an agreement. Shalit and Goitein agreed with the proposal, but suggested that the envoy not be someone directly linked to the State Department but someone "neutral from the perspective of his affiliation with the American government apparatus," such as a former ambassador to a Middle Eastern country who is no longer actively engaged in diplomacy. (See Shalit to Eban, 13 February 1952, 93.08/409/1.)
5. See No. 59 and n. 3 there.
6. See No. 70.
7. See No. 69.
8. Mahmud Fawzi, Egypt's permanent representative at the United Nations; from December 1952, Egyptian foreign minister.
9. See No. 62.

74. A. Kubovy (Prague) to M. Sharett. 22 March 1952

Coded Tel. 28; Inc.: 130.09/2343/1

Kubovy cables details of his meeting the previous day with the Czechoslovak deputy foreign minister, Borek. Borek informed him officially that Mordechai Oren was arrested because his visa had expired and because he had carried out criminal acts detrimental to state security.[1] This conversation confirms Kubovy's suspicion that the regime intends to hold a major anti-Zionist show trial. The respite in anti-Zionist and anti-Israel propaganda is only temporary; when the Comecon Conference in Moscow is over it is likely that this propaganda will recommence with fresh vigor.

Kubovy requests a meeting with Sharett somewhere in Europe for consultations.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 51.
2. A full report of the conversation with Borek, dated 25 March 1952, is in File 130.11/2494/3. The telegram was forwarded to Sharett in London, but there is no record of a meeting between Kubovy and Sharett in Europe.

   On 26 March the Israel Legation in Prague submitted a note concerning Oren to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry. The legation protested that eleven weeks had passed from Oren's arrest until official notification thereof was received by the legation, refuted the claim that Oren had been staying in Czechoslovakia illegally, and requested clarifications about the nature of the anti-state activities with which he was charged. In addition, it requested that a member of the legation staff be allowed to visit Oren at his place of detention. (The letter is in File 130.11/2513/3.)

75. M. Sharett [London] to W. Eytan. 22 March 1952

Notes

1. See No. 68. The question as to whether to report the arrival of the British military mission in Israel to France and Turkey—the other two candidates for participation in the Middle East defense organization—was discussed in an exchange of telegrams between London and Tel Aviv. Sharett was of the opinion that an announcement should be deferred until the delegation's terms of reference had been clarified and the agenda of its visit determined. (See telegram LI405, 19 March 1952, 130.02/2457/5.)
2. After his return from Israel, and obviously after consultations, Sharett stated that Israel agreed that Britain notify France and Turkey about the dispatch of the delegation, on condition that the report be in extremely general terms and not involve a commitment for ongoing reports on all details of the progress of the talks and the results of the delegation's inquiry. Israel would itself report to the United States. Sharett proposed the following text: "UK [and] Israel have agreed [to] examine together possibilities strengthening certain aspects [of] Israel's defence potential in [the] event [of an] emergency." (See the telegram from Sharett to the Israel Legation in London, LI657, 1 April 1952, 130.09/2318/9.)
3. Following this conversation, the subject was discussed again by the British Foreign Office and Defence Ministry; the Foreign Office rejected the idea of providing weapons along the lines of lend-lease or through long-term credit, but recommended that weapons transfers be facilitated by spreading out the payments over a long period. (See Wardrop to Gracewell, 10 April 1952, PRO FO371/98799.) See also No. 76.
4. See No. 61, n. 2; No. 70.

76. M. Sharett (London) to A. Eden (London). 24 March 1952

Notes

1. See No. 68, n. 6.
2. See No. 75.
3. During the conversation Israel's economic problems were discussed at length. After that the Israeli representatives raised a number of special requests: (1) British credits in the amount of £10 million for purchases of fuel; (2) a credit of £5 million for industrial development; (3) the laying of an oil pipeline from Eilat to Haifa. With regard to oil, the British suggested that the interest and part of the principal be repaid in dollars. As for the industrial credit they proposed that Britain receive first rights to purchase potash and phosphates. With regard to the pipeline they suggested the following possibilities: British credit, a concession, or a joint British-Israeli venture. There was no final decision on any of these matters and it was agreed that Horowitz would continue his inquiries. (See Sharett to Eytan, [27 March 1952], 130.02/2412/26.)

77. F. E. Shinnar and G. Josephthal (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 25 March 1952

Coded Tel. HIA37; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

By agreement with Sharett, Goldmann, Horowitz, and Keren, Josephthal yesterday announced that Israel objects to linking the negotiations with the results of the Conference on German External Debts and Germany's ability to pay. Israel based itself on Adenauer's letter to Goldmann, which is a clear-cut and unqualified commitment. The Germans requested a recess for consultations; when they returned they submitted a memorandum accompanied by an oral explanation, the substance of which is that the amount is to be fixed here, while the precise schedule and form of the payments will be determined in conjunction with the Debts Conference. The Israeli delegation finds this proposal to be generally satisfactory. Shinnar then provided practical information as to the basis of the Israeli claim, the schedule of payments, and their apportionment between goods and cash. The Germans took the material for further study and to prepare their response. The impression is that progress has been made towards serious negotiations.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 56; No. 72.
2. See the exchange of memoranda between the German and Israeli delegations, 24 September 1952, 130.02/2417/5.

78. Ambassador of Israel in Washington to the U. S. Secretary of State (Washington). 25 March 1952

Notes

1. A similar memorandum was submitted also to the governments of Great Britain and France (see File 130.02/2413/5).
2. See Vol. 6, No. 89.
3. Vol. 6, No. 19.
4. After the memorandum was delivered there was a conversation between Esther Herlitz and Geoffrey Lewis, the deputy director of the Bureau of German Affairs in the State Department. Lewis explained that because of the talks between the Western powers and Germany on new arrangements the Germans had slackened the rate of dealing with restitution claims, in the hope that procedural changes would ensue. As for the Americans, they would demand forcefully that the restitution demands be met. At the same time, the separate arrangements that had been made in a number of German Länder were the best way to accelerate processing; it should be hoped that the other German Länder would follow this path. (See Herlitz to Shinnar, 27 March 1952, 130.02/2413/5.)

   At the beginning of April the Western powers sent similar answers, evidently after coordination among themselves. The main point of the response was that negotiations concerning arrangements after termination of the occupation regime were still underway, and information on legislation concerning restitution would be made available to representatives of Israel. It was hoped that "arrangements envisaged by the High Commission will not be unsatisfactory to the Government of Israel." (See, for example, the Secretary of State to the Israel Ambassador to the United States, 10 April 1952, 93.08/358/20.) See also No. 164.

79. Sh. Eliashiv (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 25 March 1952

Coded Tel. 117; Inc.: 130.09/2325/6

Eliashiv reports on his meeting with Bazarov[1] about Israel's claim for reparations and restitution from Germany. Bazarov replied briefly that the Soviet government considers the matter to be among the issues that will have to be discussed when a peace treaty is signed with Germany. When Eliashiv asked what the Soviet position is in principle and to what degree the U.S.S.R. will support Israel on this question, Bazarov indicated that he could not reply further and had been instructed to convey only the previous statement. In Eliashiv's opinion, the statement may mean that the Soviets will not recognize an agreement between Israel and West Germany as long as there is no peace treaty with Germany, but it may also be routine propaganda designed to achieve sympathy for their position on a

German peace settlement. He asks whether it is worth telling the Soviets directly in Moscow, or through the press, that they themselves had not waited for a peace treaty with Germany and had unilaterally taken most generous war reparations.

Notes

1. Semen T. Bazarov, director of the Near and Middle East Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
2. In response, Eliashiv was told that it was impossible to publish the contents of the Soviet answer now, because publication was liable to weaken Israel's position in the current negotiations with the Germans. Israel should prepare a note to the Soviet Union that would refute its response and also use the idea in paragraph (b) of Eliashiv's telegram. (See the East European Division to the Israel Legation in Moscow, IQA72, 28 March 1952, 130.09/2325/5.)

   At the end of April, the question of reparations was discussed at a meeting between the Foreign Minister and the Soviet Minister to Israel. The latter argued that the whole matter was between Israel and West Germany and that Israel had never approached East Germany. He was told in response that the East German position on the reparations question was so negative that there was no point in approaching its government. In East Germany there had been no progress as there had been in West Germany, as expressed in Adenauer's letter. Arye Levavi, who was present at the meeting, felt that no progress should be expected from the Russians in this area. (See Levavi to Argaman, 27 April 1952, 130.11/2492/17.) See also Nos. 292 and 356.

Editorial Note

Foreign Minister's Visit to Italy

Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett paid an official visit to Italy at the end of March. The visit was preceded by many hesitations on both sides. The Italians were apprehensive of the Arabs' reaction, especially in view of the attempt at rapprochement that had been made over recent months. The Israelis were afraid that the visit would be largely ceremonial and produce no significant results, and that the Italians would sidetrack the Foreign Minister to discussions of pending commercial and technical problems between Italy and Israel. The visit, which took place from 25 to 29 March, was held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. Sharett met the leaders of the country, and, as was customary on such official visits, also the Pope. From the practical perspective, the visit bore fruit in the cultural, commercial, and economic areas. Solutions were also sketched out for a number of the commercial problems outstanding between the two countries. For details, see the report by Ishai to the West European Division, 7 April 1952, 130.10/2534/13.

80. M. Sharett (Rome) to W. Eytan. 27 March 1952

Coded Tel. 224; Inc.: 130.09/2356/2

Sharett reports on his talks and meetings in Rome. His meeting with the president[1] was cordial but non-committal. His meeting with Premier De Gasperi[2] was more interesting and important. Sharett outlined the principles of Israeli policy, which De Gasperi understood and agreed with. De Gasperi himself laid emphasis on the following points: (1) There is no contradiction between friendship for the Arabs and friendship with Israel. (2) Stability and peace must be promoted by influencing the Arab states towards peace and by demonstrating normal relations with Israel. (3) Israel has special value as a democratic country with a European heritage and ties with world Jewry. (4) He understands the special sensitivity in relation to Jews in Eastern Europe. (5) Israel should participate in the defense of the Middle East not by officially joining a binding framework but through ongoing talks and practical preparations.

Sharett heard many friendly statements in his talk with Undersecretary Dominedo,[3] but there was also discussion of practical problems and of a friendship and navigation treaty. Dominedo proposed concluding such a treaty in stages by signing a series of agreements, following the precedent set by Italy with Brazil. Sharett agreed to pursue this route.

The audience with the Pope[4] was a courtesy call only. Sharett twice attempted to steer the conversation to the question of Jerusalem but the Pope refused to be drawn out. At the end of the audience the latter asked that the Christian communities in Jerusalem be allowed to develop.

Notes

1. Luigi Einaudi, president of Italy.
2. Alcide de Gasperi, prime minister of Italy.
3. Francesco Dominedo, Italian undersecretary for foreign affairs.
4. Pope Pius XII, 1939–1958.
5. Moshe Ishai, Israel minister in Rome.

81. E. Sasson (Ankara) to W. Eytan. 28 March 1952

Copy: 130.02/2410/1

Sasson refers to a report in *Ha'aretz* (20 March) that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion told 50 newspaper editors and radio correspondents from the United States that there will soon be peace with Egypt, followed by other

Arab states. The Prime Minister also added that broad circles in Egypt are desirous of peace, but are afraid to speak openly from fear of their political rivals.

Sasson doubts the reliability of the information in the possession of the Prime Minister and questions the wisdom of disseminating in Israel reports emanating from the press and from other conversations about a move towards peace with Egypt. Along with everyone else, he is following the talks being held with the Egyptians[1] as well as the press reports on the Egyptian initiatives; but he would also cite two recent press reports from Egypt, one of them in reaction to the prime minister's remarks, utterly denying the reports of a willingness to negotiate with Israel and demanding that the new Egyptian government undertake never to entertain the possibility of any contacts whatsoever with Israel.

Sasson warns against attempts to stimulate a policy shift in the Arab world by publishing optimistic reports in Israel. Israel has already tried this approach in the past and failed. Such publicity always provokes an extremely negative reaction from the other side and retards the peace process.

Note

1. See No. 61

82. F. E. Shinnar (The Hague) to W. Eytan. 30 March 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2417/5

Shinnar reports on the developments in the reparations talks, in addition to the regular reports that the delegation sends by telegram.[1] He appends to his letter the exchange of notes with the German delegation that took place during the negotiations.[3]

The first six sessions were devoted to material discussions to substantiate the Israeli claim of $1.5 billion. It should be emphasized that the other party is not insisting on this inquiry in order to turn the talks into an exercise of haggling over sums, but in order to obtain a fair idea of the Israeli demand so that they can report to their superiors in Bonn. They stressed that they would certainly understand were the Israeli delegation to refuse to provide hard details concerning the computations that underlie the claim. In any case, this discussion gave Josephthal a convenient opportunity to explain in convincing and impressive fashion the basis for the claim. In any case the Israeli delegation believes that fixing the sum is a prerequisite for subsequent negotiations on the schedule and form of the reparations payments.

The German reaction points to two probable reservations: (1) not all the Jewish immigration to Palestine can be ascribed to the Nazi rise to power (point 4 in their letter);[4] (2) the claims of Jewish organizations with regard to heirless property and the general claim for reparations put forward by the government of Israel overlap. From their remarks it is clear that they will attempt to reduce the organizations' claim of $500 million. This does not come as a surprise to either the Israeli delegation or that of the organizations.

Another matter raised by the Germans in their letter concerns the form in which the agreement will be implemented.[8] Israel has not yet replied to these proposals, but they are definitely of interest as an indicatation that the Germans are thinking along the right lines, although their proposal to obtain an international loan for the purpose is not practicable.

In the meanwhile, the Israel delegation is preparing for the second stage of the discussions, which is to deal with implementation of the agreement. A list of goods required by Israel is already being drawn up, although the delegation has not yet received all the material it requires on this matter.

It is obvious that the upcoming recess in the talks will be decisive for the overall results of the negotiations. The Germans intend to consult with the German delegation to the Conference on German External Debts in London, in other words, mainly with Abs,[10] and then with their government. The consultation in their government will probably be held after the Easter recess, and everything will depend on the agreement reached between Adenauer's staff and that of the Finance Ministry, which will definitely be supported by Abs.

Notes

1. See Nos. 72 and 77. In another telegram (HIA43, 29 March 1952, 130.09/2303/15), progress was reported in the negotiations: the Israeli delegation had provided details on the expenses of absorbing immigrants in Israel; at the beginning of the next week there would be negotiations on the amount of reparations. After that the German delegation would go home for consultations. Then the real struggle would begin on the German side, pitting the money men against Adenauer's staff, who wished to conclude the negotiations satisfactorily.
2. See No. 77.
3. The documents are in the file but have been omitted here.
4. In point (4) of their letter, the Germans asserted that immigration to Israel, both before and after 1945, from European countries that had been in the German sphere of influence should not be ascribed only to persecution by the Nazis; other factors, such as anti-Semitism in these countries, or the immigrants' Zionist ideology, had also played a part in their emigration to Israel. Hence they did not accept the number of 500,000 immigrants who had reached Israel in these years as an index for determining the sum of reparations.

5. Point (5) in the German delegation's letter dealt with the overlap between the claim of the Israel government and that of the Jewish organizations with regard to compensation for heirless property—see below. The telegram, dated 27 March 1952, is in File 130.02/2417/5.
6. Otto Küster, head of the restitution department in the Ministry of the Interior of the German state of Baden-Württemberg, one of the two leaders of the German delegation to the reparations negotiations.
7. On this matter see No. 78. The documents have not been located.
8. The Germans posed three questions: (a) What were the chances, in Israel's opinion, that Germany's other creditors would accept the Israeli view that Germany's debt to the Jewish people took priority over its debts to other countries? (b) Would Israel agree to accept a certain proportion of the debt in the currency of the members of the European Payments Union? (c) What was the possibility, in Israel's opinion, that Germany would receive a hard-currency loan to cover the reparations payments?
9. Yitzhak Bawly, economic advisor, formerly Controller of Supplies and director of the Department of Goods and Supplies in the Ministry of Supply and Rationing.
10. Hermann Abs, German banker, head of the German delegation to the Conference on German External Debt in London.

83. Z. Shek[1] (Prague) to A. Levavi.[2] 30 March 1952

Orig.: 130.11/2498/1

Shek, after home leave in Israel, records his impressions on his return to Prague. The atmosphere is chilly and heavy, although meetings are held as usual and even marked by an aura of forced cordiality. According to his understanding of the situation, everything that has happened—the purge of the cosmopolitan intelligentsia from the top echelons of the regime, the expulsion of Jews from the government apparatus, the arrest of the Zionists, the Jews, and the Israelis—must be taken together as a single, carefully devised scheme implemented with total thoroughness. This is characteristic of the Czechs when dealing with a matter they consider to be important.

What is the reason for this campaign, and what is its origin? Is it being carried out on orders from Moscow or on local initiative? Shek has no answers, but puts forward the hypothesis that these developments reflect the Czechs' belief in an imminent world war, in which case the Jews are not to be trusted. In any case, the specific charges made against the detainees, including Oren and Orenstein, are not the real reason for the arrests; in the past such matters were ignored. Consequently he can only repeat the words of the deputy foreign minister to the Israeli minister in Prague—"You'll know in time."[4]

In the meanwhile, there is a lull in the press attacks on Zionism and the Jews, but this is to be ascribed to the Czechs' fear of critical reactions in the Western press, which would undermine the economic Conference in Moscow.

Notes

1. Zeev Shek, first secretary in the Israel Legation in Czechoslovakia.
2. Arye Levavi, deputy director-general of the Foreign Ministry and head of the East European Division.
3. See No. 51.
4. See No. 74 and n. 2 there.
5. Klement Gottwald, president of Czechoslovakia.
6. See No. 74.
7. Several paragraphs dealing with personal or administrative matters have been omitted here.

84. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division and M. Sharett. 31 March 1952

Notes

1. See No. 70.
2. Hāfez 'Afifi, chief of the Royal Cabinet in Egypt.
3. In his reply, Sharett defined the conversation with 'Azmi as the "most brilliant and creative turn seen [in a] long time." Nevertheless he sought to warn Eban against 'Azmi's tendency to theoretical formulations on the basis of far-reaching generalizations and against his anti-Western tendencies. He also suggested that Eban attempt to clarify, from sources within the State Department, whether the Egyptian Embassy was in full agreement with 'Azmi's remarks. Sharett also wanted to know the identities of the three State Department officials who had met with Eban. (Sharett to Eban, IW201, 3 April 1952, 130.09/2309/5.) See also No. 91.

85. M. Fischer (Paris) to W. Eytan. 31 March 1952

Notes

1. Alfred Cohen, an Egyptian Jewish businessman.
2. Not identified.

86. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 31 March 1952

Coded Tel. HIA44; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

An informal conversation was held with members of the German delegation, at which they said that they would not recommend that their gov-

ernment accept the Israeli claim of an overall figure of one billion dollars in reparations, but rather a slightly smaller sum, which they will disclose after consultations with their government. The Israel delegation will of course continue to stand firm on the entire sum, but requests instructions as to whether to agree in principle to less than one billion dollars. The delegation's feeling is that it will be impossible to obtain the full sum because of Germany's debts and domestic situation.[1]

Note

1. Before replying, Sharett wanted to know whether the sum of one billion referred to the reparation demands of the State of Israel only, or also included the claims of the Jewish organizations (see his telegram, dated 1 April 1952, 130.09/2303/14). See also No. 89.

87. Meeting: A. Eban–G. Lewis Jones (Washington, 1 April 1952)

Notes

1. The document is dated 15 April 1952.
2. See No. 65.
3. See No. 84.
4. The matter referred to is obscure.
5. See Vol. 6, No. 477.
6. The Three Power agreement of May 1950—see Vol. 5, No. 248.
7. See No. 65.
8. Edwin Wright, advisor on intelligence matters to the Assistant Secretary of State for African and Near Eastern Affairs.

88. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1 April 1952

Notes

1. See No. 86.
2. In the wake of the crisis in the reparations talks, a number of meetings were held in Great Britain between Israel and Great Britain. Participating on the Israeli side were Minister Elath and Councillor Keren, and, on the British side, Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Nutting and Deputy Under-secretary of State for German Affairs Frank Roberts. Keren defined one of the talks as "not unsatisfactory," and reported that, following the meetings, he had been promised that a report

would be sent to the British High Commissioner in Germany, who would react sympathetically if approached by Adenauer. (See Keren's telegram to Sharett, LI457, 4 April 1952, 130.09/2319/1.)

3. In a conversation on 30 March, Harriman told Eban that the Americans had instructed the Germans to reach a satisfactory agreement with Israel, but the United States was not committed to any particular sum; moreover, the Americans viewed the amount of the Israeli demand as impractical. (See telegram from Eban to the United States Division, W965, 30 March 1952, 93.01/2208/5.)
4. Moses A. Leavitt, Executive Vice-Chairman of the American Joint Distribution Committee and head of the delegation of the Jewish organizations to the reparations talks in The Hague.
5. Jacob Blaustein, president of the American Jewish Committee.
6. Fritz Schäffer, German Minister of Finance.
7. Eban responded that he would immediately begin action at the State Department, while Blaustein would meet at his request with President Truman. He would also ask Harriman and perhaps other leaders as well to meet with the President. It was also his intention to send a letter to Secretary of State Acheson. For the moment he requests: (1) that the delegation in The Hague not break off the talks during the coming week, because action in the United States requires time; (2) that he be told the absolute minimum amount of reparations that would be acceptable to Israel, since he anticipated that the Americans would want to reduce the amount of reparations. (Eban to the United States Division, W975, 2 April 1952, 130.09/2309/9.) See also No. 92.

89. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 April 1952

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

The delegation responds to Sharett's question about the breakdown of the total amount of reparations between the State of Israel and the Jewish organizations.[1] The sum in question refers to Israel's claim only; it must be assumed that the organizations will receive a far smaller sum than their original demand — the Germans have already made this clear. Consequently, the closer the amount for the State of Israel approaches one billion, the smaller is the organizations' prospect of increasing their share. It is the delegation's feeling that the two sums together will total less than one billion dollars.

For the moment, there is an increasing likelihood that the Germans will return from Bonn without a specific reply in an attempt to postpone the decision on the sum of reparations until after the Easter recess. The delegation is preparing to react sharply and to notify them that the amount is the only outstanding matter and that if no reply is forthcoming the future of the talks will be in jeopardy. The delegation proposes using the following

formula: "If a reply is not received within a matter of days, we will have to recommend to our government that it break off the negotiations."

Notes

1. See No. 86 and n. 1 there.
2. In the wake of this telegram, Sharett sent the following instructions to the delegation: (1) "If the intention is a single payment to us and the organizations, then by no means should we go below the amount of one billion. But if it is to Israel alone, it is possible to compromise even on a bit less." (2) "Do not say in any official meeting that the delegation will recommend suspending the negotiations. You can say this only in private discussions. Officially you must say: We will submit a full report and the government will decide whether to continue the negotiations or not." (See Sharett's telegrams to the reparations delegation, 3 April 1952, 130.09/2303/14.)

90. A. Eban [New York] to E. A. Gross (New York). 3 April 1952

Notes

1. See Nos. 26 and 45.
2. See No. 113.

91. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 3 April 1952

Note

1. See No. 84 and n. 3 there.

92. A. Eban [Washington] to D. Acheson (Washington). 3 April 1952

Notes

1. See No. 88.
2. See Vol. 6, No. 84.
3. See No. 27.
4. See Vol. 6, No. 510.

93. F. E. Shinnar and G. Josephthal (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 April 1952

Coded Tel. 13; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

The German delegation returned from Bonn. The upshot of their visit is that Adenauer is not willing to decide without Abs and the finance minister, particularly after Abs sent a sharp reply to his telegram on the need to set the level for reparations immediately.[1] Abs has been summoned to Bonn; when he arrives the decisive meeting will take place, with the participation of the chancellor's staff, Abs, and the German delegation to the reparations talks. The delegation is in a belligerent mood and will push for an answer, and may even threaten to resign. Evidently they are recommending the sum of $750 million. They reiterated that the general impression in Bonn is that the United States is indifferent to the entire matter. The Israeli delegation is trying to exert pressure through the three high commissioners in Germany. The delegation requests instructions: (1) if the German government decides to postpone an answer on the final amount for one month to six weeks, as Abs insists; (2) regarding the sum of three quarters of a billion dollars, which is being kept top secret.[3]

Note

1. See No. 88.

94. Meeting: A. Eban–G. Lewis (Washington, 4 April 1952)

Notes

1. The document is dated 15 April 1952. Those participating in the conversation were Esther Herlitz for Israel, and, on behalf of the State Department, George Baker, a senior official (for economic matters) in the Division for Occupied Areas Affairs, and Jacques Reinstein, special assistant to the director of the Department of German Affairs.
2. No. 92.
3. See No. 88.
4. No. 27.
5. Gen. John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner in Germany.
6. Compare No. 96.

95. E. Sasson (Ankara) to W. Eytan. 4 April 1952

Copy: 130.15/2565/25

Sasson reports on his conversation with the counsellor of the Iranian Embassy in Ankara on Israel-Iran relations. The counsellor proposed an "interim solution" to the problem, whereby each country would be represented in the other by a third party until conditions are ripe for normal relations. The counsellor noted that this was his personal idea; if Israel approves he will try to obtain his country's agreement.

Sasson replied that he would transmit this proposal to his government, but with a negative recommendation. In his view, normal relations should be established between the two countries; a proposal such as that put forward by the counsellor would be meaningful only for handling routine matters, such as visas, authentification of documents, and so on. He added that he is sure that the United States or any American financial institution interested in Iran's economy would welcome any step towards normalizing relations between Iran and Israel, which would benefit the region as well as the cause of world peace. Instead of this proposal, he reiterated his previous suggestion that Israel send a special representative to Iran to represent its interests temporarily, pending the establishment of normal diplomatic ties.[2]

Notes

1. Muhammad Musaddeq, prime minister of Iran.
2. Eytan handed on this proposal for consideration by Sharett, who stated that Israel ought indeed to oppose the proposed solution, but suggested delaying an answer in order to find out to what extent the establishment of such a link would further the practical issues between Israel and Iran. (See Yaish to Sasson, 25 April 1952, 130.15/2565/25.)

96. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 5 April 1952

Coded Tel. 29; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

Urgent telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The delegation requests instructions in light of the following developments:

(1) The German delegation will return on 8 April, but given the information available to the Israel delegation, originating with the American High Commissioner McCloy, there is no chance that the Germans will bring

with them a clear-cut reply on the sum of reparations. They will argue that the outcome of the Debt Conference in London must be awaited.

(2) There was no American pressure. McCloy acted on his own initiative, without instructions and with no particular urgency, having been convinced in the final instance by the German position. The American representative at the Debt Conference also supported the view that the decision about the sum should be postponed.

(3) There are as yet no visible results of Israeli action in the United States, but even if it does have some effect it will not go beyond a general sympathetic attitude.

(4) The assumption is that the Germans will content themselves with a general declaration of their willingness to pay reparations, but will propose that determination of the sum be postponed for a further four to eight weeks.

(5) The delegation proposes to react sharply by announcing that it will inform its government of the situation and await instructions.

Regarding these instructions, the delegation offers two suggestions: (1) to inform the Germans that the talks are being suspended, on the grounds that Germany misled Israel by inviting it to negotiate without itself intending to carry out negotiations, and now seeks to make them depend on the outcome of another conference; (2) to accept the German proposal of a postponement of up to eight weeks, on condition that they then appear with full authorization to propose a sum, payment schedule, and form of settlement.

The delegation tends towards the second option, because it allows for a continuation of negotiations and, in its opinion, these will ultimately have favorable results. However, it is aware that the Government must take domestic political considerations into account and is therefore awaiting instructions.

97. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6 April 1952

Coded Tel. 37; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

The delegation in The Hague sends an urgent telegram to the minister of foreign affairs.

According to a reliable source, the German delegation is due to return tomorrow with a statement that it has examined Israel's claim and reached the following conclusions: (1) The cost of absorbing Nazi victims in Israel totals some three billion marks, or $750 million. (2) The delegation recommended that the German government acknowledge this sum as its debt to Israel. (3) In light of Germany's financial and economic situation, the

delegation cannot now commit itself to the precise sum and payment schedule that Germany will be able to undertake to settle this debt. (4) They propose recessing the talks for one month.[1]

The significance of this reply is the introduction of a new element into the negotiations, namely, that the Germans differentiate between acknowledging the debt in principle and adding it to the list of Germany's debts, alongside other debts, and making a concrete commitment to pay reparations. It is obvious that this is a negative development, to be ascribed to the influence of Abs; it means that the debt to Israel will be dealt with like those to other countries, to be paid in a ratio yet to be set. In the opinion of the Israel delegation, this reply must be rejected and the Germans informed that the Israel Government has been notified of the new situation and the talks are suspended.

The delegation believes that the suspension in the talks should be used to personally influence Abs, Schäffer, and the economists who constitute the resolute core of the opposition and have not so far been handled properly. Similarly, action through political and economic channels in the United States is called for, and pressure should be exerted on the Social Democrats in Germany. After such action, which should take about three weeks, a meeting should be held in Israel for consultation and formulating a final decision.

Note

1. The full text of the German declaration, dated 5 April 1952, is in File 93.04/43/10.

98. M. Sasson (Tel Aviv) to Sh. Divon (Paris). 7 April 1952

Copy: 130.02/2410/1

Sasson refers to Divon's telegram on the continued contacts with Yassin Sarraj al-Din. Yassin asked to be recommended to the American ambassador in Egypt, Caffery, and that Caffery ascertain the position of Prime Minister al-Hilāli vis-à-vis Israel and even press for a settlement.[1] Divon argued that although he does not believe the time to be right for American involvement in Israel-Egypt relations, it is nevertheless desirable that an approach be made to the embassy, recommending Yassin, pointing to the importance of his statement, his courage, and his good will. The goal should be to have the ambassador invite Yassin for a conversation.

Sasson, too, believes that the time is not ripe for American pressure on Egypt with relation to a settlement with Israel. The Egyptians are currently involved with parliamentary elections, while their problems with

the British have not yet been resolved—a prerequisite for a settlement with Israel. He also reminds Divon that previously, when reports appeared in the Egyptian press and elsewhere of an inclination towards peace, he did not ascribe much consequence to them and maintained that they were important only for the cultivation of public opinion. Now, in light of Egypt's domestic situation and the preliminary stage of the British-Egyptian negotiations, Israel must act circumspectly and refrain from any steps having far-reaching political significance.

In Sasson's opinion, Yassin desires a meeting with the American ambassador primarily for personal and domestic reasons related to the Wafd's campaign against the Hilāli government. Sasson doubts whether, in the current situation, a recommendation from Israel will help Yassin, particularly since the American embassy will act with extreme caution to avoid accusations of being in contact with enemies of the regime. Moreover, any involvement by Israel in the current situation is likely to damage its reputation as an expert on Middle East affairs. The Americans have never felt that Yassin's initiative had any chances of success and whatever action they have taken thus far has been mainly a result of Israeli pressure. Israeli involvement at this moment will create the impression that it is not evaluating the situation realistically. The Americans should be pressed only when there is a real chance of success.

Notes

1. See Fischer and Divon to Eban and Eytan, F43, 6 April 1952, 93.01/2208/7.
2. Missing in the original.

99. E. Herlitz and D. Ginsburg [Washington] to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 7 April 1952

Notes

1. David Charles Ginsburg, American jurist.
2. Telegram from Comay to Eban, 6 April 1952, 93.01/2208/7, which reports the contents of No. 96.
3. See Vol. 6, No. 84.
4. Eban's telegram to the United States Division, dated 4 April 1952, which recommends that "we must give [a] little more time if [the] Germans ask for it while simultaneously repeating expressions [of our] impatience" (File 93.01/2208/10).

100. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague). 7 April 1952

Coded Tel.; Outg.: 130.09/2303/14

Sharett dispatches instructions to the reparations talks delegation: Yesterday he reported to the Government on the situation and was about to instruct the delegation to declare that, in light of Germany's unsatisfactory reply postponing determination of the precise amount of the reparations, the Israel delegation considers the negotiations to be suspended. The Israel Government's willingness to renew negotiations at a later stage depends on the content of any concrete proposals the Germans may make and their compliance with their initial undertakings. This was the text he intended to send them.

In the interim their telegram of 6 April[1] arrived, changing the situation for both better and worse. The change for the worse has already been analyzed by the delegation in their telegram. The change for the better is that the Germans have cited a figure and limited the duration of the recess in the talks. The new instructions below are based on this last development:

(1) The statement is to be made on behalf of the delegation and not on behalf of the Government of Israel. (2) There must be a sharp reaction to the distinction made between the magnitude of the debt and the actual amount to be paid. (3) The *sui generis* nature of the Israeli claim, which is utterly different from any other German debt, must again be stressed. (4) He leaves it to the discretion of the delegation whether to react to the claim that this is a process of reconciliation between the two peoples with a renewed emphasis on the fact that the subject being discussed is material compensation and not expiation of blood guilt. (5) As to the suspension of the talks, it should be stated that the delegation had in any event wished to consult with its government and receive new instructions.

Sharett requests that a member of the delegation come to Israel for consultations before 15 April—the date when the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee is scheduled to convene.

Note

1. No. 97.

101. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 7 April 1952

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

The morning session followed the lines set forth in yesterday's cable from the delegation.[1] There was nothing new in the German statement except one point, that on 19 May they will be prepared to make an authorized and binding proposal about the amount, schedule, and manner of the payment. They added the following clarifications: (1) The differentiation between the determination of the magnitude of the obligation and its acknowledgement by the government of Germany, on the one hand, and the actual amount to be paid, on the other, has always been clear. It has also been obvious that the actual sum would be far smaller than the obligation because of Germany's limited ability to pay. (2) Acknowledgement of the debt and the act of incorporating it into the list of Germany's external debts represents substantial progress, because Israel's claim would now be an officially recognized obligation that no longer need be justified to anyone. (3) They do not disavow the *sui generis* nature of the debt to Israel, but this does not change the economic facts; Germany cannot tell its other creditors that the debt to Israel will be handled differently. This could create strains with all its creditors, especially the largest among them, on whose assistance it depends. (4) By 19 May Germany will decide how it will compensate all its creditors, including Israel.

Notwithstanding all the above, the Germans hinted that, given the special nature of the debt to Israel, the difference between the size of the debt and the amount actually paid may be smaller than the gap between the debt and payment to other creditors. More specifically, they said that the payment schedule to Israel will be shorter and take greater account of Israel's needs than in the case of the other creditors.

The Israeli delegation reacted quite sharply, but the Germans remained steadfast. They insisted that Germany is unable to make any additional, special economic effort to satisfy the Israeli claim. There were broad hints that they intend to approach the United States for financial offsets to help them settle the Israeli claims. At the end of the meeting, the Israeli delegation announced that it would transmit the text of the German statement to the Government of Israel, and on the following day would submit a written response to the German declaration.[2]

The delegation plans to go to London to consult with Horowitz. They will try to arrange meetings with Abs, Schäffer, and Adenauer, at which the Israeli representatives will be Horowitz and Goldmann. They will also consult their colleagues in the United States and contact Social Democrats in Germany. After these actions, one or two members of the delegation will return to Israel for consultations, but by then the Israel Government

must consider its position, based on the assumption that through hard bargaining it will be possible to obtain some of the $750 million, at the rate to be paid to the other creditors; this would mean a decision to return to the talks on 19 May. The Government must, of course, decide whether continuing is worthwhile from the perspective of national honor and the Government's standing in public opinion.

Notes

1. No. 97.
2. See the memorandum by the Government of Israel, 8 April 1952, 93.04/43/10.

102. L. Kohn (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 8 April 1952

Copy: 93.03/3062/2

(1) Leo Kohn informs Eban of the establishment of the National Planning Council. In order to make its work more effective, he asks Eban to inform him of the main topics he expects will be debated at the forthcoming General Assembly, both in the international arena and those bearing upon Israel, so that Israel can plan ahead more effectively and initiate diplomatic and information activities during the spring and summer months, which will be of advantage when the time comes.

(2) In the same context, he puts forward an idea he has been considering since the General Assembly session in New York: to establish a "progressive bloc" at the UN, comprising Israel and other countries that hold similar views, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and Uruguay. In the past Israel has cooperated with and received major assistance from these countries, and it would be worthwhile turning this understanding and support into a more permanent framework of consultations and discussions of political problems likely to arise at the General Assembly.

Notes

1. Leo Kohn, Foreign Ministry political advisor.
2. Michael Pragai, a member of the Israeli delegation to the UN General Assembly.

103. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8 April 1952

Coded Tel. 43; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

The delegation asks that the following request be transmitted to Eban and Goldmann: Intervention by a number of American economic bodies is required in order to arrange the German payments to Israel. (1) The U.S. delegation to the London Debts Conference must agree that Israel's claim will be satisfied to a greater extent and within a shorter period of time than those of other creditors. It is highly likely that the Germans themselves will raise such proposals in London and it is important that the creditors, the United States foremost, not object to this. (2) It is also possible that the Germans will ask the United States for a further reduction in the occupation debts in order to settle Israel's claims. (3) The Germans will try to obtain interim international financing to settle their obligation to Israel. Consultations in the matter are in order. (4) Can they suggest an American banker who could approach Abs directly and persuade him that payments should be made to Israel and their manner of implementation? (5) Consultations must be held to consider what additional actions are required in the United States in advance of the resumption of the talks. It would be helpful if Goldmann could provide immediate responses to these questions.

Note

1. In a telegram dated 9 April, Eban reported on his and Nahum Goldmann's contacts in the United States. Goldmann was told that the State Department had instructed McCloy to talk with Adenauer and Abs. At the same time, the Department warned Israel not to provoke a rupture in the talks, because there were good prospects for their success. (Eban to the United States Division, W9, 93.01/2208/10.) See also No. 104.

104. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 9 April 1952

Coded Tel. Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

Today the Germans notified the delegation of a further postponement of the date on which they will report the size of the actual reparations to be paid and the payments schedule. They indicated that they will not be able to give final replies until approximately a month after the reconvening of the London Debts Conference, i.e., around 20 June. They explained that they need the extra time for consultations with the representatives of the

three Western Powers at the London Conference, in the course of which they will also request certain allowances from the United States to permit a better arrangement for Israel. They also suggest adding an American observer to the reparations talks.

Reports emanating from another source indicate that Abs intends to explain to the Americans that Germany will be able to make payments to Israel faster and at a more reasonable level if the Americans take one of three possible steps: (1) release German assets frozen in the United States; (2) grant another postponement in the regular repayment to the United States of its post-war financial assistance; (3) help the Germans obtain a loan in the United States.

From all this, the following is clear: (1) Abs is the central figure in the negotiations, although this does not mean that he opposes reparations. (2) U.S. influence is increasing, and with it the importance of action in that country; this is the reason for yesterday's telegram to the United States.[1]

Israel's reply to the Germans: (1) Their announcement is an additional negative factor. (2) It is clear that very little remains of the special basis for negotiations that was reflected in Adenauer's letter. (3) There is no prospect for an Israel Government decision to continue negotiations without an explicit declaration by the Germans reconfirming the Adenauer letter and emphasizing that the German government will do everything in its power to satisfy the reparations claims.

The members of the delegation are leaving for consultations in London.[3]

Notes

1. No. 103.
2. Seymour J. Rubin, American jurist, counsel for foreign affairs to the American Jewish Committee, member of the Claims Conference.
3. See No. 105.

105. E. Herlitz [Washington] to the United States Division. 12 April 1952

Notes

1. Telegram from Comay to Eban, 11 April 1952, 93.01/2208/7, reporting the main points of No. 103.
2. Telegram from Comay to the Israel Embassy in the United States, 11 April 1952, 130.09/2309/5, reporting the main points of No. 104.
3. Saul Kagan, member of the Executive Committee of the Claims Conference.
4. See n. 1 above.
5. Not identified.

Editorial Note

The Financial Crisis in Israel

Towards the middle of April Israel found itself in a severe financial crisis. Finance Ministry representatives in the United States feared it would not be possible to meet obligations to suppliers and banks, and in Britain there was a real danger that Shell Oil, Israel's source of petroleum, would cut off supplies. The crisis was exacerbated by the lack of coordination and bad relations between the United Jewish Appeal apparatus and that of the Israel Bonds. During the crisis it was proposed that Sharett or Ben-Gurion make a lightning trip to the United States to smooth over the difficulties and find an interim solution that would enable Israel to meet its commitments. It was also proposed that the President of the State send a letter to the prime minister of Britain and request special credits for fuel purchases. Another proposal was to use the American Grant-in-Aid funds to pay current bills.

106. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to D. Goitein. 17 April 1952

Notes

1. Telegram from Sharett to Goitein, 17 April 1952 (130.09/2309/5), concerning an emergency trip by Sharett to the United States to deal with the financial crisis; see the preceding Editorial Note. Sharett argued that, on the basis of information coming from the United States, he was not certain that his trip would be of any benefit, and this in terms of millions of dollars. He requested the opinion of the Embassy staff and of Golda Meyerson, then in the United States on behalf of the United Jewish Appeal.
2. Notification of the dispatch of an emergency Finance Ministry delegation to deal with the financial crisis (see the telegram from Kaplan and Sharett to the Israel Consulate-General in New York, 17 April 1952, 93.01/2204/5).
3. See No. 109.

107. E. Sasson (Ankara) to M. Sasson. 17 April 1952.

Copy: 130.20/2477/19

E. Sasson refers to the request by Yassin Sarraj al-Din that Israel recommend him to the United States Embassy in Cairo and to Israel's negative reaction to this request.[1] E. Sasson endorses the Israeli decision and agrees that this is not the time to approach the Americans with new initiatives

regarding Israel-Arab relations; American involvement should be reserved for a more propitious hour. Generally speaking, he considers it preferable to establish direct links through our own perseverance; any true friends Israel may have in the Arab world are those gained without the help of intermediaries.

E. Sasson complains that when signs of peaceful inclinations appeared in Egypt, Israel did not take advantage of the opportunity to establish direct contacts with leading Egyptian personalities in order to ascertain what was happening and did not encourage the Arab press to react positively to the Egyptian initiatives—although the Foreign Ministry had decided on such a line of action. This negligence leads him to conclude that the Foreign Ministry does not have a defined policy vis-à-vis the Arab world, that the Ministry lacks the experienced personnel necessary for such action, and that it still does not fully understand the importance of direct contact with the Arab world. He regrets this situation and argues that in the future it is likely to have a deleterious effect on Israel. Israel is marking time in all matters related to action among the Arabs. Divon's appointment as first secretary in the Israel Legation in Paris, charged with handling contacts with Arabs, is to be welcomed; but progress in this area is likely only if he can act in accordance with a plan of action approved by the Foreign Minister and binding on all Ministry personnel. He believes that it is not yet too late. Efforts should concentrate on coordinated and unflagging implementation of a carefully thought-out strategy.

Notes

1. No. 98.
2. See Vol. 6, Nos. 144 and 169.

108. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in London. 20 April 1952

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 82.
2. See No. 109 and n. 2 there.
3. Churchill's reply was negative; he suggested that Israel apply to the United States, with British support, requesting that the United States allow Israel to use foreign-aid funds to purchase fuel. (See Chadwick to Sharett, 10 May 1952, 130.02/2420/2.) See also No. 148.

109. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Keren (London). 20 April 1952

Notes

1. No. 108.
2. On the basis of the available documents it is clear that after Israel's initial requests were rejected, there were other requests, which amounted in essence to shortening the duration of the credit requested from five to three years and a change in its form from direct government credits to government guarantees for bank loans. (See Sharett to the Israel Legation in London, IL687, 15 April 1952, 130.09/2318/9.) See also No. 111.

110. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 22 April 1952

Notes

1. The reference is to emergency assistance to Israel out of the balance of uncommitted funds allocated to Israel under the Mutual Security Act (see No. 106). On the Mutual Security Act, see No. 13 and n. 1 there.
2. Dov Joseph, Minister of Justice and Minister of Commerce and Industry, rushed to the United States to deal with the financial crisis.
3. See No. 119.
4. Oscar Gass, economic advisor to the Israel Finance Ministry, based in Washington.

111. M. Keren (London) to M. Sharett. 22 April 1952

Notes

1. See No. 109.
2. A full report of the conversation is in File 130.02/2420/2.

112. F. E. Shinnar (London) to M. Sharett. 22 April 1952

Coded Tel. LIA514; Inc.: 130.09/2319/1

Shinnar reports on Goldmann's talk with Adenauer and on the conversation that he, Goldmann, and Barou held with Abs. The meeting with Adenauer was held in Bonn; David Horowitz has submitted a report on it.[1] They agreed to hold bilateral talks between German government officials and the Israeli delegation, at which details such as the proportion of

payments to be made in cash and the type of goods to be supplied to Israel will be discussed. The talks will commence on 28 April, and Goldmann will meet Adenauer again on 3 May. Goldmann says that Adenauer has not undertaken to state a final sum on 3 May, but it is likely that he will do so.

In the meeting with Abs, the Israelis emphasized in detail the unique aspects of the Israeli claim. Abs's reaction was as follows: (1) Until the London talks resume on 19 May he will work in full coordination with the Israelis on how to present the accord with Israel to the London Conference. (2) In principle, he accepts the Israeli proposal for a special transfer from the European Payments Union. (3) He stressed that the monthly sums demanded by Israel in foreign currency are excessive, but agreed that part of the payment be in cash and the remainder in merchandise. (4) He reiterated the need for simultaneous agreement in The Hague and in London as a prerequisite for Germany's continued economic development and emphasized once again that everything depends on Germany's economic capacity. During the conversation he repeated the proposal to use German assets frozen in the United States to cover part of Israel's claim. Details are to be found in the telegram sent to the United States.[2]

Shinnar's impression is that Abs's initial proposal will be unsatisfactory, but he will be prepared to improve upon it as the negotiations proceed. Shinnar offers several suggestions as to the participants in the forthcoming talks and indicates that both he and his colleagues object to holding the talks in Germany. He requests reactions and instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[3]

Notes

1. Not found; but for the content of the conversation see below and No. 122.
2. See the telegram from Shinnar to Eban, EWA7, 21 April 1952, 93.01/2208/7.
3. See No. 114.

113. Meeting: A. Eban–Representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France at the United Nations (New York, 23 April 1952)

Notes

1. See No. 26 and n. 4 there. For the text of the Security Council resolution on freedom of passage through the Suez Canal, see Vol. 6, Editorial Note, pp. 593–94.
2. See Vol. 4, No. 205.
3. Henri Hoppenot, France's permanent representative at the United Nations.

114. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in London. 23 April 1952

Coded Tel. IL719; Outg.: 130.09/2318/9

Sharett responds to two telegrams from the delegation to the reparations talks, No. 514[1] and No. 521.[2] He asks several questions and requests clarification of a number of points: (1) Horowitz's report on Goldmann's talk with Adenauer[3] is incomplete and unclear; he requests a detailed report.[4] (2) Is the sum to be indicated by Adenauer on 3 May the final amount, or is it subject to decisions to be taken at the London Conference? (3) Why does Adenauer need to hold discussions with experts in order to determine the sum? Does it depend on the type of goods that Israel will request? Has the delegation considered the possibility that the Germans' aim is to establish the fact that the negotiations are not suspended, and hence that it would be better to leave the negotiations during the hiatus without contact between the delegations? (4) The fact that Adenauer has not indicated an amount further weakens the arguement for negotiations among experts. (5) Will the surpluses from the European Payment Union be transferred in cash or in kind? (6) What are the monthly installments demanded by Israel that Abs considers to be excessive? (7) Does Abs's position, as stated in Telegram 514, paragraph 4,[1] rule out any chance of persuading him in accordance with the last part of paragraph 2 in Telegram No. 521?[2] (8) What is the delegation's general impression of Abs? Is he interested in an honorable settlement or in evading one? (9) The talks must be held outside Germany. It would be desirable—if it is decided to hold the talks—for the German delegation to come to London, since that would create the impression that they have come with a new proposal. (10) Can the existence of the talks be kept secret? (11) Until a decision is taken in Israel, there must be no commitment with regard to meetings of experts.[4]

Notes

1. No. 112.
2. Telegram from the reparations talks delegation to Sharett, 22 April 1952 (130.09/2319/1). The delegation passed on the following: (a) Adenauer's proposal to hold an unofficial and non-binding meeting of experts on 28 April; (b) the German willingness to inform Israel of the final amount of reparations even before the creditors' conference reconvenes in London, but with the understanding that the amount will be conveyed to that conference when it reconvenes; (c) in the talks with Adenauer and Abs no final sum had been mentioned.
3. See No. 112 and n. 1 there.
4. See No. 122.

115. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in London. 23 April 1952

Coded Tel ILA723; Outg.: 130.09/2318/9

Sharett summarizes the consultations held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which dealt with whether to continue the talks with Germany. The tendency in the Ministry is to reject talks at the experts' level before the meeting with Adenauer, since they are likely to be interpreted as being conducted on the basis of the German position as stated at the end of the talks in the Hague and would be construed as an Israeli concession. There is speculation in the Ministry about the origin of this idea; if it was Goldmann who put it forward, one can only be astounded at his taking an initiative that in fact commits the Government of Israel. It might be a good idea to agree to a meeting of experts if this is preceded by a clear commitment to make a binding proposal on 3 May and, second, if the talks are held in London. But again, no one in the Ministry understands why a meeting of experts is needed to arrive at a binding proposal. A binding proposal means not only setting a final sum; the breakdown of the sum between goods and cash is also important, as is the payment schedule. The Germans are well aware of all this; all the information they require to present a proposal is already in their possession.[4]

Notes

1. No. 114.
2. Not found.
3. Joseph Rosensaft, chairman of the Central Committee of Jewish DPs in the British Zone of Occupation in Germany.
4. In another telegram, Avner conveyed a number of thoughts accompanying the present telegram: he fears that the Germans might be drawing Israel into continuing the negotiations without Israel's having drawn the maximum possible benefit from stressing the severity of the crisis and its threat to break off the talks; the most recent maneuvers also indicate that Israel has abandoned its intention to demand a letter or new statement from Adenauer to the effect that Germany continues to desire an honorable agreement on the original basis of the negotiations; the consensus in the Foreign Ministry is that Israel should proceed to the stage of experts' talks if they are intended to determine from Adenauer and Abs what the final goal of the negotiations is, but if they are meant to be negotiations on a new basis they would contradict the Israeli decision to break off the talks until it is convinced that the Germans have not abandoned the original basis of the talks. (See telegram to Israel Legation in London, ILA722, 23 April 1952, 130.09/2318/9.)

116. G. Rafael (New York) to W. Eytan. 24 April 1952

Notes

1. Ely E. Palmer, U.S. representative on the Conciliation Commission.
2. Andrew W. Cordier, administrative assistant to the United Nations Secretary-General.
3. Claude B. de Boisanger, French representative on the Conciliation Commission.
4. John M. Berncastle, a lands specialist of the Refugee Office of the Conciliation Commission.
5. See No. 123.

117. D. Ben-Gurion [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Consulate-General in New York. 24 April 1952

Coded Tel. YA381; Inc.: 93.01/2204/5

Ben-Gurion addresses this telegram to Dov Joseph. To the extent that advice can be tendered from afar, the American government should be presented with the far-reaching plan of converting Israel's short-term debts into long-term ones, thus making possible regular supplies of food, fuel, and raw materials. Only under such conditions will Israel be able to increase production and achieve economic stability.

118. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to A. Eban (Washington). 24 April 1952

Notes

1. No response has been found; but see below and No. 110.
2. No. 110.

119. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 24 April 1952

Notes

1. See No. 110. For a report on Kollek's conversation, see the telegram from A. Lewin to the United States Division, W40, 23 April 1952, 93.01/2208/10.
2. See Vol. 6, No. 517.
3. See No. 129.

120. N. Goldmann to H. Blankenhorn (Bonn). 24 April 1952

Note

1. See Nos. 114 and 115.

121. M. Keren (London) to M. Comay. 25 April 1952

Note

1. See No. 113.

122. F. E. Shinnar [London] to M. Sharett. 25 April 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2417/5

Shinnar reports on developments in the negotiations with the Germans.

(1) Telegram No. 514[2] reported on Nahum Goldmann's meeting with Adenauer, and on that of Goldmann, Barou, and Shinnar with Abs.

(2) The idea of a meeting at the experts' level was raised in Goldmann's talk with Adenauer. It seems to have originated with Barou, and was supported by Blankenhorn, both of whom were present at the meeting. Barou thought that the meeting should be held in Germany and that the Israelis should make available all the data required to move the negotiations forward. It would seem that Barou did not fully consider the implications of his proposal and did not understand that such meetings weaken Israel's tactical position and contradict the Israeli policy adopted at the time of the suspension of the Hague talks. In the Adenauer-Goldmann talk, the former announced the meetings of experts as a foregone matter.

Following the meeting with Adenauer, the Israel delegation met for consultations. Shinnar and Josephthal, joined by Horowitz, rejected the entire idea of experts and made it clear to Goldmann that the time has come for the Germans to state, off the record, what they are proposing, even at the risk of their initial proposal being unsatisfactory. They added that Israel has thus far made its position clear in great detail, without receiving any German reaction worth speaking of.

(3) Subsequently, before Goldmann's return to the United States, the discussions were summarized in the following proposals: (a) Goldmann will send an unofficial letter to Blankenhorn.[3] (b) Barou will leave for Germany with a list of goods for the first three years. He will meet his contacts there to learn the results of the deliberations by the German experts. He will

inform them that they must now make a proposal so that the Israeli government can come to a final decision. (c) Barou will remain in constant touch with the delegation in London. The decision whether to hold the planned meeting with Adenauer on 3 May will depend on the information provided by Barou. Should it become clear that the Germans are still refusing to make a detailed proposal, the meeting will be called off. In that case it will be necessary to confer following Goldmann's arrival in Israel on 5 May.

(4) A go-between with Abs has been found. This is Kremarsky,[5] who has known Abs for fifteen years and helped him at the beginning of his career. He has agreed to meet Abs and will arrive in London tomorrow. He will not, of course, appear on behalf of Israel, but it is likely that his talk with Abs will have some effect.

(5) Adenauer's invitation to Goldmann was personal; this explains why Josephthal did not take part. It was specifically agreed that Josephthal will be present at the next meeting, a condition that the delegation considers absolutely essential.

(6) In the meanwhile, all the preparations have been made here for working on the German Social Democrats. Assurances have been received that the secretary of the British Labour Party, Morgan Phillips, and Dalton[10] will go to Germany and speak with Schumacher.[11] Hector McNeil[9] spoke with Eden to find out how he will respond if he asks a question in Parliament. In the course of the conversation with Eden, Churchill happened to walk in. Informed that the Germans were being difficult in the reparations negotiations, he said that action should be taken to change the situation. Eden will inform the Germans that Britain is interested in a positive outcome to the negotiations.[12]

(7) Goldmann asked Kurt Grossmann, press officer of the World Jewish Congress, to come to Germany in order to influence the press there.

(8) Shinnar had a conversation with Mrs. Outwaithe of *The Economist*. She promised to write an article within a week or two about Germany's economic situation, in order to counter the arguments (particularly those put forward by Abs) about the ostensibly feeble and difficult condition of the German economy.

(9) Horowitz takes part in all discussions and the delegation is cooperating fully with him.

(10) So far, the Germans have not indicated any amount that could be considered a concrete proposal. The sum of DM 1.8 billion put forward by Blankenhorn in an off-the-record conversation with Goldmann is not an official figure that can serve as a basis for any assumptions. The delegation believes that the amount and all other details of the proposal will be determined by Abs and Schäffer. If the sum is too small, Adenauer may intervene and increase it somewhat. In a letter to Adenauer, Economics Minister Erhard proposed that Germany make annual payments of be-

tween 100 million and 200 million deutschmarks, but he too avoided mentioning an overall amount. This may be an initial proposal, which they might be prepared to increase to twice as much.

(11) It is essential that Gershon Avner be sent here, because of the workload and the need for consultations. There is hope for progress during the week, with further details of the German proposals becoming known.

P.S.

Telegram 719[16] indicates that further clarifications are still necessary: (1) The conversation between Adenauer and Goldmann. Goldmann stated that the historic step represented by Adenauer's letter has deteriorated to shameful haggling. This has created a crisis in the talks, and Israel will not reopen them until the Germans make a firm, binding, and reasonable offer. Adenauer replied that a proposal will be forthcoming before the renewal of negotiations, but he is dependent upon his financial advisers. He told Goldmann that a committee of experts has been set up to prepare the data necessary for drafting a final proposal. At this point Barou suggested that meetings be held between Israeli representatives and the experts' committee. Goldmann then proposed a further meeting with Adenauer on 3 May, after which he would report to the Government of Israel and the Zionist Actions Committee. He emphasized that if the German statements at this meeting are not acceptable, the Israeli government is liable to break off the negotiations.

(2) In his conversation with Abs, Shinnar repeated the proposal that a third of the reparations sum be paid in foreign currency and the remainder in kind. He mentioned three to five million dollars a month, part in dollars and part in other currencies, including sterling. Abs replied that the amount was too high. His general impression is that Abs is trying to reach an accord and is not adopting evasive tactics. It must be assumed that the initial offer will be unsatisfactory, but vigorous action should make it possible to increase the amount.

Notes

1. Israel R. Kosloff, the Finance Ministry's advisor on fuel.
2. No. 112.
3. No. 120.
4. See Israel Legation in London to the Israel Consulate-General in New York, E128, 22 April 1952, 93.01/2204/6.
5. Siegfried Kremarsky, an American Jewish banker.
6. No. 115.
7. The appendix has not been found.
8. Alexander L. Easterman, political secretary of the World Jewish Congress in Great Britain.

9. Hector McNeil, member of the British Labour Party and formerly secretary of state for Scotland.
10. Hugh Dalton, chancellor of the exchequer in the Labour Government, 1945–1947.
11. Kurt Schumacher, chairman of the West German Social Democratic Party. For details of the talks with the German Social Democrats, see also No. 125.
12. On these talks, see Easterman to Goldmann, 24 April 1952, 93.04/43/10.
13. Elizabeth Monroe, a British Orientalist and member of the editorial staff of *The Economist*.
14. Michael Arnon, press attaché in the Israel Legation in London.
15. Ludwig Erhard, West German minister of the economy.
16. No. 114.
17. See No. 112.
18. Not found.
19. No. 115.

123. C. de Boisanger (New York) to A. Eban (New York). 28 April 1952

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 26–27.
2. This letter was delivered at the end of a talk with Boisanger. During the conversation Boisanger said that the Commission had no intention of taking new initiatives, except for talks of a technical nature, *inter alia* concerning blocked accounts and compensation to refugees; in this connection, J. M. Berncastle, the lands specialist and member of the Commission's Refugee Office, would be coming to Israel. (See telegram from Lourie to Sharett, X780, 29 April 1952, 130.09/2330/15.) See also Nos. 126 and 153.

124. M. Keren [London] to A. Eban (Washington). 28 April 1952

Orig.: 93.08/361/8

Keren refers to the report by Herzog and Eban on their talk with Gen. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,[1] and in particular to the proposal that the British government recommend to the American government that Israel receive military assistance, in the form of economic aid and the establishment of infrastructure industries.

To the best of his knowledge, Israel has not asked Britain to intervene on its behalf in Washington; the negotiations with the British have been conducted separately from those with Washington, although the Americans do, of course, receive ongoing reports about the talks in London. All the same, he believes that in due time these two channels of negotiation will

have to converge; the moment for this will be the visit to Israel by the British delegation.[3] This delegation will presumably investigate Israel's needs and problems, and its report will doubtless be made available to Washington.

He therefore considers that concrete action in London is not called for until after the delegation submits its report. At the moment he does not believe that the British have framed a firm policy concerning military cooperation with Israel. Two major causes underlie the British hesitation. First, they are awaiting the outcome of negotiations with the Egyptians; until they know precisely how Egypt will integrate into the defense of the Middle East they are in no hurry to reach an accord with Israel. The second reason is Israel's economic straits, of which the British have become fully aware. Israel's desperate plea for British credits has adversely affected its political and military standing; it is difficult now for the British to accept Israel's claim that, except for Turkey, it is the strongest military force in the Middle East.

In any case, the British repeatedly emphasize that Israel must not delude itself with regard to the scope of the military assistance it will receive from Britain. Britain's own economy is also not in the best of shape. Moreover, quite some time will pass before the delegation makes its recommendations and these are converted into practical policy.

Notes

1. See No. 69 and n. 2 there.
2. See Vol. 6, Nos. 67–69.
3. See No. 76.
4. See No. 121.

125. G. Josephthal (London) to M. Sharett. 28 April 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2417/5

Josephthal provides further clarifications and explanations about Goldmann's meeting with Adenauer.

Goldmann's agreement, in his talk with Adenauer, to a meeting at the experts' level in essence confronted the members of the Israel delegation with a *fait accompli*. The opposition to such a meeting expressed by the delegation was based on two assumptions: it would weaken the impression that Israel is liable to break off the negotiations at any point; the Germans already have information on the goods that Israel requires and on its willingness to accept payment in dollars and Western European currencies.

The delegation believes that the proposal for a meeting of experts was not so much an attempt to draw Israel into negotiations but rather a result of German perplexity in the face of the Israeli threat to break off the negotiations.

Goldmann replied that rejecting the proposal for a meeting of experts would adversely affect his status and provide the Germans with an excuse not to present an authoritative proposal on 3 May, as they have promised to do. The delegation weighed his arguments but ultimately decided against holding the experts' meeting.

Since he himself was not present at the meeting with Adenauer, Josephthal can only assume that during the conversation Goldmann deviated from the Israeli line. He was too moderate; Josephthal doubts whether Goldmann truly convinced Adenauer that Israel really means to break off the negotiations. There is some danger that the Germans will view the delegation's current hard-line position as a pose and believe that the talks with Goldmann reflect the true Israeli position. For this reason, the delegation insisted that one of its members accompany Goldmann to the next meeting with Adenauer.

With regard to the negotiations themselves, Blankenhorn perceives a difficulty in achieving a final and binding proposal at this stage. Consequently, he proposes a three-year arrangement, at the end of which the negotiations will be renewed. Goldmann considers this to be an acceptable proposal; so does the delegation, on condition, of course, that the initial proposal is a substantial one. Privately, Blankenhorn mentioned a figure of DM 1.8 billion over three years.

The talks with Abs: Shinnar's impression was that Abs does in fact want to reach an agreement with Israel, but, being familiar with Israel's economic situation, thinks it possible to get off cheap. Kremarsky will meet Abs today. He knows him well and describes him as an intelligent, cynical, ambitious man, utterly without emotions. Kremarsky will argue that the Jewish people will blame Abs for the breakdown of the talks, and this will lead to a sharp reaction on the part of American Jewry. Failure of the talks will also damage economic relations between Germany and the United States. Kremarsky will also advise Abs to stop inciting the London creditors against the reparations agreement. He will try to obtain a proposal from Abs as to the amount, form, and schedule of the payments.

The idea of using the British Labour Party to exert influence on its Social Democratic colleagues in Germany did not bear much fruit. Although a delegation of the party leadership is soon to meet their German colleagues to discuss global matters, there is no certainty that they will raise the matter of reparations in an effective fashion. McNeil himself refused to go specifically for that purpose; however, if it becomes clear that the Labour delegation failed to raise the issue a renewed approach will be made to McNeil. In any case, McNeil wrote to Eden to inquire as to the British

government's reaction to the crisis in the talks.[9] If there is a favorable response, he will raise his question in the House of Commons.

In the meanwhile, the delegation is awaiting the return of Kremarsky and Barou, as well as a report from Blankenhorn as to whether Adenauer intends to present a binding proposal. Shinnar may meet once more with Abs. In any case, he and Goldmann will return to Israel after the meeting with Adenauer, if it is held.

Notes

1. No. 122.
2. The letter has not been found.
3. See No. 112 and n. 1 there.
4. Wilfrid Andrew Burke, member of the executive committee of the British Labour Party and its deputy chairman (1952).
5. Maurice Orbach, Labour MP; member of the executive committee of the British section of the World Jewish Congress.
6. Barbara Castle, Labour MP, member of the executive committee of the Party.
7. Robert Weltsch, the *Ha'aretz* correspondent in London.
8. Carlo Schmidt, a member of the central Committee of the German Social Democratic Party and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag.
9. McNeil's letter, dated 25 April 1952, is in File 130.02/2417/5.

126. Meeting: D. Goitein–G. Lewis Jones (Washington, 28 April 1952, document dated 29 April 1952)

Report: 93.08/341/51

The conversation took place at Israel's request, in light of reports that the French intend to revive the Palestine Conciliation Commission and even to have this body appoint a senior representative in Jerusalem.[1] After the minister raised the matter, Jones replied unequivocally that the Americans still intend that the "commission be put in cold storage" until such time as conditions permit its work to be productive. Given this state of affairs, the State Department also sees no need for the appointment of a commission representative in Jerusalem.

At this point, Mr. Waller, head of the Israeli and Jordanian desk at the State Department, intervened and asked how Israel envisages the handling of all of those duties of the Conciliation Commission in which no changes have occurred and which remain unresolved. The minister replied that these matters should be handled through the Mixed Armistice Commissions.

After the Conciliation Commission had been dealt with, Jones turned to the situation along the Israel-Jordan border and expressed concern at

Israel's intention not to extend the agreement between Israel and Jordan to prevent infiltration.[2] Israel's representatives made it clear that the Jordanians had not honored the agreement and its extension would prevent Israel from adopting effective means to prevent infiltration. Jones replied that the senior echelons in Jordan wish to keep things quiet along the border and that the disturbances originate at the local level. Israel's representatives undertook to convey the State Department's view of the border situation to the Government.

Notes

1. See Nos. 116 and 123. This conversation took place before the meeting with Boisanger (see No. 123, n. 2). Boisanger's letter (No. 123) was received by the Israeli delegation on 1 May.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 33, and No. 128.

127. T. Kollek [Washington] to D. Goitein (Washington). 29 April 1952

128. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to R. Shiloah. 1 May 1952

Copy: 130.16/2948/13

Eytan complains that Segan-Aluf Ramati, in his last talk with the military attachés in Israel, informed them that the Israel-Jordan agreement to prevent infiltration would not be renewed. The attachés so reported to their governments, which have already made urgent representations both in Washington and in Tel Aviv that the agreement not be abrogated.[1]

As far as Eytan knows, no decision has been taken not to renew the agreement; Ramati made his statement on his own initiative, and, according to his recent explanations, expressed his personal opinion. Ramati must be made to understand that he cannot express personal opinions when speaking with military attachés. Perusal of previous reports on Ramati's conversations with the attachés reveals that they contain various comments that run counter to official policy. It appears that Ramati has not been in the habit of consulting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before conducting such talks; this has been prejudicial to the standing of both the army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As to the matter in hand, Eytan believes that the agreement should be renewed automatically, and should even be converted into a permanent one.

Notes

1. See No. 126.
2. The agreement was renewed on 13 May; see No. 150.

129. U.S. Secretary of State [Washington] to the Ambassador of Israel in Washington. 1 May 1952

Notes

1. See Nos. 110 and 119.
2. See No. 130.

130. The Ambassador of Israel in Washington to the U.S. Secretary of State (Washington). [1 May 1952]

Notes

1. See No. 129.
2. See Eban to Harriman, 25 April 1952, 93.08/343/16.
3. Thus in the original, but the reference is to No. 129.

131. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (London) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1 May 1952

Coded Tel. LIA542; Inc.: 130.09/2319/1

The delegation summarizes the state of the reparations negotiations. (1) After many discussions, it has been decided not to take part in the meeting of experts. Goldmann explained this in a letter, to which he attached a list of goods requested by Israel.[1] (2) The Germans announced that they were unable to keep their promise to present a final and authoritative proposal on 3 May, but would do so in two weeks. (3) Consequently, Goldmann is cancelling his trip to Bonn and will fly to Israel. (4) The Germans are willing to renew the official negotiations with Israel on 19 May on the basis of the reply they will give two weeks hence. They will submit their proposal to the London Conference of creditors, but will not ask it to debate the proposal or adopt any resolution relating to it. For its part, Israel will try to ensure that the London Conference does not discuss the matter of reparations to Israel. (5) It is obvious that the initial German proposal will be unsatisfactory; hence the question will arise as to whether

to enter into negotiations on the nineteenth of the month on its basis. (6) The delegation assumes that this topic will be discussed with Goldmann and Josephthal, who are coming to Israel for consultations, and that the Government will issue an ultimatum to the effect that the original basis of the negotiations be preserved and the Germans present an appropriate proposal. (7) Kremarsky spoke with Abs and concluded that the latter is not being evasive and is trying to achieve an agreement. (8) The Socialists are willing to make another public demand for a fair arrangement and for a priority commensurate with this special case. (9) The international developments affecting Germany are making the negotiations more difficult, but an initial proposal is nevertheless expected within two weeks.

Note

1. See Nos. 120 and 125.

132. Y. H. Levin [Washington] to A. Eban (Washington). 2 May 1952

Notes

1. Yehuda Harry Levin, press counselor in the Israel Embassy in Washington.
2. See No. 141.

133. A. Biran[1] (Jerusalem) to M. Sharett. 4 May 1952

Copy: 93.08/356/18

Biran reports on a meeting with 'Azmi Nashashibi, undersecretary of state in the Jordanian Foreign Ministry. The main points are as follows:

The economic boycott: 'Azmi indicated that the boycott is growing stronger and is now being organized by the Arab governments themselves. The Arabs have concluded, in light of their military weakness, that the boycott is their most effective weapon against Israel. Biran replied that the boycott is more damaging to the Arabs than to Israel, whose economy is based on other markets. Nashashibi admitted as much, but remained steadfast in his opinion.

Prospects for peace: none. The declaration by Zafrulla Khan[4] and others statements met with withering criticism in the Arab world, particularly Iraq. The Egyptian declarations emanated from one man, whose party, the Wafd, has since fallen from power. In general, Israel is ignoring the stipula-

tions accompanying these declarations, and, in any case, no Arab country would agree to less than the 1947 partition borders. Nashashibi believes that the situation will continue unchanged for many years, and the Arabs will do everything in their power to make life difficult for Israel. Nor do they intend to promote normalization of relations along the borders, which, like Israel, they regard as temporary.

The refugees: Nashashibi claims that the refugees' opposition to putting down roots where they are now living is firm and abiding. They remain attached to their former homes and will not exchange them even for better living conditions; what is more, their current living conditions are not bad at all.

Revival of the Conciliation Commission: The press reports on the renewal of the Commission's activity stirred hopes among the refugees. According to the information reaching Nashashibi, the Commission discussed the repatriation of 150,000 refugees, compensation for property, and the internationalization of Jerusalem. Nashashibi is not conversant with King Talal's position on internationalization.

In conclusion, Biran indicates that the remarks made by Nashashibi — who undoubtedly represents an important segment of Jordanian public opinion — ought to provide food for thought with regard to Israel's Arab policy in the future. One conclusion may be drawn already, he believes: the need to reinforce the ties of interdependence between Jordan and Israel. This could be done by acceding to Jordanian requests concerning the transit of visitors, the sick, newspapers, and books through the Mandelbaum Gate. These links should be strengthened despite the opposition of Nashashibi, who wants to sever relations to the greatest extent possible.

Notes

1. Avraham Biran, Jerusalem District Commissioner and Foreign Ministry representative in Jerusalem.
2. 'Azmi al-Nashashibi, undersecretary of state in the Jordanian Foreign Ministry.
3. One paragraph, dealing with arrangements for the passage of tourists between Israel and Jordan, has been omitted here.
4. See No. 59 and n. 3 there.
5. Ismail Sidqi Pasha, Egyptian statesman, prime minister 1930–33 and 1946. During his term of office in 1946 he conducted negotiations with Zionist emissaries to resolve the Palestine problem, and in 1948 was vigorously opposed to the Egyptian invasion of Palestine.
6. Professor James Joll, professor of history at Oxford University.
7. Talal ibn 'Abdallah, king of Jordan from September 1951 to August 1952.
8. Several paragraphs of a personal nature, dealing with problems discussed in the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission, have been omitted here.

134. E. Najar (Rome) to W. Eytan. 4 May 1952

Coded Tel. 20; Inc.: 130.09/2356/2

Najar reports on several talks he had in the Vatican following Sharett's visit. D'Ormesson[1] indicated that Israel's decision to request an audience with the Pope was a wise move; the Pope was extremely pleased with the very fact that the meeting took place. An Israeli representative should also meet Tardini.[2] D'Ormesson believes that the best and indeed the only way to improve relations is direct contact between Israel's representatives and the Vatican, which is striving for peace and always prefers the path of reason and a realistic course of action.

According to Tisserant,[3] the Vatican secretariat of state opposed the meeting. He does not know precisely what the Vatican's position is after the meeting. He welcomes the Vatican's decision, which is realistic.

According to Alessandrini, assistant editor of *L'Osservatore Romano*, the minister's visit was a wise step; there is no opposition to Israel in the Vatican, only a certain reservation.

On Jerusalem, all three stressed the following: the actual situation is what counts; nevertheless, Israel must refrain from making declarations about changes in the Vatican's position on this issue. The Vatican's prime interest in its relations with Israel concerns the status of the Christian denominations.

Notes

1. Count Wladimir d'Ormesson, French ambassador to the Vatican. For Sharett's visit to the Vatican, see No. 80.
2. Domenico Cardinal Tardini, Vatican secretary of state for extraordinary affairs.
3. Eugenio Cardinal Tisserant, secretary of the Congregation of the Eastern Churches in the Vatican.

135. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions abroad. 5 May 1952

Coded Tel. MTA82; Outg.: 130.09/2342/17

The Government of Israel has decided to move the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem within six to eight months. No particular political significance should be attached to the move being made now; a year ago the Minister of Foreign Affairs told the Knesset that the move was being delayed only for technical reasons rather than matters of principle.

Note

1. In another telegram, Eytan added this explanation: "Transferring the Ministry is not a political demonstration but a domestic and organizational necessity. The ongoing severance from other ministries and the Knesset affects the efficiency of the Ministry's work, makes coordination more difficult, and diminishes the Ministry's influence on other ministries. The Ministry also suffers from the fact that the Minister is absent for many days during sessions of the Government and Knesset. Transferring the Ministry is a logical and inevitable conclusion of the process that was decided on two-and-a-half years ago." (See Eytan to Israel missions abroad, MTA83, 11 May 1952, 130.09/2377/1.)

136. Meeting: A. Eban–J. D. Hickerson (Washington, 1 May 1952, document dated 5 May 1952)

Report: 130.02/2424/2

The meeting was held at the initiative of Hickerson, to consider the American request of last December that Israel send a military unit to Korea.[1] Eban explained that the Israel Government had discussed the matter exhaustively and decided that currently, and in the present conditions, Israel is unable to comply with the request. However, the question will be reconsidered from time to time as warranted by changing circumstances.

Eban gave a detailed presentation of the considerations which led to the Israeli decision, emphasizing in particular Israel's own security problems, surrounded as it is by enemies. Israeli public opinion is focused, moreover, on domestic and economic matters. In addition, Israel's forces are best retained for defense of the region, where there are very few forces willing and able to answer the call should it come. He also said that the size of the unit Israel had been asked to send, a regiment, was astonishing, in light of the military contributions that other countries with larger armies had been asked to make.

Hickerson replied that the Americans are perfectly aware of all the arguments put forward by Eban, and he realizes that there are many countries better able than Israel to lend a hand yet which refuse to do so. Nevertheless, he wished to point out that complying with the request would enhance Israel's prestige and would guarantee that, should Israel itself ever be in need of such a force in the future, its request would be granted. As to the size of the unit, he agreed that a regiment was too large, and a more suitable unit would be a battalion, i.e., around a thousand men. Hickerson reiterated that the main reason behind the request was to permit a rotation of American troops during the expected cease-fire in Korea.

The talk was held in an atmosphere of quiet persuasion, with no attempt to assert demands. At its conclusion, Eban informed Hickerson that he would pass on the request that the Government reconsider the matter.

Notes

1. See Vol. 6, No. 516.
2. See No. 143.

137. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 5 May 1952

Note

1. See also No. 142. In reply to this telegram and to No. 142, Sharett stated that the subject had been discussed by the Government; he has been authorized to act in accordance with his proposal in the last paragraph of this telegram, but must note that Israel was not currently willing to allocate more than P£1 million to this purpose. He also noted two additional difficulties: the lack of foreign currency, which might require Israel to request additional aid from the United States, and the inability to explain to the Israeli public why Israel was allocating funds when Iraq was not making a parallel gesture. (See Sharett to Eban, IW288, 12 May 1952, 130.02/2451/19.) See also No. 152.

138. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 6 May 1952

139. G. Josephthal (Tel Aviv) to F. E. Shinnar and G. Avner (London). 6 May 1952

Coded Tel. ILA746; Outg.: 130.09/2318/9

Josephthal reports on the latest developments concerning reparations. (1) The Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee will today adopt the following resolutions: The Committee advises the Government not to renew negotiations with the Germans until Germany submits a clear and binding proposal that satisfies Israel's claim. The Government should not make a statement until it knows the content of the initial German proposal. (2) If the initial German proposal is unsatisfactory, Israel will reject it and demand a new proposal on the basis of which it will be possible to renew the negotiations. (3) Goldmann's reply to Blankenhorn was drafted

with the agreement of Sharett and Josephthal.[1] (4) Goldmann asked Blankenhorn to inform him whether a binding proposal will be offered on 14–15 May. (5) Sharett agreed that Barou not be a member of the Israel delegation, but merely act as liaison with Blankenhorn. (6) He will return to London together with Goldmann. (7) Sharett wired Eban in Washington, asking him to arrange a meeting with the German ambassador in Washington. He proposed that the meeting take place without the participation of Eban himself; a non-Jewish or independent Jewish representative is to be preferred.[3]

Notes

1. Goldmann wrote that he would be happy to meet Adenauer on May 14 or 15, on the assumption that the Chancellor would be ready then, as promised, to submit a concrete proposal on the grand total of reparations, or the sum for the first three years. (The text of Goldmann's letter is included in the telegram from Sharett to Keren, IL745, 6 May 1952, 130.09/2318/9.)
2. Sharett's telegram, IW275, dated 6 May, is in File 93.01/2208/9.
3. One word is illegible in the original. According to Sharett's telegram (see n. 2 above), the reference is to the West German ambassador in Washington.

140. A. Kubovy (Prague) to the East European Division. 6 May 1952

Coded Tel. 2; Inc.: 130.09/2343/1

Kubovy offers a number of suggestions concerning Israel-Czechoslovakia relations, on the occasion of Czechoslovakia's National Day on 9 May. (1) Dr. Kugel[1] should send a telegram to the Czech minister of health, Plojhar,[2] honorary president of the Israel-Czechoslovakia Friendship League, expressing his hope that the misunderstandings between the two countries will be cleared up and suggesting that he visit Czechoslovakia. (2) To mark the occasion, the *Jerusalem Post* and *Davar* should publish articles recalling Czechoslovakia's assistance during the War of Independence, but expressing regret at the deterioration in relations reflected by the arrest of the Zionist leadership, the arrest of Oren and Orenstein, the reneging on commitments about *aliya*, and the campaign of threats designed to deter Czechoslovak Jews from any contact with the Israel legation. (3) Correspondents abroad should wire similar reports to their newspapers. (4) It should be discreetly circulated that it is inappropriate for Israeli citizens to attend a reception at the Czechoslovak legation in Israel in light of the fact that a Czechoslovak citizen was apt to put himself at risk by participating in an equivalent ceremony in Prague.

Notes

1. Haim Kugel, mayor of Holon, a member of the presidium of the Society of Czechoslovak Immigrants in Israel.
2. Josef Plojhar, Czechoslovak minister of health.
3. Arye Levavi, the head of the East European Division, replied to Kubovy that most of his recommendations had been accepted: Dr. Kugel had sent a telegram along the lines proposed and an article had been published in the *Davar* daily newspaper; members of the leftist parties, on the other hand, had not cooperated, and *inter alia* had attended the Czechoslovak Independence Day party in great numbers. Foreign Minister Sharett did attend the reception, but came late and stayed only a short time, and spoke at his initiative with the Czechoslovak chargé d'affaires. (See A. Levavi to A. Kubovy, 13 May 1952, 130.11/2493/5.) On Sharett's talk with the chargé d'affaires, see No. 147.

141. *Aide-Mémoire* by the Government of Israel (London) to the Government of the United Kingdom (London). 7 May 1952

Note

1. See No. 145.

142. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 8 May 1952

Notes

1. See No. 137.
2. Arthur Gardiner, special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

143. G. Rafael (New York) to A. Eban (Washington). 8 May 1952

Orig.: 93.08/416/1

Rafael wishes to raise a few considerations relating to the American request that Israel dispatch troops to Korea.[1] Although the prospects for a cease-fire in the near future do not seem bright, it must be assumed that in the next few months the parties will conclude such an agreement. A cease-fire will change many countries' attitude towards active participation in the

UN force in Korea; he assumes that many countries will then be willing to send contingents, including Asian and Middle Eastern states. In a conversation with Hickerson, the latter drew attention to the advantages that would accrue to countries that send troops to Korea. These are tempting, and to a large extent persuasive, advantages, but it must be borne in mind that only those who act promptly will garner them. Consequently, and taking into account Israel's need to strengthen its position both domestically and internationally, he favors sending an Israeli military force to Korea.

In light of Eban's talk with Hickerson, Rafael offers a bold idea. Perhaps Israel's consent to dispatch troops to Korea might be exploited to obtain a seat on the Security Council. Turkey's term is about to expire, and the current candidate is Lebanon, about which—on the basis of a strict construction of the UN Charter—there is a serious doubt as to its capacity to contribute to the preservation of world peace and security. He is aware that this is an audacious proposal, but thinks that it will not be long before the Americans and British realize that it is impossible to harness the Arab countries to the Western defense system. If they do not wish to create a vacuum in the region, they must assign Israel a central role, and this could be reflected in support for Israel's election to the Security Council.

Notes

1. See No. 136.
2. Eban replied that he "totally identifies" with Rafael's opinions; he too is apprehensive that Israel will not be able to get the required increase in aid without significantly modifying its foreign policy. He too is in favor of membership in the Security Council and does not fear that such membership would involve any loss on a par with the benefits accruing thereto. In his opinion, Israel should aspire to membership on the Security Council in 1954; he does not believe that the chances of being elected to the Council then are less than those of being elected now to the Economic and Social Council. (See Eban to Rafael, 2 June 1952, 130.02/2404/12.)

144. Meeting: M. Sharett–M. B. Davis (Tel Aviv, 2 May 1952, document dated 8 May 1952)

Report: 93.08/357/41

Sharett reported on Israel's financial situation, which necessitated Dr. Joseph's urgent mission to the United States. He explained that Dr. Joseph and his colleagues had decided that it was necessary to use all funds—including those raised by the United Jewish Appeal and Israel Bonds—to pay Israel's current debts; at the same time, he had made efforts to have the

balance of the Grant-in-Aid funds released. Sharett explained that economic crises follow one another, since there is a permanent gap between Israel's foreign-exchange receipts and expenditures. The American Grant-in-Aid is insufficient to make good this deficit. Last year, Israel received $65 million, after having requested $150 million, while this year, if everything goes smoothly in Congress, it will receive between $60 million and $80 million. Israel is not complaining about the sums it has received and sincerely appreciates this assistance, but the gap remains. Sharett added that, given the pressing nature of the crisis, it had been necessary to cancel the constructive programs to utilize the Grant-in-Aid funds. Israel regrets this, and difficulties have ensued for various ministries, but the situation rendered this step unavoidable.

The ambassador thanked Sharett for his explanations and expressed his regret at the cancellation of the plans to use the grant funds, but promised that this would not overshadow future recommendations and actions. He availed himself of the opportunity to raise two problems: the agreement between Israel and Jordan on prevention of infiltration,[2] which he hoped Israel would renew, and the situation in the Hula, especially the question of the dam.[3] With regard to the latter, he said he had reason to believe that the Syrians are prepared to negotiate with Israel over its operation, on condition that no damage would result to land under cultivation on their side; he had been told, however, that Israel's representatives on the Mixed Armistice Commission are refusing to negotiate with the Syrians lest this prejudice Israel's territorial rights. Sharett replied that he is pleased by the Syrians' willingness to negotiate directly with Israel and will inquire as to what had transpired in the talks.

Notes

1. On Byroade's visit to Israel, see No. 172.
2. See No. 128.
3. The reference is to the disagreement over the construction of a dam across the Jordan River in the eastern sector of the demilitarized zone. The Syrians had made operation of the dam conditional on its not causing any damage to their agricultural lands in the Btaiha Valley. On this, see A. Shalev, *Cooperation under the Shadow of Conflict* (Hebrew), p. 198.

145. M. Keren (London) to M. Sharett. 9 May 1952

Notes

1. See No. 141.

2. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, British High Commissioner in Germany.
3. Sir George Rendel, British diplomat, head of the British delegation, and chairman of the German Foreign Debt Conference held in London.

146. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to A. Eban (Washington). [11 May 1952]

Draft: 130.02/2418/20

Sharett refers to Eban's meeting with the UN representatives of the three Western powers on the issue of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. From Eban's report on the meeting[1] one might infer that the Egyptians do not allow any cargo destined for Israel to pass through the canal, but this is not the case. Regular commercial cargo destined for Israel does pass through the canal, sometimes after inspection, and after the Egyptians record the name of the vessel carrying the cargo. The ban applies only to cargoes defined as contraband of war, including fuel. Consequently, Eban's proposal in paragraph (2) of his report, viz., to test the Egyptians by sending a cargo through the canal in a foreign bottom, misses the mark.

The proposal to send a vessel flying the Israeli flag is an option; however, it requires consultations with the powers, and thus far has been impossible because of the dispute over the future of the Suez Canal. The idea should be taken up again now that the situation in the canal has returned to normal.

The crux of the matter, however, remains the passage through the canal of oil destined for Israel. The Egyptians claim that oil is contraband of war; since the problem of oil transport was a central issue in the Security Council deliberations, Israel is justified in claiming that the Egyptians must refrain from interfering with the passage of tankers en route to Israel. Israel's aim should be to bring maximum pressure to bear on the Powers to support an attempt to send a tanker through the canal. Such action is necessary since Israel itself cannot obtain a tanker without British or American assistance. So far, regrettably, Israel has encountered a British refusal "to widen the dispute," and American hesitation.

Note

1. See No. 113.

147. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan. 11 May 1952

Orig.: 130.11/2513/3

Sharett reports on his conversation with Bártušek, the Czechoslovak chargé d'affaires in Tel Aviv, during the reception to mark the Czechoslovak National Day.[1] He asked that Bártušek transmit a request to his government to release Oren, whose detention is causing a deterioration in the relations between the two countries. He added that he knows Oren well, and is certain that, apart from talking, the man had done nothing. Bártušek replied that he could not imagine that Oren had been arrested merely for talking, but would pass on the request to his government. Sharett indicates that he is considering a personal approach to the Czechoslovak foreign minister, Široký, if there is no progress in the matter.

Notes

1. On the occasion of the Czechoslovak National Day (see No. 140).
2. Alois Bártušek, Czechoslovak chargé d'affaires a.i. in Israel.
3. Vilem Široký, Czechoslovak foreign minister.

148. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 12 May 1952

Note

1. See No. 108.

149. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) and the Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (London). 12 May 1952

Notes

1. See No. 132.
2. In another telegram, Eban reported on a conversation with Burton Berry, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs, on the subject of reparations. Berry had said that the State Department would indicate to the Germans its awareness that the critical period was approaching. (See telegram to the United States Division, W95, 12 May 1952, 93.01/2208/8.)

150. Agreement between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Mandelbaum Gate, 13 May 1952)

Note

1. See Editorial Note, p. 33, and No. 128.

151. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (London) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 13 May 1952

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2319/1

The telegram is intended for Sharett, Goldmann, and Josephthal. Barou's daily reports indicate that the proposal is being worked on in Bonn; however, as there is no certainty that the final decision will be taken this week, it is not yet clear when Goldmann will be able to meet Adenauer. This is also a reply to Sharett's telegram.[1] Nor is it clear whether there will be a meeting with Abs. There has been satisfactory progress with regard to compiling a list of goods, but Barou has serious doubts about the level of the initial proposal and about how soon the Germans will take their decision. They have a tendency to defer important decisions, among other reasons because of their more general problems. In light of the postponements, the delegation proposes consultations in London, with the participation of Goldmann, Barou, and Rosensaft. The Political Research Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs predicts a lengthy deferral of the final decision.[4]

Notes

1. Not found.
2. The number of the telegram is not clear in the original, but the reference is evidently to the telegram from Avner to the Foreign Ministry, 7 May 1952 (130.09/2319/1), according to which a meeting with Abs had been set for Bonn on 15 May.
3. Members of the Foreign Ministry Research Division. See telegram "Harel-Tsafenat" to the Foreign Ministry, LI573, 13 May 1952, 130.09/2319/1.
4. See No. 156.

152. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 15 May 1952

Notes

1. See Nos. 137 and 142.
2. See No. 177.
3. The last sentence, which deals with press reaction to the affair of the blocked accounts, is garbled and has been omitted here. A full report of the conversation is in File 93.03/3061/8.

153. J. M. Berncastle (Jerusalem) to W. Eytan. 15 May 1952

Note

1. See No. 123 and n. 2 there.

154. Note from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Prague) to the Israel Legation in Prague. 16 May 1952

Note

1. These letters, as well as those cited below, are in File 130.11/2513/3.

155. A. Eban (Washington) to Sh. Bendor. 19 May 1952

Orig.: 130.20/2491/2

Eban is reacting to Bendor's letter on the decision to move the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem.[1] He welcomes the decision. For the past two years the United Nations has more or less ignored the issue of Jerusalem, to Israel's considerable benefit, and it should exploit this respite to the fullest. It is to be regretted, however, that the move had not been coordinated with the State Department, since the successful foiling of the various initiatives on Jerusalem raised during the past two years resulted entirely from cooperation with the State Department. The State Department is justified, therefore, in considering this to be an issue of common interest to itself and Israel. In his opinion, the State Department's chilly reaction[2] is a result of the lack of coordination rather than of opposition to Israel's policy on Jerusalem.

Notes

1. Bendor reported on consultations in the Foreign Ministry concerning the transfer of the Ministry to Jerusalem. The discussions focused chiefly on whether it was desirable, worthwhile, or necessary to implement the move before the beginning of the General Assembly session in the autumn. Opinions were divided. Some asserted that the General Assembly should be presented with a *fait accompli*, while others argued that the fact of the transfer would not affect the Assembly's resolution and an unfavorable resolution could be expected in any case. The decision was taken by the Government, which resolved on completing the transfer in the near future (File 130.20/2491/2).
2. The State Department immediately reacted negatively to the decision to transfer the Foreign Ministry. It was stated unofficially that "the position of the United States is well known, but it will act only in coordination with other countries"; the Americans added that "Sharett is liable to find himself alone in Jerusalem." (See telegram from the Israel Embassy in Washington to the United States Division, WNT39, 6 May 1952, 93.01/2208/8.)

156. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (London) to A. Eban (Washington). 19 May 1952

Notes

1. See No. 151.
2. See Nos. 157 and 160.

157. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations [London] to A. Eban (Washington). 19 May 1952

Coded Tel. EWA17; Inc.: 93.01/2208/9

As a precaution, the delegation repeats the information conveyed by telephone concerning the talk between Shinnar and Abs. (1) Abs indicated that the Germans have not yet formulated an official and binding proposal because they do not yet know how much they will be required to pay to the creditors of the London Conference. Since Israel has decided to continue the negotiations only if an acceptable German proposal is made, he is trying to ascertain, on Adenauer's behalf, what would constitute a satisfactory proposal for Israel. (2) In the meanwhile, he can say that as for reparations in goods, the Germans conceive of an annual payment equivalent to DM 100 million. (3) He repeats his previous proposal that all funds received from the United States as a loan or as postponement of repayment of post-war assistance be transferred to Israel in dollars. (4) Germany will

be prepared to increase the sum and even to double it once the results of the negotiations with the United States are known. If the outcome is favorable, the increase will be in dollars, and otherwise, in goods. (5) Shinnar rejected Abs's proposal out of hand: it is no basis for negotiations. (6) Abs replied that DM 400 million a year plus another third in foreign currency is not a realistic demand. He asked what Israel considers to be a fair proposal. (7) Shinnar answered that Israel does not wish to be dependent on what Germany does or does not obtain from the United States, and argued that Germany's economic condition certainly enables it to meet Israel's claim. (8) Abs said that the Germans prefer to negotiate about payments for the first three years, and not about a final and comprehensive sum; Shinnar replied that in that case the payments must be relatively higher. (9) Abs said that they had promised a reply only on 19 June, and that that date still applies. Shinnar summed up the conversation as unsatisfactory. This telegram does not modify the substance of the delegation's request made in the previous telegram.[1]

Notes

1. No. 156.
2. This information dealt with the resignation of Böhm, head of the German delegation to the reparations talks. Böhm contended that he had been unable to overcome the opposition of the German delegation to the creditors' talks in London to giving an agreement with Israel priority over an agreement with the other creditors. He was convinced that a favorable resolution with Israel would not have harmed the success of the talks in London, and his conscience would not allow him to be a party to torpedoing the talks with Israel (telegram L4934, 20 May 1952, 93.08/44/24).
3. Eban responded that he did not understand this last sentence and that he must coordinate his activities with the Jewish organizations (telegram WS268, 20 May 1952, 93.08/344/24).

158. N. Goldmann (London) to K. Adenauer (Bonn). 19 May 1952

Notes

1. The original text is in File 93.04/43/10.
2. See there.
3. See No. 157.
4. German for "equalizing the burden."

159. *Aide-Mémoire* by the British Minister to Israel [Tel Aviv]. 20 May 1952

Notes

1. See Vol. 6, No. 508.
2. See No. 50.
3. See Vol. 6, Nos. 68 and 72.
4. To this memorandum was attached another one, providing details about the members of the military mission and technical arrangements for its visit. See also No. 183.

160. A. Eban [Washington] to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (London). 20 May 1952

Notes

1. See No. 161.
2. See No. 157.
3. See there, n. 2.
4. See No. 158.

161. *Aide-Mémoire* by the Ambassador of Israel in Washington. 20 May 1952

Notes

1. No. 27.
2. No. 92.
3. See No. 157.
4. See No. 160.

162. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 21 May 1952

Notes

1. Eytan reported on Keren's conversation with Sir Roger Allen, head of the African Department in the British Foreign Office. Allen was concerned about the possibility of Israel's sending a tanker through the Suez Canal. The present British position was most delicate, and Allen hoped that nothing would happen to stir troubled waters

further. The British view was that it was not the task of the British troops based in the Canal Zone to secure freedom of passage through the Canal against Egyptian opposition. Allen added that such a step would also not be in Israel's interest, since it would rankle with the Egyptians, who would exploit the first opportunity to pay Israel back. Eytan added that at the Foreign Ministry they are most skeptical of the value of raising Suez now and had been somewhat surprised by Eban's fervor on this matter, although the idea of sending an Israel-bound ship through Canal still stands. He suggested that Eban discuss the matter with Sharett, who was about to visit the United States. (Telegram from Eytan to Eban, Y435, 20 May 1952, 93.01/2204/5.)

2. No. 11.
3. See No. 26 and n. 4 there.
4. No. 113.
5. No. 148.
6. See No. 168.

163. T. Kollek (Washington) to D. Ben-Gurion. 21 May 1952

Notes

1. Teddy Kollek, Israel minister in Washington, was to leave that post at the end of May. From July he was Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office.
2. On Dov Joseph's mission to the United States, see No. 144.
3. The letter has not been located.
4. Robert Nathan, director of the Economic Department of the Jewish Agency in New York and economic advisor to the Israel Embassy in Washington.
5. See No. 1, paragraph 10.
6. Abraham Dickenstein, American banker and president of the American Palestine Trading Corporation (AMPAL).
7. Joseph Sugarman, American businessman, head of the Bonds campaign in 1952.
8. Meir Sherman, minister for economic affairs in the Israel Embassy in the United States.
9. For Ben-Gurion's answer, see No. 180.

164. Note from the Israel Ambassador in Washington to the Secretary of State of the United States (Washington). 21 May 1952

Note

1. See No. 78 and n. 4.

165. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 22 May 1952

Note

1. See No. 162.

166. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (London) to W. Eytan. 22 May 1952

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2319/1

The resignation of Böhm and Küster and their pointed criticism of the attitude of the German government,[1] as well as the sharp reaction by Shinnar and Keren in their meeting with Abs,[2] have led to dramatic developments. In the midst of negotiations with the Western powers, Adenauer spoke with Böhm and recalled Abs from London. The American High Commissioner told Goldmann that he had rebuked the Germans, and as a result they are going to relate to their question in an appropriate manner. At the final meeting in Bonn yesterday it was decided to send Böhm to Paris with new proposals to lay before Goldmann.[3] In light of these developments, Böhm agreed to reconsider his resignation. The reaction in some Israeli newspapers, which continue to call for breaking off the negotiations, is misguided, and an effort should be made to rectify the situation.

Notes

1. See No. 157, n. 2, and No. 160.
2. See No. 157.
3. See No. 170.

167. Foreign Minister's Meeting with the Israel Embassy in Washington and with the Israel Delegation to the United Nations (Washington, 23 May 1952)

Report: 130.20/2460/6

[*Three sections (2, 4, and 6), dealing with information activities and public opinion, investments in Israel, and Israel-Arab relations, have been omitted here.*]

(1) Eban began with a general review of Israel–United States relations. During the last eighteen months Israel has chalked up many achievements: a loan from the Export-Import Bank, financial assistance under the Mutual Security Act, and support for its positions on several political questions, including Arab refugees, internationalization of Jerusalem, and freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. In effect, there have been no vital matters in which an Israeli request was turned down. By contrast, a number of Arab requests were rejected. At the same time, there have been certain developments that have affected the embassy's work and will continue to be of importance in the future. First, Congress has become the key player in those issues that are important to Israel; hence greater attention must be paid to action in the area of disseminating information and influencing public opinion. Second, the shift in emphasis from political to economic matters requires that efforts be spread out among many departments and agencies, unlike the former situation when it was possible to concentrate on the State Department. Finally, the growing importance of global defense considerations is apt to make the State Department excessively sensitive to Arab reactions.

(3) Teddy Kollek reported on efforts related to economic assistance. Israel was successful in receiving aid for the 1951/52 fiscal year primarily because of public sympathy and the wish to help the new immigrants. Lobbying began in Congress, as a result of which the White House, too, was swayed. With regard to 1952/53 the process is just the reverse: the campaign will begin in the White House and executive-branch agencies, and proceed from there to Congress. The prospects this year are slim. This is an election year, and Israel has lost some of the sympathy it previously enjoyed, among other reasons because it used most of the assistance to cover its balance-of-payments deficit, thereby giving the impression that Israel does not know how to manage its economic policy intelligently. In order to restore trust, far-reaching changes must be made at home; with the assistance of American experts, a clear and detailed economic program, which can also be integrated into comprehensive economic plans for the Middle East, must be presented. Even these changes cannot guarantee that economic assistance will be forthcoming, and it is quite probable that Israel will receive only Point 4 assistance and military aid.

M. Shalit added his comments on military assistance. Although Israel has decided to ask for military aid, many in Israel, in both the army and government circles, object to this decision and are not cooperating. This is reflected in their failure to cooperate with the American military attachés and their assertion that it is not in Israel's interest to host an American military delegation. The domestic reasons for this situation are well-known, but in these circumstances it will be difficult to pressure the United States government to grant military aid.

(5) Chaim Herzog reported on military relations. The last two years have seen a marked improvement in relations with the U.S. defense establishment. Israel is receiving more and more assistance. There are no problems with military training; with the exception of a few courses, Israel is receiving an adequate allotment of places. In the area of reimbursable military assistance, Israel may well receive a favorable reply to its request and be declared eligible for such assistance. As for non-reimbursable military assistance, no reply has yet been received, and the State Department wants to make it conditional on the establishment of the Middle East Command. The odds that the command will be established are uncertain, however; in a conversation with Mr. Nash, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, he seemed to have doubts about it. In order to make progress in this area, joint U.S.-Israel action is required. Unfortunately, thus far the embassy in Washington has acted alone, with no support from the American ambassador in Israel. Hence the government must make a clear-cut decision on the matter, make it public, and take energetic action to implement it.

(7) Gideon Rafael reviewed developments in the international arena. The signature of the Bonn accords regulating the relations between the NATO countries and West Germany has inaugurated a new phase in the Cold War. Now that the last breach in the wall around the U.S.S.R. has been filled, international tension will increase. It must be assumed that the U.S.S.R. will step up pressure on all political fronts to prevent parliamentary ratification of the Bonn accords and to improve its international standing. The most sensitive area, and that where trouble is most likely to occur, is the Middle East. This region is the only remaining no-man's land in the Cold War, and as such offers a convenient opportunity for Soviet penetration in an attempt to improve their international position without fear of armed resistance. Such a penetration is liable to heighten tension in the next year or two to the point where any spark could set off a conflagration. Israel must have an interest in the defense of the Middle East and consequently must encourage the West to play a more active and responsible part in security arrangements in the region. Only through close and ongoing cooperation with the West can Israel achieve political and military security and successfully resist its enemies near and far. Israel cannot survive except as part of an international framework that supports it in times of trouble and within which it will share in collective security. One of the inescapable conclusions is that Israel must comply with the United States' request that it send troops to Korea.[9] Israel's participation in such a force would improve its position in the United States and the world as a whole, as well as vis-à-vis the Arabs, and would also second Israel's requests for financial assistance.

(8) The minister replied that the economic situation is difficult. There is a desperate need for large amounts of foreign exchange. The lack of coordi-

nation is a severe problem. The request for economic assistance was initiated by the Government, but the gravity of the situation was not known at the time of the initial request.

The political situation: It is gratifying that support for Israel is once again not restricted to public opinion, but has taken root in government circles as well. The fact that Israel now receives support because of geopolitical considerations, and not simply in reaction to public pressure or as an expression of emotional sympathy, indicates that Israel has managed to gain important ground. The Americans understand that Israel is an outpost that must be defended, even if this complicates their relations with the Arabs. Public support must not be relinquished, however, and Israel must make unflagging efforts to maintain its favorable image in the United States. Members of the Zionist Organization of America and Jewish Agency personnel must be recruited to this end.

The Arab problem: There is nothing wrong with ambiguity. In certain circumstances ambiguity is inevitable, as, for example, given the fluid situation in Egypt. Israel must restrict itself to asserting certain immutable principles, namely: Israel is in favor of peace, but opposes the Arab League and plans for pan-Arab unification, such as the idea of Greater Syria. In its relationship with the United States Israel must not present itself as an alternative to the Arab countries. It must argue that friendship with Israel does not preclude good relations with Arab states. The moment that the Arab countries sense that their hostility to Israel determines the attitude of the Western countries towards Israel, they will increase their hostility to Israel. They must be convinced that such hostility is not worthwhile, *inter alia* as regards economic assistance.

Political orientation: Nothing he has heard in the discussion has convinced him that Israel should modify its political orientation. In his view, none of the ultimate policy makers among the Western powers entertains the slightest doubt concerning Israel's total and unqualified support for the West. Hence there is no need for declarations of identification and so forth. The speakers here also ignored other important aspects, such as Soviet Jewry. Israel considers itself responsible for this community, which see itself, too, as dependent on Israel, while the U.S.S.R. believes that the Jews are an untrustworthy element. The Cold War will endanger Soviet Jewry.

Military assistance: Sharett refuted the charge that Israel has not done enough to obtain arms from the United States. The proof—its arms request submitted to Marshall in late 1950. The fear that military secrets might be passed on to the Arabs should not be dismissed lightly. There is close military cooperation between the Americans and the British, so it is just one short step to the transmission of sensitive information to Jordan. Nor should factors within the army be underestimated. Mapam has many adherents in the army, and pointless friction should be avoided as far as

possible. In the interim, no practical progress has been achieved in this area; when and if it is, binding decisions will be taken.

Notes

1. Thus in the original, but the reference seems to be to Jordan.
2. Section 2, dealing with information campaigns and public opinion, has been omitted.
3. See also No. 163.
4. Section 4, a survey of problems connected with investments in Israel, has been omitted.
5. See Nos. 33 and 43.
6. On the conversation with Nash, see Herzog's report to the United States Division, 25 April 1952, 130.20/2488/3.
7. See No. 159.
8. Section 7, a survey of Israel-Arab relations, has been omitted.
9. See No. 136.
10. Chaim Yahil, director of the Information Division of the Foreign Ministry.
11. The reference is evidently to Comay's memorandum on "Israel and the Defence of the Middle East," 7 May 1952, 130.02/2449/1; see there. For the "depot" project, see No. 68 and n. 2 there.
12. Two paragraphs dealing with tourism and investments have been omitted.

168. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 23 May 1952

Notes

1. No. 162.
2. See No. 159.
3. See No. 148.
4. No. 165.

169. M. Fischer (Paris) to J. C. Dunn (Paris). 23 May 1952

Notes

1. James C. Dunn, U.S. ambassador to France.
2. See No. 157, n. 2.
3. Acheson replied that he had spoken with Adenauer and impressed upon him the hope of the United States government that a satisfactory agreement would be concluded in the near future. Adenauer told him that the talks had been renewed and were proceeding smoothly. (See Acheson to Sharett, 3 June 1952, 130.02/2417/6.)

170. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (London) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 24 May 1952

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2319/1

The telegram is addressed to Eytan, with copies to Sharett and to Eban in Washington. Böhm met with Nahum Goldmann and the Israel delegation and asked whether the following proposal would be acceptable as a basis for continuing the negotiations: (1) Israel would receive the entire sum recognized by the Germans as a debt, namely, $715 million. (2) Payments would be made over a period of 8–12 years. (3) During the first two years, $50 million worth of goods would be provided annually; thereafter the rate would increase. (4) Should Germany obtain a loan from the United States, it would pay part of the sum in hard currency instead of merchandise.

Israel's reaction: (1) The proposal radically changes the situation and represents a considerable improvement. (2) It provides a basis for another meeting with Adenauer aimed at making further progress on several critical points; if such progress is achieved, it will be possible to set a date for the resumption of official negotiations. (3) The points that still require rectification are, however, central. In order of importance, they are: (a) payment of $36 million a year in foreign currency in all circumstances, even if an American loan is not forthcoming; (b) an increase in the value of the goods to be delivered in the early years to at least DM 300 million;[1] (c) cutting the overall payment period to seven or eight years.

Böhm agreed to report to Adenauer and to try to obtain a more generous proposal in advance of Goldmann's meeting with Adenauer, but stressed that this would not be easy, particularly because of opposition within the cabinet. In his opinion, it should be possible to increase the volume of goods transferred annually, and he will work towards this end. He will not withdraw his resignation until he sees how matters develop.

The delegation's assessment is that the proposal represents genuine progress and must now be improved through unofficial negotiations so as to achieve an agreement in principle before resumption of the official talks. The press communiqué is vague and general. The meeting with Adenauer will take place in Paris next week. A note has been transmitted to the three Western foreign ministers.[2] Böhm said that Adenauer needs more pressure on his government.

Notes

1. In the original erroneously "dollar," but corrected from a parallel version of the telegram sent to Washington (File 93.01/2208/9). Sharett expressed his astonishment at

this amount and noted that Israel should have asked for $100 million a year (around DM 400 million). Eban also noted that there had been hints from the State Department that the yearly payment in the first years should be between $75 million and $100 million. (See Eban's telegram to the delegation in London, WE23, 26 May 1952, 93.01/2208/8.)

2. No. 169.
3. See also No. 175.

171. A. Eban (Washington) to W. Eytan. 26 May 1952

Notes

1. Eytan noted that it was necessary to work out an agreed line concerning the nationalist agitation in Tunisia. Fischer in Paris was worried by rumors about links between Israel and the Tunisian nationalists, in the wake of a meeting between Mordecai Namir, the secretary-general of the General Federation of Labour, and a Tunisian leader. At the meeting, the Tunisian asked to meet with members of the Israel delegation to the United Nations, but Fischer did not know whether this meeting had taken place. Pending was the Tunisian request for a special session of the UN General Assembly, which was likely to embroil Israel with India and other Asian countries. Hence it was preferable that Israel support the convening of the Security Council—a right reserved to all. In general, it would be better for Israel to keep its mouth shut on this question, at least for the present. (See telegram from Eytan to Sharett and Eban, 23 May 1952, 130.09/2309/5.)
2. MK Eliezer Livneh (Mapai), a member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee.

172. United States Division [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Ambassador in Washington. 27 May 1952

Report: 93.08/409/1

Bendor reports on the three-day visit by Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. His first meeting was with the finance minister and Dr. Joseph and concerned fiscal and economic matters. Byroade inquired about Israel's chances for economic survival in the face of the Arab boycott and asked how Israel sees its economic situation in the coming five or ten years. Finance Minister Kaplan replied that Israel's long-term prospects are good, although the current, transitional period is difficult. He drew attention to the projects under construction and noted that they cannot bear fruit immediately. However, the harvest had been good this year and Israel will be able to provide 50% of its own food requirements. Dr. Joseph spoke of the austerity regime, noting that it could not be continued indefinitely without

undermining national morale. Byroade moved on to the topic of the Arab refugees and said that initially, during his visit to Syria, he had received the impression that progress could be achieved by settling the refugees where they are currently living; these hopes faded, however, after his visit to Jordan, where he learned from the Jordanians and United States representatives in that country that no agreement has yet been reached on resettling the refugees.

Byroade met the Prime Minister next. He again raised the question of what Israel would be like in another five or ten years. Ben-Gurion replied that now, with the end of mass immigration, Israel is concentrating on developing its agriculture, mineral resources, and basic industries; he is confident that this will put the country on a solid economic footing within a few years. The conversation then shifted to the question of peace and relations with the Arabs. Byroade said that the Arabs do not believe that Israel desires peace; they fear many things, including Israel. Ben-Gurion replied that he once thought that the United States could influence the Arabs to make peace with Israel, but no longer believes so. Byroade met Ben-Gurion again at the dinner hosted by Ambassador Davis. The conversation did not go into specifics, but Byroade said, among other things, that in order to solve its economic and political problems Israel should cut back on *aliya*, reduce the size of the army, and announce its willingness to accept repatriation of refugees.

Byroade, accompanied by the American ambassador, held a long talk with the director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the subject of Arab hostility towards Israel, the director-general stated that such hostility is the only thing that unites the Arabs, who need it in order to preserve their unity. Egypt is the key to any peace with Israel; if the Egyptians really wanted peace they could prepare domestic public opinion for that step. Byroade replied that he had found the greatest animosity towards Israel in Jordan and Syria, not in Egypt, which was preoccupied by its dispute with Britain. Israel should alleviate Arab fears and prove that it really desires peace. The Arab fear of Israel is genuine; they assert that Israel relates to them as conqueror to the vanquished. Such an attitude, he said, would not bring peace closer. The Arabs do not intend to reopen hostilities; he had also heard this from Shishakli, and he believes him. In his opinion, the obstacle to peace is mainly psychological. Each side considers itself to be the aggrieved party. Personally he believes that the Arabs are indeed the injured party — they lost their homeland and property. Israel must make a gesture in the matter of the blocked accounts. The director-general replied that the Arabs have done nothing to reach an arrangement. They refuse to hold direct talks with Israel. Past Israeli friendly gestures achieved nothing; it is doubtful whether future ones would be any more effective. What a Great Power can do is to persuade the Arab countries to recognize the need for direct talks with Israel.

Byroade spent the rest of his visit inspecting American diplomatic facilities in Israel. He also visited the North, toured the Hula, where he heard explanations of the drainage project, passed through Nazareth, and visited Kibbutz Degania. On the personal level, his informality and candor make a good impression.

Notes

1. See No. 152.
2. Milton Fried, labor attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Israel.
3. Rav-Seren Aryeh Friedlander (Shalev), Israel representative on the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission.

173. East European Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in Prague. 27 May 1952

Coded Tel. 13; Outg.: 130.09/2342/17

The East European Division confirms receipt of the telegram from Prague containing the text of the note from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the arrest of Oren and Orenstein.[1] The draft reply prepared by the ministry's legal department is as follows: (1) Israel is not disputing Czechoslovakia's right to try foreigners who have committed offenses on its territory, but this should not infringe upon the rights of consular and diplomatic representatives to protect their citizens in accordance with the principles of international law. (2) The refusal to allow visits to the Israelis seriously infringes upon the rights of the Israel Legation to protect Israeli citizens in that country. Given the lengthy period of detention, the Legation cannot agree to postpone exercising its right to visit its citizens. (3) Hence the Legation requests that its representatives be permitted to visit the detainees and to receive full and ongoing notification of all developments connected with their detention. The Legation hopes that it will soon receive details of the accusations levelled against the two Israelis.

Note

1. Telegram from Israel Legation in Prague (20 May 1952, 130.09/2343/1), reporting the text of the note from the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, received on 20 May 1952, concerning the arrest of Oren and Orenstein. The note repeated the contents of No. 154, namely, that the Czechoslovak authorities have the sole right to try according to their laws foreign nationals who had committed criminal acts on Czechoslovak territory; that the interrogation of the two Israelis has not yet been completed and they were being held in preventive detention; finally, that the reason for their arrest has

been reported to the Israeli Legation and at present Israeli representatives will not be permitted to visit them. (The full text of the letter is in File 130.11/2513/3.)

174. A. Lourie (New York) to W. Eytan. 28 May 1952

Notes

1. Pierre Ordonneau, member of the French Permanent Mission to the United Nations, and, from May 1952, French representative on the Conciliation Commission.
2. See Nos. 113 and 162.
3. This sentence was added by hand to the margins of the incoming text, but is lacking in the outgoing text (File 93.01/2204/4).
4. See No. 152.

175. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations [London] to Walter Eytan (Tel Aviv) and the Israel Embassy in Washington. 28 May 1952

Coded Tel. EWA23; Inc. (Washington): 93.01/2208/9

The telegram is addressed to Eytan in Tel Aviv and to Eban and the Foreign Minister in Washington. Goldmann met Adenauer, who promised him a binding formal proposal on 9 June.[1] Goldmann believes that in the interim it should be possible to incorporate some of the better terms demanded by Israel. Adenauer reported that during the discussions in Paris both Acheson and Eden had approached him about the reparations issue in a manner that left no room for doubt. Their intervention will help him within his own cabinet.

Note

1. See No. 170.

176. G. Rafael (New York) to A. Eban (Washington). 29 May 1952

Copy: 130.02/2403/26

Rafael reports on his talk with Constantin Zinchenko, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs. The

conversation focused on the international situation and on U.S. policy after the coming presidential elections. Rafael believes that the purpose of the meeting was to sound Israel out concerning the prospects for success of the new Soviet steps on Korea and their influence on the German question —the major issue that preoccupies the Russians. Last year, too, the Soviet initiative on Korea was preceded by a series of exploratory meetings of this sort. Nor should the possibility be excluded that the Soviets will exploit Malik's forthcoming term as president of the Security Council to make new proposals concerning Korea.

In the conversation, Rafael noted that a cease-fire in Korea would have a welcome impact on the international situation. Israel, he said, is convinced that the United States genuinely seeks a successful conclusion to the Korean negotiations. He advised the Soviets to take into account the winds of American public opinion, which have major influence on the shaping of U.S. policy. On the same topic, Zinchenko raised a proposal to solve the prisoners-of-war problem, which is one of the stumbling blocks plaguing the negotiations. In his opinion, a draft cease-fire agreement covering all the points on which agreement has been achieved should be signed now; the question of prisoners could be submitted to some other agency—political or humanitarian—and the cease-fire would go into effect only after a prisoner accord was reached. Rafael's response was non-committal.

Notes

1. Jules Moch, a member of the French delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly.
2. Abraham Feller, American jurist, general counsel and director of the Legal Department of the United Nations Secretariat. Feller, accused of Communist leanings, committed suicide in the middle of November (see No. 450).

177. *Aide-Mémoire* by the Ambassador of Israel in Washington. 2 June 1952

Notes

1. This memorandum was sent following Eban's talk with Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (see No. 152). The memorandum was addressed to the U.S. State Department, with a request that it be handed on to the Conciliation Commission, except for its fifth paragraph. (See Eban to Hickerson, 12 June 1952, 130.02/2451/19.)
2. See No. 137.
3. See Vol. 5, No. 52 and n. 8 there.

178. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division and E. Avriel. 2 June 1952

Coded Tel. WIA161; Outg.: 93.01/2208/12

Israel has decided to embark at once on a debt-consolidation campaign. Theoretically, the United States has two options: (1) a long-term loan from the Export-Import Bank, replacing the short-term loans that burden Israel; (2) intervention by the U.S. Treasury to use dollars to purchase Israel pounds through the agency of the Currency Stabilization Fund. Both options are difficult and no one should overestimate the chances of their implementation.

The following strategy was resolved upon: talks in Washington and in Israel to instill the idea that only conversion of the short-term loans to a long-term loan can solve Israel's financial difficulties. At this stage the aforementioned options should not be presented in detail. As a next step, the Foreign Minister and the ambassador to the United States should hold meetings with the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and Harriman, in order to obtain a political decision. In these talks the two options will be raised.

In the talks held in Israel, it is crucial that Ambassador Davis, McDaniel, and Mikesell be convinced that we are giving them full information concerning Israel's expected revenues and expenses for the coming year.

Notes

1. Raymond F. Mikesell, U.S. Special Representative to Israel for Economic Affairs, was about to leave for Israel to survey the Israeli economy and its foreign currency balance.
2. See No. 184.

179. A. Eban [New York] to A. S. Bokhari (New York). 3 June 1952

Notes

1. Ahmed S. Bokhari, Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the United Nations.
2. See No. 59 and n. 3 there.

180. D. Ben-Gurion (Jerusalem) to T. Kollek (Washington). 3 June 1952

Copy: IMDEA 532/73/178

Ben-Gurion informs Kollek that he read his memorandum[1] with great interest and agrees with most of the points raised in it. He too believes that there must be a change in the relationship with the U.S. ambassador in Israel and with the administration in Washington. Assistance must be based on friendship, and friendship on mutual trust.

The meeting with Byroade of the State Department aroused concern, although Ben-Gurion believes that a number of matters were made clear to him during their long *tête-à-tête* after dinner at the American ambassador's residence.[3] Nevertheless, it is clear that the Americans have begun to "discover" the Arab world and are impressed chiefly by its geographical extent and population, in contrast to those of Israel. The conclusion is that Israel must restore the health of its economy with as little recourse to outside help as possible. To this end, the following is required:

(1) Strengthening the Government's executive capabilities, *inter alia* by replacing the finance minister (no decision has yet been made on who the new minister will be). A small economic staff will also be established in the Prime Minister's Office to gather financial and economic data and devise the framework for a program leading to economic independence.

(2) State finances must be set in order. Short-term obligations must be replaced by a long-term loan.

(3) A minimum supply of food, fuels, raw materials, tools, and machines must be guaranteed.

Only if the first two conditions are met will it be possible to take steps to expand production and exports, to increase output, and prevent waste.

Personnel changes are in the offing: Ehud Avriel will become director-general of the Finance Ministry, and it is suggested that Kollek replace him in the Prime Minister's office. Ben-Gurion would be delighted to work with him, but feels that he is needed in the United States. What does Kollek think on this point? Ben-Gurion suggests that Kollek consult with Sharett as well.

Notes

1. No. 163.
2. Ephraim Evron, the Prime Minister's private secretary.
3. On these meetings, see No. 172.
4. No response by Kollek to this letter has been found. On 25 June, there was a change of the guard in the Finance Ministry. Levi Eshkol was named Finance Minister in

place of Eliezer Kaplan, who became Deputy Prime Minister. At the end of the year, a special bureau for economic planning, headed by Oscar Gass, was set up in the Prime Minister's Office.

181. Meeting: M. Fischer and Sh. Divon–M. Schumann[1] (Paris, 30 May 1952, document dated 5 June 1952)

Report: 93.02/172/15

The meeting was held in order to present the Israeli position on Middle Eastern problems on the eve of Schumann's departure for the conference of French diplomats serving in the Middle East. The Israeli representatives focused on what they termed the crisis of confidence between the Arab peoples and the Western countries. The remedy for this, in their view, is to maintain contacts not only with Arab governments, but also with opposition and non-government circles. They also counselled not to exaggerate the danger of Communist penetration of the Arab world. Much time has been lost due to exaggerated fears of this danger; moderate and populist forces advocating reforms should certainly be encouraged. The Arab League, according to the Israelis, is losing strength, both because of the fissures in the Hashemite bloc and because of Egypt's preoccupation with non-Arab matters. The crisis facing the League reveals the folly of trying to impose on the Arab states an artificial solidarity with no basis in reality, a solidarity that prevents realization of their authentic individual interests. This has been demonstrated time and again when it comes to relations with Israel: countries have adopted extreme positions sometimes at cross-purposes to their own interests in order to preserve pan-Arab solidarity. With regard to the proposed Middle East Command, the Israeli representatives argued that the crisis in relations between Egypt and Great Britain does require the mobilization of all forces for regional defense, but not necessarily on the basis proposed heretofore, and obviously not on the basis of the Arab League's collective security pact.

The Israelis also raised two issues directly involving Israel. They complained that France had not joined forces with Britain and the United States to expedite a reparations agreement with Germany.[2] They also raised the question of free passage through the Suez Canal and argued that the Powers' demand for Israeli restraint on this question is out of place; on the contrary, active intervention would be in the interest of all parties to the dispute.

During the talk Schumann several times concurred with the presentation of the Israeli representatives. Concerning the Middle East Command, he noted that France indeed believes that Israel has a special standing in the region, but he does not consider that conditions are ripe for implementing

the Command in the form favored by Israel. Nevertheless, France will continue to work in this direction. In his opinion, the Middle East Command must be linked with NATO; there is talk now, albeit not very serious, of setting up a coordinating body in Cyprus or elsewhere that would operate under supervision of the three powers. Schumann asked what lay behind the Government's decision to transfer the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem. He listened to the Israeli explanation, but did not respond negatively. The meeting concluded with an agreement for further contacts with Quai d'Orsay officials involved with the proposed Middle East Command. It was also agreed to meet with Schumann again after his return from the diplomatic conference.

Notes

1. Maurice Schumann, French secretary of state for foreign affairs.
2. See No. 175.
3. The session of the Conciliation Commission in Paris in the autumn of 1951.
4. The reference is to the negotiations conducted by the director of UNRWA, Blandford, with Arab governments, including Syria, concerning large-scale resettlement of refugees in their territory. The discussions with the Syrians seemed to be most promising, and a proposal was discussed for resettling 500,000 Arab refugees in Syria. But the Syrians changed their mind and the plan was shelved (see No. 193).
5. See Nos. 200 and 221.

182. A. Lourie (New York) to W. Eytan. 6 June 1952

Notes

1. See No. 113.
2. Compare No. 76.
3. See No. 111.
4. A full report of the conversation is in File 93.04/41/4.

183. Meeting: W. Eytan–F. Evans (Tel Aviv, 5 June 1952, document dated 6 June 1952)

Notes

1. Also present at the conversation was Michael Comay, who recorded the protocol.
2. See No. 159.
3. On this conversation, see Vol. 6, No. 68.
4. See Vol. 6, No. 138.
5. See Vol. 6, No. 508.
6. See Nos. 159 and 189.

184. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 7 June 1952

Note

1. See No. 178, and Eban to the United States Division, W182, 5 June 1952, 130.09/2309/9.

185. M. Sharett [Washington] to D. Joseph (Jerusalem). 8 June 1952

Copy: 130.02/2420/10

Sharett reports on the state of fund-raising activities in the United States. Israel Bonds has raised less than expected, and attempts to attain short-term loans have run into difficulties. Bonds leaders are vehemently opposed to such loans; only with great difficulty was Sam Rothberg[1] persuaded not to resign officially from the Steering Committee. In other circles, too, there is little enthusiasm for such loans, and the results have so far proved disappointing. In the meanwhile, an attempt is being made to defer repayment to the Bank of America; should this fail, however, Israel will face a financial crisis before the end of this month.

As for the attempt to obtain a further large allocation from the U.S. government, it has become clear that no additional funds are available under the Mutual Security Act. Efforts are now concentrating on consolidation of short-term debts. Several preliminary feelers have been put out, and Sharett will take part in a more concerted effort to clarify the possibilities in around ten days' time.

Notes

1. Samuel Rothberg, a leader of the Israel Bonds drive in the United States.
2. Sidney Green, American accountant, advisor to the Israel Ministry of Finance.

186. D. Horowitz [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett and A. Eban (Washington). 9 June 1952

187. G. Rafael (New York) to A. Eban (Washington). 9 June 1952

Copy: 130.02/2410/2

Rafael reports on a conversation with 'Azmi, a member of the Egyptian delegation to the UN and its representative on the Human Rights Commission. 'Azmi reported on the state of the negotiations between Britain and Egypt. What is taking place is in fact not negotiations, but rather talks on the wording of a joint declaration on the objectives of the future negotiations. Britain has proposed three principles: (1) The aim of the negotiations is to bring about the withdrawal of British forces from the Suez area. (2) It notes that the Egyptian monarch has been proclaimed King of Sudan, but demands that the Sudanese people be allowed to decide whether to recognize the unified kingdom. (3) The negotiations on British withdrawal from the Canal Zone will be considered to be the beginning of negotiations on mutual defense arrangements for the region; in other words, the Canal withdrawal accords are contingent on an Anglo-Egyptian agreement on regional defense. Egypt's reply was as follows: (1) It agrees to the first principle. (2) A Sudanese government will be established and the king of Egypt will rule Sudan; a few years hence the Sudanese people will be allowed to vote on maintaining the united kingdom or seceding from it. (3) Defense of the Nile Valley is the sole responsibility and authority of the Egyptian government, so the problem of withdrawal from the Canal Zone must not be contingent on a regional security agreement. Several days ago, the Egyptian government convened to discuss the impasse in the talks, and two proposals were made: to bring the dispute to the UN, or to initiate negotiations with the United States. 'Azmi believes that neither of these proposals is practical.

Rafael's reaction: He, too, thinks these two proposals impractical. The United States will not abandon the principle of collective security for bilateral pacts; nor will it abandon Britain, since the unity of the Atlantic alliance is of great importance to it. At the same time, the trend towards closer ties with the United States is a healthy one, although it must be integrated with American intentions concerning the region, namely, promoting stability and peace throughout the region by means of a comprehensive solution of all regional conflicts. The current American inclination is less in the direction of supplying arms and increasing military forces and more towards creating political and economic conditions that can protect the area against Communist subversion and revolution. Any country that moves in that direction will enjoy American sympathy. Any serious attempt by the Egyptians to settle the conflict with Israel will contribute to increased stability in the region and help Egypt achieve its own interests.

'Azmi replied that he had already put these ideas, which had been raised in a previous talk with A. Eban,[1] to his friends in Cairo. Their answer was that even if there is agreement in Egypt that the Israeli-Egyptian dispute does not serve Egyptian interests, no Egyptian politician dare take the initiative to settle it, for fear of Arab reactions. The Egyptians know that this is a cowardly and illogical approach, based on emotional factors only, but these factors still play the decisive role in the Arab perception of the world and their influence as policy determinants cannot be ignored.

The conversation turned to the domestic situation in Egypt. In 'Azmi's assessment, the king's attempt to break the Wafd Party has failed, and the latter is now regaining its primacy. In recent days other parties, too, have begun to take steps against the illegal postponement of the elections. What is more, the army's support for the king is less than steadfast. The public is in a ferment, and he would not be surprised to see riots in the near future.

Finally, 'Azmi referred to the statement by the Israel Communist Party supporting the repatriation of the refugees and withdrawal to the 1947 borders; 'Azmi wondered whether this indicates a change in the Soviet position on the Arab-Israel conflict. Rafael replied that the Communists' statement was designed for internal consumption—to gain support among Israeli Arabs — and has nothing to do with the policy of the U.S.S.R., which, to judge from its activities at the UN and its cautious steps in the Iranian imbroglio, is maintaining its position of neutrality on the Palestine conflict and has no interest in opening a new anti-Western front in this region.

At the end of the conversation, 'Azmi indicated that he would continue his efforts to bring about an Israeli-Egyptian understanding, since he is convinced that this will serve his country's national aspirations.

Note

1. See No. 70.

188. G. Avner (London) to W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) and E. Kaplan (Jerusalem). 9 June 1952

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2319/1

Goldmann has received an official invitation to meet Adenauer and receive the German proposal.[1] It has been agreed that negotiations will take place on the spot, with the participation of Adenauer and Abs, in order to reach and initial an agreement in principle that can serve as the basis for resumption of the formal negotiations in The Hague, where the official agreement

will be drafted. The proposal Adenauer will make is the one that Böhm brought to Paris, without the rectifications demanded by Israel;[2] however, some improvements in the terms may result from these negotiations—perhaps a reduction in the payment period and an increase in the value of goods to be delivered in the first few years. The question of cash payments is the most serious stumbling block, because of the opposition of Abs, Adenauer, and the creditors at the London conference.

It must be assumed that within two days the reparations issue will be finally resolved. Josephthal and Shinnar will be available to Goldmann to provide advice and help him take decisions.

Notes

1. See No. 175.
2. See No. 170.

189. M. Comay [Tel Aviv] to E. Elath (London). 10 June 1952

Notes

1. See No. 183.
2. The appendix has not been found.
3. In a telegram to Comay, Sharett expressed his reservations about the contents of this conversation. He said that Comay had diverted the center of gravity of Israel's opposition to the British draft from the lack of balance between Israel and Britain to the question of Israel's international orientation, by stressing its neutrality in the Cold War. This was liable to lead to renewed consideration in principle of the entire matter and to create an erroneous impression concerning Israel's true position. (See telegram W229, 21 June 1952, 93.01/2208/12.) See also No. 199.

190. Meeting: N. Goldmann–W. Hallstein (10 June 1952)

Notes

1. Abraham Frowein, secretary of the German delegation to the reparations talks.
2. For the sequence of events that preceded the drafting of this document, see No. 194.
3. In another document the merchandise was detailed as follows: fuel from sterling-bloc countries in the amount of £12 million per year, wheat from Australia, and meat from Argentina. (See Israeli claims on Germany, 10 June 1952, 93.08/358/18.)

191. A. Eban (Washington) to M. Sharett (New York). 11 June 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2420/10

Eban believes that the effort to consolidate Israel's short-term debts will not succeed without the explicit support of President Truman. He has discussed the matter with Abe Feinberg and Niles,[3] and they will speak to the President about Israel's request and the reasoning behind it in the course of the week. The idea is for the President to be aware of the matter, but not to take any action prior to Sharett's meeting with the Secretary of State on the eighteenth of this month.[4] Eban disagrees with the advisors and believes that the appropriate strategy would involve using the Currency Stabilization Fund rather than forcing Israel's position on the Export-Import Bank. So as to carry out the whole operation he will try to obtain Harriman's agreement in writing, but the decisive figure will be the Secretary of State.

Notes

1. Consolidation of Israel's short-term debts.
2. President Truman.
3. David Niles, formerly executive assistant to the President of the United States.
4. See No. 203.

192. A. Yafeh[1] [Tel Aviv] to Sh. Bendor. 11 June 1952

Copy: 130.16/2952/6

The document is a position paper prepared in advance of the meeting of the Israel-Egypt Special Committee[2] to discuss the fate of the Arabs of Majdal and Azazmeh.[3] Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission require Israel to allow the Arabs of Majdal to return and to consider the Azazmeh Bedouin as Israeli citizens.

The Israel delegation, to be headed by Aluf Dayan,[4] will argue and act as follows:

(1) As long as the Egyptians fail to honor the Security Council resolution on freedom of passage through the Suez Canal, Israel will not implement the Mixed Armistice Commission decision on the return of the aforementioned persons.

(2) Should a majority of the Special Committee (the Egyptians and the chairman) rule against Israel, it has not yet been decided whether Israel will

argue that the Armistice Commission's decision exceeded its competence or will accept the ruling.

(3) If the discussion deals with the substance of the matter, Israel will act as follows: With regard to Majdal, Israel will ensure that in practice the Arabs do not return, even if this means flouting the Special Committee's decisions.

(4) As far as the Azazmeh are concerned, they are in any case already living in Israeli territory, in the Auja sector; distributing Israeli identification cards to them before the meeting would demonstrate Israel's control of this area. Moshe Dayan objected to this section, claiming that Israel's chances of controlling the Auja sector, whether by military means or by establishing settlements, are slim, and Israel would be better off with an official decision implying recognition of Israeli sovereignty there.

Notes

1. Aviad Yafeh, principal assistant in the International Organizations Division of the Foreign Ministry.
2. The Israel-Egypt Special Committee was intended to settle basic issues that had not been resolved in the Israel-Egypt Mixed Armistice Commission. See the Israel-Egypt Armistice Agreement, Section 10(4) (see Vol. 3 of this series, Appendix F).
3. The reference is to a decision by the Israel-Egypt Mixed Armistice Commission to return the Azazmeh Bedouin to the Israeli Negev and to return 2,000 Arabs from Majdal who had crossed the border into the Gaza District (see Vol. 6, No. 213 and n. 4 there).
4. Moshe Dayan, OC Southern Command.

193. G. Rafael (New York) to W. Eytan. 13 June 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2404/3

Rafael reports on the meeting that he and Foreign Minister Sharett had with the UN Secretary-General. The conversation began with a few inquiries about the development of the State of Israel and a discussion of whether the Palestine question should be placed on the agenda of the upcoming General Assembly. Sharett and Lie differed about the latter subject: Lie contended that the subject must be discussed, while Sharett asserted otherwise. The talk then moved to global matters. Lie noted that, for the first time, the United Nations had become a topic of controversy in an American election campaign. He is extremely worried by changes in the climate of opinion in the United States and throughout the world, reflected in the decline of moderate centrist elements and the increased strength of left- and right-wing radicals. He expressed apprehension at the

prospect of Senator Taft's nomination as the Republican presidential candidate, since his election would be a disaster for the UN and would torpedo any chances of ending the Korean War. He criticized the French for their intransigent position on North African affairs[2] and noted that in his talks with French leaders he had unsuccessfully tried to persuade them to give the North Africans more freedom. He then turned to the recent dismissals of UN officials. He said that while six of those fired are Jews, they had been dismissed not because they are Jews but on suspicion of belonging to an espionage network. Sharett suggested that in order to avoid public misunderstanding the Secretary-General should release an official statement to this effect.

Towards the end of the conversation Palestine issues were raised again. Lie stated that Blandford's plan to settle 500,000 Arab refugees in Syria[4] had run aground because the Syrians refused to give a binding answer. In contrast, Lie praised Israel's decision to free the refugees' blocked accounts and expressed the hope that Iraq would also release funds belonging to Israeli citizens.

Notes

1. Sen. Robert A. Taft of Ohio was running for the Republican presidential nomination.
2. See No. 171.
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 26–27.
4. See No. 181 and n. 4 there.
5. William Epstein, head of the Middle East and Africa Branch in the Department for Political Affairs and Security Council Affairs at the United Nations.

194. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations [London] to W. Eytan. 13 June 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2417/6

The members of the delegation—Shinnar, Josephthal, and Avner—report to Eytan on the sequence of events that led to the signing of a draft reparations agreement between Germany and Israel. They ask that the text be kept top secret, since it has not yet been endorsed by the German government and any publication is likely to impede its acceptance. The report is to be passed on only to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, David Horowitz, and A. Eban in the United States. They propose that after the government discusses and approves the content of the agreement, there should be a public announcement, in general terms and without any spe-

cific details, to the effect that an agreement has been reached for the payment of $715 million in reparations, and that the proposed payment schedule and terms constitute a satisfactory basis for renewing negotiations on the reparations agreement.

Annex

On 6 June a decisive meeting was held in Bonn to decide on the procedures for continuing the negotiations with Israel. Those sympathetic to the Israeli position, led by Hallstein and Blankenhorn, urged Adenauer to take a final decision on the reparations issue at once so as to keep the promise to Goldmann that the authoritative German reply would be transmitted to Israel on 8–9 June. Adenauer agreed to convene a meeting on 10 June, and the Israeli representatives were invited to Bonn for that date.

The Israeli representatives arrived in Bonn on the evening of 9 June, and a preliminary meeting was held that night. At the beginning of the session Hallstein proposed concluding a provisional accord for three years, after which a final agreement would be signed. Goldmann rejected this out of hand, emphasizing that even were Israel to agree to such an arrangement it would insist that the bulk of the sum be paid within those three years. Hallstein withdrew the suggestion immediately, and a discussion was held on the substantive questions. Agreement was reached at the outset that the amount of the reparations would be $715 million. A disagreement arose concerning the duration of implementation. Hallstein proposed 12 years, but agreed to a more flexible term of 8–12 years, noting that the shorter period would be feasible if Germany received a loan. The Israelis insisted on 10 years. At this point Goldmann suggested a compromise: a slight prolongation of the agreement, which would, however, also include the collective demand of the Jewish organizations for DM 500 million. This sum is in fact only a quarter of the Jewish organizations' original demand, but, to judge by the tenor of The Hague talks, it is far more than what could otherwise be expected. Blankenhorn's reaction was extremely positive, but he expressed the fear that combining the Jewish claim with that of the State of Israel would lead to complications and a postponement of the agreement with Israel. Goldmann replied that his proposal was subject to there being no delay in dealing with the Israeli claims.

The next point discussed was Israel's demand that payment be made in hard currency; even before the start of the talks it was obvious that this would be the major stumbling block in the way of a solution. The Israelis proposed that Germany supply Israel with goods that could be purchased with their currency reserves held in the European Payments Union, merchandise for which Israel today pays in foreign exchange. This refers chiefly to the purchase of fuel in Britain; the Germans were informed that the British Exchequer had already agreed to the arrangement. Hallstein replied that he considered such an arrangement to be satisfactory.

A second meeting was held on the morning of 10 June; this time Abs participated on the German side. Hallstein, who acted as chairman, ran the meeting skillfully and effectively. Agreement was again reached on the amount, and the Israeli delegation once more suggested combining the Jewish claim with that of the State of Israel and repeated its proposal for the fuel procurement arrangement. The Israelis asked for a written protocol of this meeting, but Hallstein objected, saying that there could not be a written agreement until the German government had endorsed it.

The formal session took place in the afternoon, with the participation of Adenauer. Adenauer opened by asking Abs to what extent the agreement reached to date would interfere with his activities at the London Debts Conference. Abs replied that these arrangements would not constitute an obstacle to his work there. Adenauer then stated that the Israeli proposals regarding the inclusion of the Jewish claims and fuel purchases in Britain seemed reasonable to him, but refrained from referring to the amount of the Jewish claim. To the astonishment of all present Adenauer then announced that, in light of the great progress made thus far, the time had come to commit the agreement to writing. Abs objected, arguing that he had to leave in order to return to London, but Adenauer forced him, albeit in an elegant manner, not only to stay, but also to take an active part in the wording of the document, along with Hallstein, Shinnar, and Goldmann. Adenauer left the room, returning later to see the final draft. It was also decided that the official negotiations would resume, once and for all, on 23 June in The Hague. After Adenauer left the discussion turned to individual Jewish claims and the impending German legislation on this matter. The parties agreed to try to come to an agreement on the two or three outstanding items before the resumption of official negotiations in The Hague; they also agreed that the global sum demanded under this rubric would not exceed DM 2.5 billion.

Here the delegation appends the English text of the agreement[1] and then offers its own summation and assessment of the negotiations:

(1) Even though the hoped-for sum of one billion dollars was not achieved, the amount agreed upon does represent a significant accomplishment, especially considering Germany's present condition as well as the international situation. As the delegation sees it, this accomplishment is commensurate with the character of the claim and the honor of the State of Israel.

(2) When the Government considers the 12-year payment term it should take into account that within 18 months the significant amount of DM 400 million will be paid, i.e., a disproportionately large share of the total.

(3) The sums to settle the claims of the Jewish organizations will be paid to Israel, which will transfer them in installments according to the existing agreement with those organizations.

(4) The agreement opens the way (although it does not yet guarantee) to a steady supply of fuel for a number of years.

The negotiations in The Hague will go on for about two weeks. They will focus on the legal phrasing of the document. The question of the goods to be delivered to Israel will also be clarified in general terms, with the details to be fixed by experts from both sides after signature of the agreement. The agreement will have to ratified by the Bundesrath and Bundestag, which will not convene until September; hence it can be assumed that implementation will begin in October.

To sum up, the delegation again implores that the very fact that a written agreement has been achieved be kept top secret, and even more so its details. Adenauer took an extremely risky step from the constitutional point of view when he approved an agreement with Israel without receiving the consent of his cabinet. True, he is confident that he will receive this within a few days, including the agreement of his finance minister, who is one of the opponents of an accord with Israel, but any untimely publication would place the entire agreement in jeopardy.

Notes

1. See No. 190.
2. On 18 June 1952, the Government of Israel considered developments in the reparations talks. The Finance Minister surveyed the topic. Before the Government was a draft agreement reached with the Germans (see No. 190). After discussion it was decided to authorize the Israeli delegation to renew the negotiations on the basis of the proposals submitted by the Germans. (See Israel Government session, 18 June 1952.)

195. F. E. Shinnar (London) to E. Kaplan (Jerusalem). 13 June 1952

Copy: 93.04/43/11

Shinnar complains that recently many Israelis have been arriving in Germany claiming to have letters authorizing them to conduct negotiations on implementation of the reparations agreement. He assumes that some of these assertions are unfounded; in order to avoid misunderstandings, he suggests that a circular be sent to all the relevant government offices asking them not to issue such letters, which prejudice Israel's interests in Germany. He also asks for more stringent controls on exit visas to Germany.

The letter was accompanied by a proposal for an organizational structure to deal with implementation of the reparations agreement.[1]

Note

1. The letter is in the file but has been omitted here. See also No. 204.

196. Report by A. Kubovy. (Prague, 13 June 1952)

Orig.: 130.11/2494/3

Kubovy summarizes and analyzes the recent arrests and trials in Czechoslovakia.

(1) The Slanský affair: No date seems to have been set for the trial of Slanský and his co-defendants, although the indictments have been prepared. Zionist and Jewish involvement does not constitute the central charge in the indictment, although its place is not negligible: Slanský is accused of providing military support to Israel during the 1948 war, of permitting mass *aliya* in 1948–49, and of encouraging illegal exit from Czechoslovakia. Kubovy doubts whether the trial will actually be held, since as far as the public is concerned Slanský and his colleagues have already been eliminated from public life and he cannot fathom who would derive benefit from a trial at this time. From Israel's point of view, it would be better if there were no trial. Kubovy does not accept the argument that such a trial would clear the air and permit the opening of a new page in the relations between the two countries.

(2) Israel-Czechoslovakia relations: There has been no change in the Czechoslovak stand on Israel and Zionism, which continues to be unfavorable. In Kubovy's opinion, the deterioration in relations stems from the Czechoslovaks' disappointment with Israeli policy. They provided a great deal of assistance to the new-born state, in the form of immigrants and weaponry, in the hope that Israel would align itself with the Soviet bloc.

(3) The detention of Oren: The reason for the arrest is still a dark secret. It is possible that what lies behind it are the negotiations Oren was conducting with representatives of East Germany concerning reparations, on the model of the agreement with West Germany. The Czechoslovaks are extremely sensitive on the question of reparations, and are afraid that demands for reparations might be raised against them, too. The Israel legation is attempting to separate the Oren case from that of Orenstein. When diplomatic notes were conveyed to the Czechoslovaks recently,[5] care was taken to transmit two separate notes, but the Czechoslovak response to both cases was contained in a single note.

Notes

1. Uriel Doron, formerly commercial counsellor in the Israel Legation in Czechoslovakia, left his post at the end of 1951.
2. Menahem Bader, formerly a Mapam MK (1949–1951).
3. Yehuda Gera, first secretary (for economic affairs) in the Israel Legation in Prague.
4. MK Hanan Rubin (Mapam).
5. Walter Ulbricht, general secretary of the East German Communist Party.
6. See the note from the Israel Legation to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, 13 May 1952, 130.02/2454/23. In the note, the legation requested particulars of the reasons for Oren's arrest and demanded that a member of its staff be allowed to meet with him and that he be permitted legal counsel. A similar note was sent concerning Orenstein. (The notes are in File 130.11/2513/3.)
7. See No. 153.
8. William N. Oatis, head of the Associated Press bureau in Prague, was arrested in April, 1951, and charged with espionage. Oatis, who confessed, was sentenced in July to ten years in prison.
9. See n. 6 above.
10. Bedřich Geminder, formerly head of the International Relations Department in the secretariat of the central committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Geminder was arrested along with Slanský and his colleagues.
11. Section 5 of the report, dealing with the arrest and trial of illegal-emigration activists in Czechoslovakia, has been omitted.

197. Sh. Bendor [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Ambassador in Washington. 15 June 1952

Orig.: 93.08/358/28

On 13 June senior Foreign Ministry staff held consultations, presided over by the director-general. Two topics were on the agenda: Israel's attitude towards the nationalist movement in Tunisia and freedom of passage through the Suez Canal.

Tunisia: Those present accepted the ambassador's position as stated in his telegram.[1] It was agreed that a decision on the matter should be deferred until the subject is brought before the General Assembly or the Security Council. The French proposal that a representative of Israel visit Tunisia and endeavor to influence the local Jewish community not to identify with the nationalist movement was discussed. It was agreed that the proposal should be accepted only if the representative does not go in response to a French invitation or under French auspices, has full freedom of movement, and is allowed to meet with members of the Tunisian nationalist movement. There was some discussion as to whether there should be any contact between Israel and the Tunisian nationalists. The consensus was that

such contact is desirable only if the initiative comes from the Tunisians themselves.

Suez: The question is, what should Israel do in the wake of the unsatisfactory reply from the three Powers on this topic.[2] The general opinion was that the time is not ripe for unilateral action such as sending a ship through the Canal or placing the question on the agenda of the Security Council. At the same time, it was agreed that the matter should not be allowed to sink into oblivion. Israel should keep badgering the Western Powers, the maritime nations, UN member states, and world public opinion in order to prevent conclusion of an agreement with the Egyptians that would be detrimental to Israel and prepare the ground for reopening the subject when circumstances change, and should perhaps try and obtain a better fuel-supply arrangement with Britain.

In a personal aside, Bendor adds his belief that pressure should continue to be brought to bear on the Powers with regard to Suez. This applies primarily to the United States, since France has no influence in Egypt and the British have not shown marked firmness in their current negotiations with the Egyptians. An attempt must be made to influence the United States to initiate unofficial contacts with the Egyptians, the first objective of which is to have Egypt drop its demand to search vessels passing through the Canal en route to Israel. For its part, Israel will undertake to discontinue its searches of vessels in Israeli harbors.

Notes

1. No. 171.
2. See No. 182.
3. Shabtai Rosenne, legal counsel to the Foreign Ministry.

198. A. Eban [Washington] to E. Elath (London). 16 June 1952

Note

1. Elath protested that there had been no consultation or coordination with the legation in London before the initiation of contacts with the British delegation to the United Nations concerning free passage through the Suez Canal (see No. 182). In his opinion, the time is not ripe for action on this matter, because the British are presently in the thick of negotiations with Egypt on issues vital to them and their allies; any action by Israel at this juncture would only be liable to cause the failure of later action, when conditions would be appropriate. (Elath to Eban, 13 June 1952, 93.01/2204/5.)

199. E. Elath (London) to M. Comay. 17 June 1952

Notes

1. See No. 189 and n. 3 there.
2. See Appendix to No. 183.
3. A preliminary draft of the corrected memorandum was submitted by Chadwick on 30 June for inspection by Comay and received Israel's approval. (See Comay's talk with Chadwick, 30 June 1952, 130.13/2595/4.)

200. A. Levavi (Tel Aviv) to M. Fischer (Paris). 17 June 1952

Note

1. No. 181.

201. E. Elath (London) to M. Comay. 17 June 1952

Notes

1. The decision to supply Meteor jet trainers to Syria was taken after protracted deliberations. Even before this, a similar number of planes had been supplied to Lebanon and to Iraq. In consultations at the British Foreign Office on 9 June, it was proposed to permit Israel, also, to purchase two of these planes, but doubts were expressed concerning Israel's ability to fund and maintain the planes and as to the effect of such a step on British relations with Jordan. (See report by Wardrop, 9 June 1952, PRO FO371/98295.) See also No. 219.
2. See No. 198.

202. M. Fischer [Paris] to A. Eban (Washington). 17 June 1952

Coded Tel. N109; Inc.: 93.01/2208/13

Fischer reports on information that has reached him, as well as the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, to the effect that the French have been consulting with other countries in order to adopt a unified strategy on Israel's decision to transfer the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem. Officially, France has said nothing, but the silence arouses suspicion that its aim is to lull Israel and its friends into a feeling of false security. Hence he suggests taking action among government and political circles in France. He intends to

emphasize that the initiative stems from the Vatican; this explanation is likely to have some effect in the light of the general and Catholic dissatisfaction with Schumann's policy.[1]

Notes

1. Eban noted in the margins of the telegram: "extremely doubtful." On the basis of the information available to the editors it seems that the Three Powers did indeed make an attempt to coordinate their positions on this question, but the initiator seems to have been Great Britain, and the motives rather political and broad, that is, the status of Jerusalem, the validity of United Nations resolutions, and the situation in the Middle East. (See, for example, memoranda and telegrams, June–July 1952, PRO FO371/98792.)
2. Alexandre Parodi, secretary-general of the French Foreign Ministry.
3. Vincent Auriol, president of France.
4. See No. 206.

203. M. Sharett [Washington] to W. Eytan. 18 June 1952

Notes

1. See No. 191.
2. See No. 144.
3. No. 186.
4. See No. 187.
5. John Snyder, U.S. secretary of the treasury.
6. Willard Thorp, assistant secretary of state for economic affairs.
7. On these meetings, see No. 207. See also No. 205.

204. N. Goldmann [Geneva] to D. Ben-Gurion. 18 June 1952

Notes

1. See No. 190.
2. See No. 195.
3. Ben-Gurion's response: "Instructions have already been given to the delegation to insert a special section into the agreement with the Germans, concerning one single company that will handle receiving the goods and collections, although I am not certain that this will prevent Jewish profiteers from flooding the German market. Just as we have been blessed with Jews who are better than their counterparts among the Gentiles, so have we been cursed with Jews who are worse than their counterparts among the Gentiles, and I do not know a people among whom there are so many thieves, cheats, and profiteers devoid of conscience, as in this small nation whose name is Israel." (Letter dated 2 July 1952, 43/5567/4069.)

205. Meeting: A. Eban–H. Byroade (Washington, 17 June 1952, document dated 19 June 1952)

Report: 130.02/2420/10

Waller and Esther Herlitz were also present at the meeting, held at Israel's request.

The purpose of the meeting was to inform Byroade of Israel's financial problems. Eban explained that the talk was a preliminary to a meeting on the same topic with the foreign minister.[1] Sharett will also have talks with Acheson, while he himself has already held meetings with the Trade Cooperation Agency and the Mutual Security Agency. Eban added that Israel is managing to balance the current account of foreign exchange income and expenditures, but is collapsing under the burden of some one hundred million dollars in short-term debts. Israel desires above all to avoid using the Grant-in-Aid funds to cover this deficit, particularly since future prospects appear good, Israeli production and exports are growing, and the reparations agreement is about to be signed. Eban indicated that there are two possible solutions: one through the Export-Import Bank, the other through the Currency Stabilization Fund. Byroade replied that the U.S. understands the need to take steps to avoid the recurrence of financial crises and will examine possibilities to this end. He stressed, however, that this must be done in a way that will not anger the Arab countries; hence the matter must be kept in strictest confidence.

The conversation turned to Byroade's impressions from his Middle East tour. He noted that in view of the declining influence of the British and French in the region, the United States must make deeper inroads there and gain the friendship of the Middle Eastern countries. The prime consideration must be the security of the United States. He is consequently worried by Arab bitterness towards Israel and their criticism of American aid to Israel. The Arabs fear Israeli expansionism; the border incidents reinforce their apprehensions on this topic, as well as those of American diplomats posted to the region.

Eban replied that the problems faced by the Arab countries and those of the Middle East in general are not dependent on Israel. If the Arab countries are in fact worried about Israeli aggression, why did they refuse to sign a non-aggression pact with Israel? Byroade responded that he had spoken firmly not only to the Israelis but also to the Arabs, and he knows perfectly well that no Arab leader will agree to sign a formal agreement with Israel. Nevertheless, he believes that Israel is the party that must make a conciliatory gesture towards the Arabs. At this point, Eban interrupted Byroade and told him of the Pakistani approach to Israel concerning a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the Tunisian problem.[2] Byroade was astonished and displayed mixed emotions on hearing the news.

Notes

1. See No. 203.
2. See No. 197.

206. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Fischer (Paris). 20 June 1952

Coded Tel. MTA96; Outg.: 130.09/2377/1

Eytan instructs Fischer to seek an immediate interview at the Quai d'Orsay, where he should raise the following points:

(1) The Israel government has been informed that French representatives in the United States and Great Britain have proposed or are about to propose to the governments of these countries that a joint protest be transmitted to Israel concerning the transfer of the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem.

(2) Although the Israeli government hopes that these reports are unfounded, it has instructed the minister in Paris to take up the matter with the French Foreign Ministry.

(3) The French government must understand that the Israel government moved to Jerusalem in December 1949, since which time all its agencies have been located there. It is only for technical reasons that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not transferred then.

(4) The Government of Israel would regret any joint *démarche* by the Three Powers resulting from a French initiative, particularly in light of the effect that such a step would have on Israeli public opinion and on world Jewry. It is not in the best interests of France, which is beset by many problems, including Tunisia, to arouse Jewish public opinion, in the world and in Israel, against it.

(5) The Israel minister has therefore been instructed to seek assurances that France is not intending to take such a step.

In addition, Eytan emphasizes two points to Fischer: (1) In no way must the Vatican be involved in this affair. (2) It should be made quite clear to the French that Israel will in no case modify its decision to move the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem; hence any French pressure on the British and the Americans would simply highlight France's lack of influence on these countries and damage its prestige.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 202.
2. In a later telegram Eytan added the following rationale: "The members of the Arab League are working feverishly to prepare a protest to the United Nations about the transfer of the Foreign Ministry. Is France interested today in helping the Arab

League achieve a victory of prestige by working on a parallel protest?" (Eytan to Fischer, 56, 22 June 1952, 130.09/2345/1.) On Fischer's activities, see No. 216.

207. M. Sharett [Washington] to the United States Division. 20 June 1952

Coded Tel. WIA223; Outg.: 93.01/2208/12

Sharett reports on his talks concerning financial assistance to Israel. Snyder was cool but not unfriendly. He referred to the United States' own economic difficulties, but expressed a willingness to look into the matter. At one point, he let slip the comment: "You are getting too big for us." In his meeting with Byroade, Sharett repeated the essence of what he had said to Acheson. Byroade replied that the Americans are willing to investigate the options, but emphasized the complication posed by possible Arab reactions and their claim that the United States extricates Israel from all its difficulties. He suggested advancing the date of Mikesell's mission to Israel.[2] Thorp listened with interest to Sharett's presentation of the situation and asked trenchant questions about Israel's need to consolidate its debts. Apparently he inclines, at best, to do the minimum through a partial consolidation of Israel's debts.

All the talks were based on the clear assumption that a decision to act in the matter has been taken. During the talks the emphasis was placed on assistance from the Export-Import Bank rather than from the Currency Stabilization Fund.

Notes

1. See No. 203.
2. See also No. 208.

208. M. Sharett [Washington] to the United States Division. 21 June 1952

Coded Tel. WIA226; Outg.: 93.01/2208/12

During Sharett's meeting with Byroade on financial assistance to Israel[1] they also—incidentally and superficially—touched upon political matters. Byroade complained that there is no peace with the Arabs. Sharett reassured him, noting that the process is a lengthy one and the Arabs are finding it difficult to adjust to Israel's very existence. Byroade asked

whether the chief of staff would be prepared to meet with Shishakli. Sharett replied that Israel is always ready to meet the other side; in this case, however, the result is apt to be disappointing, since Israel is unable to give Syria what it seeks to obtain in these talks. Byroade continued to press Sharett on this point. In order not to appear excessively negative, Sharett said that he would examine the matter.[2] Byroade was vigorous in demanding that Israel refrain from military retaliatory action and complained that the younger generation in Israel is growing up in an atmosphere of hatred. Sharett directed his attention to the actions of the Arabs and emphasized that hostile acts by one side cannot be suffered patiently indefinitely; sometimes a measured response is preferable to an uncontrolled reaction.

Notes

1. No. 207.
2. Since Shishakli's seizure of power in Syria in late December, 1951, Israeli representatives had made strenuous efforts to arrange a meeting at the level of chiefs of staff (i.e., Shishakli for the Syrians and Yadin for the Israelis) to discuss issues beyond the regular concerns of the Armistice Commissions. Contacts on this matter were particularly intensive in May and June and each side's position crystallized: the Syrians were interested in a *de facto* partition of the demilitarized zones and wanted to begin the talks at a lower level, though higher than that of the Armistice Commission discussions; Israel insisted on meetings of the two chiefs of staff and wanted the agenda to be general and open. By mid-July the sides had still not managed to reach agreement as to a date for the meeting and an agenda. (See No. 245 and n. 2 there.) See also No. 228.

209. M. Sharett [Washington] to W. Eytan. 21 June 1952

Notes

1. See No. 205.
2. The telegram has not been found.

210. Sh. Bendor [Tel Aviv] to A. Eban (Washington). 22 June 1952

Orig.: 93.08/354/15

A consultation was held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 20 June concerning reactions to Israel's decision to move the Ministry to Jerusalem. Three possible lines of action emerged:

(1) To disregard the French complaint and move to Jerusalem despite the protests (the assumption is that the transfer will be implemented in January, 1953).

(2) To deliver an official warning to France concerning the actions it is initiating.

(3) To take diplomatic action both in France and in the United States.

The discussion was in fact rather theoretical, since on 19 June the Prime Minister had opted for the second option and appropriate instructions had been sent to the minister in France.[1] Despite this, Bendor believes that an approach should also be made to the State Department, whether officially or informally. He would also suggest an off-the-record meeting with Ambassador Davis in Tel Aviv, to request his help to ward off any possible trouble. As far as is known, Davis is numbered among the realists and favors moving the embassy to Jerusalem.

Note

1. No. 206

211. G. Rafael (New York) to W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) and M. Fischer (Paris). 24 June 1952

Note

1. See also No. 215.

212. Ch. Herzog (Washington) to A. Eban (Washington). 25 June 1952

Copy: 130.20/2488/3

Herzog writes about U.S. military aid to Israel. The time has come to fight for Israel's inclusion among the countries receiving military assistance. The Americans are divided on the matter. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department are inclined to provide military assistance, to the extent possible, to all states that apply for it, including Israel. The State Department is opposed on principle to supplying arms to the Middle East and believes that the Middle East Command should be established first. Pentagon staffers, who have less expertise in this region than in others, are dependent on the foreign-policy makers and are not inclined to argue with

them. Herzog believes that the time has come to rally public opinion on this matter, particularly in light of the favorable climate prevailing in Congress, and apparently also in the White House, and of the inclination to approve military aid to Israel. The forthcoming presidential elections provide a convenient basis for a public opinion campaign. The next few months should be exploited to wage an open campaign, mobilize members of Congress, and exert pressure on the administration. General Olmsted, who bears responsibility for military assistance on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has advised Herzog to do so on a number of occasions and expressed his amazement that Israel has thus far not brought its influence to bear on public opinion in this matter. Herzog acknowledges that the decision is a difficult one, and consequently advises raising the subject in the Government as soon as possible. Otherwise the Turks and Greeks are likely to submit requests for the entire aid sum appropriated for the Middle East.

Note

1. Isaiah Kenen, advisor to the American Zionist Council, formerly director of the Information Department of the Consulate-General of Israel in New York and of the Israel delegation at the United Nations.

213. A. Eban [Washington] to A. Lourie (New York). 25 June 1952

Note

1. See No. 182.

214. M. Fischer [Paris] to M. Sharett and A. Eban (Washington). 25 June 1952

Coded Tel. PW20; Inc.: 93.01/2208/13

Fischer reports on information he has received from a reliable journalist, who saw a report of the conversation on Jerusalem between Tardini and the French ambassador in Rome. The ambassador said that France holds by the principle of internationalization; with regard to the transfer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem, it is trying to coordinate policy with Great Britain and the United States. Tardini replied that the Vatican is interested in maintaining the *status quo* in Jerusalem, including the principle of internationalization. The Vatican believes that the Americans are

interested in achieving some compromise on Jerusalem at the next session of the General Assembly. The Vatican opposes this, and in such a case will even take steps to keep the question off the agenda.

215. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations (New York) and the Israel Legation in Paris. 26 June 1952

Notes

1. Edouard Félix Guyon, French minister to Israel.
2. See No. 211.

216. M. Fischer (Paris) to A. Levavi. 26 June 1952

Notes

1. René Neuville, French consul-general in Jerusalem, died at his post on 23 June.
2. No. 206.
3. Daniel Mayer, Socialist member of the French National Assembly and former cabinet minister.

217. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to W. Eytan. 26 June 1952

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

The delegation expresses its surprise at the chilly reactions to the reparations agreement in the Israeli press. They were also surprised at the wording of the communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministry spokesman, which emphasized that the proposal is not yet satisfactory. They warn that although there is still some prospect of shortening the implementation period, the odds of this are not great, and no reduction of more than two years can be envisioned in any case. The agreement is the result of persistent and protracted efforts by Goldmann and the members of the delegation on the one hand, and of Adenauer and his aides on the other, who had to overcome the objections of his economic advisors. The Israeli public must be made to understand that this is the final proposal. Evidently the vast improvement between the current proposal and its predecessor—such as its severance from the London Conference arrangements, where, for

example, reference is made to the debt being settled over thirty to forty years—has not been properly understood. There are no grounds for pessimism concerning the loan to the Germans, which will allow for improvements as the agreement is implemented.

218. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 30 June 1952

Notes

1. Of the Israel-Jordan Armistice agreement.
2. See No. 242.
3. See Permanent Representative of Syria at the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 27 June 1952, 130.03/2014/10.
4. The reference is to inquiries concerning Israel's election to the Economic and Social Council. D. Wainhaus, director of the Office of UN Political and Security Affairs in the State Department, had said that the United States would give favorable consideration to Israel's candidacy but could not make a commitment until right before the opening of the General Assembly (see report of the conversation, 2 July 1952, 130.02/2382/22). Inquiries made in Israel yielded a not very encouraging picture of Arab pressures on Latin American states and contradictory commitments by a number of countries. (See the telegram from the International Organizations Division to the Israel Mission at the United Nations, Y536, 2 July 1952, 130.09/2330/10; Eytan to the Israel Mission at the United Nations, 3 July 1952, MTA12, 130.09/2377/1.)
5. See No. 222.

219. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (London). 30 June 1952

Notes

1. See No. 201 and n. 1 there.
2. Following this telegram, the staff of the legation in London initiated discussions and contacts with MPs and government figures, both personally and through the intermediacy of friends in the Conservative and Labour parties, in order to prevent supply of the planes to Syria. In the wake of these contacts it was reported that the deal with Syria would not be implemented because of the Syrians' request to receive 12 more planes in the near future, in addition to the two already promised to them. After further consultations, the British decided to increase the number of aircraft destined for each country, including Israel, to 14. (See Israel Legation in London to Comay, L1720, 24 July 1952; L1731, 29 July 1952, 130.09/2319/3; see Foreign Office to British Missions in the Middle East, 6 September 1952, PRO FO371/98296.) See also No. 369.

220. M. Davis (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion (Tel Aviv). 1 July 1952

Notes

1. Sent to David Ben-Gurion as acting foreign minister.
2. See No. 33.
3. Israel confirmed this note and gave it the status of an agreement (see Sharett to Davis, 29 July 1952, 130.20/2488/3). In conversation after the note was handed over, Ambassador Davis reiterated that the entire affair should be kept strictly confidential, that Israel's eligibility did not guarantee that it would receive assistance in the near future, and that the granting of assistance depended on a number of factors. (See telegram from United States Division to the Israel Embassy in Washington, IWA437, 2 July 1952, 130.09/2309/6.)

221. Sh. Divon (Paris) to M. Fischer (Paris). 1 July 1952

Copy: 93.02/177/2

Divon reports on his weekly meeting with Luc. This session was devoted to Luc's impressions of the consultation of French diplomats in Istanbul.[1] The almost unanimous assessment was that, in view of the domestic crisis in Egypt, there is no chance of arriving at a formula that would permit the start of collective negotiations between the Western powers and Arab countries on the establishment of a Middle East Command. The realistic approach, as the French see it, is to try for the moment to conclude secret bilateral arrangements between the West and those Middle Eastern countries that are willing to cooperate on the basis of a plan devised in advance by a planning group. This approach will of course allow the French to consolidate their position in Syria and Lebanon and ultimately lead to the establishment of spheres of influence. Luc sees this as the most rational solution, and it is also compatible with Israel's interests — although for obvious reasons this not mentioned in public. Luc revealed that several sites had been put forward as planning group headquarters, including London, Paris, Izmir, and Cyprus. Luc asked Israel's opinion about these sites, and specifically whether Cyprus is not too close for its taste.

Other topics discussed were as follows: (1) Communism and the danger of Soviet penetration of the Middle East: the conclusion was that there are no signs that the Communist parties in the region are on the upsurge; hence for the moment they do not menace the stability of the current regimes, nor is there any threat of Soviet penetration. (2) The economic situation: the assessment was that there is no likelihood of major American economic assistance, nor of oil-revenues investments by the Arab countries themselves. (3) Rehabilitation of the refugees: the impression is that the

Syrians will be willing to adopt the Blandford plan,[2] mainly because of the direct benefit they can reap from it. If this proves to be the case, this will be a positive step deserving of French support.

Israel-Arab relations were also discussed. The opinion was that there is a slow improvement and that, despite the extremist declarations, the Arab countries, and especially Egypt, are evolving a more pragmatic approach towards Israel. The French will do everything in their power to encourage this process, in the hope that a few years hence it will be possible to resolve the problems between Israel and its neighbors. They advise Israel to act circumspectly and with moderation, and to continue its secret ties with Arab circles. With regard to the two actual problems currently on the agenda—Jerusalem and Suez—Israel's intention to move the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem arouses and unites the Arab countries and creates tension in the area, which France wishes to avoid. In connection with Suez, the French position is that the time is not yet ripe to run a test ship through the canal; only if a real crisis flares up in Egypt will there be any justification for dramatic action by the Western powers concerning freedom of passage through the canal.

The conversation then shifted to topics of concern to the French, first and foremost Tunisia. The French are extremely disappointed by the position adopted by Syria and Lebanon on events in Tunisia. Divon availed himself of the opportunity to insert a few words of explanation concerning the nature of Syrian and Lebanese "friendship." Luc asked for advice as to possible courses of action, mainly how to present matters in Tunisia to the world and before the UN General Assembly and how to deal with Iraq and Pakistan, who are pouring fuel on the fire. Throughout the talk Luc asked many questions and frequently requested Divon's opinion. Divon believes that Luc needed such clarifications in advance of a major French consultation on Middle East affairs.

Notes

1. See No. 181.
2. See No. 181 and n. 4.
3. Jacques Emile Paris, French minister to Syria.

Editorial Note

Meeting of Foreign Minister Sharett and Ambassador Eban with President Truman

At the end of his visit to the United States Foreign Minister Sharett paid a courtesy call on President Truman on 1 July 1952. Also present was

Ambassador Abba Eban. At the meeting the President, in accordance with a previous recommendation by the State Department, avoided making any promise or commitment on political or economic matters. He warmly praised the State of Israel and its leaders, especially Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and President Weizmann. Sharett invited the President to visit Israel after he left office. The President thanked him for the invitation and noted that after he left the White House he would be master of his own time and could visit anywhere in the world. A large part of the conversation revolved around domestic American affairs; the President expressed his confidence in a Democratic victory in the upcoming presidential elections. (See report by Moshe Sharett, 4 July 1952, 130.02/2414/27; *FRUS*, 1952–1954, Vol. IX, No. 453, pp. 953–59.)

222. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations (New York). 2 July 1952

Notes

1. No. 218.
2. See No. 223.

223. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 2 July 1952

Notes

1. No. 222.
2. Michael Amir, Israel Minister to the Netherlands; until mid-year also Minister to Belgium and to Luxembourg.
3. See No. 206.
4. 'Ali G. Ardalan, permanent representative of Iran at the United Nations.
5. Ardalan approached Rafael to request Israel's support for Iran's election to the Security Council in place of Turkey. He noted what he called "Israeli-Irani friendship" and Israel's active support and assistance on behalf of Turkey's election, and stressed that Israel had an interest in preventing the election of Lebanon. Rafael did not give a binding answer, but stressed the link between Israel's assistance to Turkey and the close diplomatic relations between the two countries. In his telegram to Eytan he noted that this opportunity should be exploited to obtain a *quid pro quo* for supporting Iran. (See telegram to Eytan, 2 July 1952, 93.01/2204/7.) See also No. 229.

224. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to W. Eytan. 2 July 1952

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

The German delegation has requested that the list of goods on which they are about to agree be kept confidential until the agreement with Germany's creditors is signed in London. They consider this essential so that the agreement will not hamper them in the London discussions. The request applies particularly to the oil agreement, which, in itself, has been finalized. The delegation has committed itself to act accordingly, but explained that when the entire agreement comes before the Knesset it will be necessary to relate, in general terms, to the supply of goods. The Germans agreed, but repeated their request that the details of the agreement be kept secret until the London agreement is signed and for several weeks thereafter, until the final text of the agreement with the creditors has been drafted. The delegation suggests a statement to the effect that discussions are being held on the list of goods required by Israel's economy, including those from non-German sources. The list of goods was included in a letter sent on 27 June.[2]

Notes

1. On the personnel changes at the Finance Ministry, see No. 180 and n. 4 there.
2. See Appendix 3 of Shinnar's letter to Kaplan, 26 June 1952, 130.02/2417/6.
3. The second part of the telegram, which deals with the feverish activity of Israeli and Jewish agents and representatives in Germany in advance of the anticipated signing of the reparations agreement and attempts to forestall it, has been omitted.

225. O. Gass (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 July 1952

Note

1. See Nos. 203, 205, and 207.

226. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 4 July 1952.

Coded Tel. XA973; Outg.: 93.01/2204/7

Sharett endorses Rafael's proposal to open discussions with the Jordanian government in anticipation of the possibility that Jerusalem will again be placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. The Jordanians should be told that introduction of the item will embarrass them as well, and not only Israel, and could lead to international supervision over the Old City, which is under their control. He proposes sending a direct message to the Jordanian prime minister, as well as instructing the Israel minister in London to ask the Foreign Office to exert its influence in Jordan. The intention is to arouse Jordan to oppose the Syrian initiative and issue a stern warning to the other Arab countries. Sharett asks that the Ministry wire him its opinion and a report of its actions.[2]

Notes

1. There are no details on this meeting in Foreign Ministry files.
2. The Ministry replied that the Prime Minister supported the proposed action; there remained only the problem of a channel for communicatimg with the Jordanian Prime Minister, but possibilities were being investigated. On the other hand, there were doubts concerning the benefit from action by the British Foreign Office. It was suggested that the latter be deferred until after direct contact had been made with Jordan. (See Comay to Sharett, Y549, 7 July 1952, 130.09/2330/10.) See also No. 236.

227. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations (New York). 6 July 1952

Note

1. Sharett replied that the matter was not so simple; the United States is a key factor, and from his cautious inquiries the previous week it developed that it was necessary to wait until after the American elections. (See Sharett's telegram to Eytan, X974, 7 July 1952, 93.01/2204/7.)

228. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations (New York). 8 July 1952

Notes

1. The first part of the telegram, dealing with a Jordanian complaint about an attempt to smuggle weapons to Mount Scopus, in violation of the armistice accords, has been omitted.
2. See No. 208 and n. 2 there.
3. The meeting with the Syrians was postponed at their request. Eban replied that Riley's proposals do indeed reflect the line of thinking of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs of the State Department. In conversations with Israeli representatives, officials of the latter had spoken in a similar vein, but rather tentatively and with no real evidence that they expected Israel to accept or Shishakli to keep his promises (see Eban to Comay, W281, 9 July 1952, 93.01/2204/8). See also No. 230.

229. G. Rafael (New York) to A. Eban (Washington). 8 July 1952

Copy: 130.02/2410/12

Rafael reports on his meeting with Ardalan, Iran's permanent representative to the UN, concerning Iran's request for Israeli support in winning the Security Council seat currently held by Turkey as representative of the Middle East.[1] Rafael, following consultations with the Foreign Minister and the ambassador in Washington, informed him of Israel's position. Israel considers Iran to be a country that is undoubtedly deserving of a seat on the Security Council, both because of its geopolitical importance in the region and because it maintains correct relations with all countries in the region. Israel is, however, concerned by the state of relations between the two countries. The closure of the Iranian mission in Israel left a disagreeable impression with the Israeli public, which cannot understand the link between Iran's maintaining a mission in Israel and its dispute with Great Britain. Two years ago, Turkey asked Israel to help it win election to the Security Council, and Israel did so; but this action was done in an atmosphere of normal relations between the two countries. Turkey's objective position on the Palestine question and its support for freedom of passage through the Suez Canal have proved that Israel's choice was not mistaken.

Ardalan replied that he was one of the first to regret the deterioration in relations with Israel. The closure of the mission in Israel was an opportunistic surrender to the extremist circles headed by Kashani[3] during the period when the government was in need of mass enthusiasm and support. Now, however, there is increasing recognition in the government that

friendly ties with Israel are likely to be of greater benefit to Iran than any demonstrative pro-Arab act. He hopes that Israel will bring its influence to bear on those countries and circles to which Iran has no access, and that these efforts will provide a foundation for improved relations between the two countries in the future.

Rafael agreed to Ardalan's request that they keep in touch in order to consult and plan action. He promised to inform his government of the gist of the talks.

Notes

1. See No. 223 and n. 5 there.
2. Nasrollah Entezam, Iranian ambassador to the United States.
3. Abu al-Kassem Kashani, Iranian religious and political leader, a supporter of Musaddeq, and speaker of the Majlis from August 1952.

230. A. Eban (Tel Aviv) to the United States Division. 9 July 1952

Notes

1. See No. 228.
2. Hussain Sirri, Prime Minister of Egypt from 2 till 20 July.

Editorial Note

Protests by Foreign Representatives over the Transfer of the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem

On 9–11 July, the Foreign Ministry was visited by representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Turkey, Australia, and Italy, who expressed the displeasure of their governments at the decision of the Government of Israel to transfer the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem. The director-general of the Foreign Ministry listened to their remonstrations but did not respond. The protests by the three Western powers followed prior coordination among them. The United States was the only country that submitted its protest as a written memorandum (see No. 231 below). In addition to the memorandum, the U.S. representative stated orally that the transfer of the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem was not likely to have "a constructive influence" on Israel's foreign relations and on "the political interests" of friendly powers. The representative also stated that many

practical difficulties were liable to be created if a number of countries did not transfer their missions to Jerusalem. The British representative stated that the British Foreign Secretary was of the opinion that, taking into account the special status of Jerusalem in the eyes of the United Nations and in light of reactions in the Arab world, the time was not appropriate for the transfer of the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem, since it would only increase Arab hostility. The French representative spoke along similar lines. (See Information to Israel Missions Abroad, No. 518, 11 July 1952, 130.02/2444/5; *FRUS*, 1952–1954, Vol. IX, Nos. 455–56, pp. 960–62; British Foreign Office to British Legation in Israel, PRO FO371/98792, 2 July 1952.)

231. *Aide-Mémoire* by the United States Embassy in Israel (Tel Aviv, 9 July 1952)

Note

1. See Editorial Note, p. 159. Because of the ambassador's illness the memorandum was delivered by Milton Fried, labor attaché at the embassy.

232. West European Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in Paris. 9 July 1952

Coded Tel. 92; Inc.: 130.09/2345/1

The purpose of the telegram is to bring Fischer up to date concerning the transfer of the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem. The Foreign Minister and the UN delegation believe that there is no hurry and do not rule out the possibility of postponing the transfer until after the General Assembly session; but the decision taken is irrevocable. The Foreign Minister considers it advisable to confer with several governments in order to forestall discussion of the matter by the General Assembly.

In the meanwhile, the Division believes that the technical preparations for moving the ministry should be made public; but there should be no special emphasis on Israel's sovereign right to make the move, which goes without saying. In a conversation with the French chargé d'affaires in Tel Aviv,[1] it became clear that France is endeavoring to keep the North Africa problem as quiet as possible. This provides Israel with an opportunity for tactical negotiations. The chargé d'affaires was informed that consultations in Israel concerning a special session of the General Assembly to discuss Tunisia are continuing, but he was given to understand that Israel will not adopt a position detrimental to France.

Note

1. Yves Debroise, counselor at the French Legation in Israel. In the absence of the minister, Debroise transmitted the French position on the transfer of the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem.

233. A. Levavi (Tel Aviv) to M. Avidan[1] (Bucharest). 9 July 1952

Copy: 130.11/2503/2

Levavi replies to Avidan's letter on *aliya* from Rumania[2] and to his review of the purges in the Rumanian Politburo.[3] He has spoken with the Israel minister to the U.S.S.R., Eliashiv, and asked him to raise the problem of *aliya* from the people's democracies when he returns to his post—directly with Foreign Minister Vyshinsky, if possible. The possibility of a meeting with the Rumanian ambassador in Moscow had also been considered, but in the meanwhile the latter has been appointed his country's foreign minister.[5] Levavi, like Avidan, sees little hope of presuading the Rumanians to sanction immigration to Israel, but this does not acquit him of the duty to make every effort along these lines. Rumanian Jewry must also take part in such efforts by queuing outside the passport offices, despite the attendant risks. With regard to the purges in Rumania, he, like Avidan, believes that the cause is the agrarian crisis. To all appearances, the new Politburo lacks people of stature and with leadership qualities. A similar situation has developed in Czechoslovakia, too, and this may indicate a general trend in the people's democracies.

Notes

1. Moshe Avidan (Walter), first secretary and chargé d'affaires *a.i.* at the Israel Legation in Rumania.
2. Avidan attempted to pinpoint the reasons for the halt of *aliya* from Rumania. He offered two possibilities: external political pressure, or collapse of the apparatus that had promoted Jewish emigration due to the wide-scale purges (letter in File 130.11/2503/2).
3. Avidan to A. Halevi, 4 July 1952, 130.11/2493/1.
4. See No. 293.
5. At the beginning of June 1952, Ana Pauker was replaced as Rumanian foreign minister by Simon Bughici, formerly ambassador in Moscow.

234. A. Eban (Washington) to the United States Division. 10 July 1952

Coded Tel.: WIA293; Outg.: 93.01/2208/16

Eban reviews domestic developments in the United States in view of the approaching presidential elections. Eisenhower's candidacy promises a close and vigorous race. This enhances the importance of maintaining contacts with the parties and attempting to win pro-Israeli declarations from them. Israel is the only country mentioned by name in the Democratic platform as deserving of support; efforts are being made to arrange a meeting with Eisenhower in order to persuade him to make a binding statement before election day. Since the race is so close, the prospects are good.

Notes

1. Gov. Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois, Democratic candidate for president in the November 1952 elections.
2. Sen. Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia, had run for the Democratic presidential nomination.
3. The reference is evidently to P. G. Hoffman, president of the Ford Foundation and chairman of the advisory committee of Citizens for Eisenhower.

235. G. Rafael (New York) to W. Eytan. 11 July 1952

Notes

1. See No. 177.
2. A full report on the conversation is in File 130.02/2401/22. Before the next meeting Rafael was told to repeat the promise made by Israel in 1950, namely, the release of up to P£100 per account, in response to a personal request by the account holder and in accordance with Israel's foreign currency regulations; this arrangement did not include securities and valuables contained in safe-deposit boxes whose keys were held by the depositors or the banks. Israel also could not hand over a full list of account holders without receiving authorization from them. (Telegram from Kidron to the Israel delegation to the United Nations, Y565, 14 July 1952, 130.09/2330/10.) See also No. 240.

236. W. Eytan (Jerusalem) to T. Abu al-Huda (Amman). 11 July 1952

130.02/2443/9[1]

His Excellency Tawfiq Pasha Abu al-Huda
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Greetings!

The attention of the Government of Israel has been drawn to the fact that certain Arab governments, and in particular the Syrian government, are attempting to exploit the completion of the transfer of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to its permanent seat in order to revive the debate over the plan to internationalize Jerusalem, and that these governments intend to bring pressure to bear on the government of Jordan and to urge it to declare that it no longer opposes internationalization.[2]

While we are confident of your stand on the internationalization plan, a position that you have openly and explicitly stated repeatedly in various circumstances, we wish to call your attention to the negative consequences that are apt to be suffered by Jordan as a result of the aforementioned attempts, were they to be crowned with any degree of success.

It is manifest and well-known that the Israeli sector of Jerusalem has become an integral part of the State of Israel and its permanent capital. Renewal of the debate over the internationalization plan will not alter this status in the slightest, nor will it delay completion of the transfer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the place where the other government ministries are located. Nevertheless, such a debate is likely to call attention to the fact that the arrangements involved in the imposition of international supervision over the Holy Places of the three world religions—almost all of which are located in the Old City—have not yet been implemented. There are two ways of implementing these arrangements: one is limited territorial internationalization, i.e., the establishment of an international enclave in the entire Old City or in most of its area; the second is functional internationalization, i.e., the imposition of international supervision of the principal Holy Places.

Israel has already given its agreement in principle to the introduction of functional supervision of the Holy Places by the United Nations. Israel is also inclined to view favorably a plan to turn the Old City into an international enclave; implementation of this plan would assure application of the stipulations of the Armistice Agreement regarding free access to the Jewish Holy Places and cultural institutions in the Old City.

Hence the stratagems of the governments referred to above are not likely to have any detrimental effect whatsoever on the status of the Israeli sector

of Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel. At the same time, these schemes are liable to undermine the existing link between Jerusalem and the Hashemite Kingdom.

If the Jordanian government is desirous of preventing such a situation, it will undoubtedly work to frustrate the plan of the Arab countries that wish to raise the problem anew.

Respectfully and with best wishes,

W.E.

Notes

1. The Arabic text of the document is in the file. The letter was delivered by Moshe Sasson on 19 July to Ahmad al-Sabbagh, director of the Jordanian Foreign Ministry office on the West Bank. Sasson asked al-Sabbagh to tell his prime minister that the letter opened the door for cooperation between the two governments on the question of Jerusalem. (See Sasson to Eytan, 22 July 1952, 130.02/2443/9.) Abu al-Huda's reply was transmitted orally: he was opposed to the internationalization of Jerusalem and would continue to oppose it with all his might. (See United States Division to the Israel Embassy in Washington, No. 545, 30 July 1952, 130.09/2309/6.)
2. See No. 226.

237. L. Kohn (Tel Aviv) to G. Avner (The Hague). 13 July 1952

Copy: 130.02/2417/6

Kohn expresses his personal opinion concerning the character of the relations and ties to be established between Israel and Germany after signature of the reparations agreement. The Germans should be made to understand that the agreement is merely amends for a fundamental injustice and has no connection whatsoever with the larger moral problem involved in relations between the German people and the Jews. While Israel respects the moral impulses that inspired the Germans to sign the agreement, this is no more than a first step; everything depends on how the Germans implement the agreement and on their acts in the future. Only a spiritual revolution within the German nation, uprooting the anti-Semitism that is so deeply engrained in it, will enable the establishment of any relations between Israel and Germany. This requires a supreme effort by the entire German nation, and the country's entire educational system must be devoted to this effort. Regrettably, with the exception of a small circle of people who understand this, the overwhelming majority of the German people have not yet grasped this and do not realize how vast is the abyss that divides them from the Jewish people.

238. A. Eban [Washington] to W. Eytan. 14 July 1952

Notes

1. Eytan reported that the Prime Minister wanted to know who had authorized Eban to tell the State Department that Israel would not make any further steps to transfer the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem until the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. (See his telegram dated 13 July 1952, 130.09/2309/6.)
2. No. 218.
3. No. 223.
4. A report on this conversation, dated 2 July 1952, is in File 130.02/2382/22.
5. In response to this telegram, Bendor pointed out to Eban the internal contradiction in his arguments: on the one hand, he ostensibly agrees to transferring Foreign Ministry departments even before the General Assembly, but on the other hand holds that foreign governments should not be forced to take basic and functional decisions on the eve of the General Assembly. Bendor reiterated his position, namely, that Israel would do better to transfer organic units of the Ministry even before the General Assembly, since he does not believe it possible to avoid discussion of the issue at the General Assembly; when the debate takes place, Israel needs to be in as strong a position as possible, which means presenting the General Assembly with a *fait accompli*. Bendor suggested holding back on a decision until after consultations with the Foreign Minister on 19 July. (See Bendor to Eban, 17 July 1952, 130.20/2491/2.) See also No. 246.

239. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Comay. 14 July 1952

Coded Tel. WIA301; Outg.: 93.01/2208/16

Eban refers to Comay's letter on the Ben-Gurion–Davis meeting.[1] This indicated that the Prime Minister does not exclude the possibility of partitioning the demilitarized area in peace negotiations or even in negotiations on preliminaries to peace. He asks for confirmation, since previously the line was that the international borders in the north must not be modified, given that they had been drawn for important and vital reasons that should not be disregarded.[2]

Notes

1. In File 93.03/3008/5. In his letter, Comay reported on Ben-Gurion's conversation with the U.S. Ambassador, which dealt with tensions in the demilitarized zone in the north.
2. In the margins of the telegram Ben-Gurion noted: "The reference is to the al-Hamma salient, and not to partition of the demilitarized zone. And even then as part of negotiations for peace or a non-aggression pact and economic relations, and not in discus-

sions of an armistice agreement. B.G." (Ben-Gurion's note on the incoming text of the telegram, IMDEA 230/72/1173.)

240. G. Rafael (New York) to W. Eytan. 16 July 1952

Notes

1. See No. 235.
2. See No. 241.

241. G. Rafael (New York) to M. R. Kidron. 17 July 1952

Note

1. See No. 240.

242. L. Kohn [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan. 18 July 1952

243. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 18 July 1952

Coded Tel. 486; Outg.: 130.09/2309/6

Fried of the United States Embassy was summoned to the Foreign Ministry, where his attention was drawn to several incidents and statements indicative of Arab aggression, including the murder of the five guards in the Negev,[1] a series of murders and shooting incidents along the Jordanian border, Shishakli's statement that Syria will take part of the demilitarized zone by force, the meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commissions in Damascus, and the upcoming meeting of the Arab chiefs of staff in Alexandria.[2] He was told that these incidents and statements have a negative influence on the Israeli public in general, and on the Israeli Arabs in particular. Fried noted all of this and said that United States policy was to advise all parties to exercise the utmost restraint.

Notes

1. On 15 July, five watchmen at the copper mines in Timna were murdered. The tracks of the attackers led towards the Jordanian border in the Arava.

2. These reports appeared in the Israeli press between 13 and 17 of July, based on foreign news agencies or Arab sources. As for the conference of chiefs of staff, it was stated that it would take place in Alexandria at the beginning of August, in accordance with the Arab League's collective security pact.
3. See No. 228 and n. 1 there.

244. E. Herlitz (Washington) to the United States Division. 18 July 1952

Copy: 93.08/357/42

Herlitz discusses Byroade's personality and his impressions from his visit to Israel. Byroade excels at getting to the core of a problem, even a new one, and quickly dealing with it by proposing novel and innovative solutions. Given this, there are grounds for concern at his impressions from his visit to Israel. Byroade returned disquieted by the marked influence of the army on Israel's policies and economy. He is worried by Israel's economic situation, and did not receive the impression that there is any significant momentum for development. It has been learned from another source that he is not convinced that Israel has political and military significance, neither in the Cold War nor in the event of a military conflict. Politically speaking, Israel is a nuisance because it is detrimental to the United States' relations with the Arab world.

Herlitz believes that Byroade's negative impressions stem from the briefing he received at the United States Embassy in Israel, and in particular from the military attachés there. Coordinated action must be taken in both Tel Aviv and Washington to correct the situation. In Tel Aviv, attempts must be made to influence the thinking of the embassy staff, while in Washington efforts must be directed at Byroade himself, in order to try to modify his attitudes and conclusions before they become set.

245. Memorandum by Sh. Ramati.[1] 18 July 1952

Copy: 130.02/2433/6

[. . .][2]

Section B: Instructions to the Israeli delegation. The general instructions are to listen to the Syrian proposals and clarify them, but to refuse to discuss them unless they fall under the rubric of a peace agreement, a non-aggression pact, or some other accord that represents progress from an armistice agreement towards a permanent peace treaty. In the wake of Shishakli's bellicose declaration which—as made public—threatened the use

of force in order to advance to the waterline and put an end to the drainage operations in the Hula, the delegation is further instructed to ascertain whether this declaration was in fact made and, if so, to inform the Syrians that Israel will not hold discussions under pressure of threats.

Section C: The current situation in the demilitarized zone. The tension that prevailed in the area a year ago has subsided. The drainage operations are progressing on Jewish-owned land and in the river bed, but not on the eastern bank, where there are technical difficulties because the dam has not been commissioned. The Syrians are not interfering with the work and apparently do not consider these operations to be an infringement of the *status quo*. The two sides are consolidating their control of the areas under their supervision. Illegal Syrian fishing in the Sea of Galilee is continuing, and the Syrians control part of its eastern shore.

Section D: Syrian incentives for a meeting at this point. Ramati suggests several possible reasons for Shishakli's steps: (1) An attempt to consolidate Syria's position in the Arab world by making territorial gains without war. He needs this in light of his decision to settle large numbers of Arab refugees in Syria, which has incurred the wrath of the radical states. (2) During the past year the Syrians have made *de facto* territorial gains in the demilitarized zone by means of military operations and inciting the residents. They were supported throughout by the United States, which considers Syria to be its most stable prop in the area. The Syrians, again with American support, are now trying to consolidate and expand their achievements through negotiations. (3) It may be that Shishakli has already received promises of support for his demands from the United States and also perhaps from France. (4) The real objective of the Syrian request is to meet with Israeli representatives not under the aegis of the Mixed Armistice Commission, with the aim of obtaining Israeli acknowledgement, outside the framework of the cease-fire agreement, of its *de facto* gains of the past year.

Section E: Advantages and disadvantages of such a meeting: Ramati lists a lengthy series of advantages and disadvantages of these negotiations. The advantages include: the possibility of eliminating the demilitarized zone; the political importance of negotiations with an Arab country; improved relations with the United States; the possibility of concluding accords on general matters dividing Israel and the Arabs (the Middle East Command, for example); the continuation of drainage operations without fear of Syrian action as long as the talks are in progress; a step toward normalizing relations with Syria; etc. The disadvantages include: the risk that Israel may be forced to make territorial concessions without receiving anything in return; the creation of an unfavorable precedent with regard to the demilitarized zones along the Egyptian and Jordanian borders; encouragement of Western countries to pressure Israel to make further territorial concessions; the creation of a precedent that would lead Syria and other

Arab countries to believe that concessions can be obtained from Israel through an arrangement that falls short of a peace treaty; and the danger of military escalation if the talks fail.

Ramati proposes stalling until the end of the drainage operations before beginning talks on the composition of the delegation, its credentials, and the agenda—this in order to reap the benefits without running any major risks.

Notes

1. The memorandum was sent to the head of the Operations and Intelligence Branch, the OC Northern Command, the Armistice Commissions with Syria and Lebanon, and to Reuven Dafni, chief liaison officer with the armistice commissions in the Foreign Ministry. The copy in the Foreign Ministry files is blurred and hard to decipher. Ungrammatical language in the original has not been corrected.
2. The first part of the memorandum, which recounts the sequence of contacts and attempts to convene Israeli and Syrian representatives for negotiations, has been omitted.
3. See No. 243 and n. 2 there.
4. On these issues, see Vol. 6, Nos. 376 and 385.
5. Paragraph 5 of the Israel-Syria Armistice Agreement deals with arrangements for the demilitarized zone.

246. Consultation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tel Aviv, 18 July 1952)

Resumé: 130.10/2550/13

The consultation opened with a survey by Eytan of developments since the Government made public its decision to transfer the Ministry to Jerusalem and concluding with the requests by a number of countries that the decision not be implemented.

Sharett listed a number of arguments that should be put to the foreign representatives: (1) Israel announced as early as January, 1951, its intention to move the Ministry, and received no reactions from the various countries. (2) The move has no connection whatsoever with the problem of the Holy Places. (3) The move is a domestic Israeli matter and does not affect the Arabs. (4) Israel is not obligating any foreign mission to move to Jerusalem. (5) The move is a practical necessity; the distance between the Foreign Ministry and other ministries has caused problems. (6) The transfer is a long and gradual process, and they are not being confronted by *faits accomplis*. In any case, the transfer will not take place before the General Assembly session. (7) McGhee had informed the Foreign Minister that the

U.S. Embassy would move to Jerusalem if the Holy Places were internationalized.

K. Katz, head of the Political Research Division, then reported on the Arab reactions to the move. They were not encouraged by the initial reactions of the world powers. They are now trying to link the matter to a question on which there is great sensitivity, namely, the deterioration of Middle East security. Counter-propaganda activities must be stepped up and any deterioration of the situation on the borders of Jerusalem must be prevented. This requires political and military coordination.

J. Herzog alluded to the Christian factor. As far as is known, the Vatican has not yet decided whether to bring the matter up at the UN. Rosenne suggests reviving the earlier Israeli proposal to internationalize the Holy Places. Shiloah opposes the proposal for fear that this might complicate the Ministry's move to Jerusalem.

Bendor proposes a written response to the American note and the creation of facts on the ground by moving some Ministry divisions to Jerusalem. Sharett supports the latter suggestion, but warns that such action is likely to harm relations with the Powers if common ground is found for cooperation with them in the affair as a whole.

In conclusion, it was decided to set up a committee to draft proposals in advance of the General Assembly session.[2]

Notes

1. The reference is to the speech by the United States delegate at the United Nations, J. Ross, in the debate on Jerusalem in December of 1950. Ross supported the compromise proposals to solve the Jerusalem crisis raised then and stressed the need to take into account the actual situation in the city and the changes that had intervened since the United Nations had resolved on its internationalization. (See *GAOR, 5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee*, 78th meeting, 12 December 1952.)
2. See No. 274.

247. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 21 July 1952

Notes

1. The reference is to a proposal drafted by Sweden in the autumn of 1950, whose essence was the appointment by the General Assembly of a committee to protect and supervise the holy places of the various religions in Jerusalem.
2. See Vol. 5, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 257–258.

248. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to W. Eytan. 22 July 1952

Coded Tel. 33; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

The delegation refers to Eytan's telegram concerning the draft agreement.[1] There is still no final draft, but it is expected in about two weeks' time. Robinson will come to Israel then. In the interim, a significant difficulty has arisen concerning the paragraph dealing with the stability of the German currency, in other words, the attempt to ensure that should the deutschmark be devalued Israel will still receive the volume of goods initially stipulated. Agreement on this matter had already been achieved, but the arrangement was rejected by the German government; the chancellor, too, under the influence of Abs, opposes it. The Germans contend that Israel should not have any doubts as to the value of the German currency and should in any case accept such a risk. Israel replied that this is a central issue and it will not sign the agreement without a solution to it. The Israeli delegation is active on the matter. There will be an official meeting tomorrow, attended by Abs's aides, at which Israel will submit an official memorandum; efforts are also being made in Bonn to renew the discussions, with the help of Nahum Goldmann. The process of drafting the final text of the agreement continues and a great deal remains to be done. It is to be hoped that this process will result in further significant advantages for Israel.[2]

Note

1. Eytan transmitted Sharett's request that one member of the delegation, Jacob Robinson, return to Israel and submit the draft reparations agreement to the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. (See telegram No. 53, 21 July 1952, 130.09/2303/14.)

Editorial Note

Free Officers' Coup in Egypt

On 23 July there was a military coup in Egypt. A group of officers led by Gen. Muhammad Naguib seized power, declared itself a Revolutionary Council, dismissed the government, and forced King Faruq to abdicate and go into exile. His infant son Ahmad Fuad was crowned and a regency council appointed. The Revolutionary Council installed a new government, headed by 'Ali Māhir, and announced its intention to institute governmental and political reforms, and especially wide-ranging agrarian reform.

249. Note for the Record by A. Eban [Washington]. 23 July 1952

Notes

1. A report on the conversation was sent to Israel only on 28 July; see No. 257.
2. See No. 243 and n. 2 there.
3. See No. 255.
4. See No. 229.
5. See No. 251.

250. G. Rafael [New York] to W. Eytan. 23 July 1952

Copy: 93.03/3055/13

Rafael sums up the situation on the negotiations to free the blocked accounts.[1] At this stage in the discussions, Israel must reply to Palmer's statement and prepare a detailed procedure for unblocking the accounts.

Of all the demands made on Israel—territorial concessions, repatriation of the refugees, and so on—the demand that the refugees' blocked accounts be unfrozen is the least critical and the easiest for Israel to deal with. Acquiescence to this demand will provide Israel with major political advantages and refute the contention that Israel is adopting an inflexible position and refusing to make concessions in its relations with the Arabs. Reducing tensions on this matter will also further Israel's objective of preventing a General Assembly debate on the Palestine question this year, and this would in turn help promote direct contacts with the Arab states towards settlement of the Palestine conflict. Rafael is convinced that all Israeli policy makers agree on the above, but he wishes to emphasize that if Israel has decided to make concessions on this point it should do so soon, in a graceful and mannerly fashion. He therefore suggests a simple procedure for unblocking the accounts, primarily involving processing by Barclay's Bank through its branches located in the refugees' countries of residence and its head office in London. At the end of the procedure, their money will be transferred to free accounts in Israel. Israel's foreign-exchange regulations will be amended to permit transfer of the funds abroad.

Rafael suggests initiating the procedure in the very near future, before the General Assembly convenes, in order to gain maximum political advantage. At the same time, a start must be made on registering the claims of Iraqi Jews to their accounts in that country.

Notes

1. See No. 240.
2. See "Summary of Meeting between Conciliation Commission Staff and Israeli Representatives," 22 July 1952, 93.03/3055/13.

251. *Aide-Mémoire* by the Ambassador of Israel in Washington. 23 July 1952

Notes

1. The original erroneously reads "19".
2. See No. 186.
3. See No. 205.
4. See No. 203.

252. G. Rafael (New York) to A. Eban (Washington). 25 July 1952

Orig.: 93.08/358/2

Rafael reports on his talk with Ross of the American delegation to the UN. Ross first asked about Mahmud Fawzi, the Egyptian representative to the UN, inquiring as to his standing in his country and his attitude towards Israel. Rafael replied according to the best of his knowledge, and Ross indicated that he has influence with Fawzi and will try to arrange a meeting between him and Israeli representatives. Rafael thanked him for his initiative, but reminded him of the abortive attempt to arrange a meeting between Israeli and Egyptian representatives in 1950, which failed as a result of excessive caution on the part of the Americans.

Rafael turned the conversation to the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly session and asked whether the United States concurs with Israel's goal of preventing discussion on the Palestine issue. Ross replied that a final decision has not yet been taken in the State Department, but he believes that the tendency is still towards preventing a debate. To make his own position clear, he stressed that he had tried to convince the American representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission to postpone publication of the Commission's interim report until after the Assembly agenda has been set.

Rafael presented arguments in favor of Iran's election to the Security Council. Ross replied that Israel's points were well taken, but the U.S. position is uncomfortable, since many countries that voted for Turkey now feel obliged to support Lebanon, which is also the nominee of the

Arab League. There is already an excessively wide zone of friction between the West and the Arab countries, and the State Department thinks it should not be broadened further. In any case, the State Department has not made a final decision; Ross asks whether it might be possible to compensate Lebanon by placing it on the Economic and Social Council. Rafael replied that Israel has proposed its own candidacy for ECOSOC and is requesting U.S. support. Israel will be able to reply to this question only after the United States has determined its position on the Security Council candidates.

Ross raised the issue of whether the Tunisian question should be placed on the General Assembly agenda. Rafael replied that Israel has not yet determined its position, which it is considering both on its own merits as well as in the light of its friendly relations with France and of the interest the problem has aroused among the Asian nations. The impression in Israel is that French public opinion and the Chamber of Deputies are split, and there is no certainty that France will vigorously oppose the matter's inclusion on the agenda. Ross replied that the State Department, too, has not yet taken a decision on the matter, although he believes that the scales will tip in favor of those who support placing the question on the agenda.

Korea was also discussed. Rafael tried to convince Ross that both sides are interested in a cease-fire, and that only matters related to the mechanics of the negotiations are preventing resolution of the impasse. Ross replied that the State Department is examining all options for breaking the deadlock in the negotiations.

The final topic discussed was the blocked accounts. Ross said that a solution must be reached before the General Assembly convenes, and this will help keep the Palestine issue off the Assembly's agenda.

Notes

1. On this issue, see Vol. 5, No. 480.
2. The reference is to the leaking of No. 231, which led to sharp exchanges between Israel and the United States but to no concrete results.
3. See No. 229.
4. See No. 250.

253. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to N. R. Pillai (New Delhi). 25 July 1952

Notes

1. Narayana R. Pillai, secretary-general of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
2. See No. 71.

3. There was no answer to this letter until 1 February 1953, when the secretary for foreign affairs in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs wrote as follows: "We have not yet reached a decision on the question of [an] exchange of missions between our two countries. I would like to assure you, however, that this matter is under our constant consideration. I shall write to you again as soon as a decision has been reached." (See letter from R. K. Nehru to Eytan, File 130.02/2414/1.)

254. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions in Washington, Paris and London. 27 July 1952

Notes

1. Not found.
2. On the question of free passage through the Suez Canal, see No. 255.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 171.

255. Note by the Israel Ambassador in Washington to the U.S. Secretary of State (Washington). 28 July 1952

Notes

1. A similar note was sent to the governments of Great Britain and France.
2. See No. 182.
3. For the U.S. reply, see No. 329.

256. E. Elath (London) to W. Eytan. 28 July 1952

Notes

1. No. 255.
2. Anthony Nutting, British under-secretary of state for foreign affairs.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 171.
4. Compare the protocol of the conversation recorded in the British Foreign Office, 29 July 1952, PRO FO371/96997.

257. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 28 July 1952

Notes

1. See No. 249.
2. See No. 243.

3. No. 231.
4. No. 255.
5. See No. 252.
6. See No. 259.

258. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 28 July 1952

Coded Tel. 532; Outg.: 130.09/2309/6

Sharett asks for Eban's assessment of the American refusal to make public their decision that Israel is eligible for reimbursable military aid. This refusal has led to a strange situation in which Israel has initiated a public campaign for the aid while the Americans keep silent. The resulting predicament, in which Israeli efforts are public knowledge while the fact that these efforts have been successful remains a secret, has weakened Israel's political standing both at home and abroad. He asks whether there are grounds for the fear that the publicity given to Israel's request placed the State Department in a difficult position, because of which it is liable to torpedo any further favorable response or even jeopardize implementation of the affirmative response in principle that has already been made.[1]

Note

1. See No. 265, paragraph (b).

259. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 28 July 1952

Notes

1. Herbert E. Gaston, president and chairman of the board of the Export-Import Bank, Washington.
2. Not identified.
3. Walter C. Sauer, vice-president of the Export-Import Bank.
4. Bernard R. Bell, chief of the Economics Division of the Export-Import Bank.

260. O. Gass (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 28 July 1952

Note

1. Reese E. Fryer, assistant administrator for the Near East and Africa in the U.S. Technical Assistance Administration.

261. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 28 July 1952

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 171.
2. See No. 262.
3. Eban replied that he would begin talks at the State Department in accordance with the instructions in this telegram; in addition, he proposed meeting with Acheson and persuading him to instruct the American ambassador in Cairo to tell Naguib that the United States would welcome an end to the dispute between Israel and Egypt. He thought it would also be possible to enlist the White House in this effort. (Eban to Sharett, W378, 29 July 1952, 93.01/2208/16.)

262. Sh. Divon [Paris] to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 28 July 1952

Coded Tel. PWA23; Inc.: 93.01/2208/14

Divon reports on recent developments involving Egypt. He spent a day in Geneva and had exchanges, through a contact, with Nahas and with Fuad Sarraj al-Din. Conclusions: (1) Naguib's unforeseen decision resulted from his easy successes and the fear that the Americans would help King Faruq escape. (2) Salah al-Din told Fuad Sarraj al-Din that there is a chance of reaching an accord with Naguib and advised that they return immediately to Egypt, but they think that Naguib's recent successes will turn his head and make an agreement impossible. (3) From sources in the Quai d'Orsay it was learned today that the Americans are extremely active in trying to prevent any drastic development, and that a crisis has erupted between 'Ali Māhir and Naguib over the latter's desire to exercise real supervision over the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and the interior. (4) On Divon's initiative his friend S., a member of the Wafd party, spoke to Fuad about the Israel-Egypt problem, and reported that Fuad is convinced of the need to resolve the conflict. When he arrives in Cairo, Fuad will check with

Naguib whether the time is right for this, in light of the need to maintain quiet in Gaza. Fuad asked for a draft proposal for resolution of the problems between Israel and Egypt, emphasizing "between Israel and Egypt, not between Israel and the Arab world." S. is prepared to fly to Egypt if Israel commissions him to do so.

Notes

1. Not found; but see No. 261.
2. See No. 267.

263. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 28 July 1952

Coded Tel. 38; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

The difficulty over the Israeli demand to ensure the level of Germany's obligations irrespective of currency fluctuations[1] has come to an end. Shinnar went to London and met with Abs and his aides, and after complex and arduous negotiations they arrived at a formula that guarantees stability of the volume of goods should there be a devaluation of the deutschmark. Abs repeated that he is about to successfully conclude the negotiations with the creditors in London and has no doubt that he will manage within the next year or two to obtain a foreign loan that will make it possible to reduce the term of the payments to Israel. Abs again raised the question of frozen German assets in the United States, which he estimates at $140 million, and asked for Israeli assistance to obtain their release. He emphasized that there is no connection between the frozen assets and the loan. There still remain some outstanding matters, such as the preamble to the agreement, the final wording of certain sections, and the translation into English.

There is now another problem: where the agreement will be signed and the rank of the signatories. Shinnar has been told that Adenauer has decided to sign it himself in order to confer on it the significance he feels it merits. The chancellor is willing to agree that the signatories for the other side not have the same rank—for example, the heads of the Israel delegation. The chancellor wants the agreement to be signed in Bonn. The delegation is making efforts, through Goldmann, to change the venue, perhaps to the chancellor's vacation resort in Switzerland.

Josephthal obtained a draft of the agreement on the funds allocated to the Jewish organizations and their mode of payment. The text is on its way to Israel as well as to the presidents of the organizations in the United

States, for their comments and approval. If approval is received, it can be signed next week.

Notes

1. See No. 248.
2. Sharett suggested that Adenauer sign in his capital, whereas Israel would sign in Israel. If this solution was not acceptable, the delegation would go to Bonn and sign there. (See Sharett to the delegation, No. 63, 4 August 1952, 130.09/2303/14.)

264. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 29 July 1952

Coded Tel. IWA540; Outg.: 130.09/2309/6

The United States Division reports on a meeting between Sharett and Ambassador Davis. Davis came to introduce Fryer, of the Technical Cooperation Administration, with responsibility for the Middle East and Africa. Fryer described the plan for the Yarmuk Dam, which will make it possible to settle 21,000 refugee families, without infringing on Israel's water rights. Syria has agreed to the plan, which will cost the Technical Cooperation Administration and UNRWA $11 million. This is the first opportunity there has been to remove refugees from the camps, and rapid progress can be made if the matter is not turned into an issue of high politics.

The Foreign Minister replied that Israel welcomes such a plan, but it raises two questions: can Israel agree to such a plan without prior negotiations between it and Jordan, since Israel is an interested party? This question will have to be referred to the Government. The second question is whether there will in fact be no infringement of Israel's rights to the waters of the Yarmuk. This will have to be clarified in a meeting between Israeli experts and the staff of the Technical Cooperation Administration. The point must be clarified before Israel addresses the first question. Fryer agreed, and said that as soon as he returns to Washington he will check on how the work stands and give appropriate instructions to the engineer.

265. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 29 July 1952

Coded Tel. IWA539; Outg.: 130.09/2309/6

The United States Division reports on Sharett's talk with Ambassador Davis:

(1) Egypt: Sharett repeated his previous assessment (see No. 261), with the qualification that the situation is fluid. He said that it is quite possible that the Americans will be presented with a golden opportunity to make military and economic aid conditional on an accord with Israel. The Foreign Minister drew attention to Israel's announcement of the previous day as both a warning and a reassurance to Egypt, and an indication to the Israeli public that the Government has no desire to embark upon adventures.[2] Shiloah, who was present at the meeting, added that Faruq's ouster meant the removal of foreign influences; it would be easier for this military clique, which opposed the war with Israel, to conclude an accord with it. Davis took notes, saying only that he has always been convinced that no progress can be made in the region without peace.

(2) Reimbursable military aid: Sharett handed over the Israeli reply,[3] and Davis said that the State Department has no objection to making it public, but only after coordination between the two governments. The Foreign Minister replied that now that the principle of making it public had been agreed upon, Israel must consider whether doing so is in its best interest.

(3) The economic situation: Davis said that Mikesell would soon submit his report to Washington. They understand the gravity and urgency of the situation, particularly as August approaches.

(4) Suez: Davis said that his government favors the implementation of the Security Council resolution, but this is not the proper time for action that is apt merely to increase Egyptian obstinacy. The Foreign Minister replied that talks with the Egyptians on arrangements are certain to be held in the coming days, and the opportunity of opening the Canal to Israeli shipping must not be missed.

Notes

1. No. 261.
2. In response to reporters' questions, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said on 28 July that the changes in Egypt were an internal matter and the Israeli government would never dream of doing anything that could be interpreted as interference in domestic Egyptian affairs.
3. See No. 220 and n. 3 there.
4. See No. 258.
5. A full report on the conversation is in the letter from the United States Division to the Israel Ambassador in Washington, 1 August 1952, 93.08/357/41.

266. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 30 July 1952

Notes

1. See No. 255.
2. The Muslim Brotherhood organization.
3. For a full report on the conversation, see Rafael to Eytan, 31 July 1952, 93.03/3006/3. Compare also the report by Jebb to the British Foreign Office, 29 July 1952, PRO FO371/98799.

267. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 31 July 1952

Coded Tel. IWA552; Outg.: 130.09/2309/6

Continuing his earlier telegram,[1] fourth sentence from the end, Sharett reports on his instructions to Divon. He is to give S. the following message for the "senior figure in the party," but without setting anything down on paper: Israel is interested in a peace settlement with Egypt that would lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations, make it possible to renew transport and trade, and open the way to cooperation in economic development, regional security, and the whole range of international problems, whether or not Egypt is ready for this. However, Israel is also prepared to discuss the stages of the peace process. The major topics for discussion are as follows: (1) Demarcating the border along the cease-fire line, with slight, mutually agreed rectifications; (2) conclusion of a non-aggression pact; (3) the future of the Gaza Strip; (4) joint or coordinated action to solve the refugee problem in Gaza; (5) an agreement by which Israel will use its influence abroad to help satisfy Egypt's just national aspirations and Egypt will bring its influence to bear to help integrate Israel into the Middle East; (6) joint or coordinated action to obtain financial and military assistance from the United States and other sources; (7) investigation of possibilities for cooperation in regional defense plans; (8) coordination of action in UN agencies; (9) commercial ties between the two countries. This telegram is for briefing purposes only.[2]

Notes

1. No. 261.
2. Eban replied that he had held talks on the matter at the State Department, which was of the opinion that the situation in Egypt had not yet stabilized and the survival of the new regime should not be seen as certain. He suggested informing the State

Department of the Israeli initiative at the appropriate time, since it refuted a number of the charges concerning Israel's ostensible negligence of its duty towards peace with its neighbors. (Telegram WIA391, 31 July 1952, 93.01/2208/16.)

268. Sh. Bendor (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Ambassador in Washington. 31 July 1952

Orig.: 93.08/357/1

During the past week the Foreign Ministry was largely preoccupied with developments in Egypt. There were three short meetings with the minister, the conclusions of which were wired to the ambassador.[1] The United States Division also discussed the topic, and its conclusions are as follows: It is obvious that a peace offensive should be launched on the Egyptian front. When the situation stabilizes, the Egyptians should be informed, through the Americans, that we are inviting them to talks with the aim of finding a way to improve relations between the two countries. Naturally, pressure must be simultaneously exerted on the United States, as has already been done, to make any assistance to the Egyptians conditional on a peace settlement with Israel. He does not believe that the Americans will comply, nor does he envision an early accord between the countries; but Israel must make every effort in this direction.

The main obstacle to an agreement with Egypt is the problem of the Gaza refugees. The Egyptians dare not take any steps towards peace without resolving this question. Unfortunately, at the moment Israel has no plan for solving the problem of the refugees in the Gaza Strip.

Even if Israeli-Egyptian talks do not take place, Israel is still bound to make a proposal. With this in mind, the Division has drawn up two documents: (a) the advantages that would accrue to the Egyptians as a result of an accord with Israel; (b) the agenda for Israeli-Egyptian talks. A number of questions with regard to the Gaza Strip and its refugees have also been noted down. Bendor asks for the opinion of the Embassy staff.

Appendix

Advantages accruing to Egypt from an agreement with Israel

1. Freedom to deal with domestic matters.
2. Release of the division deployed in El-Arish.
3. Improved prospects for U.S. military assistance.
4. Improved prospects for U.S. economic assistance.
5. A market in Israel for agricultural produce and other items.
6. Revenue from customs levies on oil passing through the Suez Canal.
7. Technical assistance from Israel.
8. A direct overland link with Lebanon and Syria.

Agenda for an Israeli-Egyptian meeting

1. Expansion of the scope of the Armistice Agreement or conclusion of a non-aggression pact.
2. The Gaza Strip and rehabilitation of the refugees.
3. Cooperation on regional defense.
4. Development of economic and commercial ties.
5. Technical assistance.

Questions

1. Does Israel want the Gaza Strip?
2. Is Israel prepared to accept the Strip with its permanent residents (about 50,000)?
3. What would it do with the refugees in the Gaza Strip? Is Israel prepared to contribute—let us say one million dollars — for their rehabilitation? If so, where will they be rehabilitated?[2]

Notes

1. See No. 267.
2. See also No. 273.

269. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 31 July 1952

Note

1. The Foreign Minister's private residence.

270. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 1 August 1952

Note

1. Parker T. Hart, director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, from mid-June 1952.

271. A. Kubovy (Prague) to A. Levavi. 3 August 1952

Coded Tel. 5; Inc.: 130.09/2343/3

Kubovy refers once more to the issue of Mordechai Oren's arrest. Since the Czechoslovaks have not replied to the last note on the Oren affair,[1] he proposes the following: to summon Bártušek tomorrow, rebuke him, and hint that the matter will be brought before the UN; to instigate a question and ministerial reply in the Knesset; to arrange for editorials in the press; to call an urgent meeting of the Israel-Czechoslovakia Friendship League; and to have the Human Rights League send a cable to the World Peace Council in Prague. For his part, he will try to meet with officials in the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry. Finally, he asks whether anything is known about what Mapam may have done in the matter.

Notes

1. The note has not been found in Foreign Ministry files; from a later report, however, it seems that the Israel Legation requested particulars of the accusations against Oren, the name and address of the defense counsel appointed for him, asked about the possibility of appointing an Israeli defense counsel, and again requested permission for a member of the legation staff to meet with Oren without delay. (See L. Kadar to Rega Oren, 15 June 1952, 130.11/2513/3.)
2. Ladislav Šimovič, head of the Asia and Middle East Department of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry.
3. Meir Yaari, general secretary of the Mapam party.
4. Jacob Majus, member of Mapam's central committee and political committee; member of the Israel Peace Council.

272. T. Kollek [Washington] to D. Ben-Gurion.[1] 4 August 1952

Notes

1. Also sent to the Foreign Ministry and to Ehud Avriel.
2. See No. 277.

273. A. Yafeh [Tel Aviv] to Sh. Bendor. 4 August 1952

Copy: 130.20/2477/19

Yafeh refers to the letter from the United States Division on relations with Egypt.[1] He argues that it is not in Egypt's interest to reach an arrangement

with Israel; this being the case, he asks whether it is nevertheless a good idea to propose to the Egyptians that negotiations aimed at an accord be initiated. His reasoning runs as follows:

The conflict with Israel is the most important and strongest factor upholding Arab unity, and in particular the Arab League. An Egyptian agreement with Israel would mean the collapse of the League, undermine Egypt's status as leader of the Arab bloc, and lead to a deterioration of its position vis-à-vis Great Britain and the rest of the world. The new regime in Egypt is facing two acute problems, on both of which it will ultimately be forced to make concessions—the economic crisis, and its relations with Britain. Hostility to Israel is a convenient means of diverting attention from such future concessions and deflecting it onto the external enemy. The new regime is an outgrowth of the nationalist movement and cannot deny its parentage. This movement, which is primarily concerned with confronting Israel, insists that there must be a solution of the refugee problem before any negotiations are conducted with Israel.

He offers the following comments on the items enumerated in the letter under the heading, "Advantages accruing to Egypt from an agreement with Israel": (1) On the contrary, in order to be able to concentrate on domestic matters, an external scapegoat is necessary, and Israel is conveniently to hand for that role. (2) The Egyptians may prefer to keep their army units in a state of alert. (3–4) The consensus among the Arab countries, including Egypt, is that the more stubborn they are, the more they will obtain from the West. (5) Palestine was never an important market for Egypt. (6) These are small sums compared with the vast revenues generated by the canal. (7) Even if Israel and Egypt take another step towards peace, some time will elapse before any Arab country can accept direct assistance from Israel on any serious scale. (8) This is more important to Lebanon and Syria than it is to Egypt. What Egypt really needs is a direct land link with Jordan, by wresting Eilat and part of the southern Negev from Israel. (9) The blocked accounts are no longer a bargaining chip for Israel.

All of this notwithstanding, he believes that a moderate proposal should be submitted, with no pretensions to achieving peace negotiations or preliminaries thereto or even merely direct contacts. The contact itself is important to Israel, enabling it to learn what is going on and to influence events; such contact can be exploited when possible to advance Israel's interests and improve relations. Presenting such a proposal would also have a beneficial influence on the State Department. Hence he also supports Eban's suggestion to transmit the proposal through Secretary of State Acheson and Ambassador Caffery.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 268.
2. See No. 270.

274. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 5 August 1952

Notes

1. See No. 246.
2. See No. 236, n. 1.
3. The reference is to the negotiations to implement Paragraph 8 of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement.
4. No. 231.

275. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to G. Rafael (New York). 5 August 1952

Notes

1. See No. 250.
2. No. 177.
3. See No. 283.

276. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to M. Sharett. 6 August 1952

Tel. 48; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

The delegation replies to Sharett's telegram complaining about the slow pace of the negotiations.[1] The delegation, too, is uneasy at the procrastination, which results not from a desire to draft a literary masterpiece but from serious and objective factors: (1) The German delegation does not budge without authorization from Bonn, and many ministers and officials are out-of-town this month. (2) There remain some unresolved substantive problems raised by Israel, including the stability of the deutschmark.[2] The agreement reached on this point has not yet been approved by the Germans. No solution has been found to the problem of tax exemptions for those exporting to Israel, and the Bonn government has yet to endorse the preamble to the agreement. (3) The agreement with Israel depends on the

conclusion of negotiations with the Jewish organizations, and this is still far off. (4) Formulation of the final text is being carried out simultaneously with the substantive negotiations and is not the reason for the slowness of the process. (5) Implementation of the agreement requires ratification by parliament, which is in recess until October. This does not apply to the oil supply agreement, which is supposed to go into effect immediately upon signature. A special telegram has been sent on this matter.[3]

Notes

1. Sharett cabled that he was extremely concerned by the slow pace of the negotiations. It seemed to him that time was being wasted on fine points of legal phraseology, while the need to hasten implementation of the main point, which would determine the future of the entire project, was being ignored. (See his telegram dated 5 August, 130.09/2303/14.)
2. See No. 263.
3. See delegation in The Hague to the Foreign Minister and Finance Minister, No. 46, 6 August 1952, 130.09/2303/15.

277. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 6 August 1952

Notes

1. No. 272.
2. Jacob M. Arvey, a Democratic Party leader in Chicago.
3. Eliezer Z. Hoofien, chairman of the board of directors of Bank Leumi le-Israel.
4. See No. 278.

278. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 6 August 1952

Notes

1. No. 277.
2. No. 272.
3. These telegrams deal with the drafting of the preliminary text of the Israeli letter requesting an advance against the grant-in-aid for 1952/3. For the final text of the letter, see No. 289. (The telegrams, dated 5 August, are in File 93.01/2208/18.)
4. See n. 3 above.
5. At the meeting, President Truman stated that he supported the Israeli position, namely, that the organizational and budgetary recommendations in Mikesell's report were reasonable, that it was dangerous to make a direct approach to the creditors, and

that Israel's financial problems would not be solved by an advance against the grant, but only through long-term financing. He promised to help in the matter of funding, and would call in Byroade afterwards to give him instructions. (See Kollek to the Foreign Ministry [W419], 6 August 1952, 93.01/2208/18.)

279. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Comay. 6 August 1952

Coded Tel. XA46; Outg.: 93.01/2204/7

During Rafael's meeting with Sarper,[1] the latter raised the issue of the rivalry between Turkey and Israel for the seat being vacated on the Economic and Social Council. He noted that Pakistan, too, is seeking re-election, and India has also put forward its own candidacy. He suggested avoiding competition and reaching an agreement befitting the friendly relations between Turkey and Israel. Rafael replied that Israel seeks Turkish support of its candidacy, believes that the rivalry between India and Pakistan increases the chances of a third candidate, and will suggest that both governments examine the situation. Rafael himself believes that Israel's prospects of being elected are poor (he told Sarper that Israel's chances are good), and therefore asks that the ministry try to ascertain the climate of opinion in various capitals and instruct him how to act.[2]

Notes

1. Selim Sarper, Turkish Permanent Representative at the United Nations.
2. In another telegram, Rafael noted his belief that in light of the long odds, the major headache that membership would involve, and the need to preserve friendship with Turkey, Israel would to better to withdraw its candidacy and request compensation from Israel's friends—support of Israel for the vice-presidency of the General Assembly. (See telegram XA47, 8 August 1952, 93.01/2204/7.) Comay responded that it was true that Israel's chances were not good, but he saw no reason to substitute one doubtful candidacy for another until Israel's chances for each had been more fully investigated. (See Comay to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations, Y617, 17 August 1952, 130.09/2330/10.)

280. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 7 August 1952

Orig.: 130.20/2491/2

Eban refers to the United States Division's letter of 17 July,[1] and in particular to Rosenne's evaluation, stemming from his analysis of the American note on Jerusalem. He agrees with the conclusions, having reached them

on the basis of his talks at the State Department. His conclusions are as follows: (1) The United States shows no particular interest in the problem of Jerusalem and attaches no importance to an early resolution of the issue. (2) On the substance of the matter, the United States supports functional supervision of the Holy Places, on condition that such a plan is acceptable to Israel and Jordan and is supported by world public opinion, including various religious elements. The United States does not think that Vatican agreement is essential. (3) The United States would prefer that the matter not come up at the UN, but is not making any special effort to prevent a debate. (4) The American note adopts a position only with reference to the transfer of the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem; what underlies it is an attempt to avoid further complications with Arab countries and others at the UN who still support internationalization. (5) If the General Assembly session concludes without a discussion or a decision on the Jerusalem question, the United States will reexamine the issue. It has not yet decided whether to move its embassy to Jerusalem.

Note

1. No. 246.

281. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 8 August 1952

Notes

1. See No. 267.
2. In his first interview with the press since seizing power, Naguib stated that he would ask the Western countries, including the United States, for military aid; if this was not forthcoming, he would turn to the East. (See *New York Times*, 8 August 1952.)
3. After consultations with his colleagues, Eban amended his proposal and suggested approaching Egypt through unofficial channels, by means of Divon and Eliahu Sasson. (See his telegram to Sharett, W445, 11 August 1952, 130.09/2309/10.)

282. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) and E. Elath (London). 8 August 1952

283. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 8 August 1952

Notes

1. No. 275.
2. See No. 299.

284. M. Comay [Tel Aviv] to A. Eban (Washington). 9 August 1952

Notes

1. No. 255.
2. Eban responded that in accordance with his instructions the delegation at the United Nations had approached the maritime countries and most members of the Security Council and verbally informed them of the content of the Israeli note. He proposes continuing diplomatic efforts in Tel Aviv and the various capitals. As for paragraph (3), he believes that Israel should hold off for the moment, since both the British and the Americans were opposed to a debate in the General Assembly or Security Council and Israel could use this as a bargaining chip against the intention to raise the issue of Jerusalem at the United Nations (telegram W444, 11 August 1952, 93.01/2208/18).

285. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 10 August 1952

Coded Tel. IWA593; Inc.: 93.01/2208/17

Sharett reports on a meeting with U.S. Ambassador Davis. Initial details of the conversation have already been cabled.[1] Sharett expressed his astonishment at Mikesell's conclusions, which offer no solution to the problem but merely defer the crisis. Davis replied that these are no more than interim conclusions, intended to ease the current distress; there will be further discussions concerning a long-term solution. Sharett said that Israel will renew its request for debt consolidation. He then referred to Mikesell's proposal to impose daily supervision of Israel's foreign currency account, asserting that this would represent an infringement of Israel's parliamentary democracy and of its government's freedom of action. Davis reassured him that there is absolutely no intention of encroaching upon Israel's sovereignty and that Israel itself had drawn the same conclusions.

The Jerusalem question was also discussed. Davis argued that no country has ever recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital. It is true that United States' representatives do visit Jerusalem; however, so long as the internationalization resolution has not been repealed, the U.S. embassy will not be moved to Jerusalem. Sharett replied that two General Assembly sessions have passed without a resolution on Jerusalem, and no solution is in sight. It is for Israel to choose between having its Foreign Ministry separated from its government and having the foreign missions separated from the Foreign Ministry; it sees no alternative to rejecting the former option. In reply to Davis's question about the actual transfer of the ministry, Sharett replied that it will apparently take place in late winter or early spring.

Note

1. Telegram from United States Division to Eban, 8 August 1952, with initial details on Sharett's meeting with U.S. Ambassador Davis. At the meeting Sharett expressed concern at Mikesell's conclusions, which ignored the Israeli request for debt consolidation and instead suggested day-to-day supervision of foreign currency receipts and expenditures—which was tantamount to direct intervention in the affairs of the State of Israel. Bendor, who was present at the meeting, was of the opinion that Davis had only general information about Mikesell's proposals and was not aware of the proposal to impose day-to-day supervision of the foreign currency account. (The telegram is in File 130.09/2309/6.)

286. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) and E. Elath (London). 11 August 1952

Coded Tel. WTEA18; Outg.: 93.01/2208/18

Eban analyzes the new Middle East defense plan (MEDO) and compares it with its previous incarnation (SACME).[1] There are three fundamental differences: Instead of a joint command that would negotiate with the countries of the region about the deployment of forces and acquisition of bases, the new proposal is simply to set up a planning staff to draft contingency plans. Egypt has lost its special status, and all countries of the Middle East now have equal standing. The core of the organization has been increased from four to seven countries by the addition of three Commonwealth states—Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. In Eban's opinion, these changes are favorable to Israel. Tactically speaking, the British approach of first setting up the staff as an established fact and then inviting the countries of the region to cooperate with it suits Israel better than the American approach, which would have establishment of the staff conditional on agreement by the countries of the region—a tactic that opens the way for extortion by the Arabs. He suggests that Israel lend its maximum support to the British strategy.

Notes

1. See No. 282.
2. Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations—Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand.
3. See No. 296.

287. G. Rafael (New York) to A. Eban (Washington). 11 August 1952

Orig.: 93.08/356/1

Rafael summarizes his conversation of 7 August with Eban, which dealt with various points on the agenda at the UN and in Washington.

(1) Jerusalem: It was decided to adopt the following tactics in Israel's dealings with the State Department: If the question is placed on the agenda, Israel will insist on a comprehensive discussion and a functional solution. If the Arabs raise the issue, Israel will insist on a discussion of all instances in which the Arabs have flouted Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, including the failure to implement Article 8,[1] the Suez resolution, and perhaps the Arab boycott as well.

(2) Suez: Efforts should continue to be addressed to the maritime nations, focusing on the Scandinavian capitals. Foreign Ministry approval should be sought for submitting a memorandum, different from that submitted to the Three Powers, to the maritime nations.[2]

(3) Blocked accounts: The formulation of procedures for the release of blocked accounts must be speeded up in order to derive maximum benefit from this move prior to the convening of the General Assembly. A reply to the Foreign Minister's questions has been prepared and cabled to Tel Aviv.[3]

(4) Economic and Social Council: It was decided to recommend to the Ministry that Israel withdraw its candidacy in return for a consideration from Turkey and compensation by Israel's friends: support for Israel's candidacy for the vice-presidency of the General Assembly.[4]

(5) Middle East Command: There was an exchange of ideas about the differences of opinion between Great Britain and the United States on the mode of setting up MEDO.[5] It was decided to convey Israel's stand to the State Department.

(6) The Seventh Session of the General Assembly: The options for Israeli action on various topics, such as Korea, the admission of new members, and social and economic problems, should be examined. There must be coordination with the Foreign Ministry in Israel and further consideration of the matter when the provisional General Assembly agenda is published.

(7) Collective measures: It was agreed to send Rafael's draft proposal to the Ministry for consultation.

(8) Financial negotiations with the State Department: The ambassador reported on his conversations at the State Department and the wording of the Embassy's note.[6]

Notes

1. Of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement.
2. Compare No. 284.
3. See Nos. 283 and 275.
4. See No. 279.
5. See No. 286.
6. For the Embassy's note, see No. 289.

288. A. Eban (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 11 August 1952

Note

1. No. 289.

289. Note from the Ambassador of Israel in Washington to the U.S. Secretary of State (Washington). 12 August 1952

Notes

1. Nos. 129 and 130. In Foreign Ministry files the American note is dated 1 May 1952.
2. See No. 203.

290. A. Levavi (Tel Aviv) to I. Raphael[1] (Jerusalem). 12 August 1952

Copy: 130.11/2503/2

The Foreign Minister has referred to Levavi the two questions raised by Raphael: (1) Is it desirable to instigate public reactions and protests in Israel with regard to the prevention or halting of *aliya* from Rumania and Hungary? (2) Should the Jews in those countries be encouraged to give public expression to their desire to emigrate to Israel? The Foreign Ministry's reply is that such actions should definitely be encouraged. There have already been various gathering of immigrants from these countries in Israel, preceded by consultations at the Foreign Ministry. The press has also been briefed by the Ministry. Israel's legations in Bucharest and Budapest have also been active, and these were important manifestations of the Jews' desire to emigrate to Israel. However, the regimes in these coun-

tries are now clamping down and the possibilities for such actions are becoming more limited. There is of course a limit that the local Jews do not dare exceed.

Notes

1. Izhak Raphael, director of the Aliyah Department of the Jewish Agency.
2. The question of *aliya* from Rumania and Hungary had been discussed by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. At the conclusion of the debate the following recommendations were passed: (1) to publish a manifesto in the Knesset; (2) to stimulate public activity in Israel and abroad; (3) to organize a mass letter-writing campaign by relatives in Israel and abroad to Rumanian and Hungarian leaders, requesting that relatives be allowed to emigrate; (4) to increase broadcasts by Kol Yisrael and Kol Ziyyon La-golah; (5) to investigate the possibilities of smuggling Jews out of those countries. (See Sh. Bentsur to Moshe Sharett, 14 August 1952, 130.11/2503/2.)

291. East European Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in Moscow. 12 August 1952

Coded Tel.; Outg.: 130.09/2325/5

In the wake of the question put by the minister in Moscow,[1] Sharett instructs him to convey the following message to the Soviets: Great Britain and France have approached Israel unofficially and made known their intention to raise their missions to embassy level. They intend to do this in all countries of the Middle East. Israel would be delighted to host a Soviet embassy as well, should the Soviets so request. Thus far the text of the statement. Sharett suggests that Eliashiv avail himself of the meeting already set for conveying the note concerning German reparations to transmit this message.[2]

Notes

1. Eliashiv asked whether, in light of reports about raising the French and British missions in Israel to embassy level, he should suggest to the Soviets that they also raise their level of representation (10 August 1952, 130.09/2325/5).
2. See No. 292.

292. A. Levavi (Tel Aviv) to Sh. Eliashiv (Moscow). 12 August 1952

Copy: 130.11/2511/17

Levavi encloses a draft of the note to the Soviet Union regarding reparations from East Germany. He instructs Eliashiv to request a meeting in order to deliver the note and asks him to wire back the substance of the conversation that develops at that meeting.[1]

In the note, Israel expressed its objections to the U.S.S.R.'s reply to Israel's request for reparations from East Germany.[2] Israel's claim is not an ordinary demand for war damages, such as those that form part of the Potsdam agreement of 1945, or which could be part of a future peace treaty with Germany. This is a claim originating from an act of genocide that has no parallel in even the worst wartime atrocities. Some of these deeds can no longer be amended, but in the post-war period there are still Jews who are victims of the destruction and agony, for which compensation is possible. Thus Israel's claim for reparations has no linkage to a peace treaty with Germany. The current situation in the State of Israel, which absorbed most surviving victims of the Nazis, makes imperative satisfaction of its claim as soon as possible.

The Government of Israel also points to the fact that a long list of countries have already received, and continue to receive, compensation from East Germany. There is also the problem of compensation and restitution of property to individuals. Israel notes that not only has the D.D.R. taken no steps in this direction, it has even expropriated such private property belonging to non-citizens of the D.D.R. Such action by the D.D.R. and the absence of any manifestation of good will on its part rule out any possibility of direct contacts with that country. Consequently the Government of Israel hopes that the Soviet Union will bring its influence to bear on the D.D.R. and pave the way for a just solution of the problem of reparations and compensation from East Germany.

Notes

1. The note was delivered on 16 September 1952; see No. 356.
2. See No. 77.
3. See Vol. 6, No. 19.
4. Otto Grotewohl, prime minister of East Germany.
5. See Vol. 6, No. 84.

293. A. Levavi (Tel Aviv) to Sh. Eliashiv (Moscow). 12 August 1952

Copy: 130.11/2511/17

Levavi sums up for Eliashiv three topics on the agenda of the Israel legation in Moscow: (1) transmitting the note concerning reparations from East Germany;[2] (2) dealing with the problem of *aliya* from Eastern Europe, which has come to a standstill, leaving a number of grave family and personal problems, in Rumania for example. Activity on this subject in the capitals of these countries is most difficult and to no avail; Israel has a moral obligation to attempt to deal with the problem at the highest levels in Moscow. (3) Dealing with the *aliya* of relatives from the Soviet Union: Levavi proposes that the legation itself take up one of the individual cases pending and turn it into a test case.

Notes

1. The first part of the letter, which deals with personal and administrative matters, has been omitted.
2. See No. 292.
3. An agreement to allow 3,000 persons to emigrate from Hungary, signed in 1950.

Editorial Note

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Israel and the Government of the United States concerning Special Aid and Rehabilitation Programs for Immigrants and Refugees in Israel

On 13 August, Foreign Minister Sharett and the U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv exchanged letters concerning the Grant-in-Aid under Title 205 of the U.S. Mutual Security Act. In accordance with this agreement, the United States would extend to Israel during the fiscal year ending on 30 June 1953 the sum of $70,228,000 for special programs, to be approved by the United States government, aimed at assisting and rehabilitating refugees and immigrants to Israel. These sums would be spent under the guidance and general supervision of members of the U.S. Technical Cooperation Administration in Israel and of representatives appointed by the Israeli government for this purpose. The Israeli government would allow the U.S. government full freedom to monitor the use of the Grant-in-Aid funds. (The full text of the exchange of notes, along with their translation into Hebrew, was published in *Reshumot* [the official gazette], Treaties, 1952, No. 87.)

294. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to M. Sharett. 13 August 1952

Coded Tel. 60; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

The delegation sends an urgent, personal, and confidential telegram concerning the level of the signatories to the reparations agreement and location of the signing ceremony.[1] In a confidential talk among Goldmann, Shinnar, Hallstein, and Blankenhorn, all outstanding problems were resolved except for the currency stability clause; on this matter, too, an agreement is imminent, and the Germans will accept the principle of stable value. The only question remaining involves the level of the signatories and where the ceremony will be held. Hallstein said that he feels obliged to suggest to Adenauer that the Chancellor himself sign, in order to endow the agreement with the maximum importance. It is also clear to him that Adenauer will demand that the Israeli signatory be of cabinet rank. Goldmann will sign on behalf of the Jewish organizations. As for the site, he sees no problem in holding the ceremony outside Germany. Luxembourg, which is close to Bonn, strikes him as the best location. The delegation recommends accepting the German proposal. Goldmann, too, insists on its acceptance. An urgent reply is essential by Friday, in advance of Goldmann's meeting with Adenauer in Switzerland.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 263.
2. See No. 295. In the wake of this telegram and No. 295, Sharett consulted with Ben-Gurion and exchanged telegrams with the delegation. Sharett reported that neither he nor the Prime Minister had any opposition to the Foreign Minister's signing on behalf of Israel, but sought to investigate the possibility of having the Finance Minister sign, in order to give the agreement a practical and businesslike air. The delegation responded that it seemed logical that Adenauer wanted the signature to have rather a human and political coloration, and really did expect that Sharett would represent the Israeli side. (See exchange of telegrams between Tel Aviv and the delegation, 14–15 August, Files 130.09/2303/14–15.) Ultimately the issue was brought before the Government for a decision, and it resolved to send the Foreign Minister to sign the agreement. (See his telegram to the delegation in The Hague, No. 105, 25 August 1952, 130.09/2303/14.)

295. N. Goldmann to D. Ben-Gurion. 13 August 1952

Note

1. See No. 294.

296. E. Elath [London] to M. Comay (Tel Aviv) and A. Eban (Washington). 14 August 1952

Notes

1. Not found.
2. No. 286.

297. G. Rafael [New York] to M. Sharett. 14 August 1952

Notes

1. No. 281.
2. The Foreign Ministry replied that it was considering the possibility of a direct approach to Egypt, but did not believe that the time was ripe to exert pressure on the new Egyptian regime (telegram dated 21 August, 130.15/3744/1). See also Editorial Note, pp. 204–205.

298. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 14 August 1952

Coded Tel. IWA616; Outg.: 130.09/2309/6

Divon met with 'Azmi, who reported on the situation in Egypt: Salah al-Din is trying not to leave and not to split the Wafd party. The Free Officers and the Muslim Brotherhood are intoxicated with power. 'Ali Māhir is a senior member of the government and is interested in a defense pact under UN auspices. He is cooperating with 'Azzam to revive the Arab League collective security pact. Māhir and Naguib are hopeful of receiving U.S. aid. 'Azmi emphasizes that the time is not propitious for Israel-Egypt rapprochement, despite the slight improvement in the atmosphere, and counsels Israel not to make declarations of peaceful intent.

299. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to G. Rafael (New York). 14 August 1952

Notes

1. No. 275.
2. No. 283.
3. No. 177.
4. See No. 300.

300. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 15 August 1952

Notes

1. No. 299.
2. Sharett replied that Rafael's approach was praiseworthy but unrealistic, because it required an expenditure of $10 million to $12 million and he does not know how even the million dollars required for the first payment to eligibles would be raised. Inflation is a worldwide phenomenon and there are many precedents for payments of frozen accounts at bygone exchange rates. (See Sharett to Rafael, Y622, 19 August 1952, 130.09/2330/10.) The Conciliation Commission convened on 27 August to discuss the procedure and timing of the payments. In the course of the discussion, which was largely technical, Rafael announced that the payment would be made according to the effective legal exchange rate in Israel; the Conciliation Commission, on the other hand, recommended it be done on the basis of the sterling exchange rate. (See Israel delegation to the United Nations to the director-general, 28 August 1952, 93.03/3055/13; Rafael to Sharett, X110, 5 September 1952, 130.09/2330/17.)

301. M. Comay [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 18 August 1952

Notes

1. The reference is to two statements by Shishakli, the ruler of Syria. One was made during a military parade in Aleppo on 15 August, and the second in an interview published in the Cairo daily *Al Ahram* on 16 August. For the text of these statements, see No. 304.
2. See No. 304.
3. The Israel delegation to the United Nations and the Israel Embassy in Washington recommended that the Security Council not be involved in the affair, because Israel was not interested in having the coming session of the General Assembly deal with the Palestine and Jerusalem questions. The issue should be avoided unless the Arabs raised the Palestine question at the United Nations. At the same time, the minister in Washington stated that he would raise the topic at the State Department and expressed his astonishment that Comay did not want him to mention in this context the three-power declaration. (See Rafael to Comay, X73; Goitein to Foreign Ministry, W118, 19 August 1952, 93.01/2204/7.) See also Nos. 303 and 305.

302. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 19 August 1952

303. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 19 August 1952

Notes

1. No. 301.
2. No. 304.

304. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to W. E. Riley (Jerusalem). 19 August 1952

Note

1. Riley replied that the statements attributed to Shishakli, made by any party to the Armistice Agreements, do not contribute to the creation of the friendly atmosphere required for solving the problems. Consequently he rejects them, but does not believe that a discussion of these statements by the Mixed Armistice Commission would bear any fruit, and certainly would not help create the appropriate conditions that all are interested in. He added that Shishakli and other Arab spokesmen are not the only ones to whom such statements are attributed, and proposed that Israel withdraw its request for a debate in the Armistice Commission. (See Riley to Comay, 10 September 1952, 130.02/2454/9.) In a conversation with an Israeli representative on 21 August, covering the gamut of problems associated with the frontiers, Riley noted that Rav-Aluf Yadin, too, frequently made such statements on similar occasions; but he, Riley, did not attribute any importance to them and saw them as nothing other than statements intended to raise morale. (See report on the meeting with Riley [the author has not been identified], 21 August 1952, 130.02/2478/1.)

305. M. Comay [Tel Aviv] to D. Goitein (Washington). 20 August 1952

Notes

1. See No. 301, n. 3.
2. Following this and other telegrams dealing with Shishakli's statements, Rafael complained that the Foreign Ministry had caused perplexity at the United Nations delegation when it transmitted contradictory information and committed itself to action before consulting with the delegation and the Embassy. He repeated his recommendation that UN agencies not be involved in this affair for the present. (See his telegram to Sharett, NWTA22, 21 August 1952, 93.01/2204/7.) See also Nos. 307, 317, and 331.

306. Report of the Jerusalem Committee. [20 August 1952][1]

Copy: 130.02/2443/9

The committee was appointed by the Foreign Minister to review the status of the Jerusalem issue in advance of the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly.[2]

I

The committee's conclusion is that it is in Israel's interest to prevent a General Assembly debate on Jerusalem. Preventing such a debate would be a diplomatic coup equal to that of last year, when the question did not come up in the General Assembly either. The committee offers a number of suggestions designed to prevent a debate:

(1) Efforts in the State Department to have the United States use its influence in various capitals to keep the item off the agenda. As far as is known, the State Department would prefer not to have the issue discussed by the General Assembly. The following arguments should be presented to the State Department: (a) A new *status quo* is emerging in Jerusalem, in which Israel, Jordan, and the representatives of the Christian communities are cooperating to guarantee freedom of access and a correct attitude towards international interests in Jerusalem. Any renewal of the debate could only undermine the status quo. (b) The Foreign Ministry is not planning to move to Jerusalem before the General Assembly session, in line with the American request. (c) The Jordanian prime minister has announced his opposition to internationalization of the city.[3] (d) Repeat the Foreign Minister's arguments in the debate on Jerusalem (see (a) above). (e) A General Assembly debate would cause tension in Jordan and within the Greek Orthodox community in Jerusalem.

(2) Action to strengthen the hand of Jordanian Prime Minister Abu al-Huda; an approach parallel to Eban's on the part of Dajāni; further contacts with Jordan to work out arrangements facilitating free access to the Old City; an approach to the State Department by the Greek Orthodox community in the Old City; a similar approach by Protestants in the United States; attempts to undermine the Vatican's confidence that a renewed debate would result in a resolution more to its liking.

II

Operative planning for the Ministry's transfer to Jerusalem should be accelerated.

III

A number of proposals that might appear on the agenda were discussed, namely: (1) reaffirmation of previous General Assembly resolutions; (2) declaration of the international interests in Jerusalem but without re-

voking previous resolutions; (3) an expression of regret at the transfer of the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem; (4) a request that UN members represented in Israel not transfer their missions to Jerusalem; (5) a request that UN members represented in Israel bear in mind the international status of Jerusalem.

IV

Should it become certain that the General Assembly will discuss Jerusalem, the following steps should be taken: (1) initiating a counter-resolution, something along the lines of the Swedish-Dutch draft resolution of 1950; (2) diplomatic activity in Latin America, *inter alia* by dispatching a special envoy; (3) increasing the effectiveness of Israeli propaganda among Protestant circles in the United States; (4) utilization of Israel's contacts with the Christian communities in the Old City; (5) avoiding provocations along the borders, in the Mixed Armistice Commission, and in dealings with Christian communities; suspending action on the implementation of Article 8 of the Israel-Jordan armistice agreement; restraining the press.

Notes

1. The date has been determined on the basis of the document's location in the File.
2. See No. 246.
3. See No. 236 and n. 1 there.
4. Omar Dajāni, first secretary in the Jordanian Legation in Washington.
5. The matter being referred to is obscure.
6. Mordechai Shenhavi, member of the board of directors of Yad Vashem; director of the For Jerusalem fund.

307. Y. Tekoah [Tel Aviv] to M. Comay. 21 August 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2434/2

Tekoah refers to the hesitancy of Israel's UN representatives to call attention to Shishakli's bellicose declarations. It should be borne in mind that the purpose of Israel's appeals to the Mixed Armistice Commission, to General Riley, and to the president of the Security Council is not to provoke a condemnation of Shishakli but to score political points: first, to weaken U.S. support for Shishakli by underscoring his true nature and aggressive intentions; second, from the tactical perspective, to establish a link between Shishakli's threats and his demand that the cease-fire line run along the waterline in the north. This demand is more or less supported by the United States, which characterized it as a natural and justified demand

that is not detrimental to Israeli interests. It is important that Israel depict this demand as an overt and practical expression of Shishakli's aggressive intentions, publicly stated in more general fashion. Such a presentation will significantly facilitate Israel's position on this issue. Consequently Tekoah proposes that in addition to the official complaints Israel launch a propaganda campaign in the European and American press.

308. D. Goitein [Washington] to M. Comay. 21 August 1952

309. M. Avidan (Bucharest) to Sh. Bentsur.[1] 21 August 1952

Orig.: 130.11/2493/1

Avidan reports on his interview with the Rumanian foreign minister. The atmosphere was official and grave. The foreign minister hardly spoke. Bentsur raised the question of *aliya*. The minister replied that he had nothing to add to what was stated a number of weeks ago, namely, that this is an internal Rumanian affair and Rumania is under no obligation to reply or offer explanations. Avidan sums up the meeting as negative, but sees a glimmer of hope in the fact that it was not stated explicitly that the Rumanian government has no intention of permitting the resumption of *aliya*. He derives additional encouragement from rumors originating with reliable sources that there are signs of a thaw on this issue. These include the renewal of anti-emigration propaganda by Jewish Communists, visits to the homes of potential emigrants and examination of their personal records, and the like.

Notes

1. Shmuel Bentsur, acting director of the East European Division.
2. Bentsur wrote about the substantive and organizational difficulties in conducting protest actions in Israel, throughout the world, and in Rumania against limitations on *aliya* and the arrest of Zionist activists in Rumania. (The letter is in File 130.11/2493/1.)
3. In response, Bentsur noted that there had been rumors in Israel, too, based on telegrams from relatives, of Rumanian preparations to renew *aliya*. (See Bentsur to Avidan, 3 September 1952, 130.11/2494/1.)
4. Sections 3-5 of the letter, dealing with commercial negotiations and their link with *aliya*, imprisonment of Zionist activists, and contacts with the Jewish community, have been omitted here.

Editorial Note

Prime Minister's Statement to the Knesset about the Israeli Peace Initiative directed at Egypt

On 18 August 1952, during the Knesset debate on amending the Defence Service Law, the Prime Minister surveyed events in the Middle East. With reference to Egypt he said as follows:

"There is . . . no reason or basis for a quarrel between Egypt and Israel. Between the two countries there stretches a vast desert, and there is no need for border disputes, and there neither was nor is any cause for political, economic, or territorial differences between the two neighbors. On the contrary, cooperation between Israel and Egypt would help Egypt overcome the political and social difficulties it is wrestling with. Its cultural development could only benefit from cooperation with Israel, and there is no doubt that its international status, too, would be buttressed no little bit by this.

"The State of Israel wants to see a free, independent, progressive Egypt. We harbor no enmity on account of what it did to our ancestors in the times of Pharaoh, nor even on account of what it did to us four years ago. We have demonstrated . . . our good will towards Egypt during all the months when Egypt was embroiled in a serious dispute with a great world power. It never occurred to us to exploit these difficulties to attack Egypt or to take revenge, as Egypt did to us when our state was born. And to the extent that the current rulers of Egypt endeavor to uproot domestic corruption and to move their country forward towards cultural and social progress, we can only offer heartfelt wishes for the success of this campaign. We cannot, however, ignore the fact that this Egypt, too, does not reveal any sign of good will to amend the grievous sin committed by the ousted Faruq, and none of us can state with certainty where this Egypt is headed: towards peace or towards war. It may be that today the new rulers of Egypt are concentrating exclusively on consolidating their rule and repairing the conspicuous injustices in their domestic regime. Let us not be too hasty to judge. This transitional period in Egypt offers many possibilities, both for good and for evil, and we must stand by with understanding and alertness." (See *Divrei Ha-Knesset*, First Session of the Second Knesset, Vol. XII, meeting 122, 18 August 1952, pp. 2985–86.)

On the same day, the newspapers published an interview that the Prime Minister had given to the United Press correspondent in Israel on 17 August. In the course of the interview, which dealt with all of Israel's political problems, the Prime Minister expressed a willingness to extend a friendly hand to the Arabs and called on them to do likewise towards Israel. When asked to list Israel's conditions for establishing a durable

peace with the Arabs, he replied that the only condition was a desire for peace. This desire certainly existed in Israel, but thus far had not been evinced by the neighboring countries. Nevertheless Israel had not despaired. Cooperation between Israel and the Arab countries would produce benefits for both sides, from the social and economic perspectives, and there could be no doubt that it would also help strengthen world peace. (See *Ha'aretz,* 18 August 1952.)

310. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 22 August 1952

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above. The original text is in File 130.02/2453/20. Sharett's telegram to Divon, TPA458, 22 August 1952, is in File 130.15/3744/1.
2. See No. 312.
3. For a full report on the conversation with Davis, see No. 313.

311. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Comay. 22 August 1952

Copy: 93.03/3010/3

Rafael writes about the need for preparations in the event that the Arabs succeed in placing the Palestine and Jerusalem issues on the agenda of the General Assembly. He assumes that in such a case Israel will respond with an across-the-board offensive. It is too early to determine what topics Israel will raise in that event, but he proposes preparing dossiers now on the non-implementation of Article 8 of the Israel-Jordan cease-fire agreement, the Arabs' economic warfare against Israel, the hostile propaganda campaign, and the blockade of the Suez Canal.

312. Sh. Divon (Paris) to M. Sharett. 23 August 1952

Coded Tel. PTA379; Inc.: 130.02/2453/20

Divon had a meeting this morning with the Egyptian chargé d'affaires in Paris, 'Ali Shawqi, and read him the communiqué.[1] Shawqi said that he would transmit the note to Cairo and arranged procedures for relaying the reply to Divon. After the formal part of the talk, they exchanged opinions about events in Egypt. According to Shawqi, the situation is complex, with the Wafd apparently organizing to fight Naguib. The Muslim Brotherhood

has adopted a wait-and-see position. There are problems of coordination between the government and the army. With regard to the Israeli proposal, he said that in the current situation he could not express an opinion.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 310.
2. See No. 310, n. 1. These sections deal with Israel's preference for direct contacts rather than through intermediaries and the promise to maintain the contacts in strictest confidence.
3. See No. 324.

313. Sh. Bendor (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 24 August 1952

Orig.: 93.08/357/41

Bendor reports on Sharett's meeting about Israel's peace initiative with U.S. Ambassador Davis on 22 August.[1] Sharett opened the conversation by stressing that the information that he was about to impart is confidential and will not be conveyed to any other foreign representative. He then told Davis of Israel's direct approach to the Egyptians to begin peace negotiations.[2] Davis replied that he considers that to be the most important and encouraging event since his arrival in Israel. It is the act of a bold leadership willing to brave hazards. Israel is in a position of strength when it takes steps that bring peace and stability closer. He asked that his congratulations be conveyed to the Prime Minister.

Sharett explained that there are two reasons why Israel approached Egypt directly and not through a third party: first is the apprehension that an indirect approach through the United States, for instance, might be construed by the Egyptians as no more than a propaganda measure and an attempt to impress the Americans. The second reason is that the Egyptian government might well complain that this was an attempt to bring pressure to bear on it through a Great Power. Davis replied that Israel had acted correctly in making a direct approach. U.S. intermediacy would probably have spoiled things, by infuriating the Arabs who are in any case always accusing the Americans of partiality. Even should Israel's initiative fail, it has gained points with the Americans. The United States welcomes the initiative. The question then arose as to whether the U.S. Ambassador in Cairo should be informed of the Israeli *démarche*;[3] Sharett objected, while Davis said that Ambassador Caffery could be relied upon.

Recent developments in Egypt were discussed next. Sharett repeated his opinion that the United States has an opportunity to avail itself of the turn of events and make its assistance to Egypt conditional on a peace settlement with Israel.[4] Davis replied that in the present situation it is preferable to refrain from such action, which moreover might prejudice the Israeli initiative. He added that certain State Department officials complain that Israel is trying to dictate what they may and may not do. Sharett maintained his stance, complained about the renewal of British arms deliveries to the Egyptians, and reminded Davis of American obligations as a signatory of the Three Power Declaration.

In the course of the conversation, various topics pending between Israel and the United States came up for discussion. Sharett referred to Shishakli's public statements[5] and criticized the preferential treatment the latter receives from the State Department—for example, Syrian eligibility for reimbursable military aid. Sharett also referred to the Arab League's collective security pact and said that Israel has a feeling that the Arabs will try to obtain recognition of this pact as a regional organization by the UN and the Western countries. In the course of the meeting Davis said that has some information that he cannot reveal, relating *inter alia* to Suez, and cautioned Israel that "certain things are afoot with regard to the maritime powers that Israeli action on Suez would have upset."

The whole conversation was rather disjointed, with the ambassador jumping from one topic to another and frequently interrupting Sharett. Evidently Davis was displeased that a record was taken, especially of his remark about the maritime powers.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 204–205. In response to the Israeli initiative, 'Ali Māhir, the Egyptian prime minister, noted that Israel had not approached Egypt officially about peace between the two countries and that he knew nothing about the affair, other than what he had read in the newspapers. 'Azzam Pasha, secretary-general of the Arab League, described the Israeli proposal as "arrogance" and demanded that Israel honor United Nations resolutions, allow the refugees to return, and stop threatening the Arabs. (See *Ha'aretz*, 21 August 1952.)
2. See No. 312.
3. Jefferson Caffery, U.S. ambassador to Egypt.
4. See No. 265.
5. See No. 304.

314. E. Elath [London] to M. Sharett. 25 August 1952

Note

1. The Foreign Ministry immediately accepted Elath's proposal to submit a note to the signatories of the three-power agreement, but argued that the supply of arms to the Arabs should not be accepted as a *fait accompli* and rely therefore on guarantees to Israel. Rather, action should be taken to eliminate arms supplies to the Arab countries. (See Sharett to Elath and Comay to Elath, IL3 and IL4, 28 August 1952, 130.09/2319/2.) See also No. 323.

315. T. Kollek (Jerusalem) to D. Ben-Gurion. 25 August 1952

Copy: 130.02/2420/13

Kollek summarizes his activity in Washington from 3 to 20 August with regard to Israel's financial situation. All together, Israel received a cash advance of $25 million to pay its obligations in August–October 1952, and a further $17.5 million under the regular program to purchase commodities. The entire amount comes from the Grant-in-Aid for fiscal 1953.

In return, Israel undertook to prepare a foreign-exchange budget and adhere to it strictly, under no circumstances to increase the country's short- or medium-term debts, and to ask its creditors to postpone repayment of its debts. The Americans accepted Israel's stipulation that such action must not jeopardize the supply of vital raw materials.

Only if Israel implements these steps is there any prospect of discussing consolidation of its debts to American government agencies. Generally speaking, the chances of this are not good, since the only source of funds for such debt consolidation, the Export-Import Bank, is opposed to making loans for such purposes, and efforts in other directions are difficult in an election year, when promises can be obtained freely but there is no certainty that they will be honored after the elections. The implication of all the above is that from October, 1952, until March, 1953, Israel will have to manage without any additional help from the United States, other than the remaining $28 million from the Grant-in-Aid funds for commodity purchases.

All these actions were taken without providing any guarantees that there would be no further request for aid after receipt of these sums. On the contrary, it was emphatically stated that Israel is deeply concerned about its financial situation and foresees serious danger and the possibility of a grave crisis at the end of October. Hence it desires to reserve the option to request more aid.

316. M. Sasson (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 25 August 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2445/1

Several days ago Sasson received a message from Mr. 'Aziz Shihādeh,[2] the crux of which was that the time has come for cooperation between certain Palestinian circles and Israel. These circles argue that Israel is mistaken in attempting to solve the problem through contacts with Arab countries; instead, it must establish close contacts with the refugees themselves and agree on a joint plan of action with their leadership to find a solution to the problem. These refugees propose two possible solutions:

(1) The establishment of a federation in the entire territory of Palestine, comprising seven provinces: three Jewish, three Arab, and a shared province, Jerusalem, which would be the seat of the central federal authority.

(2) The establishment of an independent Arab state in the territories occupied by Jordan (with certain border rectifications to its benefit). This state will join in an economic union with Israel.

Shihādeh notes that these proposals are merely indications of the general line of thinking and are open to discussion and modification. His present objective is to meet the Israelis in order to discuss the possibilities for cooperation. It has proven difficult to discover who stands behind Mr. Shihādeh, whether the group includes members of the Jordanian parliament, their real power, and what they are actually proposing. Shihādeh himself was at one time Hawari's right-hand man in the Arab refugee organization, and participated with him in the refugees' delegation to the Lausanne Conference. Since returning from Lausanne, he has on a number of occasions tried to renew contacts with Israel and met several times with Sasson. Sasson believes that it would be worthwhile meeting him in order to ascertain the nature and strength of the group of refugees that he represents.

Notes

1. 'Aziz Shihādeh, Palestinian attorney.
2. The documents have not been found in the file.
3. Muhammad Nimr Hawari, an Israeli Arab jurist, formerly head of the Palestinian refugee delegation at the Lausanne Conference.

317. D. Goitein and E. Ben-Horin [Washington] to the United States Division. 26 August 1952

Notes

1. See No. 305.
2. See No. 313.
3. See Eliashiv Ben-Horin to Abba Eban, 28 August 1952, 93.03/3008/5.

318. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 27 August 1952

Notes

1. Comay's telegram to Rafael, who wanted to submit a serious complaint to the Security Council concerning Shishakli's statements and not merely to make do with repeating Comay's letter to Riley—No. 304. (25 August 1952, File 130.09/2330/10.)
2. See No. 331.

319. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 27 August 1952

Coded Tel. IWA650; Outg.: 130.09/2309/6

At a meeting of the Israel-Egypt Mixed Armistice Commission on 26 August,[1] Ramati made the following suggestions, which were acceptable to the Egyptians: (1) mutual withdrawal of all pending complaints (some 300); (2) henceforth the parties will deal with complaints directly between themselves, rather than bring them before the Commission; (3) armistice violators will be punished and both sides will refrain from opening fire; (4) territorial waters will extend three miles off the coast of Gaza, and six miles south of that point. The Egyptian representative[2] agreed, but needs the approval of his superiors. He is sure that the last two items will be approved. He suggested that the agreement not to bring complaints to the Commission be implemented on a trial basis for the first two weeks of September. Israel submitted these proposals as a demonstration of good will.

Notes

1. The Commission reconvened after a ten-month recess.

2. Col. Salah Gohar, Egyptian representative on the Israel-Egypt Mixed Armistice Commission.
3. At another meeting of the Commission, on 9 September, it was again decided to dismiss all complaints on the agenda, to extend for two more weeks the agreement on activity against infiltrators, refraining from gunfire, and direct clarification of complaints, and to continue observing the agreement concerning territorial waters. (See the United States Division to the Israel Embassy in Washington, MTA59, 10 September 1952, 93.01/2208/19.)

Editorial Note

Raising of the Level of the British and French Missions in Israel to Embassies

On 28 August, Great Britain, France, and Israel announced that they were raising their missions to the status of embassies. In parallel, Great Britain and France raised the level of their missions in other Middle Eastern countries. At the same time, France announced that it was replacing its envoy in Israel. Minister Guyon left his post; the new ambassador was Pierre E. Gilbert.

320. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 28 August 1952

Coded Tel. XA90; Outg.: 93.01/2208/15

The telegram is personal, intended for Sharett and Ben-Gurion only. Eban reports that he consulted three leading Jewish members of Democratic Party, Abe Feinberg,[1] David Niles,[2] and George Backer.[3] All believe that the time has come to define what Israel expects to receive from the outgoing administration before January. These men have considerable power at the moment because of their special services to the party. They agreed upon the following objectives: (1) explicit support for consolidation of Israel's debts, including bringing pressure to bear on the Export-Import Bank before Israel's foreign-currency budget is submitted; (2) an obligation by the President to make public Israel's eligibility for non-reimbursable military aid; (3) instructions from the President to Ambassador Caffery in Egypt to express to the new rulers the United States' firm desire that Egypt reply favorably to Israel's peace proposal.

Eban indicates that he is now encouraging action on the first two objectives and awaits Sharett's reply as to the third. He adds that it is also desirable that Israel endeavor to obtain an official decision by the Administration that if the upcoming session of the General Assembly passes smoothly

concerning the Jerusalem issue, the United States will agree to transfer its embassy to Jerusalem.

With regard to the fall elections, he thinks that Stevenson's chances have improved as a result of the mobilization of the traditional bloc of Democratic supporters and the their skillful management of the campaign.

Notes

1. Abe Feinberg, American Jewish businessman, president of the Development Corporation for Israel (Israel Bonds).
2. David Niles, formerly administrative assistant to the President of the United States and liaison between President Truman and American Jewry.
3. George Backer, author and journalist, Democratic Party activist, formerly publisher of the *New York Post*.
4. Of the United Nations General Assembly.
5. Sharett's response: Yes to (c), but not in the form proposed by Eban. Israel should make do with reporting its initiative to the United States; the effort had to be aimed at achieving maximum U.S. pressure on Egypt to begin negotiations with Israel, without any link to the Israeli *démarche*. No to (d), since this strikes him as excessive extortion; nor is it worthwhile to stretch this account too far, since it is already heavily burdened. The most that can be asked in this matter is absolute opposition to the raising of the question at the United Nations. (See his telegram YA641, 1 September 1952, 93.01/2208/15.) See also No. 361.

321. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Paris. 28 August 1952

Coded Tel. 460; Outg.: 130.09/2345/1

Sharett sends an urgent telegram to Divon concerning Israel's peace initiative. At the beginning of the week, the Foreign Ministry spokesman was asked whether Israel had taken any concrete steps in the wake of the Prime Minister's speech. The spokesman replied that nothing had been done, but that the Government might well consider taking some action. It is not known how this remark was disseminated and interpreted in Egypt, but there is some apprehension that the Egyptians will treat it as disclosure of the initiative. Hence Divon is requested to arrange a meeting with his contact, in order to explain that Israel considered Māhir's statement to the effect that Israel had not yet made a direct approach to Egypt, published immediately after the Prime Minister's remarks, as a public invitation to make an official approach; this is what lies behind the spokesman's statement. Sharett asks Divon to assure his contact that Israel intends to keep

the matter confidential; Divon should at the same time try to find out whether there has been any reaction to the Israeli initiative.

322. D. Goitein [Washington] to M. Comay. 29 August 1952

Notes

1. D. Sandifer, deputy assistant secretary of state for UN affairs.
2. Compare No. 153. On the basis of the full report of the conversation, it seems that the Americans pressured Goitein and Rafael on this matter and reiterated their demand that Israel commit itself to paying in accordance with the 1948 exchange rate, i.e., $2.8 million as a first payment. The Israelis replied that they would forward this position to their government; but the question of the exchange rate was not yet relevant, since it was first necessary to overcome the technical obstacles. (See Rafael to Eytan, 3 September 1952, 130.02/2414/27.) See also No. 299.
3. No. 231.
4. David H. Popper, deputy director of the Office of United Nations, Security, and Political Affairs section of the State Department.

323. E. Elath (London) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 29 August 1952

Notes

1. See No. 314 and n. 1 there.
2. No. 314.

324. Sh. Divon (Paris) to M. Comay and R. Shiloah. 31 August 1952

Coded Tel. 396; Inc.: 130.15/3744/1

Divon reports on a short meeting with Ahmed 'Abbud,[1] who arrived the previous day from Cairo. (1) 'Abbud suggests that Israel not take for granted that the Wafd has no further role to play in Egypt. (2) Fuad Sarraj al-Din is a genuine advocate of an Israel-Egypt accord. (3) There is a chance for restoration of the parliamentary regime in Egypt. (4) Those who wish to liquidate the Wafd will only create a vacuum that might be filled by the Communists. Divon and 'Abbud agreed to meet again.[2]

Notes

1. Ahmad 'Abbud, Egyptian economist, financier, and industrialist.
2. See No. 326.

325. Sh. Bendor [Tel Aviv] to M. Comay. 31 August 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2418/20

Bendor disputes several of Comay's assumptions in respect of the proposal to send a note to the signatories of the Three Power Declaration, protesting against the armament of Egypt.[1]

(1) Comay asserts that Israel has no grounds for protest. Perhaps not. Nevertheless, there are grounds for a warning. The Americans wish to assist the new regime in Egypt and will do so when they think the time is right. If Israel waits until then it will miss the boat. Then, at best, it will only be able to lodge a protest, but will be unable to prevent such assistance. The time for a warning is now.

(2) Comay argues that this is not a convenient moment and that it is preferable to wait for the meeting of the Arab League, at which anti-Israel resolutions will apparently be adopted. Perhaps the order should be reversed and the note transmitted now; then, when the Arabs make their bellicose declarations, we can say: we told you so, the Arabs are threatening war.

(3) Israel can contend that providing assistance to Egypt at this juncture will jeopardize the prospects of an affirmative response to Israel's peace initiative.

(4) The note must include a warning against recognition of the Arab League's collective security pact as a regional defense organization. This should be done without delay, before the Arab League convenes.

(5) A possible course of action is to reverse the order: in other words, to draft a note opposing the collective security pact, and to append a warning against arming the Arab countries in general and Egypt in particular, or only against military aid to Egypt.

Note

1. See Nos. 314 and 323.

326. Sh. Divon (Paris) to M. Comay and R. Shiloah. 1 September 1952

Coded Tel. 15; Inc.: 130.15/3744/1

Divon had another meeting with 'Abbud.[1] The latter reported that before he left Egypt he had held lengthy conversations with Nahas, Fuad Sarraj al-Din, and Naguib. There were also contacts with Caffery and Stevenson.[2] His conclusions are as follows: (1) Internal tensions in Egypt severely reduce the prospects for an agreement with Britain and the West; despite Naguib's fervent desire to strengthen his army he cannot afford to become part of a Western defense pact. (2) There are differences in outlook among the officers' group, and Naguib is to be counted among the moderates. (3) 'Ali Māhir's influence is on the wane. The British and the Americans erred in their assessment of the possible courses of action open to Naguib and underrated the problems facing him. Now they are in a dilemma and are looking for a way out. 'Abbud believes that an agreement with the Wafd will again be suggested as a possible solution. (4) Naguib and his fellow officers are beginning to understand that revolutionary fervor and good will are not enough, and that in order to overcome the country's problems they must cooperate with civilian circles. They are coming to the conclusion that there is no alternative to restoring parliamentary life, and this means an understanding with the Wafd. (5) Last week there were informal contacts between Fuad Sarraj al-Din and Naguib; 'Abbud himself had a lengthy talk with Naguib and two of his officers on the eve of his departure and suggested advancing the date for elections, more moderation, and cooperation with the Wafd. (6) He does not believe that Naguib and his people are considering an aggressive policy vis-à-vis Israel; some of them are weighing the possibility of an agreement. (7) In his opinion, a stronger Wafd party is in Israel's better interests; he believes that Fuad Sarraj al-Din's policy towards Israel will be adopted by the party. As he sees it, the Wafd's extremism is not a *sine qua non*; should a serious effort be made by Britain and the United States on the one hand, and the Wafd on the other, a more moderate approach could be adopted, permitting progress towards an agreement between Egypt and the West, and between Egypt and Israel. He feels that should Israel agree to assist the Wafd and increase its prestige the party will undertake to act in accordance with a prearranged strategy to promote an Egyptian-Israeli accord.

Divon did not respond to the proposal of cooperation. He intends to continue his talks with 'Abbud and requests comments and instructions.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 324.
2. Ralph Stevenson, British ambassador to Egypt.
3. See No. 334.

327. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Paris. 1 September 1952

Coded Tel. TPA461; Inc.: 130.09/2345/1

In an urgent telegram to Divon, Sharett instructs him to hold another meeting with his contact[1] and inquire what lies behind Naguib's statement yesterday to the effect that Israel has not yet approached the Egyptians.[2] Are they unaware of the Israeli proposal? Does he want Israel to make a public approach? His contact must report home that Israel cannot keep its initiative under wraps for long in order to make life easier for the Egyptian government, while its statements — perhaps unintentionally — give world public opinion a distorted impression of Israel's position.

Notes

1. See No. 321.
2. The reference is to Naguib's statement at a press conference on 29 August that there had been no official Israeli message proposing peace between the two countries. He went on to say that he hoped that Great Britain would cancel its ban on weapons sales to Egypt and that he had no intention to use such arms against Israel. (See *Ha'aretz*, 31 August.) Compare also No. 313 and n. 1 there.

328. Y. Tekoah (Tel Aviv) to R. Shiloah. 1 September 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2418/20

Tekoah transmits a legal opinion regarding the proposal to send an Israeli vessel through the Suez Canal.

(1) Israel's complaints and the Security Council resolution on freedom of passage through the Suez Canal have so far turned on the passage of cargo to and from Israel, and not on the passage of vessels.

(2) Israel's arguments have been based on the 1888 Constantinople Convention and the provisions of the Israel-Egypt Armistice Agreement. Israel's demand that its vessels be allowed passage can be grounded in those very documents. The Constantinople Convention states that all vessels

shall be allowed free passage through the Canal, whatever their nationality, in peacetime as well as wartime. Hence it is irrelevant whether a state of war exists between Israel and Egypt. With reference to the Armistice Agreement, those sections on which Israel bases its demand for the passage of cargo also apply to the passage of vessels.

(3) It is true that the demand for free passage by Israeli vessels raises a problem that was not discussed as long as the issue focused on passage of cargo — passage through Egyptian territorial waters by vessels flying the Israeli flag. In normal circumstances, innocent passage through the territorial waters of another state is a right reserved to vessels of every country, but it is obvious that a sovereign state may regulate passage under special conditions resulting from security considerations and other needs. A question of principle must therefore be ruled upon: whether the right of free passage through the Suez Canal implies the unqualified right in all circumstances to free passage through Egyptian territorial waters. The precedents do not favor Israel's case, since in the past the provisions of the Constantinople Convention have been narrowly construed as applying to the Canal alone. During the First World War, for example, the British attacked German ships in Egyptian territorial waters outside the Canal.

(4) The Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt does not bar the merchant vessels of one party from entering the territorial waters of the other, but this does not prejudice the parties' right to restrict the presence of the other side's vessels in its territorial waters and monitor them. In fact, since the conclusion of the armistice agreement, both Israel and Egypt have strictly barred the other party's vessels from their coastal waters. Should Israel take action to demonstrate the illegality of the Egyptian refusal to permit free access to the Canal and free passage through it, it would face two inconvenient facts: (a) the precedents of British belligerent actions, which distinguished between free passage through the Canal and the question of immunity in the territorial waters outside the Canal; (b) the fact that there is no international decision that can serve as a full and unshakable basis for Israel's assertion that Israeli vessels are entitled to pass through Egypt's territorial waters in order to reach the Canal. Consequently, it will be necessary to embark upon a new legal struggle in an attempt to prove that the Security Council resolution of September 1951 also refers to the right of Israeli vessels to pass unhindered through the Canal itself and its approaches. This would require a new Security Council debate, aimed both at assuring implementation of the September 1951 resolution and at expanding it to apply to Israeli-flag vessels.

(5) In the light of the foregoing, he concludes as follows: (a) If Israel intends to test the Egyptians' willingness to implement the 1951 resolution now, it should avoid complicating matters by sending an Israeli vessel through the Canal. (b) The vessel to be dispatched can be leased by an Israeli company, but it should fly its own national flag. (c) If Israel intends

to clarify the position of the new Egyptian regime towards Israel in general it ought not to confront it with the acid test of an Israeli vessel sailing through the Canal and Egyptian territorial waters.[1]

Note

1. In a marginal note, Sharett indicated that Tekoah's analysis seemed right to him. Shabtai Rosenne, legal counsel to the Foreign Ministry, and Leo Kohn, the political advisor, also supported Tekoah's conclusions.

329. U.S. Secretary of State (Washington) to the Israel Ambassador in Washington. 2 September 1952

Notes

1. No. 255.
2. A similar response was received from Great Britain and from France. (See Information to Israel Missions Abroad, 5 November 1952, 93.03.3006/3.)

330. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 2 September 1952

Note

1. See No. 326 and n. 2 there.

331. A. Eban [New York] to the President of the Security Council. 2 September 1952

Notes

1. See No. 301.
2. See No. 304.

332. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to Sh. Rosenne. 2 September 1952

Copy: 130.02/2417/6

Sharett replies to Rosenne's letter criticizing the Government's decision to have Foreign Minister Sharett sign the reparations agreement on behalf of the State of Israel.[1]

He could have dismissed Rosenne's arguments as moot; since it has already been announced that the foreign minister will sign the agreement, changing this decision is not practicable. However, the arguments and considerations put forward by Rosenne are sufficiently weighty to require a substantive answer. Rosenne cited two considerations in justifying his opposition—moral and practical. On moral grounds he asserted that it is beneath the foreign minister's dignity to sign the agreement. Sharett rejects this argument. One cannot have it both ways: either the reparations negotiations are utterly immoral, in which case the issue of the rank of the signatories is unimportant, or the negotiations serve a moral end, in which case there is nothing objectionable in having the agreement signed by a senior figure, whether the foreign minister or even the president of Israel. In any case, he rejects the logic of the assumption that the foreign minister may send loyal associates, whose honor is no less dear to him than his own, to the negotiations and then shirk his responsibility to come forward when political circumstances so require.

Sharett also rejects Rosenne's "practical" argument that Adenauer's signature has no real significance for implementation of the agreement. The short term—the next two or three years—will be crucial for future implementation of the agreement. Adenauer's signature—whether he remains in power or not—will have decisive influence on his party and on the general public, both at home and abroad, when it comes to implementation of the agreement. There is no comparison between Adenauer's signature and that of Böhm, for example. The significance of the matter transcends the obligation it imposes on the other party. A question of historical justice is also involved. Adenauer initiated an act unprecedented in history—parallel to the unprecedented massacre of the Jews—when he accepted responsibility for the Reparations Agreement. It would be unchivalrous, narrow-minded, and lacking in a sense of history for Israel to deprive him of this privilege or strike a discordant note by lowering the level of the Israeli delegation to the signing ceremony from that which he had established.

Sharett concludes by stating that the attitude of the independent state of Israel, which from the historical and moral perspective rose on the ruins of Nazi Germany and redeemed the honor of the Jewish people, violated by the Germans, must be based on the criteria of respect, reciprocity, and even chivalry towards a German head of government. In its fear of applying such criteria in our relations with Germany Israel reverts to its former

status — that of a people deprived of sovereign political gratification and exempt from sovereign political considerations, a society closed in on itself, lamenting its past, praying for its future, and solving the problem of its present relations with other peoples by inwardly despising them. A sovereign nation looks to the future, while its relationships in the present impose upon it the honorable yoke of practical action, honorable because others treat it similarly. We must educate the people to accept this new conception of our national dignity, starting with ourselves.

Note

1. Rosenne wrote that he was extremely worried by the idea that the foreign minister would sign the reparations agreement on behalf of the State of Israel. In his opinion it was beneath the dignity of the foreign minister and might even cast aspersions on Moshe Sharett as an individual. From the practical perspective, as well, he saw no need for a signature at such a high level; the signature of the delegation heads seemed adequate. (See Rosenne to Sharett, 1 September 1952, 130.02/2417/6.)

333. A. Eban (Washington) to M. Sharett. 2 September 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2414/27

Eban reports on meetings with the presidential candidates, Eisenhower and Stevenson. The meeting with Eisenhower, which took place in New York, was attended by four Jewish representatives, including leaders of the UJA and the Bonds. All present were surprised by the candidate's positive reaction to all their points (a sympathetic approach to Israel in the international arena, continued economic assistance, initiation of military aid, help in bringing Israel and the Arab countries together for open negotiations). The participants reported that the General expressed no reservations whatsoever, other than his desire to maintain good relations with the Arab countries while continuing and improving relations with Israel. The candidate was extremely interested to learn of the extent of support for Israel in both houses of Congress as well as of public manifestations of sympathy for Israel. At the end of the conversation Eisenhower intimated that his positive attitude toward Israel will receive public expression later in the campaign.

Governor Stevenson wanted to meet with Eban, having already met him in the past, but after much consultation it was decided that since such a meeting was apt to set off a complex web of rumors and inferences it was preferable for him to meet prominent Jews identified with the Democratic party. Two separate meetings were held, one with David Niles and the

other with Abe Feinberg. The meeting with Niles was cordial. Stevenson promised to implement his party's platform with regard to Israel and the Middle East. He considers it desirable to postpone his statement on Israel until later in the campaign, since at present both candidates are discussing general matters and points of principle and have not yet touched on specific topics. The conversation with Feinberg, who unlike Niles was not previously acquainted with the candidate, was less warm and cordial. Stevenson repeated his support for Israel, as well as his willingness to express it publicly at an appropriate moment before election day. Several days ago Mr. Niles was notified that Stevenson's aides wish to consult with him immediately concerning the timing of the candidate's statement on Israel and the Middle East. They insist that the Democratic candidate be given an opportunity to speak on this point before his Republican rival. They believe that this right accrues to the party in power, in light of its actions in the past.[1]

Note

1. Following these talks, the candidates accelerated their preparations for statements on Israel (see Eban's telegram to the United States Department, X122, 10 September 1952, 130.09/2330/17).

334. Sh. Divon (Paris) to M. Sharett. 3 September 1952

Coded Tel. 31; 130.15/3744/1

In reply to Sharett's telegram,[1] Divon suggests using Israel's influence in the Western press to put across the idea that the Wafd's extremism is not irremediable. Hence it may be feasible to come to terms with it as part of the return to a parliamentary regime that will make possible an accommodation between Naguib and the Wafd. This would lead to internal stability that would considerably facilitate a resolution of problems between Egypt, the West, and Israel. Divon also suggests that Israel mobilize support for this stratagem in the State Department, Foreign Office, and Quai d'Orsay, as well as among other circles dealing with Middle Eastern problems in the United States, Britain, and France. He believes that Israel can act along these lines without seriously damaging the myth of its major influence on the press, a myth that is a major asset. For example, the previous day he was involved in the publication of an interview with 'Abbud in *Le Monde*. 'Abbud feared that his statements would be distorted, but Divon spoke to a senior journalist on the paper, with the result that the interview appeared in a prominent location and made a good impression. In his conversation

with 'Abbud today, he heard interesting news from behind-the-scenes of the revolution. He wants to note only one important point from this: When Abbud asked Abdel Nasser[3] when he envisages doing something to put an end to the conflict with Israel, the latter replied, "Can you assure me that your friends in the Wafd would not exploit that to our detriment?"

'Abbud, who is leaving for London, invited him to dinner before his departure. If no instructions are received, Divon intends to tell him that Israel will give careful attention to his proposals and wait for the results of his talks on this subject with Wafd leaders in Egypt.[4]

Notes

1. Not found, but see No. 326.
2. Edouard Sablier, senior correspondent for *Le Monde* and an expert on Middle Eastern affairs.
3. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, a member of the Free Officers group.
4. The telegram has not been found.
5. Divon dined with 'Abbud on 4 September. 'Abbud promised that when he returned to Egypt he would speak with members of the Wafd Party and the military about ways towards an agreement with Israel and the possibilities for cooperation. He would also endeavor to find means of solving the problem of passage through the Suez Canal. 'Abbud said that he would return to Paris in early October; intermediaries were arranged for the duration of his absence. (See Divon to Sharett, No. 42, 4 September 1952, 130.15/3744/1.)

335. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan. 3 September 1952

Copy: 130.02/2415/31

Sharett reacts to the memorandum by Zvi Giveon on the relations between Israel and Asian countries.[1] He found echoes in the memorandum of certain misguided opinions that are prevalent in the Foreign Ministry and wishes to comment on them, not only in reply to the memorandum but in a wider context as well, so that his remarks can also serve as general information for wider circulation.

The widespread opinion in the Foreign Ministry, namely, that Israel has neglected its ties with the Asian countries and that a special effort was needed to persuade senior Ministry officials to focus on this part of the world, has no basis in reality. Immediately after the establishemnt of the state, Israel approached all countries in the world, except for the Arab states that were waging war against it, with a request for recognition and establishment of relations. Response was slow and moved from the periphery towards the center; recognitions came initially from more distant countries and later from nearer ones, including the major countries of

Europe. There was no response from Asia, with the exception of Nationalist China, for obvious reasons.

The author of the memorandum errs when he attributes Israel's ostensible preference for establishing links with the countries of Europe and the Americas to the Jewish factor. It is true that the affinity and ties with Jewish communities are an important and sometimes prime consideration in relations with many countries. It is also true that the vast continent of Asia has almost no Jews (with the exception of those in Arab countries, who pose a separate problem) and its countries lack any relationship to the history and cultural heritage of the Jewish people. Nevertheless, Israel invested effort in establishing ties with Europe and America not because of these factors, but in view of its requirements as a developing country that needs food, fuel, capital, economic and scientific guidance, and military assistance.

This does not mean that Israel has ever ignored the need to establish ties with the Asian countries. Unfortunately, Israel's advances have borne little fruit. The Indian example is the most instructive,[5] but other countries have also used all sorts of stratagems and excuses to avoid establishing relations with Israel. In the case of the People's Republic of China, relations were complicated by the Korean War and the inter-bloc tensions. The progress in ties with Japan is important, but the value of establishing a legation there should not be overestimated. A significant breakthrough has been achieved in only two countries—relations with Turkey, which are very important, and those with Iran, where, after a temporary retreat, there are now signs of renewed progress.[6] To sum up, he advises continued efforts to develop relations with the Asian countries, while ensuring that the importance of any new tie be judged on the basis of its substantive content and not be merely a matter of show and protocol.

Notes

1. The memorandum is in File 130.14/2561/7. In the memorandum, Z. Giveon, an official in the Asia Division, called for a reevaluation of Israeli foreign policy. In his opinion, Israel should abandon its exclusive reliance on the countries of Europe, whose sympathy is based on emotional factors and their Jewish minorities, sympathy which identifies Israel in Asian eyes with the old imperialist regime, and should seek support among Asian countries, such as Japan and Burma, as a counterweight to Arab hostility.
2. Hermann Kallenbach, a South African architect and one of Gandhi's supporters in South Africa.
3. Berl Locker, chairman of the World Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency Executive.
4. See No. 53.
5. See No. 71.

6. See No. 229.
7. Joseph Linton, Israel Minister to Australia and New Zealand until October 1952; from December, Minister to Japan.

336. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 3 September 1952

Copy: 93.08/357/13

Rafael reports on a conversation with Malik, the Soviet permanent representative to the UN. Malik began by saying that he had noted with satisfaction that the Palestine question was not on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. The Soviet Union had always believed that the parties should be allowed to deal with the outstanding issues between them through direct negotiations. This was also the reason why the Soviet Union opposed the continued existence of the Conciliation Commission. Rafael replied that this was Israel's position as well; with regard to the Conciliation Commission, Israel was striving to bring about its gradual demise. Rafael took advantage of the meeting to report on the negotiations with the Commission to unblock the refugees' accounts.

In order to sound out the Soviet position on the Palestine question in general, Rafael steered the conversation around to the issue of Jerusalem. Malik noted that the Arabs were making a lot of fuss about the topic, "but who pays them any attention?" As to the substance of the matter, he indicated that the location of Israeli Foreign Ministry is a matter subject to the sole discretion of the Government of Israel, and neither the UN nor any foreign government is entitled to interfere.

Malik then turned the conversation to Israel's peace initiative and the Prime Minister's approach to General Naguib. He asked how Israel thinks it can get along with "that military dictator." Rafael replied that there was still no information concerning the fate of the Israeli initiative. Israel does not believe that it is entitled to intervene and choose the kind of regime with which it can live in peace. In its relations with other countries it believes in coexistence. It is surrounded by reactionary and backward regimes, but Israel does not consider itself entitled to take action against them merely for that reason. The only criterion is whether these regimes are prepared to live in peace with Israel and recognize its sovereignty. Malik expressed agreement with this position, but said that the processes under way in the Arab world, presaging the elimination of monarchical regimes, must not be ignored.

Rafael brought up the Suez Canal issue and Israel's note to the Three Powers.[1] Malik said that the Soviet Union is opposed to any maritime blockade. Israel was right to approach the Three Powers, who must ensure that the Security Council resolution is implemented.

The conversation then turned to the Middle East Command. Rafael pointed out that to date no one had invited Israel to join it and complained that the Soviet press was publishing inaccurate reports about the establishment of foreign bases in Israel. Malik replied that he did not know what reports were referred to and proceeded to a general discussion of the United States' global policy.

The remainder of the talk concerned international problems, including Korea, Germany, North Africa, and disarmament.

Notes

1. See No. 255.
2. Semen Tsarapkin, deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union at the United Nations.
3. No record of this conversation has been found in Foreign Ministry files.
4. Gen. Mark Clark, Commander-in-Chief of United Nations Forces in Korea since May 1952.

337. F. E. Shinnar (The Hague) to G. Avner. 3 September 1952

Coded Tel. 103; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

Shinnar provides a summary and an economic evaluation of the Reparations Agreement for use when it is debated in the Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee. This agreement is the result of arduous negotiations. Compared to that reached by Germany with its creditors at the London Conference, it is a good agreement. Germany's debt to Israel has been reduced less than any of its other debts, and the payment schedule is more favorable. Israel will receive only essential goods; no luxury items are included, and Israel's domestic production will not be adversely affected. The fuel arrangement ensures an ongoing supply from Britain of this vital commodity.

Full implementation of the agreement will lead to the following results: an immediate improvement in the balance of payments by one-third or more; acquisition of goods at market prices, with payment in funds available to Israel and which do not have to be raised; income for the government from resale of the goods; strengthening Israel's economic position on world markets and enhancing the possibility of receiving loans; freeing other foreign exchange resources for other objectives; establishment of vital enterprises and increasing production; free and equal access to the German market. The division of the goods to be supplied is also favorable:

37.5% fuel; 32% chemicals and pharmaceuticals, packaging materials, rubber, etc.; and only 10% for semi-essential non-luxury products.

To sum up: The agreement gives Israel practically everything it could have desired. Compared with the rest of the country's revenues, this is the most certain, both in terms of use and in terms of related expenditures. The contribution to the balance of payments is greater than the mathematical calculation of one third and may be a decisive factor in Israel's economic recovery.

Note

1. For the agreement achieved with Germany's creditors at the London debts conference.

338. E. Elath (London) to M. Sharett and M. Comay. 5 September 1952

Tel. 10036; Inc.: 130.09/2319/3

Elath summarizes in brief his impressions of the Prime Minister's announcement of the peace initiative towards Egypt. The report was received here favorably, both in official circles and by the press and public. It has been interpreted as a deliberate statement designed to counteract the Arab propaganda and rumors concerning Israel's ostensible aggressive nature. The announcement has also been interpreted here as indirect acknowledgment of the principle of regional cooperation and of Israel's desire to take part in regional defense together with its neighbors. Nevertheless, some are of the opinion that the real value of the announcement is limited and that it will remain unilateral, at least in the near future, because of Naguib's desire to consolidate and stabilize his hold on power. To sum up: the announcement had great political value and improved Israel's image as a peace-loving country.[1]

Note

1. See also No. 339.

339. E. Elath (London) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 5 September 1952

Notes

1. See No. 314.
2. The British military mission that was supposed to visit Israel (see No. 199).

340. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 5 September 1952

Coded Tel. MTA53; Inc.: 93.01/2208/19

Sharett asks that the press, especially the Jewish press, be prepared for the signing of the reparations agreement. It is important to prevent a typical diaspora reaction of regret and protest. The historical significance of the first such agreement in the history of the State of Israel should be lauded, and emphasis placed on the rank of the signatories—the German chancellor and foreign minister, on one side, and Israel's foreign minister on the other. Also to be emphasized is the change in the status of the entire Jewish people due to the establishment of the State of Israel, which demands redress of wrongs done to the Jews and compels those who plundered it to make amends. The foreign minister's participation in the ceremony should be presented as a demonstration of strength and self-respect.

Note

1. See No. 345.

341. Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 5 September 1952

Coded Tel. 124; Inc.: 130.09/2303/15

The delegation reports on the vehement intervention by Arab countries, led by Syria, against the reparations agreement. Following this intervention, 20 members of the Bundestag representing the coalition parties submitted a memorandum to the Bonn government, demanding that the reparations agreement be reconsidered in light of its potential threat to Ger-

many's commercial ties with Arab states. Blankenhorn is extremely worried about the memorandum's influence on cabinet members, especially the minister of finance. He visited the U.S. mission today to request State Department intervention to relieve the pressure on the Bonn government. He also cabled the German chargé d'affaires in Washington with the same intention, and asked that Israel's ambassador in Washington take steps to ease the pressure.

Notes

1. The original reads "foreign minister," but this has been corrected as required by the sense and in accordance with the text of the telegram sent to Washington (see Foreign Ministry to the Israel Embassy in Washington, IWA689, 7 September 1952, 130.09/2309/6).
2. Samuel Reber, counselor and director of the Political Affairs Department in the Office of the United States High Commissioner in Germany.
3. Walter J. Donnelly, United States High Commissioner in Germany from August, 1952.
4. See Nos. 342 and 343.

342. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation to the Reparations Negotiations (The Hague). 7 September 1952

Coded Tel. 154; Inc.: 130.09/2303/14

(1) Sharett requests that the Germans be notified on behalf of the foreign minister that should changes be made in the draft agreement following the cabinet meeting in Bonn, the Government of Israel will not be able to approve it and its signing will consequently be deferred.

(2) Arab threats.[1] Blankenhorn evidently assumes that the Arabs are in the pocket of the United States and that the United States is in the pocket of Israel. Nevertheless, Sharett has passed everything on to Eban with the proposal that he try to have Washington drop a clear hint to Bonn.[2]

(3) Sharett suggests encouraging Bonn by explaining that the Arabs have frequently threatened economic boycotts and trade embargoes, but have never implemented these threats.

Notes

1. No. 341.
2. See No. 343.

3. The delegation asked whether any attempt had been made to influence German Finance Minister Schäffer during his visit to the United States, through conversations with an American politician or journalist. (See telegram dated 6 September 1952, File 130.09/2303/15.)

343. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 7 September 1952

Coded Tel. IWA687; Outg.: 130.09/2309/6

Arab activity in Bonn is at its peak. There is strong pressure on the German government to reconsider the reparations agreement.[1] The supporters of the agreement there are worried, and one of them suggested asking the Israel Embassy in Washington to get the Americans to pressure the Arabs to ease up. Sharett asks the embassy to consider the practicality of such a step. He suggests that the Americans be asked to drop an urgent hint to Bonn not to take the Arab threats too seriously and make them understand that the reparations have nothing to do with the refugee problem, and that the United States would be seriously disappointed should the negotiations fail after such great progress had been achieved. Speed is of the essence, since the cabinet will meet in Bonn tomorrow.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 341.
2. On 8 September, Embassy personnel met with Lewis of the German desk of the State Department. Lewis told them that he was confident that Adenauer would sign the agreement, and that the United States would work through its embassies in Arab countries to persuade the Arabs that there is no link between the agreement and their claims against Israel. The United States has informed the Germans that it is interested in an agreement, and he himself is about to so inform the German Finance Minister personally. (See Goitein to Sharett, WIA520, 8 September 1952, 93.01/2208/20.)

Editorial Note

Government Decision to Approve the Reparations Agreement

On 8 September, the Government of Israel convened to consider the reparations agreement. The Foreign Minister reported on the most recent developments in the particulars of the negotiations and drafting of the agreement. At the end of the debate it was decided to approve the agreement between the Government of Israel and the Government of West

Germany and to authorize the Foreign Minister to sign the agreement on behalf of the Government of Israel. The Foreign Minister's trip to Luxembourg to sign the agreement was likewise approved.

344. Political Research Division (Tel Aviv) to Israel Missions Abroad. 8 September 1952

Coded Tel. MTA54; Outg.: 130.09/2377/1

The Political Research Division summarizes and assesses recent events in Egypt.[1]

(1) The army is unswerving in its determination to carry out the agrarian reform. Māhir tried to decelerate the reform and curb the purge of the parties, which is why he was forced to step down.

(2) In recent weeks the landowners have tried to foil the reform program and exploit the new regime's lack of experience in running the country, while relying on the leaders of the traditional parties. Naguib put an end to this by the arrests carried out on 7 September.

(3) Since Naguib has no basis of public support in the traditional parties, he has so far relied on unaligned cabinet ministers who have no declared social and political orientation. Now, however, they have been joined by two members of the radical faction of the Nationalist Party, which demands a consistently neutral line in the East-West conflict. A leader of the Muslim Brotherhood has also joined the Cabinet. It is too early to know whether the alliance with these elements will prove more durable than that with Māhir.

(4) The need to rely on the support of extremist elements is likely to make it difficult for Naguib to realize his objective of a quick rapprochement with the West.

(5) Early stabilization of the situation is not to be expected. Among the impediments to stability are the growing struggle over the character of Egyptian society and the intensifying contradiction between economic dependence on the West and the rising tide of nationalism due to the ongoing dispute with Britain.

Note

1. 'Ali Māhir's government resigned on 7 September, in the wake of the sudden arrest of some 50 politicians and senior officers, including former Prime Minister Hilāli and the secretary of the Wafd party, Fuad Sarraj al-Din. Naguib installed a new government with himself as premier and also kept for himself the Defense and Navy portfolios as well as supreme command of the Army.

345. Information Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 8 September 1952

Coded Tel. Outg.: 130.09/2319/2

The Information Division transmits the Foreign Minister's conclusions and assessment of the reparations agreement to be signed shortly. The material is designed to be used in press briefings in order to channel in advance the media reaction when the agreement is signed (with the exception of those paragraphs intended for internal use), but is not to be attributed to the Foreign Minister or any official source.

(1) The agreement is a historic achievement for the State of Israel. Not only is it a result of Israel's initiative, but the mere appearance of Israel as a claimant forced the other side to accede to its demands. For the first time in human history, and the history of the Jewish people in particular, at least some looted property is to be returned.

(2) The Jewish Claims Conference was also convened at Israel's initiative, and, once established, demonstrated the unity of the Jewish people in its claim against Germany and in its support for Israel's demands. Israeli support of the Conference's claim has created a precedent: for the first time, Israel appears in an international agreement as the protector-state of the Jewish Diaspora.

(3) The amount of reparations agreed upon is a substantial percentage of the initial claim. The Israeli claims have been reduced less than those of other countries, and the payment schedule is far more favorable. The debt to Israel was placed on a separate and independent basis and not incorporated with debts to other countries.

(4) The agreement has far-reaching economic implications. It will ensure the regular supply of vital raw materials, especially fuel, which had been a major problem; it will ensure that funds are transferred to individuals entitled to them, to the benefit of the entire Israeli economy; it will cover around one-third of the balance of payments. Consequently it will strengthen the country's economic position, improve its credit rating, and help it advance towards a fully balanced economy. Of all of Israel's foreign revenues, this is the most reliable and cheapest source.

(5) Now for the weak points. The payment period is longer than Israel expected, although it may be shortened if Bonn obtains a loan. Bonn wishes to obtain the loan as its first step into the international capital market and believes that earmarking the loan for reparations will facilitate the success of its initiative in the United States.

(6) The paragraph on currency stability is not to Israel's satisfaction, but it should be noted that it was inserted despite the Bonn government's decision in principle to make no reference to the problem of the stability of the deutschmark; furthermore, Bonn's obligations to the Occupation

Powers forbid it to make any commitment with regard to dollar payments. It should be borne in mind that the deutschmark is now one of the most stable currencies.

(7) It is true that in theory some manufacturers and exporters may refuse to sell to Israel, but in fact German exports are on the rise and everyone is keen to sell; nor is there any tradition of collusion and cartels. There is nothing that can be done about a possible neo-Nazi coup, just as one cannot cope with any political or economic disaster. So much for the shortcomings.

(8) According to Israeli law, the agreement will come into force when signed by the Government. Under German constitutional practice, it must be ratified by parliament, which is currently in recess. Ratification is a certainty, since the coalition parties will not vote against it and the opposition Social Democrats support it.

(9) This paragraph and the next one are confidential. On the German side, the agreement is mainly Adenauer's personal achievement. He sees it as a moral obligation and as a step that ensures him a place in Jewish and world history, one that paves the path to a peace with Israel and world Jewry that will improve Germany's standing in the world and in the United States. In Germany, he has the support of: the Social Democrats, his personal followers, a number of senior officials who wish to improve their image abroad, the economics minister and others, who believe that in the long run the agreement will improve Germany's economic standing, as well as a number of individuals, such as Prof. Böhm, who wish to atone for Germany's crimes. Support for the agreement among the German public is dwindling, and many are vociferously opposed to it, such as the finance minister, who has the support of banking circles. In these circumstances, waiting for better terms would jeopardize the entire agreement.

(10) In dealings with German officials, the contribution by various members of their government and foreign ministry staff who helped work out the agreement should be stressed.

(11) Outwardly, it must be seen to that the Jewish and general press emphasize Adenauer's decisive personal role in concluding the agreement.

346. Sh. Eliashiv (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8 September 1952

Coded Tel. QIA232; Inc.: 130.09/2325/6

Eliashiv believes that the submission of Israel's note to the Soviet Union concerning reparations should be made public.[1] He also requests permission to inform the press when the note is presented. He further asks that consideration be given to transmitting similar notes to the other People's

Democracies, with an emphasis on the fact that Israel took in persons who had suffered under the Nazis in their countries. Such wide-ranging action might find the Soviet bloc more attentive.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 292.
2. On the margins of the telegram Ben-Gurion wrote: "In general we should now take some public action to strengthen our demand for reparations from East Germany. The demand should be made both in East bloc countries and in the West. B.G."

347. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 10 September 1952

Notes

1. That same day the UN Secretary-General sent the Israeli representative a copy of the letter he had received from the Government of Iraq, complaining that Israel was violating UN resolutions on Jerusalem and noting the latter's intention to transfer the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem. (See UN Secretary-General to the Foreign Minister of Israel, 10 September 1952, 130.03/2014/10; telegram from Rafael to Comay, 11 September 1952, 130.02/2443/9.)
2. Erik C. Boheman, Swedish Ambassador to the United States and a member of the Swedish Mission to the United Nations.
3. See No. 287.
4. See No. 350.

348. A. Eban and G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 10 September 1952

Notes

1. See No. 300 and n. 2 there.
2. On 18 September, Sharett telegrammed final instructions concerning the blocked accounts, according to which Israel agreed to release the money in accordance with the old rate of one Palestine pound to the pound sterling, and in monthly sums of £50, a rate that should satisfy the holders of small accounts, who constituted the vast majority. (See Sharett's telegram to the Israel delegation at the United Nations, Y667, 18 September 1952, 130.02/2451/19.) Israel's representatives made these instructions known in a meeting with the U.S. representatives on the Conciliation Commission, but to the Israelis' disappointment the Americans did not attach great value to the issue and counseled against excessive hope that it might bring the Arabs to sit down and talk with Israel. (See report by Pragai to the International Organizations Division, 26 September 1952, 93.03/3055/13.)

349. Statement to the Press by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tel Aviv). 10 September 1952

Stencilled communiqué: 93.08/358/21

The statement contains the principal provision of the reparations agreement signed in Luxembourg on 10 September.[1] Paragraph (1) contains the full text of the Preamble to the agreement. Paragraph (2) summarizes the substance of the German financial commitment. Paragraph (3) covers the payment schedule. Paragraph (4) details the types of goods to be supplied under the agreement. Paragraph (5) deals with transport and insurance. Paragraph (6) concerns the provisions for ensuring stability of the German obligation. Paragraph (7) deals with the possibility of re-exporting the reparations goods from Israel. Paragraph (8) refers to institutions and bodies to be set up to implement and monitor the reparations agreement. Paragraph (9) deals with arbitration in the event of a disagreement between the parties. Paragraph (10) deals with ratification of the agreement. Paragraph (11) covers miscellaneous matters, including the establishment of a special agency in Israel to handle reparations affairs and the German delegation's request that Israel give preference to goods manufactured in West Berlin.

Note

1. The full text of the agreement was published in *Reshumot* (Official Gazette), Treaties, Vol. 3, No. 69, pp. 75–120.

350. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 11 September 1952

Note

1. Sharett's reply has not been found. After Israel's attempts (through direct contacts and via the State Department) to keep the Arabs from placing the issue on the agenda failed (see No. 351, Eban's telegrams W531 and W532, 13 September 1952, 93.01/2208/20), Israel decided to submit its own complaint against the Arab countries (see No. 352).

351. E. Ben-Horin [Washington] to A. Eban (Washington). 11 September 1952

Copy: 130.20/2476/7

Ben-Horin reports on his contacts and talks with the Arab states concerning their intention to place the Palestine question on the General Assembly

agenda.[1] The purpose of these contacts was to draw their attention to the risks attendant on a motion to this effect by one of the Arab states.

The contacts with Jordan were through a reliable intermediary. The latter told the Jordanians that should the question of Jerusalem be raised at the UN, Israel will see to the revival of the 1950 Swedish proposal for internationalization of the Holy Places. This proposal would be particularly detrimental to the Jordanians.

The contact with Egypt was by direct conversation with a member of the Egyptian Embassy staff. Ben-Horin explained that Israel is following with sympathy and interest the sincere efforts at social reforms in Egypt and has therefore been acting with great restraint recently, so as not to embarrass the Egyptians. Consequently Israel is not submitting to the forthcoming General Assembly session complaints against Arab countries in general, and Egypt in particular. Recently, however, there have been rumors that a certain Arab country—Syria or Iraq—is thinking of placing various questions relating to Palestine on the agenda. Not only Israel, but also most UN member states, including the three Great Powers, oppose a renewed discussion of this question, which they believe would be acrimonious and non-productive. Should the question nevertheless be raised at the United Nations, Israel will have no choice but to launch a counter-attack, which will be directed not only against Iraq and Syria, but also, and mainly, against Egypt, focusing on the issue of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. This is a problem that distresses Israel, but it prefers to seek other ways to resolve it. Israel is aware that in the past Egypt has tended to act rationally and responsibly, and not on the basis of the emotionalism characteristic of less mature countries. It is not in Egypt's interest for one of its fellow members of the Arab League to make propaganda gains at its expense. Israel assumes that the final instructions in this matter will be issued by the secretariat of the Arab League, which is meeting now. If the Egyptian Embassy deems appropriate, it is free to report to its government on this conversation. Ben-Horin's interlocutor offered almost no comments, but listened and took notes. He thanked him for Israel's fairness in providing advance warning and added that his Embassy had been very pleased by Ben-Gurion's statement in the Knesset.

The contacts with Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq were conducted through M. Benard, counselor at the French Embassy. He telephoned the Lebanese in Ben-Horin's presence and transmitted the warning to them. The Lebanese official said he would report to his Iraqi and Syrian counterparts so they could reconsider their position. Later, he reported back that to the best of his knowledge the Iraqis stand firm on raising the matter, even if the Arab League does not send instructions to this effect on its own initiative. Ben-Horin concludes that all necessary preparations should be made for a discussion of the Palestine question by the UN General Assembly.

Note

1. See No. 350.

352. A. Eban [New York] to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 14 September 1952

Note

1. See No. 350.

353. M. Comay [Tel Aviv] to E. Elath (London). 14 September 1952

Notes

1. Elath wrote that he was concerned by the lack of progress on the British military mission to Israel. Initially Israel had displayed great enthusiasm about the very idea, but this had lapsed, and it was now procrastinating on setting a date for the British to come. This hesitation raised concern on its own merits, but also cast a shadow on Israel's ability to conduct a responsible foreign policy (File 130.02/2457/5).
2. Mordecai Makleff, deputy chief of the General Staff; from 7 December 1952, Chief of the General Staff.
3. See No. 68 and n. 2 there.
4. For the exchange concerning paragraph 2, see Nos. 183 and 189.
5. After further discussions, Israel proposed 6 October for the arrival of the British mission. For the missions's deliberations, see No. 385.

354. E. Najar (Tel Aviv) to M. Fischer (Paris). 15 September 1952

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 211.
2. Clement R. Attlee, head of the British Labour Party and leader of the opposition.
3. Bo Östen Undén, Swedish foreign minister.

355. East European Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in Moscow. 16 September 1952

Coded Tel. IQA181; Outg.: 130.09/2325/5

The Division instructs the minister in Moscow to inform the Soviets that an agreement with West Germany has just been signed when he presents the note on reparations.[1] In the course of his explanations, and with an emphasis on Israel's request for assistance from the Soviet Union, he should state that Israel is prepared to meet with East German representatives for preliminary informal talks on the question of compensation, if this contact can be brought about by Soviet mediation, which would not of itself commit them. He is also asked to make a change in the wording of the note wired previously.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 292. Because this telegram arrived after the Israeli note had been transmitted, Eliashiv was unable to relate to the instructions contained below. For the circumstances of the transmission of the note and a full report on the meeting, see No. 362.
2. See No. 356.

356. Sh. Eliashiv (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 16 September 1952

Coded Tel. QIA237; Inc.: 130.09/2325/6

Eliashiv delivered the note on reparations[1] to Pushkin.[2] The latter's reactions were as follows: In his opinion, his government will repeat its previous response.[3] East Germany is an independent state and Israel should approach it directly. He does not understand how part of Germany can undertake to reply on behalf of the whole of Germany; he believes that it is in Israel's interest to help achieve German unification. In reply to Eliashiv's comment that the Bonn government had already concluded an agreement with Israel, he said that this accord is part of Bonn's general tendency to perpetuate the division of Germany and prevent the signing of a comprehensive peace treaty.

The Hebrew draft[5] of the note presented to the Soviets is appended.

Notes

1. See No. 355.
2. Gyorgiy M. Pushkin, U.S.S.R. joint deputy foreign minister and formerly Soviet High Commissioner in East Germany.
3. See No. 79.
4. Arie Aroch, first secretary and head of the consular section of the Israel Legation in Moscow.
5. The original text, delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, was prepared at the Israel Legation in Moscow and not preserved in the Foreign Ministry archives.
6. See Vol. 6, Nos. 19 and 84.

357. M. Fischer (Paris) to E. Najar. 17 September 1952

Notes

1. Antoine Pinay, prime minister of France, March–December 1952.
2. Daniel F. Malan, prime minister and foreign minister of South Africa.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 211.

358. M. Comay [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 17 September 1952

Notes

1. See No. 236.
2. Yusuf Haykal, Jordanian minister in Washington and Jordanian observer at the Security Council.
3. No details of this conversation have been found.
4. See No. 347 and n. 1 there.

359. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 18 September 1952

Notes

1. See No. 350.
2. On this affair, see Vol. 5, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 254.

360. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Comay. 18 September 1952

Notes

1. David M. Johnson, permanent representative of Canada at the United Nations.
2. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian secretary of state for external affairs, head of the Canadian delegation to the Seventh session of the UN General Assembly and president thereof.

361. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 18 September 1952

Notes

1. The reference is evidently to an untitled document dealing with a request for military assistance to Israel and attached to Eban's letter to Goitein dated 24 September 1952, 93.08/361/9.
2. Sen. John J. Sparkman of Alabama, the Democratic vice-presidential candidate.

362. Sh. Eliashiv (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 18 September 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2418/13

Eliashiv reports on the transmission of Israel's note concerning its demand for reparations from East Germany.[1] He briefly reviews the circumstances that led to the delivery of the note without the correction and without taking into account the most recent instructions wired from Tel Aviv, but promises to take steps to rectify the situation. He relates the gist of what he said and the Russians' reply in the interview, details of which he provided briefly in his telegram,[4] and adds a few additional details and assessments.

(1) The exchange took the form of a dialogue, which is a rare occurrence in contacts with the Soviets, who prefer to listen without commenting. This attests to the high rank of the Soviet official (Pushkin) and his expert knowledge of the subject.

(2) The description of the Nazi atrocities and in particular indication of the fact that these events began long before the war apparently left a marked impression on the Russian. In Eliashiv's opinion, this latter argument should be reiterated in further contacts with the Russians, with emphasis on the fact that the Israeli claim is of a completely different character than mere war damages.

He avoided pointing out that the Soviet Union has already received and continues to receive war damages from the Germans. This is a weak point in the Israeli argument, and he recommends that it not be used again. The Soviet Union is receiving damages under the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, whereas Israel's claim is of a unique nature. Russian policy on Germany is designed exclusively to strengthen those agreements and prevent any deviation from existing arrangements.

From Pushkin's comment that the matter could be resolved through a comprehensive peace treaty with Germany, and hence Israel ought to work for German unification, it may be deduced that they do not reject the Israeli claim out of hand. He does not believe, however, that the Russians will accede to the Israeli request to mediate; even if they do, the results cannot be foreseen.

Notes

1. See Nos. 355 and 356.
2. In File 130.09/2325/6. The telegram includes an explanation of the circumstances of the delivery of the note.
3. No. 355.
4. See No. 365.

363. Meeting: A. Eban–J. Hickerson (Washington, 19 September 1952)

Copy: 93.08/358/1

Eban expressed Israel's concern at the inclusion of the Palestine question on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. The problem can be resolved through a call for direct negotiations between the parties; this can be done through either a specific General Assembly resolution or an appeal from its president. Hickerson made it clear that the State Department was "terribly sorry" that the matter had been raised. It is part of a dangerous trend whereby all kinds of problems are brought before the UN, not in order to move towards a solution, but only for the sake of the debate. As for the substance of the matter, the State Department is currently formulating its position and in the meanwhile cannot express an opinion on the Israeli proposal.

Eban raised Israel's request that it be elected to one of the Assembly vice-presidencies.[4] Hickerson replied that he would consider the matter, but could not commit himself at present.

The situation in Korea was also discussed. Hickerson said that the prospects for an armistice are poorer now than they were a year ago. In any event, whether or not there is a cease-fire, the State Department is eager to have Israel dispatch a military contingent to Korea. Eban replied that he would refer the matter to his government.

Notes

1. The signature is missing from the extant copy.
2. See No. 359.
3. See No. 331.
4. See Nos. 287 and 322.

364. M. Comay [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett. 19 September 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2406/17

Comay replies to Sharett's memorandum of 2 September recommending support for Syria's application for membership on the advisory committee of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.[1] This had been his opinion even before he received the memorandum, based on his own analysis of the problem. He considers that the existence of a large body of refugees on Israel's borders constitutes a potential threat to the state; the possibility cannot be excluded that these refugees might rise up in their masses and force their way across the border. From his familiarity with a similar problem in South Africa, he believes it preferable to work towards their settlement and rehabilitation in Jordan and Syria, even if this would strengthen the economies and military potential of those countries.

Notes

1. In File 130.02/2406/17. Sharett expressed his opinion that Israel should respond favorably to Syria's request to sit on the UNRWA Advisory Council, which should be seen as an expression of its willingness to cooperate in the resettlement of the Arab refugees.
2. See No. 181 and n. 4 there.

365. Sh. Eliashiv (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 21 September 1952

Coded Tel. QIA240; Inc.: 130.09/2325/6

Eliashiv met Shchiborin[1] to present the explanations and the amendment to the Israeli note on reparations.[2] Shchiborin said that the Israeli note had already reached him and accepted the explanations and amendment. The conversation then turned to events in Egypt and freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. He asked how the events in Egypt would affect relations with Israel and said that it is amazing that unknowns, including Naguib, came to power there. He is aware of Israel's peace initiative. He asked whether Israel was planning to raise the Suez question in the Security Council.

Notes

1. Aleksandr Shchiborin, deputy director of the Near East and Middle East Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
2. Levavi's telegram to the legation in Moscow (17 September 1952, File 130.09/2325/5), with a request for a meeting with the director of the department in order to update and correct the text of the note with regard to reparations (see Nos. 355 and 362).
3. Dated 19 September, in File 130.09/2325/5. In the telegram Eliashiv was asked to deliver a copy of the reparations letter to the Chinese and Albanian legations as well.
4. Not found.

366. Meetings: A. Eban–D. Acheson and H. Byroade (Washington, 22 September 1952)

Notes

1. The reference is to Salah al-Din Tarazi, legal advisor to the Syrian delegation to the 1949 armistice talks with Israel; chargé d'affaires at the Syrian legation in Brussels, 1951–1953.
2. See No. 341.
3. Samuel Kramer, economist; from October 1952 the personal representative in Israel of Assistant Secretary of State Byroade.

367. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 22 September 1952

Note

1. The reference may be to contacts by Ahmad 'Abbud—see Nos. 324, 326, and 334.

368. Israel Minister in London to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (London). 23 September 1952

Notes

1. See No. 314.
2. On the delivery of the note, see No. 370. Similar texts were delivered to the Quai d'Orsay and to the State Department.

369. E. Elath (London) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 23 September 1952

Notes

1. See No. 219 and n. 2 there.
2. See No. 368.

370. E. Elath (London) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 24 September 1952

Notes

1. No. 368.
2. See No. 369.
3. Compare the version of the meeting with the British as recorded by the British Foreign Office—PRO FO371/98284. The first inclination of the British was to answer at once and orally, but after discussions and consultations with the British Legation in Israel it was decided to coordinate the response with Washington and Paris. (See PRO FO371/98285.) See also Nos. 431 and 432.

371. A. Levavi (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in Moscow. 24 September 1952

Coded Tel. IQA189; Outg.: 130.09/2325/5

Levavi asks the minister to make discreet contact with the East German ambassador in Moscow and request an authoritative interpretation of the statement by the East German agriculture minister concerning Israel's demand for reparations, transmitted on 20 September.[1] Was this an authorized statement, and, if so, what are the prospects for opening negotiations?[2]

Notes

1. The reference is to a Kol Yisrael report that the East German agriculture minister had stated that his government was not opposed in principle to discussing the issue of reparations, but had done nothing about this because there had been no real approach by Israel. He noted, however, that he was expressing his personal opinion. Attempts to obtain the exact text of this declaration were unsuccessful. (See East European Division to Israel Legation in Moscow, IQA188 and IQA190, 23–24 September 1952, 130.09/2325/5.)
2. Eliashiv replied that he would do everything required; but the difficulty in obtaining an authorized version of the remarks inspired some doubt as to whether they had ever been made. He was liable to receive a response denying the entire matter, leaving Israel in a situation where it had taken the first step towards a meeting and been turned down. This might also pull the rug out from underneath Israel's request that the Soviet Union mediate between it and the East Germans. (See his telegram to the Foreign Ministry, IQP249, 25 September 1952, 130.09/2325/6.) In response Eliashiv was again instructed to approach the East German ambassador; it was noted that there was no doubt that the remarks had been made and that efforts were continuing to obtain the precise text of the statement. (See Levavi to the Israel Legation in Moscow, IQA192, 26 September 1952, 130.09/2325/5.) See also No. 378.

372. M. Avidan (Bucharest) to A. Levavi. 24 September 1952

Orig.: 130.11/2493/1

Avidan writes about the situation of the Jews and the chances for *aliya* from Rumania, referring to Levavi's letter of 12 September to him.[1] He regrets that the signs of renewed *aliya* have remained indications only. It is possible that now that the State Security Ministry is fully functioning some change may be in the offing, but this is not certain. The interrogation of potential immigrants continues, and the Jewish Communists persist in their anti-emigration activities. In the meantime, the condition of the Jews has become alarming and they are still afraid to contact the legation,

although recently a few individuals have done so. Perhaps this is the effect of reports about the renewal of *aliya*.

Notes

1. In File 130.11/2493/1. Levavi wrote about the crisis in *aliya* from East Bloc countries. There was only a trickle from Poland and Bulgaria, and some of it through illegal channels. A real change could result only from a renewal of mass *aliya*, and the best chance for this was Rumania. He asked Eliashiv to raise the question in Moscow; the Foreign Minister, who was about to leave for the General Assembly session, would work in the same direction in New York.
2. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, prime minister of Rumania and secretary-general of the Rumanian Workers Party.
3. Vasile Luca, formerly Rumanian deputy prime minister and finance minister, dismissed in March.
4. Teohari Georgescu, Rumanian deputy prime minister and interior minister until May.

373. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassies in Washington and London. 25 September 1952

Notes

1. No. 369.
2. No. 368.
3. See Nos. 369 and 377.

374. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 26 September 1952

Coded Tel. IWA739; Outg.: 130.02/2450/1

The telegram reports on a conversation with Ambassador Davis. Davis referred to the rumor concerning Israel's intention to send a vessel through the Suez Canal. Sharett replied that Israel has no such intention at present, but the possibility of such a step in the future cannot be ruled out. Davis emphasized that his government favors implementation of the Security Council resolution, but one must await the opportune moment, and unilateral action might provoke the Egyptians. They also discussed developments in Egypt and reports about Syria's readiness to hold talks with Israel. Sharett informed Davis of the note protesting military assistance to Arab countries,[1] and Bendor reported on the meetings with the Jordanians and the Egyptians.[2]

Notes

1. No. 368.
2. The telegram reported on the meeting of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission on 24 September and on a talk with the Egyptian representative on the Armistice Commission. In the latter, the Egyptian representative proposed a special meeting to discuss all matters pending between the two countries; Israel proposed a meeting at a higher level to discuss shipping problems and expanding the agreement to prevent infiltration. (See telegram dated 26 September 1952, 130.09/2319/2.) A full report on the conversation is in File 93.08/357/41. See also No. 375.

375. United States Division [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 26 September 1952

Coded Tel. IWA740; Outg.: 130.09/2309/6

The telegram is a confidential addendum to the previous one.[1] Davis reported on contacts with Egypt. Ambassador Caffery was instructed to tell the Egyptians that the United States wishes to see the contacts bear fruit. Before his resignation, 'Ali Māhir told the Americans about the contacts in Paris. He said that he was considering an accord with Israel, but Egypt must first know Israel's intentions with regard to the implementation of UN resolutions. He did not elaborate, even when asked, but Davis believes that he was repeating the old Arab refrain about Israel's failure to comply with UN resolutions. Davis also believes that the refugee question will be the central issue in any talks to be held. He thinks that the Egyptians fear that Israel will disclose the contacts which have taken place, especially if they lead nowhere. Sharett replied that Israel is familiar with Egyptian sensitivity and is in no hurry.

Note

1. No. 374.

376. E. Elath (London) to M. Comay. 26 September 1952

Tel. 10102; Inc.: 130.09/2319/3

Elath reports on his conversation with Bowker. Elath relayed the contents of the last telegram[1] and emphasized Israel's concern at the supply of air-

craft to Arab countries. Bowker replied that there are no grounds as yet for talk about the arming of Egypt, and that the sale of jet planes to Israel and the Arabs was in the context of the Three-Power declaration guaranteeing the security and equal treatment of all parties. At the end of the conversation, he commented that the French and Turks had been confidentially informed of the forthcoming visit to Israel of the British military mission.

Note

1. No. 373.

377. Meeting: M. Sharett–F. Evans (Tel Aviv, 26 September 1952, document dated 28 September 1952)

Notes

1. See No. 367.
2. See No. 341.
3. Compare the report by Ambassador Evans to the British Foreign Office, 26 September 1952, PRO FO371/98297.

378. Sh. Eliashiv (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1 October 1952

Coded Tel. QIA258; Inc.: 130.09/2325/6

Eliashiv discussed Israel's demand for reparations with the East German ambassador in Moscow. The ambassador knew of the agriculture minister's press conference in Bonn, but was unaware that he had referred to the issue of reparations. He promised to refer Eliashiv's questions to his government and get back to him when he receives an answer. To the best of his knowledge, his government has as yet done nothing in this matter, other than to gather data. Eliashiv's impression is that the ambassador was pleasantly surprised at being approached by the Israeli minister.

Note

1. See No. 371.

379. D. Ben-Gurion [Tel Aviv] to M. Makleff. 1 October 1952

Copy: 130.02/2457/5

Ben-Gurion transmits instructions for the talks between the senior army commanders and the British military mission. After reviewing the issue of the mission's visit, including the differences of opinion between Israel and the British as to the significance of the talks, he lays down the principles to be followed by the Israeli side:

(1) The relationship between Israel and Britain is founded on the model of ties between two friendly, equal countries, both of them interested in preserving the peace and opposing aggression.

(2) It should be ascertained, in general terms, what are the defense plans for the Middle East, the degree to which Great Britain, the United States, and other allies will participate, and what are the general lines of defense.

(3) The British should be informed that Israel's military potential is a 250,000 men, without disclosure of details of the IDF's structure.

(4) The IDF's freedom of movement in the case of a war to defend the region, the size of the other forces that might be committed to joint defense, and in general of the role of each force, should be clarified.

(5) The British should be asked as to the extent to which weapons and other military equipment will be supplied to Israel, for its ground and air forces, and under what conditions. The quantity of armaments and equipment involved is for an army of 250,000 men.

(6) It should be ascertained whether Israel can expect assistance to expand its existing air fields and build new ones, *inter alia* for jet aircraft, to construct a port and a road or rail line to Eilat.

(7) Under what conditions will fuel be stockpiled, and in what quantities? Under what conditions could this fuel be used in peacetime?

It must be taken for granted that the details of the talks will be relayed to the United States (and perhaps also to the French and Turks). On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that Britain is acting with the knowledge of the United States (and perhaps on its behalf), and an improvement of ties with Britain is also desirable in terms of Israel–United States relations.[1]

Notes

1. See Vol. 6, No. 508.
2. See Vol. 6, No. 138.
3. See No. 38.
4. See No. 159.
5. See No. 183.
6. See No. 219.
7. See No. 380.

380. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion. 3 October 1952

Orig.: IMDEA 532/73/174

Sharett disagrees with Ben-Gurion's instructions for the talks with the British military mission.[1] He feels that the document drafted by Ben-Gurion will not solve the problem that will confront the Israeli delegation during the negotiations. It must be remembered that in the talks, the Israeli side will not have exclusive control over the subjects raised, whereas, on the basis of Ben-Gurion's instructions, the delegation is only supposed to request information and ask questions without providing significant information and without being explicit about the commitments that Israel will undertake. He fears that should the delegation adopt this tactic, not only will it achieve nothing, the other side is also likely to conclude that Israel has internal reservations about cooperation, so that there is no possibility of coming to an understanding.

He therefore suggests that the delegation be instructed as follows:

(1) To inform the other side of Israel's military potential in a state of emergency not only in general terms, but also to some extent with a breakdown by the various branches of the armed forces and type of weaponry.

(2) With regard to Israel's participation in regional defense, to define its position as follows: (a) Israel is resolved to defend its liberty, territorial integrity, and system of government under all conditions and with all the resources at its disposal. (b) Its willingness to fight outside its borders in defense of the entire region depends on the Western powers' willingness to defend the Middle East. (c) Any future declaration by the Arab states of their willingness to defend the area is insufficient to commit Israel to participate in regional defense, because it cannot count on their political reliability or their military capability. (d) Should Israel be convinced that the Western powers are absolutely committed to defense of the Middle East, come what may, in all circumstances and throughout all stages of a war, and should Israel receive the requisite assistance from them, it is willing to commit itself to participate in regional defense in accordance with an agreed plan specifying the distribution of forces and roles. (e) A cardinal guideline in Israel's considerations on the allocation of its forces for regional defense will be its evaluation of the threat of possible attacks on it by neighboring Arab countries—before, during and after a war.

(3) Israel must state that it will be prepared to grant Western forces passage through Israel, temporary bases there, and use of its transportation network. It is in any case obvious that its ability to be of assistance in this respect depends on the amount of assistance it receives in the interim for improving its transportation system.

(4) The delegation should conduct the negotiations with the clear assumption that the United States is the main partner in the entire design and that these talks are part of the plan for a more comprehensive arrangement in which both Israel and the other side have direct contact with the United States.[2]

Note

1. No. 379. The British military mission arrived in Israel at the beginning of October. On its meetings, see No. 385.

381. A. Kubovy (Prague) to the East European and Information Divisions. 3 October 1952

Coded Tel. 763; Inc.: 130.09/2343/3

Kubovy proposes publishing the following item in the *Jewish Chronicle*, as a report emanating from Paris or London, through its Jerusalem correspondent: Despite the propaganda campaign launched by the *Kulturgesellschaft*, the synagogues were full of worshippers, including many Communists, during the High Holidays. The main topics of discussion were the renewal of *aliya* and its laggard pace. The security services continue to detain and question all visitors to the Israel Legation, but the pressure and threats are failing to deter the thousands of Polish Jews separated from their families in Israel. They express their confidence in the president and prime minister of Poland. The chairman of the Association of Jewish Communities[1] sent a letter to all the communities warning them that contacts with representatives of foreign countries are prohibited. Nevertheless the Israel minister, who attended services in a Warsaw synagogue on the Day of Atonement, was warmly received.

Note

1. Szymon Datner, chairman of the Association of Jewish Communities in Poland.

382. Y. Tekoah [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan. 7 October 1952

Copy: 130.16/2953/9

Tekoah makes several suggestions for the anticipated meeting with the Syrians.[1] The instructions given to Israel's representatives for the planned

meeting with the Syrians at the beginning of July, which did not materialize, included the following: "General directive to let Syrians submit anticipated proposals for partition demilitarized zone, then state we are unwilling consider such adjustments within framework existing armistice agreement, only as part peace arrangements or in context some further step towards peace such as non-aggression pact."[2]

In advance of the present meeting, Tekoah believes that the Israeli delegation must be guided by three main principles: (1) to strive to achieve genuine progress in relations with Syria, if at all possible; (2) to avoid appearing recalcitrant; (3) given the favorable inclination of the Powers and the UN to the Syrian position, to cautiously avoid, from the outset, a situation in which Israel is subject to pressure by them to abandon its own position.

The first question that Israel will need to tackle is that of the agenda. As is known, Israel agreed in advance to discuss the question of the demilitarized zone, provided that other topics were also discussed. There is a danger that the Syrians will raise this subject as the first point on the agenda and insist on the partition of the demilitarized zone. In such a case Israel will appear recalcitrant from the outset. In order to prevent such a situation, Israel must respond with the argument that any accord must be within the framework of a final peace arrangement or at least a non-aggression pact. To this the Syrians are likely to respond that the substantive questions must be discussed first, and the issue of the form the agreement takes—peace treaty or non-aggression pact—left until after agreement has been reached on material points.

In order to prevent this development, Tekoah suggests that Israel respond to the Syrian demand to discuss the demilitarized zone by raising a series of practical problems: (1) fulfillment of Syrian obligations under the Armistice Agreement; (2) demarcation of the international boundary between Israel and Syria; (3) cooperation in patrolling the borders; and (4) the establishment of economic ties. Since these problems arise in the context of the parties' existing commitments, there are objective grounds for insisting on a discussion of compliance with previous undertakings before discussing new problems, particularly when the issue is implementing the commitment to non-aggression and avoidance of aggressive acts, which are a basic and primary component of the Armistice Agreement. He therefore suggests that the Israeli delegation insist that the negotiations open with a solemn, official, and explicit endorsement of the Armistice Agreement. In legal terms, the value of such a declaration is no less than that of a document entitled "a non-aggression pact." The second stage would be a discussion of the Syrian proposals concerning the demilitarized zone, and the third stage a discussion of the Israeli demands outlined above.

Notes

1. The meeting with the Syrians took place on 9 October; see No. 384.
2. See Comay to Eban, MT11, 29 June 1952, 93.01/2208/13.

383. A. Eban [New York] to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 9 October 1952

Note

1. No. 352.

384. Report on a Meeting between Israel and Syria. 9 October 1952[1]

Copy: 93.03/3043/14

Y. Tekoah reports on the meeting between the representatives of Israel and Syria to discuss the armistice and demilitarized-zone issues. There is a lengthy history behind this meeting. Since the outbreak of the Hula dispute, the Syrians have been trying to have the question of the demilitarized zone included on the agenda of the Mixed Armistice Commission. Israel refused, arguing that this was a matter for discussion between itself and the chairman of the Commission alone. The Syrians persisted, and Israel replied that it was prepared to discuss the issue, on condition that it be free to raise other matters. Israel also insisted that the talks be held on a high level—between the chiefs of staff. Finally, the Syrians agreed to the addition of items to the agenda and Israel consented to lower-level representation.[3]

After many postponements, the meeting took place on 9 October. For Israel, those present were Aluf Moshe Dayan, Segan-Aluf Shaul Ramati, Rav-Seren A. Friedlander, and Y. Tekoah, representing the Foreign Ministry. The Syrian delegation comprised Col. Jadid, head of the Syrian delegation to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, and Dr. Samuḥi Fuad al-Adi, head of the Political Division of the Syrian Foreign Ministry. The Israel delegation's general instructions were to allow the Syrians to submit their proposal for partition of the demilitarized zone, and then to announce that Israel is prepared to discuss such an arrangement only within the framework of a peace treaty or at least a non-aggression pact.

After a few polite exchanges and a discussion of the credentials of the two parties' representatives, the delegations turned to the substance of the meeting. The Syrians stated that they were not authorized to discuss peace

or any other political question. They were prepared to negotiate only those problems that arise under the armistice agreement, its effective and sincere implementation, or proposed amendments. Should they conclude that negotiations are impossible under the conditions they presented, they would demand an emergency meeting of the Armistice Commission to discuss the interpretation of Article VII(7) of the agreement[5] and sovereignty over the demilitarized zone.

The Israeli delegation took the following position: After three years of an armistice arrangement, which is a temporary situation by definition, there is no point in trying to amend the agreement; instead, efforts should focus on concluding a peace treaty or at least a non-aggression pact. Nevertheless, Israel does not rule out discussion of any issue, including matters related to the Armistice Agreement. If, however, the Syrians wish to discuss this topic alone, the matter ought to be dealt with by the Mixed Armistice Commission.

Several comments made by the Commission chairman, Col. Taxis, suggested that he basically endorses the Syrian position. He asked the parties not to exaggerate the importance of the context and requested them to discuss the substance of the problems. After the parties' opening statements, the official meeting was adjourned with no decision taken. The parties expressed their hopes that the Mixed Armistice Commission will continue to perform its assigned duties and did not rule out reconvening the talks should there be reason to do so.

After the official meeting broke up, discussions continued informally. Dayan with Col. Jadid, and Tekoah with Dr. Fuad al-Adi. Tekoah expressed his regret that the talks had reached an impasse. He explained that it is unthinkable that important questions, such as the future of the demilitarized zone, be resolved through technical amendments to the Armistice Agreement. The Syrian repeated his argument that the Armistice Agreement explicitly permits such amendment and that changes that resolve pressing problems would be a practical step towards improving relations between the two countries. At present, he asserted, the Syrian government cannot do more than this and must take into account both domestic public opinion and the attitude of the Arab countries. Syria believes in gradual progress, and Israel must accept this approach. Fuad al-Adi noted that he had already suggested to the Syrian Foreign Ministry the framework and substance of the amendments to the Armistice Agreement. The agreement would be termed "A Protocol for Amending the Armistice Agreement"; the Syrians are willing to have it include reaffirmation of the non-aggression commitment that forms part of the Armistice Agreement and an arrangement to eliminate the demilitarized zone. The Syrians do not rule out in advance discussion of other questions, provided they stem from the Armistice Agreement. Dr. Fuad al-Adi also indicated that there is no need to discuss a new non-aggression agreement, since the Armistice

Agreement already includes such a provision. Tekoah replied that the Syrians' definition of the Armistice Agreement as a non-aggression pact is interesting, and in fact should facilitate their signing a separate non-aggression pact. In reply to Fuad al-Adi's question as to whether Israel has suggested such agreements to other Arab states, Tekoah said that Israel had raised this idea at the meeting of the Conciliation Commission in Paris in 1951.

The discussion of this topic continued during lunch, when Tekoah sat next to Col. Jadid. The latter repeated the arguments put forward by Fuad al-Adi and insisted on the need to resolve serious and pressing problems. At the same time he emphasized that ultimately Israel and Syria will have to reach full agreement on all aspects of their mutual relations. Tekoah steered the conversation around to the territorial issue, noting that in fact the Syrians are asking Israel to make the most extreme concession that can be demanded of a sovereign state—ceding territory, and in a particularly non-binding context such as an amendment to the Armistice Agreement. Jadid replied that Syria's demand that the armistice line run through the Sea of Galilee and the Hula and along the Jordan is not based on an aspiration to expand its territory or increase its population, but on security considerations. Tekoah replied that in security terms it makes no difference whether the line runs along the eastern shore or through the middle of the lakes.

Dayan and Jadid held a very detailed discussion, with the use of maps, concerning a new demarcation of the border. The Syrians, as indicated, proposed a line running through the lakes, but promised that, with regard to water use, the parties would retain their previous rights. The Israelis' impression is that the Syrians are prepared to compromise on a line running along the eastern shore of the lake. When the talk turned to a detailed discussion of the line in the northern demilitarized zone, it became clear that the Syrians do not have a definite proposal for this area. In Dayan's opinion this shows the Syrian's lack of interest in this region; perhaps they might be prepared to leave the entire area in Israeli hands. On the other hand, Jadid insisted on the incorporation of the entire Dardara area into Syria. As for Ein Gev, Jadid agreed that this could remain an enclave on the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee, with access by water, although Dayan's impression was that the Syrians are prepared to concede on this point too and permit access by the road along the eastern shore. With regard to the southern demilitarized zone, Dayan and Ramati's impression was that the Syrians are willing to discuss transfer of the area to Israel, with the exception of al-Hamma.

The two parties took leave of each other with promises to report to their governments on the official meeting as well as on the informal talks that followed it.

Note

1. This report was written by Yosef Tekoah, the Foreign Ministry representative at the talks. It was published as Information for Israel Missions Abroad, No. 560, 19 October 1952. File 130.16/2953/9 also contains two other reports written by the IDF representatives at the meeting, one by Segan-Aluf Ramati and the other by Rav-Seren Friedlander (Shalev).
2. Article V of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement states that the arrangements for the armistice demarcation line between Israeli and Syrian armed forces and for the demilitarized zone are not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to the ultimate territorial arrangements affecting the two parties to this agreement.
3. On the attempts to arrange a meeting between Israeli and Syrian representatives, see No. 245.
4. Samuḥi Fuad al-Adi, head of the political department of the Syrian Foreign Ministry.
5. This article states that claims or complaints submitted by one of the parties concerning the applicability of the Armistice Agreement will immediately be brought before the Mixed Armistice Commission by its chairman. The Commission, through its monitoring and investigative staff, will act on all such claims and complaints and take any action it feels necessary to reach a just solution satisfying both parties.
6. See this photograph in A. Shalev, *Co-operation under the Shadow of Conflict.*
7. On this, see Vol. 5, Nos. 106 and 108.
8. Riley's memorandum is in File 130.16/2953/9.
9. See No. 331.

385. W. Eytan and M. Makleff (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in London. 10 October 1952

Coded Tel. 130; Outg.: 130.09/2403/18

Eytan and Makleff report on the two days of talks with the British military mission.[2] Israel stated that it will defend itself in all circumstances but would participate in regional defense only if the Powers defend the Middle East. In wartime, it will agree to grant passage to the Powers' armed forces and permit use of its ports, roads, airfields, and fuel storage facilities. This contribution to the war effort depends on an improvement of these installations, with British help. The British appear to have been favorably impressed by the presentation. They asked whether Israel would be willing to store heavy equipment, ammunition, and fuel in peacetime, so that Israel could serve as a wartime supply depot. They also inquired about Israel's willingness to place three airfields at their disposal in wartime. They do not view Israel as a naval base. The Israelis asked the British to outline their basic plan and Israel's role in it. The British did not provide a clear answer, claiming that they were not authorized to provide these details and that the plan is being modified. This reply generated a certain amount of tension. Israel also took advantage of the talks to protest the

delivery of jet aircraft to Arab countries.[3] The general impression is that the British envisage the possibility of cooperating with the Israel Air Force in Arab air space but foresee difficulties in joint operations with land forces. A detailed report follows in a letter.[4]

Notes

1. Aluf-Mishne Katriel Salmon, military, naval, and air attaché in Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries.
2. See No. 380.
3. See No. 369.
4. A full report of the military talks is in IMDEA, File 532/73/174.

386. E. Elath [London] to M. Sharett. 10 October 1952

Copy: 130.02/2403/18

Elath writes of the developments in the relations of Britain and the United States with the countries of the Middle East in the aftermath of the coup in Egypt, of the implications this will have for Israel's policy with regard to the arming of Arab countries, and of the steps it must take to follow up the protest note it submitted on this matter.[1]

The British government's desire to reach an agreement with Egypt has high priority in British foreign policy, fully supported by the United States. Naguib is acceptable to the British, who believe him to be the best person to run Egypt's affairs. They consider any alternative, whether the Wafd or the Muslim Brotherhood, to be less satisfactory, and will therefore strive to enhance Naguib's position and influence in all spheres. The various concessions that the British have so far made to Egypt, both military and economic, are only the first stage in anticipation of similar actions in the future, which will increase as long as Naguib is willing to cooperate.

This change is not limited specifically to Egypt and also affects relations with other countries in the Middle East. The decision to supply jet aircraft to Syria is a clear expression of the British government's desire to maintain and intensify its links with the Arab governments, particularly with those that display stability and willingness to cooperate with Britain and its allies. The British believe that the prospects for such cooperation will increase if the Western Powers help the regimes buttress their positions, and this includes acquisition of arms. The decision to allow the Syrians to acquire jet aircraft had two purposes: to obtain an effective foothold in the Syrian military establishment, which has previously been dependent on French armaments, and to use this advantage when necessary for both mil-

itary and political purposes, especially during discussions on the establishment of a regional defense organization.

These changes require modification of the Israeli position on arming the Arab countries. Israel must not delude itself that protests and propaganda campaigns alone can put an end to arms supplies to the Arabs. It must soberly face reality and adopt a practical and constructive approach. Elath therefore suggests that Israel approach the signatories of the Three Power Declaration with the following request: (1) that all countries receiving arms from the signatories be required to sign a non-aggression pact with Israel; and (2) that Israel not be discriminated against in arms supplies. With regard to a non-aggression pact, Elath emphasizes that such a pact is preferable to a peace treaty, which in his opinion is likely to raise fundamental problems in Israel-Arab relations, such as refugees and borders, whose solution will require significant Israeli concessions.

Elath is fully aware of the major economic burden that Israel will have to bear as a result of an arms race in the Middle East. He has always been apprehensive of the moment when Israel would have to find the golden mean among the needs to preserve its political independence, economic strength, and military security. Thus far it has benefitted from the Arabs' mistakes and hesitations. The assumption that "the Arabs will help us," so that whatever Israel cannot achieve by its own effort it will obtain as a result of its enemies' errors, is unfounded. In the present situation, the only option is to take the initiative and adopt a clear-cut policy whose main thrust is to strengthen Israel's ties with Britain and the United States. This must be done with discretion and caution, but there must be no hesitation and no agonizing about the possible negative by-products of this policy. This is why he had complained about the postponements and hesitations in setting a date for the British military mission's visit to Israel.

In conclusion, Elath states that from his viewpoint in London, he and his colleagues can evaluate events and processes better than from other vantage points. He also warns against any illusion that everything depends on Israel, and that if it displays initiative and activity the British and Americans will come forward with open arms. On the contrary, he is concerned and skeptical about these countries' possible reactions to Israel's proposals and statements, and recommends being prepared for disappointment and failure. It is vital, however, that Israel not remain passive in the serious campaign currently being waged around it.[3]

Notes

1. No. 368.
2. See Elath to Sharett, 14 August 1952, 130.02/2457/5.
3. Keren's letter, dated 10 October, is in File 130.02/2403/18. For reactions, see Nos. 387 and 392.

387. A. Eban (Harrow, Middlesex) to E. Elath (London). 11 October 1952

Orig.: 93.04/42/13

Eban praises Elath's memorandum on arms for the Arabs.[1] Elath's line of thinking entirely coincides with that of the embassy staff in Washington, who also believe that the Egyptian request for Western arms should be exploited as a mechanism for modifying the Egyptian attitude towards Israel at the instigation of the countries supplying the weapons, or, a less favorable alternative, for a parallel supply of arms to Israel, free of charge, so as to preserve the military balance. Like Elath, he is worried about the lack of an initiative for deliberate, ongoing diplomatic action in London and Washington in the coming months. He will do his best to persuade the Foreign Ministry to authorize them to take such action.

Note

1. See No. 386.

388. A. Aroch (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 13 October 1952

Coded Tel. QIA275; Inc.: 130.09/2325/6

The telegram is addressed to Levavi only. On the evening of the Simhat Torah festival the rabbi[2] told them that because of informers in the synagogue he can no longer maintain any relations with Israel Legation personnel except for their attendance at prayers in the synagogue. He also returned a parcel of religious books he had received in response to his requests on various occasions in the past. This is the first time that he has spoken openly to Legation staff about his situation, and he asked that the conversation not be made public.

Notes

1. Yitzhak Efratt, director of the coding department of the Foreign Ministry.
2. Rabbi Solomon Schleifer, chief rabbi of Moscow.

389. A. Eban [Washington] to D. Acheson (Washington). 14 October 1952

Note

1. See No. 363.

390. G. Rafael (New York) to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 14 October 1952

Copy: 93.03/116/8

Rafael reports on a conversation with Malik, the Soviet permanent representative to the UN. He requested the meeting in order to ascertain the Soviet position on Israel's request to be elected to a General Assembly vice-presidency,[1] but the conversation was prolonged and turned to other topics. With regard to the vice-presidency, Malik said that he would pass on Israel's request to his government. Regarding the forthcoming discussion of the Palestine question, Malik noted that the Soviet Union has always supported Israel's demand for direct negotiations between the parties, and that in his opinion this is the only way to achieve peace. Much of the conversation was devoted to Korea, and Malik repeated the Soviet position that the United States is responsible for the conflict. With regard to prisoners of war, which is the main obstacle to the conclusion of an armistice agreement, Malik noted that the Americans are adopting a hard line that reflects their lack of understanding of and sensitivity to the feelings of other nations. Towards the end of the conversation, which was marked by humor and good nature, they touched upon personal questions, including the controversy involving the American ambassador in Moscow, George Kennan.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 389.
2. George F. Kennan, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from May 1952; in early October he was declared *persona non grata* because, while outside the Soviet Union, he had criticized the isolation of Western diplomats in Moscow and the rampant anti-American propaganda in the Soviet Union.

391. A. Kubovy (Prague) to the East European Division. 14 October 1952

Coded Tel. 777; Inc.: 130.09/2343/3

Kubovy reports on his visit to Bratislava over the Hoshanah Rabbah and Shemini Atseret festivals. The atmosphere was depressing. The local community, consisting of between 2800 and 4000 individuals, lives in pathological fear because of anti-Semitic manifestations, the arrest of Zionist activists, the prohibition of emigration to Israel, and the purges of Jewish officials. Outside the synagogues, the Jews avoided all contact with the Legation personnel; even in the synagogues the congregations were small and the atmosphere pathetic. By contrast, in Prague, on the Simhat Torah festival, the joyousness of the festival was tangible and the worshippers found ways to express their feelings.

Note

1. One sentence, of a personal nature, has been omitted here.

392. D. Ben-Gurion (Jerusalem) to M. Sharett. 16 October 1952

Copy: 130.02/2451/9

Ben-Gurion rejects Elath's proposal that Israel launch a propaganda campaign in favor of concluding non-aggression pacts with its neighbors. He sees no legal or diplomatic advantage to such treaties. The armistice agreements forbid armed attacks, which effectively renders them non-aggression pacts, and there is no need for additional ones. Should Israel demand non-aggression pacts and the Arabs agree, the Arabs will gain points in world public opinion for displaying good will, and Israel will be expected to compensate them by making concessions in various areas; if it refuses, it will be blamed for preventing the conclusion of the non-aggression pacts. There are no reasons why Israel should make concessions to achieve non-aggression pacts that do not substantially change the status quo. The situation is different when it comes to peace; here it is worth Israel's while to make concessions. Israel must continue insisting on peace treaties. If these ensue, the matter has decisive importance, if not, the very demand has moral and diplomatic value.[2]

Notes

1. No. 386.
2. See No. 422.

393. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to A. Eban (New York). 16 October 1952

Coded Tel. YA716; Outg.: 130.09/2330/11

Sharett considers the 33 votes that Israel received in the elections for the vice-presidency of the General Assembly[1] a creditable achievement. Yugoslavia disappointed Israel; its delegation should be informed that its action was unfair. The nagging question is whether an Arab candidate would have been put forward, even had Israel not been running, or did Israel itself bring about the election of an Arab country to the General Committee?

Note

1. On 14 October, the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly convened in New York. The Canadian delegate, Lester B. Pearson, was elected president of the Assembly. Delegates from seven other countries were chosen vice-presidents, including the Egyptian representative, who received 34 votes and was the last in the list of electees. Israel received 33 votes. The General Committee of the General Assembly, which decides on procedural matters and the agenda, comprises the president of the Assembly, the vice-presidents, and the chairmen of the six major committees of the General Assembly.

394. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Paris. 16 October 1952

Coded Tel. 243; Outg.: 130.09/2345/1

Eytan reports to Fischer on his conversation with the French chargé d'affaires, Debroise. On instructions from Paris, the latter complained that Israel had violated the Mount Scopus agreement[1] by establishing an observation post contrary to the directives of the UN representative. Eytan replied that he and Makleff were about to meet General Riley and Vigier[2] and would discuss the subject directly with them. In the meanwhile, he expressed to Debroise his criticism of several flagrant Jordanian infringements of the Mount Scopus agreement and the Armistice Agreement, which Riley had ignored, while complaining about trifling matters such as the erection of a hut in territory that Israel considers to be its own.

A similar complaint has been received from the British minister, and the American ambassador is also expected today. This is therefore a Three-Power *démarche*, although neither of the two diplomats referred to the Three-Power declaration.

Notes

1. For the agreement between the Israeli and Jordanian commanders on procedures for operating and supplying Israeli institutions on Mt. Scopus, see Vol. 2, Appendix E(1).
2. Henri Vigier, political advisor to the chief of staff of the United Nations observers in Palestine.

395. Political Consultation. (Tel Aviv, 19 October 1952)

Copy: 130.02/2410/9

The document is a *précis* of the consultation held in the Prime Minister's office on 1 October. The participants were the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Deputy Chief of Staff, and senior Foreign Ministry officials. The problem on the agenda was whether Israel should be a passive spectator of Middle East events or should try to influence them. Do these events herald changing relationships in the area and therefore provide an opening for Israeli political initiatives?

Shiloah submitted a summary drafted in cooperation with IDF Intelligence: (1) Though recent events in the Middle East are internal developments within the Arab countries, Israel must not delude itself into thinking that the option of reopening the war against it has been discarded. Those elements interested in a second round have not disappeared, and are active primarily in Syria and Iraq. (2) Nevertheless, the revolutions, particularly the one in Egypt, have shaken the united Arab front against Israel and directed attention towards domestic matters. (3) The Western countries will have to formulate a new Mideast policy during the next few months; this will be followed by the implementation phase, which will be characterized by decisiveness and ruthlessness. The inescapable conclusion is that Israel must be more active with regard both to the Arab and the Western countries. Its policy must be designed to reinforce the process of disintegration in the Arab world and encourage these countries to concentrate on their domestic problems, to display vigorous opposition to any reliance on an Arab League collective security pact in Mideast defense arrangements, and to foster any signs of rapprochement with Israel, particularly in Egypt, which is the most important country in the Middle East. To this end, existing instruments must be strengthened and new ones established. "Existing instruments" means intelligence services, radio

broadcasts, the Armistice Commissions, and Israel's diplomatic missions throughout the world. "Additional instruments" means a select staff in the Foreign Ministry to coordinate and direct action as required, as well as adding new branches to existing mechanisms.

Eliahu Sasson presented several thoughts about the coup in Egypt. This revolution still lacks a clear-cut direction and is being swept along from one stage to the next. It is obvious that Naguib will not be able to concentrate on foreign affairs in the near future, but on the other hand events are impelling him towards extremism. Israel must keep an eye on developments and be prepared to use its connections when they might prove valuable.

Divon noted that this is a period of major upheavals and change. In order to comprehend them Israel must deepen its understanding and intensify its connections. There is a need for more contacts and a more relaxed atmosphere.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that contacts with the Arabs have been maintained for years, but today there is indeed an urgent need to extend and regularize them. Above all, however, Israel must decide what its policy goals are. These must be to reduce tension and encourage those circles who strive for peace. Any Israeli step or reaction must be carefully weighed, and sometimes it is preferable to forgo an action that responds to a local threat but makes the long-term prospect of peace more distant. Israel should also consider world reactions and not only those of the Arab countries. Israel must never appear guilty of provocation or war-mongering. As for driving a wedge into the Arab front, Israel must distinguish between short-term tactics and long-term policy. From time to time it may be able to sow dissension and increase separatism, but in the long run the forces of unity in the Arab world, based on blood ties, territorial continuity, and a common religion, will be decisive. Summing up, he warned that the peace process in the Middle East will be long and drawn-out and requires unremitting effort by Israel, including taking advantage of revolutionary situations, such as that now prevailing in Egypt (but not initiating such situations). We must be patient and strengthen the relevant agencies.

Eban expressed his opinion on the role of the United States in Mideast events. The Americans have had many failures and disappointments in this region and are in no rush to act; moreover, it must be assumed that the new administration will be preoccupied with domestic affairs. In addition, he distinguishes two principles that guide the Americans. First is the assumption that the process of rapprochement between Israel and the Arabs will be a slow one. The implication is that there will be no immediate pressure on the Arabs. The second principle is that the initiative must come from the parties involved, with the Americans providing assistance only after the initial link has been forged. Eban notes an American tendency to abandon the concept of a united Arab world and to derive advantage from the separatist elements at work in the Arab world while gradu-

ally progressing towards a solution by dealing with specific problems. Eban ruled out the possibility of influencing the Americans to terminate their assistance to the Egyptians or to make it conditional on progress towards an accord with Israel. First, the Americans will not accept this condition; second, it is not in Israel's interest, as a recipient of American aid, to introduce the practice of making economic assistance dependent on acceptance of political demands.

The discussion concluded with presentations by Ben-Gurion and Sharett. Ben-Gurion stated that Israel's policy is dictated by the following scale of priorities: Israel's interests, its relations with American Jewry (and indirectly, with the United States itself), and, third, peace with the Arabs. The test of whether Israel truly desires peace is not how it reacts to acts of murder and pillage along its borders. These call for vigorous retaliation; otherwise, peace will recede and violence increase. Not abandoning those settlements that are suffering from Arab actions is preferable to peace with the Arabs. Israel must manage its contacts with the Arabs on the basis of practical considerations and not complicate them with beliefs and ideologies. There had been prospects for an accord with the Jordanians, but they were never realized. Egypt is now the preferred target, and contacts with it must be continued, whether or not they bear fruit.

Sharett disagreed with Ben-Gurion. All retaliatory actions must be tempered by a further consideration, namely, how they will influence the Arabs. With regard to the scale of priorities, he suggests avoiding a rigid ranking. He also doubts whether it is possible to improve relations with one Arab country while maintaining hostility with the others.

Note

1. The consultation was held in the Prime Minister's office on 1 October 1952. For a full report, see File 130.02/2446/7.

396. A. Eban (Washington) to the United States Division. 20 October 1952

Coded Tel. WIA613; Outg.: 93.01/2208/22

President Truman has promised a close friend of Israel that before leaving office he will arrange for military assistance to Israel. He has instructed Harriman to deal with the matter. An inside source reports that Acheson sent a memorandum to the White House after his talk with Eban,[1] accepting the suggestion that the Egyptian request for American assistance be used to raise the problem of relations with Israel, although he does not be-

lieve that assistance to Egypt should be made conditional on peace with Israel. Senior American officials say that relations between Egypt and Israel are about to change dramatically, and Egypt's request for American aid appears to be the key to such a change. In its information campaign, Israel stresses how the UN General Assembly can be involved in this process by passing a resolution calling for direct negotiations and an initiative to bring the sides together. Israel points to the Security Council resolution of 18 November 1948 as a catalyst that encouraged Egypt to negotiate with Israel when there were internal forces pressing for dialogue.

Note

1. See No. 366.

397. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 20 October 1952

Note

1. John D. Jernegan, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

398. M. Avidan (Bucharest) to A. Levavi. 20 October 1952

Orig.: 130.11/2493/1

Avidan thanks Levavi for his letter.[1] He deeply regrets not having any good news about *aliya* from Rumania. The Jewish community is panic-stricken; when the minister and his aides went to synagogue on the Day of Atonement the local Jews totally ignored them, so great is their fear. For his part, he has despaired of any possibility that they will stage a demonstration or participate in an act of civil disobedience concerning *aliya*. He hopes that during the UN General Assembly the Foreign Minister will find an opportunity to raise this question, but warns against linking the Rumanian issue to that of *aliya* from the Soviet Union. He believes that it would be expedient to emphasize the difference between the Jewish question in the Soviet Union and in the Peoples' democracies. Any discussion of matters relating to Soviet Jewry will be a futile exercise, while discussion of the situation in the other Eastern Bloc countries might produce concrete results.

Note

1. Levavi wrote that Sh. Eliashiv, the Israel Minister to the Soviet Union, was about to depart for the General Assembly session in New York and would take advantage of his presence there for talks with the Soviets about immigration from Rumania. The Foreign Minister, too, would deal with this if he travelled to the Assembly session in New York. (Levavi's letter is in File 130.11/2493/1.) See also No. 411.
2. Gershon Avner was appointed chargé d'affaires in the Israel legations in Budapest and Sofia in May 1952, but did not take up his posts until October.

399. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 21 October 1952

Notes

1. Daniel F. Malan, prime minister and foreign minister of South Africa.
2. The reference is obscure.

400. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 21 October 1952

401. M. Sharett (Jerusalem) to D. Ben-Gurion. 21 October 1952

Orig.: IMDEA 532/73/178

Sharett calls Ben-Gurion's attention to the dilemma facing Israel with regard to its request for arms from the United States. When requesting American arms in the past, Israel did not attach any conditions about the arming of the Arab countries, although it was clear from the outset that Israel could not expect to receive American arms unless one or several of its neighbors received similar concessions. It was also obvious that when it comes to armaments the United States does not view Israel as being on a par with all the Arab countries, but rather as one of the countries in the Middle East to which arms may be given or sold.

Moreover, when Israel asked for arms it explicitly meant to be the first to make such a request and thus to steal a march on the Arab countries. It was successful in this, only thereby to accelerate the process of the distribution of arms to both Israel and the Arab countries, on the basis of quantitative equality not between Israel and all the Arab countries, but between Israel and each individual Arab country. If it is truly preferable that arms be supplied neither to Israel nor to the Arab countries rather than to Israel on an equal footing with each Arab country, Israel should perhaps change its strategy and explicitly inform the Americans what distribution it envis-

ages; on the other hand, it might be preferable to wait until the arms supply is imminent and only then express its opposition to the form it is to take. There are obvious advantages and disadvantages to each approach. In the first case, Israel is liable to completely undermine its objective of receiving military assistance and achieve only its negative aim, namely, that no arms be supplied to any party in the Middle East. In the second case, Israel might be too late and ultimately have no choice but to compromise and accept arms deliveries on an unequal footing between itself and all the Arab countries together. Sharett asks for Ben-Gurion's opinion.[1]

Note

1. See No. 407.

402. M. Sharett (Jerusalem) to W. Eytan. 21 October 1952

Copy: 130.16/2953/9

Sharett refers to the meeting with the Syrians on 9 October. According to the reports he has read about this meeting,[1] Israel's position is unsatisfactory. Any disinterested party reading these reports would receive the impression that whereas the Syrians had demonstrated good will towards solving a number of pressing and controversial issues, the Israelis indulged in formalistic and legalistic hairsplitting that complicated matters. This is particularly conspicuous with regard to the two main topics on the agenda: the future of the demilitarized zone and the proposal for a non-aggression pact. On the first of these, Israel's position fails any logical test. One cannot have it both ways: either Israel opposes any such discussion, which necessarily implies agreement to partition of the demilitarized zone; or it is willing to discuss the future of the demilitarized area, in which case its refusal to discuss the topic in the framework of the Mixed Armistice Commission, as the Syrians proposed, is mere hairsplitting — especially since Israel has always claimed that the Armistice Agreements can be amended without limit until they actually become peace treaties and has held that such gradual progress would help overcome Arab resistance to a peace treaty. Israel's insistence on a non-aggression pact is also astonishing. There are grounds for the Syrian argument that there is no practical difference between an armistice agreement and a non-aggression pact; in fact, the idea of a non-aggression pact was raised by the Jordanians in 1950, when they realized that it would be difficult for them to sign a full peace treaty with Israel. There is no reason why Israel should turn this Jordanian device into a matter of principle.

The report on the informal conversations with the Syrians after the conclusion of the official talks shows that the IDF representatives did in fact agree to partition of the demilitarized zone, with certain reservations regarding rights and territory. If that is Israel's policy, and if there is a real prospect of achieving an accord, there was no need to be stubborn about the framework for discussions or the form of the agreement. If Israel is prepared to make certain territorial concession, *a fortiori* it should agree to the formal framework for the discussions.

On the basis of this analysis and on the assumption that no one suggests letting the matter drop after one meeting and accepting responsibility for severing the contact that was established with so much effort, Sharett believes that the other party should be informed that Israel is prepared to hold a second meeting, without fixing a precise date now. In the meanwhile consultations should be arranged among Foreign Ministry staff, the army, and water and soil experts, in order to draft plans for the partition of the demilitarized zone that will be least detrimental to Israel's vital defense and development interests.

Notes

1. See No. 384 and n. 1 there.
2. See Nos. 408 and 409.

403. Sh. Divon [Paris] to R. Shiloah. 22 October 1952

Coded Tel. 279, 285; Inc.: 130.15/3744/1

Divon reports as follows from Paris: (1) He has learned from journalistic sources that Zakariah Lutfi and Sadiq were dispatched to the Egyptian Embassy in Paris on behalf of the officers' group in Egypt. (2) Sadiq himself, requesting absolute secrecy, reported that in the wake of many conversations with his fellow officers in Egypt he was told by a key member of the junta that they are considering the establishment of contacts with Israel in Paris and will inform him of their decision. This decision will be taken by the Supreme Council. He did not mention the name of the officer in question, since utmost secrecy is the watchword in Egypt, where they are terrified of leaks. The junta is aware of the contacts held so far, but Israel must not make the mistake of considering them to be official. He has been instructed to report directly to the junta, and consequently requested an explanation of Israel's position vis-à-vis the Naguib regime. In Divon's evaluation, there is no prospect of contacts or of Israel's receiving any message, but this incident attests to the serious attitude of some of the officers

in Egypt, and in any case provides an important conduit for relaying information and observations to Egypt.

Note

1. Sharett replied that in his opinion this information did not commit Israel to take an official initiative; rather, it must reconsider the proposals submitted by it previously (see No. 267) that had not yet merited an answer. On the other hand, it was desirable that Sadiq himself report to his superiors in Egypt that it had been made clear to him in his conversations with the Israelis how they wanted the talks to be conducted. As for Israel's position on Naguib's regime, Sharett instructed Divon to hand over to the Egyptians the evaluations consolidated in Foreign Ministry briefings. (See Sharett to Shiloah, 25 October 1952, 130.15/3744/1.)

404. Memorandum by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 22 October 1952

Copy: 130.20/2488/3

In the wake of recent developments connected with arms supplies to the Middle East, including Britain's decision to supply 14 jet aircraft to each of the Arab countries and to Israel, Sharett drafted a series of principles regarding Israel's policy on arms supply to the Middle East.

(1) One of Israel's most crucial and urgent objectives is to considerably increase the quantity of modern weapons in its possession.

(2) In the light of Israel's financial situation, it must make every effort to attain such weapons either as a grant or on long-term credit.

(3) Since the issue of regional defense preoccupies those most likely to supply arms to Israel, and will continue to do so for a long time, Israel should base its requests for military assistance on its willingness to participate in such defense. This disposition is not simply a tactic on Israel's part, but reflects its true policy.

(4) Nevertheless, Israel should emphasize at every opportunity the threat posed by its neighbors, especially as long as they refuse to sign peace treaties with it.

(5) Israel deserves special consideration for the following reasons: it is a single Jewish country surrounded by several Arab states; it has major economic problems; it is coping with large numbers of refugees and is undertaking development projects unparalleled in the Middle East; and, finally, its army has technical superiority in all that relates to the use of modern and complex weapons.

(6) Israel should steadfastly insist that the Arab states not be supplied any arms, even if they pay for them, so long as they refuse to hold peace talks

with Israel. Israel must not hesitate to advance this argument, even if it is not accepted by the Powers, since in the long run it will make it more difficult for them to ignore the issue of Arab-Israel peace and may perhaps make things somewhat easier for Israel with regards to arms supplies.

(7) Israel should insist that it be considered on a par with all the Arab states taken together when the quantity of arms to be supplied to the Middle East is determined. This principle of aggregate equality expresses the military reality, which is based on the existing political situation.

(8) Israel should object to any proposal that it receive the same quantity of weapons as each individual Arab state. Israel should explain that it prefers no arms at all for the Middle East to an allocation of weapons that would provide the Arab states with overwhelming superiority.

(9) It goes without saying that should Israel's argument not be accepted and it becomes clear that the Arabs are about to receive weapons on the basis of parity between each individual country and Israel, Israel will then at least demand its meager portion.

(10) Hence Israel should reject the British proposal that it supply it and each Arab state with 14 jet aircraft. Such a rejection is not only a matter of principle, but is practical as well, because the aircraft are obsolete and it is also doubtful whether Israel can raise the money to pay for them.

(11) When Israel asked Britain to supply it with jet aircraft, its goal was to restore the equilibrium destroyed when such planes were supplied to Egypt. It is now confronted by a proposal that not only will fail to reestablish the balance of power but will actually worsen it further relative to all the Arab countries taken together.

(12) The rejection of the British proposal should be accompanied by a renewal of the general request made in the last note to the Three Powers,[1] namely, that no additional weapons be supplied to the Arab countries as long as they maintain a state of war with Israel.

(13) Should it become clear that England is steadfast in its determination to sell these planes to the Arabs, Israel will have to consider whether to buy these aircraft, and, if so, to try and obtain more favorable terms with regard to the price and payment terms.

(14) In the interim, Israel should step up its efforts to obtain non-reimbursable aid from the United States.

(15) Public opinion in Great Britain and the United States should also be enlisted against giving or selling arms to the Arabs as long as they show no inclination to make peace and there is no confidence in their ability and willingness to participate in regional defense.

Note

1. No. 368.

405. Sh. Eliashiv (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 24 October 1952

Coded Tel. XA231; Inc.: 130.09/2930/18

Eliashiv accompanied Eban to a meeting with Zorin, the Soviet representative on the Ad Hoc Committee.[1] Eban expressed Israel's regret that the Palestine question had been placed on the agenda and added that Israel wants the General Assembly to issue a call to the parties to initiate unconditional direct negotiations, with no reference to previous resolutions. Israel hopes that the Russians will support this line, which coincides with their general approach.

Zorin replied cautiously that the Soviet Union generally supports the solution of problems through direct negotiations, but will determine its position only after hearing the parties and getting better acquainted with the problems. He expressed his willingness to meet the Israeli delegation at the appropriate time.

Note

1. Valerian Zorin, a Soviet deputy foreign minister.

406. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 25 October 1952

Notes

1. See No. 400.
2. See No. 412.
3. Ahmad Muhammad Farāg, Egyptian foreign minister from September 1952.
4. Sharett replied that he approved of the line proposed by Eban. The three major powers should be given the right of first refusal to be the sponsors of the resolution. Their refusal was certain, but such an approach was important tactically. As for the conversation with 'Azmi, he suspected that the latter was excessively optimistic, but it was necessary to wait until his forecasts had been tested. (See telegram Y749, 28 October 1952, 130.09/2330/11.)

   On 7 November Lourie reported on additional developments with regard to the wording of a draft resolution to conclude the Palestine debate. He wrote that the Israeli text had been favorably received by the British, Norwegians, and Dutch, and that the Israeli delegation was continuing its contacts to obtain a majority for the proposal. (Telegram X278, 130.09/2330/18.)

407. D. Ben-Gurion (Jerusalem) to M. Sharett. 26 October 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2422/8

Ben-Gurion disagrees with Sharett's conclusions concerning arms supplies to Israel.[1] There is no necessary parallel between supplying arms and providing military or non-military assistance. The military assistance that has so far been provided to Israel but not to the Arabs proves that under certain conditions Israel can enjoy some benefit without the Arabs' receiving the same benefit and to the same degree. Nor is it impossible that one or several of the Arab states, but not Israel, might receive reimbursable or non-reimbursable military assistance. Should a concrete situation arise and the Arabs, too, request military assistance, Israel must insist on the principle of parity, but it should not refrain from adopting a course of action that is likely to benefit it merely because of some hypothetical parallelism that may not materialize.

Note

1. No. 401.

408. D. Ben-Gurion (Jerusalem) to M. Sharett. 26 October 1952

Copy: 130.16/2953/9

Ben-Gurion reacts to the Foreign Minister's criticisms of the meeting with the Syrians.[1] He entirely agrees with Sharett's opinion that there should be no insistence on non-aggression pacts, since the armistice agreements are tantamount to them. On every other point he disagrees with Sharett, especially with his conclusion that the Syrians displayed good will about solving several of the disputed questions while Israel engaged in legalistic hair-splitting. The Syrians actually requested several things they do not have—territories and water rights—without offering anything in return. Every conflict can be resolved in this fashion. Israel must not renounce its exclusive rights over the Jordan and Sea of Galilee, unless the Syrians offer a suitable consideration. For his part, he does not see such compensation as realistic and practical.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 402.
2. See No. 392.
3. See No. 413.

409. Y. Tekoah (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan. 26 October 1952

Copy: 130.16/2953/9

Tekoah refers to Foreign Minister's letter to Eytan about the meeting with the Syrians on 9 October.[1] He agrees with Sharett's basic evaluation of the discussion and is aware that it is difficult to explain and justify the formalistic line adopted by Israel in these talks. It must be remembered, however, that the delegation espoused it in accordance with prior instructions based on information that the Syrians would propose rectifications in the cease-fire lines without nullifying the special status of the demilitarized zone. This was utterly unacceptable to Israel, and the only option was to strike the topic from the agenda by strict adherence to protocol. The meeting made it clear that the Syrians are in fact willing to abrogate the special status of the demilitarized zone and to sign an agreement between the two countries to that end. This being the case, Israel should continue negotiating, *inter alia* to create a more relaxed atmosphere, particularly while the General Assembly is in session, and also to reap political benefits. As for the Syrian proposals, he doubts whether Israel should agree to partition of the demilitarized zone, even if this leads to abrogation of the zone's special status. Such partition would represent a territorial concession on Israel's part, and the question on the agenda at the moment is whether Israel must insist that any accord in the area be conditional on defining the international boundary as the final border between Israel and Syria.

In summary, he concludes as follows: (1) In future stages of the negotiations Israel should ignore the formal framework of the accord. He believes that this can be done without explicitly renouncing its principled position, if Israel agrees to the proposal to start with discussion of practical issues. (2) The Syrians should be informed without delay that Israel is willing to hold a second meeting. (3) In the meanwhile, discussions and internal consultations between the Foreign Ministry and the IDF are called for, in order to determine Israel's basic position.

Notes

1. No. 402.
2. No. 382.

Editorial Note

Continued Negotiations with the Syrians

On 27 October, the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, Col. Taxis, sent the following telegram to Rav-Seren Friedlander, head of the Israeli delegation to the Commission:

"At meeting of 9 October Brigadier Dayan stated that he would approach Israel Government relative to a meeting, within framework of General Armistice Agreement, and aimed at discussion of ways and means to settle such outstanding differences between the two parties as the demilitarized zone (change of location of demarcation line), fishing rights, etc. Senior Syrian delegate is most anxious to have earliest possible answer from Senior Israel delegate on this matter. Will you please expedite."

On 31 October, Dayan met with Taxis to discuss the next stage of the negotiations. Dayan stressed that the Syrians were demanding territorial concessions without compensation and that their intention was to reach the water line; but Israel too has its own interests and certain demands concerning the water sources on the Syrian side of the international frontier. However, were the Syrians to agree to speak about territorial exchanges along the entire international frontier and on both sides thereof, and not merely about partition of the demilitarized zone, Israel would agree to enter serious discussions. Taxis replied that it was Israel and not Syria that was defending the sanctity of the international frontier and that he was prepared to seek Syrian agreement to continued negotiations on the basis of Dayan's proposal. Dayan requested that Syria's consent be put in writing. It was agreed that Dayan would address Taxis in writing and request formal confirmation from the Syrians of his proposal, and that Taxis would work on the Syrians to obtain the confirmation. It was made plain that this conclusion required approval by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. In order to obtain a final decision on the matter of the negotiations, a meeting was set for 6 November, with the participation of land and water experts—see Nos. 413 and 424. (See note for the record, end of October 1952, 130.02/2434/3.)

410. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 27 October 1952

Notes

1. The Israeli reply was drawn up in consultations with Sharett, as follows: Israel is always ready to investigate the possibility of progress towards peace through interim

agreements, such as the granting of free-port rights in Haifa, but such progress must be on a basis of mutuality. Israel expects that in return for such a concession Jordan would, for example, allow renewal of commercial relations between the two countries. A situation in which Israel opened Haifa to the Jordanians but they continued to observe the terms of the Arab League boycott was untenable. (See Eytan to Israel Missions Abroad, 29 October 1952, 130.02/2453/3.)

2. In File 130.02/2408/13.

411. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations. 28 October 1952

Coded Tel. 747; Outg.: 130.09/2330/11

Sharett asks Eliashiv to hold two talks on his behalf at the UN General Assembly: (1) with Vyshinsky or Zorin about *aliya* from Rumania, which has come to a standstill with no signs or prospects for its renewal; and (2) with the Czechs, concerning Oren's detention in Prague. Israel does not understand why he has not been released; why it has not been informed of the charges against him; and why he has not been brought to trial. Israel has no idea what crime is supposed to have been committed and the affair is casting a blight on relations between the two countries. His immediate release is requested.

Notes

1. See No. 398. In another telegram, Sharett asked Eliashiv to raise also the question of *aliya* from Hungary (see telegram YA764, 2 November 1952).
2. See Vol. 2, No. 249.

412. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 29 October 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2410/2

Rafael reports on a conversation with Mahmud 'Azmi, a member of the Egyptian delegation to the UN, with the participation of Abba Eban. The discussion centered on the Middle East, events in Egypt, and Egypt-Israel relations. 'Azmi indicated that the officers' revolt had been a long time in the planning — since 1947. Naguib himself joined the group only later, which explains his caution and hesitancy in the early stages. Naguib has become less constrained in his actions since the dismissal of 'Ali Māhir. According to 'Azmi, Naguib knows what he wants, and the regime enjoys enthusiastic support among the peasants. Things are different with the

urban population, where the Wafd Party still has a strong foothold. 'Azmi thinks that despite the regime's instability and other deficiencies, it represents a major turning point in Egyptian history. Nevertheless, such a regime is dependent on foreign military and economic assistance. For this reason, making British or American assistance to Egypt conditional on improved relations with Israel will fall upon attentive Egyptian ears.

It is clear to all that in the long run Naguib favors reducing tensions between Israel and Egypt. He is cautious, however, and will proceed in this direction step by step, trying first to resolve the problem of the Sudan and to reach an agreement with the Powers on regional defense. When Eban asked whether a call by the UN for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries could contribute towards this objective, 'Azmi replied strongly in the affirmative. He is convinced that the change that has taken place in the Arab world with regard to Israel will be reflected in the current session of the General Assembly. The Egyptian delegation has not yet received any instructions and awaits the foreign minister's arrival in New York. One obstacle to peace is represented by the professional troublemakers, such as Fadil Jamali and Shuqairy, whose extremism does not reflect the opinions of their governments.

Rafael's impression from this talk is that this time, in contrast to previous occasions, 'Azmi displayed great optimism about the prospects for an accord between Israel and Egypt, as well as about Egypt's joining a regional defense organization. Also of great importance is his emphasis on the role that the United States could play in achieving rapprochement between Israel and Egypt. 'Azmi promised to stay in touch with the Israelis and to consult with them again once he knows what line his delegation will follow in the General Assembly.

413. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion. 30 October 1952

Orig.: 43/5570/4125

Sharett wishes to clarify a number of matters related to their exchange of notes about the meeting with the Syrians.[1] Sharett did not assert that *he* had the impression that the Syrians displayed good will in these talks. His argument was rather that a *disinterested observer* reading the reports from the talks was likely to receive such an impression.

As for the subject in question, he does not believe that the issue of "compensation" must necessarily arise for every solution to the problem of the demilitarized zone. There are insignificant Israeli concessions, such as abandoning the al-Hamma salient, which in any case is not under Israeli control, or a small area near Dardara, and similar possibilities, which

would definitely be worth making in order to eliminate the demilitarized zone and have *the Syrians* recognize the remaining area as Israeli territory, without Israel's insisting on parallel territorial concessions by the Syrians. The same applies to the problem of water usage. His argument about the demilitarized zone is based on two facts: first, the IDF representatives who participated in the talks in any case discussed—albeit in an unofficial and noncommittal fashion — the possibility of partitioning the demilitarized zone; and second, their impression was that an agreement could be reached with the Syrians on this matter.

In view of this situation, he has scheduled a consultation at the Foreign Ministry to include representatives of the army, along with water and land experts, to determine whether it is possible to work out a plan for eliminating the demilitarized zone that would be acceptable to Israel and to which the Syrians might agree. Should such a plan be devised, he proposes that it be discussed before further steps are taken.

Note

1. See Nos. 402 and 408.

414. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 31 October 1952

Note

1. See No. 400.

415. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 31 October 1952

Coded Tel. XA260; Inc.: 130.09/2330/18

Eban summarizes the discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Arab refugee question, which wound up yesterday.[1] The discussion took place without the tension and bitterness typical of the past. The Arab speakers were no less irreconcilable and haughty than in previous sessions, but drew little response. The Israeli statement, in contrast, had a warm reception, even though it ruled out the idea of repatriation. The Arabs, realizing that they had no chance of passing a motion calling for repatriation, offered no amendment along these lines to the draft resolution. Several speakers were bold enough to hint to the Arabs that assistance would be terminated if not put to use for actual absorption. The Americans told the Israeli delegation that at this General Assembly session they intend to insist explicitly on absorption of the refugees and to drop the repatriation solution. This

information must be kept confidential. The Israeli argument that the Arabs are responsible both for creating the problem and for artificially perpetuating it is finally beginning to get through. The Arabs may try to regroup their routed forces to renew the campaign as part of the political debate, but for the moment it appears that the refugee problem is not so sharp a weapon as in the past.[2]

Notes

1. The Arab refugee problem was debated at a series of meetings of the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. On the table was the report of the UNRWA director and a draft resolution submitted by the member states of the Conciliation Commission, plus Great Britain, which called for reaffirming previous UN resolutions concerning the refugees and for increasing the assistance budget. During the course of the debate Eban criticized the Arab countries' political exploitation of the refugee question and called on them to cooperate with the United Nations and Israel in the resettlement of the refugees in the Arab countries. At the end of the debate the draft resolution was approved by a large majority. (See *GAOR, Seventh Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee*, 3rd-7th meetings, 23-30 October 1952.)
2. The question of the Arab refugees was discussed again on 6 November when the General Assembly plenum considered the report and draft resolution approved by the Ad Hoc Political Committee. After the debate this draft was accepted without changes. (See *GAOR, Seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 391st meeting, 6 November 1952.)

416. E. Elath (London) to M. Sharett and W. Eytan. 31 October 1952

Coded Tel. 10195; Inc.: 130.09/2319/3

Elath reports on the conclusions of the consultation on Israel's policy on arms supplies to the Middle East, held in the embassy in London in the wake of Sharett's memorandum.[1]

(1) The American and British desire to arm the Arabs is an irrevocable fact that Israel cannot change. It stems from these countries' desire to appease the Arabs and integrate them — particularly Egypt — in regional defense plans. Consideration of Israel's interests will not sway them from their intention, and it must be assumed that the armament process will continue and expand.

(2) The willingness of the British to supply Israel and each of the Arab states with 14 jet aircraft is also a reality that cannot be changed. There is no political restriction on purchasing additional planes, and it is known that the Syrians are already negotiating such purchases.

(3) In these circumstances, Israel has no choice but to acquire those aircraft that it has been offered. The military attaché has already received instructions to negotiate their purchase.

(4) Though the prospects of success are doubtful, the Foreign Minister's suggestion should be followed and the public campaign against supply of weapons to the Arabs continued. In addition to the steps laid down by Sharett, an official approach should be made to the three Powers with a request for a speedy reply to the Israeli note about the arming of Arab countries.[2] While there is no hope that this will prevent arms supplies to the Arabs, it might make it easier to obtain some compensation from the two powers, in the form of both increased financial and military assistance and political guarantees.

(5) Israel should reconsider its policy on participation in Middle East defense. While it must continue to argue that no effective defense is possible without peace between Israel and its neighbors, this argument must nevertheless be moderated by Israeli willingness to join a comprehensive regional defense framework as a member with equal rights and obligations. This, of course, requires a decision of principle that only the Government can take.

Notes

1. See No. 401.
2. No. 368.

417. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 2 November 1952

Notes

1. The reference is to an Arab diplomatic mission that came to Bonn to work against the reparations agreement. The delegation was received with marked coolness in the German capital. (See Consulate in Munich to Walter Eytan, 22 October 1952, 130.02/2417/6.)
2. See No. 427.

418. A. Eban [New York] to M. Sharett. 3 November 1952

Note

1. See No. 415.

419. G. Rafael (New York) to W. Eytan. 3 November 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2413/29

Rafael reports on his conversation with Shiva Rao, a member of the Indian delegation to the UN. Rafael asked whether there had been any progress concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel. He added that the promise made to Israel[1] had not yet been kept, and this was surprising. Rao replied that no importance should be ascribed to the delay, which was purely technical in nature. He even suggested that the matter would be resolved by the appointment of a non-resident minister, perhaps the Indian minister to Ethiopia. In any event he promised to pass on Israel's concern to Nehru. The conversation then turned to the General Assembly debate on Palestine. Rao noted that Arab extremism causes concern to India and all the Asian delegations. The Palestine item was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly against their advice, and they fear that Arab extremism might have prejudicial effects on other matters of importance to the Asians, such as the question of South Africa or events in North Africa. At the end of their conversation Rao proposed that Israeli representatives meet the head of the Indian delegation, Mrs. Pandit,[3] to discuss all aspects of the Palestine problem as well as the topics placed on the agenda by the Asian bloc.

Notes

1. See No. 71.
2. See No. 415.
3. Vijaya L. Pandit, head of the Indian delegation to the UN General Assembly. In notes to this letter Sharett proposed to express to Mrs. Pandit Israel's astonishment that no notification had as yet been received concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. (See Sharett to Walter Eytan, 4 November 1952, 130.02/2385/30.)

420. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 5 November 1952

Coded Tel. WIA650; Outg.: 93.01/2208/24

Eban transmits his initial evaluation in the wake of Eisenhower's victory. He requests that the contents of the telegram be passed on to the Government.

The consensus is that the election was decided by the Korean question, which was slipped into the campaign at the last moment. The prospects for an end to the Korean conflict, as put forward by the Republicans, persuaded many undecided voters at the last minute.

The fear of Communism, both domestic and foreign, has given rise to extreme social conservatism and suspicion of liberal movements among a large segment of the American people. Another factor was the natural tendency to change the guard after twenty years of Democratic administrations. Those who know the president-elect say that he is in the habit of working deliberately and quietly and relying on his aides. Consequently much will depend on the latter. There will obviously be a fierce battle between the new president, who is an internationalist and easy-going, and the Republican leadership, whose conservative elements were most successful.

One can anticipate a reduction in economic and technical foreign aid, and perhaps in military assistance as well.

Eban does not foresee sweeping changes in U.S. policy towards Israel, since this is already anchored in tradition, but Arab policy might become less flexible on the assumption that the new administration is more favorably disposed towards them; this might find its initial expression at the current session of the United Nations. Hence Israel must seek to exploit the remaining months of the Democratic administration to make some gains with regard to economic and military assistance.[6]

For the Israel Embassy the Republican victory represents a sweeping change. In recent years a ramified network of contacts has been built up in the Administration and Congress, based on cooperation with the Democratic administration and broad public sympathy. A whole new network of contacts will have to be developed now, relying on Republican go-betweens who will work quietly and with discipline.

The election results indicate that an overwhelming majority of American Jews cast their ballots for Stevenson. The Republicans are undoubtedly aware of this, but it is quite likely that long-term considerations will lead them to seek to foster good ties with the Jewish community.

Some Jewish reactions express uncertainty and instability, and some even speak of immigration to Israel, but Eban has no doubts that this will pass. Because the rebirth of Israel and the growing economic and public prominence of American Jewry both took place during the Roosevelt-Truman era, which provided a comfortable and congenial home. Now the Jews feel like orphans abandoned in the care of a stepfather. At this hour the Jews need to be comforted and look to Israel, expecting it to take dignified action in all spheres, internal and foreign.

The reaction at the United Nations is one of open concern and disappointment. Only the Muslims and some of the Far Eastern countries, including Formosa, are happy. At the same time, most feel reassured by

Eisenhower's international experience and the balance in the Senate, where there is a guaranteed majority for a positive and active international policy.

Notes

1. Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican of Massachusetts, 1937–January, 1953.
2. Sen. Wayne L. Morse of Oregon announced in January, 1953, that he was quitting the Republican Party and would henceforth call himself an "Independent Republican."
3. See No. 428.
4. Jacob Blaustein, president of the American Jewish Committee.
5. Edward Jacobson, President Truman's one-time business partner.
6. A few days later Eban stated that Congressman Jacob Javits (Republican of New York), the industrialist David Sarnoff, and Lazarus, who were close to the president-elect, had agreed to be liaisons with Eisenhower. Eban also stressed that Abba Hillel Silver should not be employed in this capacity, "which requires an absence of publicity and absolute obedience to the authority of the Embassy, with no ancillary personal accounts." (See his telegram WIA660, 8 November 1952, 93.01/2208/11.)

421. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations (New York). 5 November 1952

Notes

1. Rafael cabled that he had learned from a reliable source in the U.S. delegation to the UN that the Arabs would attempt to carry a resolution condemning Israel for transferring the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem (3 November 1952, File 130.09/2330/18).
2. With regard to the Swedish initiative and proposal in late 1950, see Vol. 5, No. 401.
3. The reference is to the United Nations resolution requiring the recall of diplomatic representatives from Franco's Spain; see Vol. 5, No. 22, and n. 2 there.
4. The UN resolution of December, 1949, on the internationalization of Jerusalem.

422. E. Elath [London] to M. Sharett. 5 November 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2410/9

Elath refers to the Prime Minister's comments on his memorandum about Arab weapons procurement and the need to sign a non-aggression pact with the Arabs.[1] He has received the Prime Minister's response to the memorandum[2] and does not agree with the absolute rejection of the idea of a non-aggression pact. He himself—both before he wrote the memorandum and after he read the Prime Minister's reaction—consulted with experts in

international law. Their conclusion was that from the legal perspective, at least, his proposal has some basis, although there could be political reservations about it. With regard to the question itself, he would like to make the following points:

(1) The idea of a non-aggression pact has already been raised by Israel, most recently during the negotiations with the Syrians.

(2) The Prime Minister is correct when he asserts that a peace treaty is preferable to a non-aggression pact, but in the present circumstances it is better to seek progress towards a final agreement through the intermediate stage of a non-aggression pact, even though there is no guarantee that the Arabs will agree even to the latter. In any event, efforts to achieve a non-aggression pact are likely to win points for Israel in its relations with the Great Powers, who are troubled first and foremost by the security aspect of Arab-Israeli relations.

(3) Elath does not agree with the Prime Minister that a non-aggression pact will require concessions by Israel. Such agreements generally do not deal with territorial matters, and as for the refugees—Israel would be better off starting negotiations about this before negotiating peace. The resettlement of the refugees in the Arab countries would deprive the Arabs of their strongest bargaining chip, one with which world opinion, especially in the United States and Great Britain, sympathizes.

Elath notes that he too believes that Israel must never stop sounding its demand for a peace treaty, and is aware of the propaganda value of such a demand. In the present circumstances, however, it is unrealistic. In the pragmatic talks that Israel conducts with the Great Powers it should be more specific and speak of a non-aggression pact. Such an accord is important in itself both for Israel and for the Arabs, and also as a step towards full peace between the two sides.

Notes

1. No. 386.
2. No. 392.
3. Hersch Lauterpacht, professor of international law at Cambridge University.
4. The appendix, found in the file, has been omitted here.

423. Sh. Divon (Paris) to R. Shiloah. 6 November 1952

Coded Tel. 60; Inc.: 130.15/3744/1

Divon reports on his conversation with 'Abbud, who has returned from Egypt.[1] 'Abbud spoke with Naguib along the lines of the talks that took

place between Divon and Egyptian representatives in Paris. According to 'Abbud, Naguib agreed that efforts should be made to put an end to the dispute, but domestic problems and consideration for the other Arab states complicate the matter. He is endeavoring to be moderate, and pointed out as an example that he had allowed a ship laden with food for Israel to pass through the Suez Canal. Naguib suggested talking with the other officers in the junta. 'Abbud did so, and found a receptive ear with Nasser, 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir, and Ahmad Shawqi. He says he also tried to spread the gospel with the Salem brothers. He believes that it is most important to continue explaining the Israeli position. For his part he will continue his efforts in that direction, since he is persuaded that it is a vital Egyptian interest.

Divon replied that if Naguib adopts a wise and pragmatic policy towards Israel the latter would be prepared to purchase various Egyptian goods. 'Abbud answered that such a proposal amounts to decisive proof of Israel's good intentions. He is willing to speak about it with Naguib and report to Divon on the outcome of the talk. He handed over a list of the commodities that Egypt can sell, especially cotton. Another meeting was scheduled in advance of 'Abbud's departure for Cairo.

Note

1. The first paragraphs of the telegram deal with a report on internal affairs in Egypt, relations among the junta members, the chances for solving the crisis in relations with Britain, and Egypt's integration into Middle East defense.

424. Consultation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tel Aviv, 6 November 1952)

Copy: 130.16/2954/4

The consultation was convened to discuss the continuation of the negotiations with the Syrians and to examine the implications of Israel's development and water plans for the negotiations. Participants included IDF personnel, water experts, and Foreign Ministry officials.[1]

Mr. Blass[2] reviewed the irrigation and development plans of Israel and its neighbors. His conclusion is that the water sources must be divided up in such a way that development in each country can be independent of the others. The Arab countries can interfere with Israel's development plans, whereas Israel can obstruct only Jordan's irrigation plans. In engineering

terms, the waters of the Upper Jordan should be earmarked for Israel, while those of the Yarmuk should be assigned to Jordan. Syria can be compensated for losing the Banias by use of water from the Yarmuk.

Aluf-Mishneh Eshet[4] reviewed the military problems. In principle, the General Staff is not willing to give up a single inch, but for the sake of the country's development is prepared to discuss certain concessions. The al-Hamma salient makes no major contribution to security and is also difficult to defend. This is not the case for the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee, which is important both for the defense of the Sea of Galilee and as a jumping-off point for attacking Syria.

Shiloah presented a political analysis. Tactically, it is important for Israel to maintain contacts with the Syrians, but in his estimation there are no prospects at the moment of attaining a serious agreement that could justify concessions. For his own part, he would recommend maximum restraint, unless the matter in hand is of urgent and vital importance for the country's economic development.

Tekoah analyzed the question from the perspective of international law. Israel is bound by several Mandate-era agreements that give the Syrians and Lebanese water and fishing rights. Israel can choose between two possibilities: (1) a three-way arrangement among these countries to settle all water and fishing questions; (2) negotiations with the Syrians. In his opinion, confirming the fishing rights that the Syrians previously enjoyed will give Israel the possibility of making general arrangements without binding it in the future.

Eytan summed up the discussion. One of the things that had become clear in the consultation is that it is impractical to restrict the scope of the talks with the Syrians in the absence of an overall plan. An entirely different question is whether it is possible today to negotiate an overall plan. He informed the participants that the views presented at the meeting will be brought to the attention of the Foreign Minister. It is up to the Government to decide, in the light of what has been said, whether to continue negotiating with the Syrians, and, if so, what instructions to give to the delegation to the talks.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 274
2. Simcha Blass, head of the Water Department in the Ministry of Agriculture.
3. See No. 60 and n. 3 there.
4. Aluf-Mishneh Shalom Eshet, the Prime Minister's military advisor.

425. A. Eban [Washington] to W. Eytan. 7 November 1952

Note

1. See No. 421.

426. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 8 November 1952

Notes

1. See Goitein to the United States Division, 13 November 1952, 130.20/2460/6.
2. No. 404.
3. See No. 428.
4. See No. 361.
5. See No. 406.

427. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Embassies in Washington and London. 9 November 1952

Note

1. Reactions to this telegram: Elath stated that he had spoken with Bowker of the Foreign Office, who had promised to pass on Israel's request to his superiors. As for the press, its attitude was sympathetic and understanding. (See telegram to Eytan, No. 10221, 10 November 1952, 93.04/43/11.) Eban reported that in the wake of the interest displayed by Acheson in the affair he would try to speak with him and with Abe Feinberg. (See his telegram to Eytan, W669, 12 November 1952, 130.09/2309/11.) See also Nos. 434 and 442.

428. A. Eban (Washington) to the United States Division. 10 November 1952

Notes

1. See No. 420.
2. At the same time, talks were under way with the heads of the Export-Import Bank concerning the dispatch of a survey mission to Israel to investigate the possibilities of a new development loan or a program to refinance existing loans. (See Eban to Sharett, [W622], 8 November 1952, 93.01/2203/15.)
3. See No. 414.

429. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations (New York). 10 November 1952

Notes

1. No. 425.
2. The UN delegation did not respond to this telegram. After a reminder from Tel Aviv (Eytan to the Israel delegation at the United Nations, Y828, 19 November 1952), Lourie cabled back that the French and Belgian delegations were opposed to a debate on Jerusalem, and the French would even work among Latin American delegations to this end (see his telegram, X316, dated 19 November 1952, 130.09/2330/18).

430. A. E. Levin (Washington) to the United States Division. 10 November 1952

431. E. Elath (London) to W. Eytan. 10 November 1952

Coded Tel. 10223; Inc.: 130.09/2319/3

Elath was summoned to Bowker, who informed him that Israel could purchase more jet aircraft from Britain than previously authorized.[1] The rate of supply depends on the type of Meteor aircraft chosen by Israel. He also indicated that Israel would be able to train more pilots in Britain than in the past. Although it was not stated explicitly, it was Elath's impression that the Arabs will receive similar concessions. At the beginning of the talk Bowker said that the reply to Israel's note on the arming of the Arab countries[2] will be transmitted orally, with the following principles: (1) The Three-Power Declaration is still valid and assures the security of the states in the region. (2) The supply of arms to certain Arab countries in the region stems from British commitments to these countries; Britain cannot demand that they undertake to make peace with Israel as a condition for weapon supplies. Elath replied that his government would be extremely disappointed by this reply and will continue to take steps to defend the country and preserve its security.

Notes

1. See No. 416.
2. No. 368.
3. See No. 432. Following this response, Sharett had a talk with British Ambassador Evans. He noted, *inter alia*, that as a citizen of the world he was appalled at how large quantities of modern weapons were likely to be placed in the hands of countries that

had never expressed any willingness to fight for the sake of democracy and peace. (See Yapou to Elath, 18 November 1952, 93.04/42/13.)

432. J. Bowker [London] to E. Elath (London). 11 November 1952

Notes

1. See No. 431.
2. No. 368.

433. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington) and E. Elath (London). 12 November 1952

Notes

1. See No. 427.
2. See ibid., n. 1.

434. E. Herlitz [Washington] to the United States Division. 12 November 1952

Notes

1. See No. 433.
2. Close to the time of dispatch of this telegram and No. 433, the spokesman of the Bonn government published the following statement:

   At its meeting yesterday the government rejected the demand by the [Arab] League to postpone the [reparations] agreement for an unspecified period. The League rejected the German proposal to subject shipments to Israel to international inspection with regard to war matériel. Bonn has notified the League that it is prepared to discuss its requests as long as the agreement has not been ratified by the parliament. For technical reasons such ratification is impossible until the end of the year and this will provide an opportunity for reaching a satisfactory agreement with the Arab states. Bonn stands strongly on the sacred principle of upholding contracts.

   (See the version of the announcement as telegrammed by Eytan to London, 12 November 1952, 130.09/2319/2.)

435. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 13 November 1952

Note

1. Eban spoke in the debate on Korea in the First (Political) Committee—*GAOR, Seventh Session, First Committee*, 522nd meeting, 14 November 1952, pp. 94–96.

436. Oral Message by the United States Ambassador in Israel [Tel Aviv, 13 November 1952]

Note

1. This communiqué was delivered orally at a meeting with the Foreign Minister on 13 November and was a reply to the Israeli note; see No. 368 and n. 2 there. The written version was taken down by the ambassador and transmitted to the Foreign Ministry the next day. For a full report on the conversation, see No. 439.

437. Agreement between Jordan and Israel (Jerusalem, 13 November 1952)

Note

1. See No. 150; compare also No. 521.

438. A. Aroch (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 13 November 1952

Coded Tel. QIA297; Inc.: 130.09/2325/5

Aroch cables Levavi in the Foreign Ministry. He contacted Appelt, the East German Ambassador, concerning the demand for reparations from East Germany. Appelt said that at this moment he could express only his personal opinion, which is that the issue of reparations is directly linked to that of a peace treaty with Germany. He is aware how much Israel desires a peace treaty and has no doubt that when this question is resolved, that of reparations will be too. He reiterated that this is his personal opinion and added no further clarification. Neither did he refer to the statement by the East German minister during his visit to Bonn.

Notes

1. See No. 371 and n. 2 there; see also No. 378.
2. That same day Aroch reported on the call paid him by the first secretary of the U.S. Embassy. The latter questioned Aroch concerning Israel's attempts to obtain reparations from East Germany and noted U.S. apprehensions that Israel, in its efforts to obtain reparations, might take steps liable to be interpreted by the world, or by the Russians, as *de facto* recognition of East Germany. Aroch explained that, apart from what had been published officially, Israel had made no additional moves. (See Aroch's telegram to the Foreign Ministry, QIA298, 13 November 1952, 130.09/2325/6.)

439. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 14 November 1952

Notes

1. Dated 13 November 1952, File 130.09/2809/7. The telegram is a brief on-the-spot report on the talk with Davis.
2. Francis Henry Russell, as of 13 October counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Israel.
3. See No. 414.
4. See No. 368.
5. See Nos. 433 and 434.
6. See No. 436.

440. E. Elath (London) to M. Sharett. 14 November 1952

Notes

1. No. 432.
2. See No. 436.
3. The Foreign Ministry archives contain a number of documents dealing with the conclusions and recommendations of research groups on Middle East defense; see, for example, "Israel and the Defense of the Middle East," 4 November 1952, 130.02/2445/12.

441. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division (Tel Aviv) and E. Elath (London). 15 November 1952

Notes

1. See No. 439 and n. 1 there.
2. See No. 366.

3. There is no report in Foreign Ministry files on a conversation between Eban and Acheson at this time.
4. Elath replied that he was in total agreement with Eban, but that the public campaign in the United States should be coordinated with a diplomatic campaign in London, and in any case the diplomatic campaign in London had to precede public activity in the United States. (See Elath to Eban, EWT4, 17 November 1952, 93.01/2208/21.)

442. E. Elath [London] to W. Eytan. 15 November 1952

Coded Tel.; Outg.: 93.04/43/11

Elath had a meeting with Roberts, head of the German Department in the Foreign Office, concerning the Arab campaign against the Reparations Agreement.[1] Roberts said that he had spoken with the German representative in Britain, who assured him that there is no reason to fear that Adenauer will not comply with the agreement. Consequently the British see no need to intervene, particularly since any British or American intervention would be likely to strengthen the fears of German industrialists that this is a plot to interfere with German commercial links with Arab countries to the benefit of British or American trade. Roberts related that the Arabs, too, had asked the British for assistance and had been turned down.

Note

1. See Nos. 427 and 433.

443. Sh. Divon (Paris) to R. Shiloah. 15 November 1952

Coded Tel. 171; Inc.: 130.15/3744/1

Divon reports on the recent unfavorable turn in Egyptian policy.[2] 'Abbud has left for Egypt, promising to explain to Naguib and his intimates that Israel cannot maintain its conciliatory position forever in light of the change in their stance, and that abandoning the policy of moderation could be detrimental to Egypt. He hopes to receive a reply within ten days. Sadiq, too, sent a detailed written message to Cairo along similar lines. The day before yesterday he showed Divon the reply he had received, to the effect that his letter had been discussed seriously and he should continue his talks with Israel. He believes that Israel's position is quite clear to the Egyptians. In reply to Divon's argument that the situation should be clarified without delay, he said that he will write back at once, emphasizing the

need for contacts. Should he receive no reply he will ask permission to return to Cairo.

Divon's conclusions: Naguib's actions are a logical result of the combination of factors at work in Cairo; it must not be assumed that at this stage he would be affected by reminders of unkept promises and hints that Israel might change its position. The reply to such a message would almost certainly be evasive and would not alter the situation. Should Naguib continue to move away from moderation, Israel may have to modify its policy and adopt an approach of general and effective harassment in the press, public opinion, contacts with the Great Powers, and other actions. In such a case Israel would have to bear in mind the fact that Britain, and to some extent the United States, are not interested in pressuring Naguib as long as they think there is still some hope of concluding a Mideast security pact. A message to the Egyptians with an unmistakable hint as to the outcome of an unsatisfactory reply would be justified only should Israel be convinced that Naguib's change of policy is permanent and requires some reaction—and that Israel can cope with the consequences of that reaction.

To sum up: Since Israel's message has been transmitted to Cairo, he suggests that Israel forgo a direct approach for the moment and decide on further action in light of the reactions reported by the go-betweens. He assumes that the waiting period will be around two weeks. In the interim, it is worth having articles appear in the American press expressing disappointment with and criticism of Naguib (he will probably ascribe them to Israeli influence); it is also expedient to initiate informal talks with important Americans and Egyptians in order to express disappointment at Naguib's behavior and to relay the hope that he understands the damage an anti-Israeli line will cause him.[4]

Notes

1. Not found.
2. November was an active month in both domestic and foreign affairs in Egypt. Domestically the cabinet granted Gen. Naguib unlimited powers for a six-month period, released many political prisoners, and announced economic reforms intended to encourage foreign investment. The situation of the Wafd Party, on the other hand, did not improve, and approval of its list of candidates for the elections was made contingent on the resignation of its veteran leader, Nahas Pasha. In foreign affairs, Egypt signed an agreement with the Sudanese Liberation Front specifying a timetable and modalities for Sudanese independence. In the international arena it played a central role in the international campaign against the reparations agreement between Israel and Germany.
3. Not found.
4. See No. 489.

444. Sh. Bendor (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan. 16 November 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2418/20

Bendor asks several questions and raises a few ideas concerning the Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal. Is it Israel's intention to refrain from *specifically* raising the Suez Canal at this session of the General Assembly? Why must Israel allow the Arabs to attack it from all sides without reacting? In his opinion, it is not enough to include the Suez matter in the general discussion of the Palestine question; rather, the Three Powers should be notified that Israel intends to raise the question in the Security Council. If Israel does not exert pressure on the Great Powers, they will view this as acquiescence in the current situation. Lastly, Bendor asks whether it is not worthwhile to respond to the Three Powers' replies to Israel's note.[1]

Note

1. See Nos. 432 and 436.

Some Foreign Ministry comments on this memorandum follow. Levavi to Eytan: "I am extremely doubtful. In my opinion we should now be focusing our discussions with the Powers on the problems of Middle East armaments, whereas at the General Assembly we ought to leave the amount of attention given to the special Suez problem, in the framework of the delegation's appearance in the Palestine item, to tactical considerations—in essence, perhaps our line on the subject will be determined according to the conduct of the Powers on the general Arab front. A. Levavi, 19 November."

Sharett to Eytan: "While we are debating a major new development has intervened: the impounding of the meat [see No. 462]. It is clear that we must complain to the Security Council. I understand that you are still waiting for a detailed report. Will we get one? We must act swiftly. M.S., 24 November."

445. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 18 November 1952

Notes

1. Dana Schmidt, *New York Times* correspondent in Israel.
2. No. 441.

446. G. Rafael (New York) to W. Eytan. 19 November 1952

Notes

1. Eric Stein, an official in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs in the State Department.
2. The reference is to Arab initiatives to submit a draft resolution summing up the Palestine debate as a counterweight to the draft sponsored by the Israeli delegation. Following internal debates and the rejection of extremist texts, the Pakistani delegate submitted a draft resolution calling for affirmation of previous UN resolutions, increasing the membership of the Conciliation Commission, and transferring its headquarters to Jerusalem. (See the daily summary of the Research Department, 1 December 1952, 130.03/1973/12; *GAOR, Seventh Session, First Committee*, 32nd meeting, 3 December 1952, pp. 183–85.)
3. The Conciliation Commission session in Paris in the autumn of 1951.

447. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 19 November 1952

Notes

1. See No. 446.
2. Sir Ponsonby Moore Crosthwaite, deputy British permanent representative at the United Nations.
3. Michael S. Williams, an advisor in the British delegation to the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly.

448. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 19 November 1952

Notes

1. See No. 446.
2. Sharett advised not raising the question of compensation; however, were Eban asked to make a defined and binding declaration on this subject at the General Assembly, he should respond that he required the approval of his government. On merits, Israel would oppose payment of compensation at a rate determined by the United Nations and would insist upon payments based on an agreement. (Telegram to Eban, Y832, 20 November 1952, 130.09/2330/11.)

449. British Commonwealth Division [Tel Aviv] to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 20 November 1952

Notes

1. See No. 432.
2. The minister's comments have not been found.

450. G. Rafael (New York) to R. Shiloah. 20 November 1952

Orig.: 130.15/3738/23

Rafael reports about the atmosphere and mood prevailing at the UN General Assembly session.[1] A series of disasters and crises, including the death of Feller,[2] the death of President Weizmann, and the American election results, have created a troubled atmosphere. At the same time, it is incumbent upon Israel to act forcefully on those issues that affect it. This time, Israel took the initiative and submitted a draft resolution, conceived and drafted at Rafael's desk, calling for direct negotiations. The Arabs, for their part, propose abolishing the Conciliation Commission and replacing it with a seven-member committee to implement UN resolutions.[4] So as to encourage its supporters, Israel is trying to appear in a moderate light during the initial stages of the debate. It will avoid bringing up the past and endeavor to work out proposals for a solution, in the form of slogans more than in practical form. One of the possibilities is to declare that Israel does not wish to become a wedge between the Arab countries, but rather to act as a bridge. This slogan can be taken to imply that in peace negotiations with Egypt Israel would be prepared to consider an arrangement providing free passage between Sinai and Jordan, on condition that this corridor remain under Israeli sovereignty. At this stage Israel will avoid going into detail and making commitments.

Israel's conciliatory stance notwithstanding, it is to be feared that the Arabs will launch a vigorous attack against Israel. This apprehension has led several delegations to consider calling upon both parties, even before the start of the Palestine debate, to avoid mutual recriminations and attacks. It cannot be assumed that the Arabs will reply positively to this, and their reaction will strengthen Israel's supporters.

In addition to General Assembly matters, Rafael raises several thoughts concerning Israel's Arab policy. He fears that Israel's attitude towards the new regime in Egypt is excessively naive, jumping at any sign of moderation and ignoring all other facts. In his opinion, the new regime evolving in Egypt aims to strengthen that country through a moderate and carefully

considered foreign policy and domestic social reforms, but without obligating itself to refrain from bringing its enhanced military power to bear against Israel, in due time. Generally speaking, the more deeply he examines Israel's relations with the Arabs over the years, the more he is convinced that the problem can be solved only if Israel follows a path that on the one hand combines a moderate campaign of persuasion with diplomatic action and on the other hand develops a potential of strength and the capacity to create dangerous situations for hostile countries. Egypt's recent efforts to foil the Reparations Agreement is the best possible proof of the need to demonstrate strength. Egypt publicly asserts that it is at war with Israel. Were this proclamation made by some other country with regard to its relations with another country, it would be taken as an overt declaration of war and lead to hostilities, while Israel did not react.

Notes

1. The present letter is the only document found from a private exchange of correspondence. It is included here because it sheds light on moods and trends of thought in the Israel delegation to the United Nations.
2. See No. 176 and n. 3 there.
3. President Weizmann died on 9 November.
4. See No. 446 and n. 2 there.

451. E. Sasson (Ankara) to R. Shiloah. 20 November 1952

Orig.: 130.15/3744/1

Sasson criticizes Foreign Ministry policy towards the new regime in Egypt. The uncontrolled venom of the Egyptians and the other Arab representatives at the General Assembly, the Egyptian-led Arab assault against German reparations, and the recent actions to intensify the economic boycott all prove that there is no tendency to moderation towards Israel in the Arab world generally, and in Egypt in particular. Hopes that the revolution in Egypt would be accompanied by an improvement in the Arab world's attitude vis-à-vis Israel have faded. Arab anti-Israel activities have in fact been increasing — pursued this time not by discredited leaders with whom the world has long since grown disgusted, but by a new regime, modern and reformist, which claims to be ushering in a new era and which is universally admired.

His intention in this letter is not to discourage Shiloah or Divon but rather to reiterate to them his opinion that action in the Arab world must embrace many countries and spheres. There must be a proliferation of

links with important personalities and journalists, better intelligence sources, improved broadcasts to Arab countries, and so on and so forth. In addition, an effort must be made to find a direct and reliable channel to Gen. Naguib that will convey to him unequivocally Israel's positive evaluation of his actions, but will also make him understand that he will not be allowed to use Israel in order to consolidate his regime in Egypt or make political gains in the West. He believes that these efforts should be made before the Republicans assume office, since—according to what he gathers from reading the Arab press—the Arabs are currently examining all sorts of possibilities and proposals for winning the favor of the new administration in the United States.

Note

1. See No. 395.

452. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 21 November 1952

Notes

1. Sharett asked Eban whether he anticipated any danger of an initiative for a draft resolution bridging between the Israeli and Arab drafts. (Telegram dated 21 November 1952, 130.09/2330/11.)
2. Sharett approved Eban's proposal; he also suggested hinting to the Americans that their renewed activity on the question of returning the refugees hinders progress towards paying them compensation. (See Sharett to Eban, Y842, 24 November 1952, 130.09/2330/11.)

453. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 21 November 1952

Notes

1. Edward G. Platt, a State Department official.
2. Andrew D. Fritzlan, State Department official, formerly consul and first secretary in the U.S. Legation in Amman.
3. Thus in the original, but the intention was evidently 350,000.

454. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 21 November 1952

Notes

1. See No. 453.
2. See No. 462 and n. 1 there.

455. E. Sasson (Ankara) to W. Eytan. 21 November 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2410/1

Sasson refers to Elath's conversation with Mahmud Fawzi, the Egyptian ambassador in London, about which he received a report in a personal telegram from Sharett.[1] There is nothing new in Fawzi's remarks to the effect that Egypt is demanding an overland corridor to Jordan; the same idea was raised in a conversation which he and Shiloah had three and a half years ago with the Egyptian representative to the Lausanne session of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, 'Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa.[2] Evidently this principle has remained unchanged and is likely to be raised whenever the question of an accord between Israel and Egypt is discussed. It must be assumed that Fawzi's statement was made in accordance with specific instructions he received before leaving for London, based on the assumption that the matter of an accord with Israel would crop up.

The question now is how Israel should react. First, it must root out the assumption, widely held in Israel, that there are no conflicts of interest—political or territorial—between Israel and Egypt, and that Egyptian support of Arab policy results primarily from considerations of Arab solidarity or from the lack of suitable groundwork for peace in Egypt. Second, in its broadcasts Israel should emphasize the development work it has undertaken in the Negev and how important and vital this area is to its absorption policy. Third, it must make the Western countries understand that the new Egypt of Gen. Naguib, ostensibly so moderate and realistic, nurtures expansionist aspirations at Israel's expense. Fourth, all Israeli representatives who come into contact with Egyptians or other Arabs should be instructed to reject, immediately and unambiguously, any proposal for territorial changes as absurd and unrealistic. These suggestions are only an initial reaction; he will return to the topic when he receives further details about the conversation.[3]

Notes

1. Sharett reported on a conversation between the Turkish and Egyptian ambassadors in London, whose contents were revealed to Israel by a most reliable source. In the conversation, Mahmud Fawzi, the Egyptian Ambassador, stated that Egypt's conditions for a peace agreement with Israel were: (1) an overland corridor linking Egypt with the other Arab states, but not necessarily annexed to Egypt; (2) payment of a sum of money large enough to resettle the Arab refugees in other Arab countries, not necessarily to be paid by Israel, but perhaps by the United States. (See Sharett to Eban, Sasson, and Elath, MT19, 130.09/2377/1.)
2. See Vol. 4, No. 178.
3. See also Nos. 459 and 468.

Editorial Note

The Prague Trial

On 20 November, the trial began in Prague of Rudolf Slanský and his 13 colleagues (see No. 51 and n. 2 there), who were accused of espionage, treason, sabotage, and cooperation with the intelligence services of the Western countries and Israel. The indictment was replete with charges against the State of Israel, Zionism, Jewish organizations, and the Israel Legation in Prague and its staff. The Jewish origins of 11 of the 14 defendants were explicitly noted. During the course of the trial the Israeli detainees, Mordechai Oren and Shimon Orenstein, appeared as prosecution witnesses; the former Czechoslovak minister to Israel, Eduard Goldstücker, also testified about on the contacts between the defendants and the State of Israel and Jewish and Zionist organizations. All of the defendants pleaded guilty and sentence was handed down on 27 November. Eleven of the 14 defendants, including Slanský, were sentenced to death, while the other 3 received life terms.

After the trial Minister Kubovy left for Israel to report on developments. While he was in Israel the Czechoslovaks declared him *persona non grata*. See also No. 484.

456. A. Kubovy (Prague) to the East European Division. 21 November 1952

Coded Tel. 869; Inc.: 130.09/2343/3

Kubovy reports on the opening in Prague of the trial of Slanský and his associates.[1] Those sections of the charge sheet dealing with Israel and Zion-

ism are a violent anti-Jewish libel and incitement in the style of Czarist Russia and Nazi Germany. The articles in *Rude Pravo* are reminiscent of the *Völkischer Beobachter*. For foreign consumption, however, the authorities are trying to camouflage the anti-Jewish overtones and present the case as a standard Communist purge trial. Apparently the Czechoslovaks fear foreign reactions similar to those that forced them to suspend their journalistic propaganda in January. This should be exploited, particularly in the United States. An atmosphere must be created around the Czechoslovak mission to the UN that will cause it to send distress signals to Prague. This is also vital for the safety of Jews in Czechoslovakia and in other People's Democracies. The depths to which the regime has sunk can be judged from the incident yesterday, when the police surrounded the kosher restaurant and arrested those present, charging that the place was being used by a Zionist cell. He suggests that Israel's representatives at the UN approach the Soviet delegate. Although he has no doubt that the trial has been coordinated with Moscow, he finds it hard to believe that the Soviet leadership is aware of the antisemitic and anti-Israel character of the charge sheet and of the courtroom interrogation. Kubovy also complains that in its broadcasts *Kol Israel* has not emphasized the anti-Jewish and anti-Israel nature of the trial and is presenting it as a standard Communist purge trial. World public opinion must denounce the present regime in Czechoslovakia as anti-Semitic, in order to prevent the trial from becoming a precedent for other countries. It must also be remembered that after Slanský will come the turn of Oren, Orenstein, and those arrested for seeking permission to emigrate to Israel.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.
2. Uriel (Felix) Doron, commercial attaché and subsequently commercial counselor in the Israel Legation in Czechoslovakia, until September 1951.
3. Rafael Benshalom, first secretary and consul in the Israel Legation in Czechoslovakia until June 1950.
4. Bedřich Geminder, formerly head of the Department of International Relations in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party; Otto Fischel, formerly deputy finance minister of Czechoslovakia—both among the Prague defendants.
5. In response to this comment the Foreign Minister stated that the Ministry's information line would be changed and henceforth stress the anti-Jewish nature of the events. (See Levavi to the Israel Legation in Prague, No. 181, 23 November 1952, 130.09/2342/17.) See also No. 460.

457. A. Lourie (New York) to W. Eytan. 22 November 1952

Notes

1. See No. 400.
2. C. L. Patijn, a member of the Dutch Mission at the United Nations.
3. Margaretha Klompé, alternate representative in the Dutch Mission at the United Nations.
4. Elizabeth P. McCallum, a member of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations.
5. See No. 461.
6. This text is in File 130.20/2476/7, but evidently refers to the present telegram.

458. A. Kubovy (Prague) to the East European Division. 22 November 1952

Coded Tel. 876; Inc.: 130.09/2343/3

Kubovy speculates as to the motives for and the background of the Prague trials: it is not impossible that this and similar trials to be expected in other Peoples' Democracies presage a world war, like the purges in the Soviet Union prior to the Second World War. Moscow seeks monolithic unity in the leadership of all its satellites and wants to instill fear in all those who entertain doubts. Nor is it impossible that Moscow is interested in closer ties with the Arabs or wishes to delegate this task to one or several of its satellites. Kubovy gives a few examples of the quasi-wartime atmosphere prevailing in Czechoslovakia, and makes two suggestions: (1) Israel's reaction to the trial should relentlessly spotlight the antisemitic regime in Czechoslovakia and try to drive a wedge, as far as possible, between this regime and the other Soviet bloc countries; (2) Israel should initiate wide-ranging action to persuade Jewish and Free World leaders to announce, with maximum publicity, that they will not participate in the planned peace conference in Vienna.

Notes

1. The reference is to the reign of terror instituted by the head of the NKVD, Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov, in 1936–38, in the course of which the veteran Communist leadership was purged.
2. See Kubovy to the East European Division, 14 November 1952, 130.09/2343/3. Kubovy reported that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had begun drawing up a list of the types and quantities of weapons supplied to Israel in 1948–49 and that the arrest of Shimon Orenstein was linked to this matter.

459. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban. 23 November 1952

Coded Tel. Y839; Outg.: 130.09/2330/11

Sharett refers to Eban's telegram about his conversation with Sarper, the Turkish delegate to the UN, concerning the negotiations with Egypt.[1] In Sharett's opinion, it is preferable to solicit information from the Turks rather than to provide them with it. In any case, Eban can tell him that Israel is aware of the moderate trends in Egypt, but that these are being accompanied by bellicose statements. Israel is also aware that some foresee a number of obstacles on the road to understanding, including the problem of free overland passage from Sinai to Jordan and Saudi Arabia—more of symbolical than practical importance—and the problem of the refugees in the Gaza Strip, where the Egyptians' prime concern is that they be resettled somewhere, and not necessarily in Israel. Eban is instructed to use the term "passage" exclusively, rather than "corridor"; he can add that thus far Israel has heard nothing directly from any Egyptian representative. Eban should act cautiously, and in particular adhere to the advice given at the start of this communication; in no case is it desirable for the Egyptians to become aware that Israel knows their conditions.[2]

Notes

1. Eban telegrammed that in a conversation with the Turkish ambassador to the United Nations, Sarper, the latter had asked whether the Arabs had informed Israel that they would agree to negotiations on condition that there was prior agreement on a number of practical matters. Eban replied that he knew nothing of this, and that to date the Arabs had not expressed willingness to open negotiations on reasonable conditions. Eban asked whether he should tell Sarper that he understood his implications. (See telegram dated 19 November 1952, 130.02/2330/18.)
2. See also No. 455.

460. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 23 November 1952

Coded Tel. MT26; Outg.: 130.09/2377/1

Eytan instructs the missions how to explain the Prague trial. The trial is being conducted in an anti-Zionist, anti-Israel, and anti-Jewish atmosphere. The Jewish origin of most of the defendants is being emphasized, and the defendants have confessed that they brought ruin on Czechoslovakia to benefit Israel and the American capitalists. True, efforts are being made to

camouflage, for external consumption, the antisemitic nature of the trial, and English-language communiqués on the trial have been "purged" of antisemitic expressions; but in fact the trial identifies the Jews with the Zionists and describes them as a satanic force. In the spirit of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, it tells of a secret meeting at the White House in 1947, involving Ben-Gurion, Morgenthau, and Truman, at which it was agreed that the Americans would support Israel after its establishment, while the Zionists would organize cells for espionage and subversion in the Soviet bloc. The prime intention of the trial is to make the Jews the scapegoat for Czechoslovakia's difficulties and to rouse mass support for the regime. It can be assumed that another purpose is to terrify Soviet bloc Jews and make them both despair of and suspect Israel. There may also be an intention to gain Arab sympathy. The Israeli missions outside the Soviet bloc are asked to help muster condemnation of the antisemitic nature of the regime and to explain the purpose of the trial to public figures in the countries where they are posted, including personalities known to be Communist sympathizers, stressing the contradiction between progressive, liberal views and the nature of the Stalinist regime.

Notes

1. See No. 456.
2. Eduard Goldstücker, Czechoslovak Minister to Israel, December 1949–1951.
3. The reference is evidently to André Simone, until his arrest foreign affairs commentator for the Prague daily *Rude Pravo*.
4. Bernard M. Baruch, American financier and diplomat.
5. Walter Bedell Smith, head of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1950–1953.
6. Georges Mandel, French politician, who held various ministerial posts from 1935 until the fall of France in 1940.
7. Mosa Pijade, Yugoslav politician, member of the Politburo of the Yugoslav Communist Party, vice-president of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly.
8. Aleš Bebler, deputy foreign minister of Yugoslavia.

461. A. Lourie (New York) to W. Eytan. 24 November 1952

Notes

1. See No. 457.
2. The original includes the main points of the draft resolution—see below.
3. In a later conversation with Jessup the American representative noted that his delegation fully supported the idea of direct negotiations, but had no instructions to oppose an increase in the membership of the Conciliation Commission. Nor could it commit

itself in advance with regard to amendments that might be offered during the debate on the draft. (See Rafael to Eytan, X337, 25 November 1952, 130.09/2330/18.)

462. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 24 November 1952

Notes

1. The reference is to the search at Port Said on 31 October of the Norwegian ship *Rimfrost*, which was carrying a cargo of frozen meat from Eritrea to Israel. In the wake of the search the ship was detained and was released with its cargo only after Israel submitted a protest to the three Western powers. See Nos. 474 and 505.
2. See No. 450.
3. See No. 474 and n. 1 there.

463. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 24 November 1952

Notes

1. See Nos. 425 and 429. For previous recommendations of the Committee on Jerusalem, see No. 306.
2. No. 231.
3. Attached to this telegram was the following draft: "The telegram on Jerusalem is from the Ministry Committee. It is sent you as material for consideration and not as instructions for action. As for myself I demur (a) at the proposal to tell the Americans that we are firmly resolved on the transfer no matter what. Fear that such an announcement would provoke them to teach us a lesson and treat us high-handedly. Only those on the spot can evaluate whether such a tactic is worthwhile; (b) at the proposal to include Jerusalem in the resolution on direct negotiations. Perhaps you can find another way out that is not as bad as this? Sharett."

464. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 24 November 1952

Notes

1. No. 453.
2. Eban commented on this section that he was by no means suggesting a change in Israel's original position, which was in essence the payment of compensation to the United Nations Reintegration Fund and not to individual claimants. All he meant to propose was that before a payment of any sort, even an indirect payment to the Arab

countries, Israel should demand some *quid pro quo*, such as abrogation of the Arab boycott. (See Eban to Sharett, X334, 25 November 1952, 130.09/2330/18.)

3. See No. 465.

465. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 24 November 1952

Notes

1. John H. Ohly, director for programs, Office of the Director of the Mutual Security Agency.
2. In another telegram the Embassy staff reported on plans for meetings at the White House on this subject, including the planned meeting between Abe Feinberg and outgoing President Truman. No details of these meetings have been found. (See Israel delegation to the UN to Moshe Sharett, T809, 25 November 1952, 130.09/2335/15.)

466. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 24 November 1952

Coded Tel. 308; Inc. (Paris): 130.09/2345/1

The telegram, addressed to the missions in New York, London, Paris, and Prague,[1] offers suppositions as to the background of the Prague trial. (1) Czechoslovakia, as the most developed East-Bloc country, suffers the most from its Communist regime, from which no social class has benefited. This explains the need to find a scapegoat in the guise of the Jews and Israel and to consolidate the people around the regime. (2) Slanský's arrest was preceded by unrest. He and his colleagues championed absolute obedience to Moscow, whereas the Gottwald faction favored greater leniency. Moscow tilted towards the latter group and decided to sacrifice the Slanský group, even though their views are closer to its own. (3) The trial may be intended to make Israel odious in the eyes of the Jews and deter all East-Bloc Jews from contact with it. (4) There are increasing signs that the Czechoslovaks are attempting to move closer to the Arabs; it is possible that Prague intends to serve as the bridge between the East Bloc and the Arab world and the trial is meant to further this goal.

In any case, the trial is clearly antisemitic, of a nature previously known only in Tsarist Russia and Nazi Germany. This aspect is highlighted domestically, while it is presented to the outside world as a standard purge trial. Israel must condemn precisely the antisemitic facet of the trial and make Communist Czechoslovakia a target for the shafts of the entire Free World. Criticism should also be directed against the Soviet Union, and attempts made to dissuade Jewish and other leaders from attending the

forthcoming peace conference in Vienna. A special effort should be made to talk with Vyshinsky. Last year, when he spoke with Sharett, he denounced antisemitic attacks.

Note

1. Paragraph (5) was sent to New York only.

Editorial Note

The Opening of the Palestine Debate in the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly

The Palestine debate in the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly began on 25 November. At its outset the Committee rejected the request of the emissary of the Arab refugees to be represented during the course of the debate. After that the chairman of the Conciliation Commission delivered a report on the Commission's activities.

He noted that the parties to the Palestine conflict had not availed themselves of the Commission's services in order to begin negotiations; in consequence, the Commission had concentrated on secondary matters, such as freeing refugees' blocked accounts.

Three draft resolutions to conclude the debate were submitted. The first, sponsored by Uruguay, Ecuador, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Canada, was essentially similar to that contained in the Appendix to No. 461, and called for direct negotiations between the sides. This proposal was initiated by Israel, which endeavored to mobilize broad support for it. The second draft resolution, submitted by the Arab states, demanded implementation of UN resolutions and called for the addition of two more countries to the Commission and transfer of its headquarters to Jerusalem. The third draft, sponsored by Syria, sought the intervention of the International Court of Justice in the issue of the Arab refugees. During the debate the first of these three underwent a number of amendments, and Panama and Cuba were added to its sponsors, which was thereafter called the "Eight Powers' Resolution." Ultimately the Arab proposals were rejected, as only India voted with the Arab and Muslim countries. The Eight Powers' Resolution was supported by the Western Powers and was passed by a vote of 32 to 13, with 19 abstentions. The text of the most important paragraph of the resolution (§4) follows:

The General Assembly,

. . .

Urges the Governments concerned to enter at an early date, without prejudice to their respective rights and claims, into direct negotiations for the establishment of such a settlement, bearing in mind the resolutions as well as the principal objectives of the United Nations on the Palestine question, including the religious interests of the parties.

See *GAOR, Seventh Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee*, 25th–39th meetings, 25 November–11 December 1952, pp. 147–238. See also No. 467 and n. 2 there, as well as the Editorial Note on p. 331.

467. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 25 November 1952

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above. During the debate the Mexican delegate called on the parties to abandon their original positions and to try to solve the problem by talks in the spirit of compromise and moderation. (See *GAOR, Seventh Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee*, 25th meeting, 25 November 1952, pp. 150–151.)
2. Eban spoke on 1 December; ibid., 29th meeting, 1 December 1952, pp. 165–171.

468. E. Elath (London) to M. Sharett. 25 November 1952

Coded Tel. 10266; Inc.: 130.09/2319/3

Elath reports on his talk with the Swiss minister in London. The latter told him, "personally and confidentially," about his conversation with the Egyptian ambassador in London, in which he confirmed the information contained in Sharett's telegram MT19,[1] with the following differences: (1) The Egyptians insist on *annexing* the corridor to Egypt. The Egyptian envoy explained that a few square kilometers would make no difference to Israel, but the corridor would restore the Arabs' lost sense of territorial contiguity. (2) Israel must allow at least some of the refugees to return, in addition to paying compensation to those who do not. The ambassador did not specify what he meant by "some." Elath explained Israel's position to his Swiss counterpart, on the assumption that the message would be conveyed to the Egyptian ambassador. Elath believes that there is nothing to these remarks and they constitute part of Naguib's overall propaganda campaign intended to create cordial relations with all parties.

Note

1. See No. 455 and n. 1 there.

469. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations (New York). 25 November 1952

Coded Tel. YA850; Outg.: 130.09/2330/11

Sharett instructs the delegation to take advantage of the first opportunity at the General Assembly to denounce the Prague trial as an antisemitic demonstration reviving the spirit of Hitler. Even if there is an initial stormy reaction from the East Bloc countries, in the long run such a move can prevent the recurrence of similar events in other Eastern European countries.

470. Y. Tekoah [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett. 27 November 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2434/3

Tekoah refers to the renewal of contacts with the Syrians.[1] According to information received from Syria via Col. Taxis, the Syrians await an Israeli reply concerning continuation of the direct negotiations. According to Taxis, they are willing to fix the new armistice line along the eastern shore of Lake Hula, the Jordan, and the Sea of Galilee, ten meters from the water line and to leave Ein Gev as an Israeli enclave. What interests them is not water and fishing rights, but attaining a good strategic line. Taxis believes that Shishakli is honestly interested in reaching an agreement on partition of the demilitarized zone. Taxis advises Israel to meet with the Syrians, since, as far as he knows, Riley is considering submitting the question of the status of the demilitarized zone to the Security Council, and any arrangement achieved through direct negotiations is preferable to one imposed by the Security Council.

In the wake of this conversation, Tekoah believes that negotiations with the Syrians should be continued even if they produce no immediate results. The Syrians should be informed of Israel's agreement in principle to continue the negotiations, with the precise date to be set after the UN General Assembly passes its resolution on the Palestine question.[3]

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 274, and No. 424.
2. Segan-Aluf Haim Gaon, General Staff officer in charge of the Israel delegations to the Mixed Armistice Commissions, starting in November 1952.
3. Meetings with the Syrians were renewed in mid-January 1953. See reports in File 130.15/3738/10.

471. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 30 November 1952

Tel. W871; Outg.: 130.09/2309/4

The Division reports on Sharett's talk with Ambassador Davis. The Foreign Minister asked whether the ambassador had received a reply from the State Department to Israel's questions about the supply of aircraft and about the U.S. attitude towards Britain's decision to permit unrestricted sales of jet planes to Mideast countries.[1] Davis, obviously uncomfortable, replied that he had not yet received an answer.[2]

Sharett again raised the Jordanian-Syrian plan to dam the Yarmuk.[3] He noted that no meeting had yet taken place between the engineers, as promised, and that the only solution to the water question is face-to-face meetings between the countries involved. Davis was again embarrassed.

The Division suggests raising the water question in talks in Washington. Israel may submit a note on this matter.

Notes

1. See No. 439.
2. See No. 504.
3. See No. 264.
4. The question of water came up once again in the conversation between Bendor and Fried on 6 December. Fried said that conditions were still not right for a meeting between engineers from the two sides. Bendor asked that until such a meeting took place nothing be done that might infringe upon Israel's water rights. In response Fried again raised the Jordanian complaint about the pumping of water from the Jordan River some 10 kilometers south of the mouth of the Yarmuk. According to the Jordanians, Israel was laying a new 24-inch pipe. Bendor replied that Israeli settlements had been pumping water from this point for many years and that it was possible that they were laying a new pipe. Bendor promised to investigate the matter and said that if the Jordanians had common water problems with Israel they should meet for talks on the subject. (See United States Division to the Israel Embassy in Washington, 883, 130.09/2309/4.)

472. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 30 November 1952

Stencilled communiqué: 130.02/2413/2

Eytan sends revised instructions on relations with German diplomats in the light of the signing of the Reparations Agreement.

(1) After an Israeli representative abroad presents his credentials, he will not send his German counterpart the letter customarily sent to other members of the diplomatic corps.

(2) When a new German ambassador or minister assumes his post and sends out such a letter, the Israeli representative will confirm receipt thereof but will avoid any indication of cordial relations between the two missions.

(3) There will be no reciprocal official visits between Israeli and German heads of mission.

(4) No invitations to receptions, banquets, and similar functions should be sent to the German heads of mission, nor should such invitations from the Germans be accepted.

(5) If the Israeli head of mission or one of its members is invited by a third party to a reception or party at which a German representative will also be present, the invitation should be accepted.

(6) If an Israeli representative encounters a German representative at an event of the sort described in Paragraph 5 or on a similar occasion, he may greet him, or return his greeting, or even converse with him, but the tone of the conversation should be determined by what is known of the representative's role during the Nazi period.

(7) German representatives who ask to speak privately with an Israeli representative should receive an affirmative reply, but the tone of the conversation should be as in Paragraph 6 above.

(8) All of the foregoing also applies, with the appropriate modifications, to consular representatives.

(9) Publications and informational material distributed to foreign missions should be sent also to German missions.

(10) Requests by German journalists to interview an Israeli head of mission or diplomat should be refused. German journalists should, however, be provided with news and informational material about Israel.

(11) All of the foregoing applies to representatives of West Germany. With regard to East Germany, the current instructions forbidding any contact must be followed, unless explicitly stipulated otherwise.

Note

1. For previous instructions on this matter, see Vol. 5, No. 362.

473. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassy in London. 2 December 1952

Coded Tel. 345; Outg.: 130.09/2319/2

Sharett reports on a meeting with Archibald Ross,[1] also attended by Ambassador Evans. Sharett raised the matter of jet aircraft sales to Arab countries.[2] He emphasized Israel's opposition to arms sales to Arab countries in the absence of a peace accord and the spurious parity in the number of planes, which actually gives the Arabs an overwhelming advantage over Israel; he also protested the inclination to abandon the ceiling. Ross explained that there is no intention to eliminate the maximum of 14 aircraft to the Arab countries, except for Egypt, where a prior commitment exists. Sharett responded that even with such an arrangement the Arabs would have a significant edge over Israel and also pointed to Israel's financial predicament. The British tried to console him by saying that the Lebanese, too, are short of funds. Sharett went on to denounce the internal contradiction in their policy—at the UN they call for peace, but in its absence arm the Arabs. Ross replied that they consider peace to be vital, but it is no less vital to strengthen Jordanian and Iraqi defense. Sharett also raised the issue of the UN debate on Palestine and the wording of its concluding resolution.[4] He requested the British to remain steadfast in their opposition to increasing the number of members of the Conciliation Commission and to any weakening of the paragraph calling for direct negotiations between the parties. Ross was not fully aware of all the issues and Sharett enlightened him. Ross's other meetings included one with the Prime Minister.[5]

Notes

1. Archibald Ross, head of the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office; his visit was part of a tour of the Middle East. Compare also the British Ambassador's report on this visit to Foreign Secretary Eden, 6 December 1952, PRO FO371/98799.
2. See Nos. 369, 416, and 471.
3. See No. 369.
4. See Editorial Note, pp. 306–307.
5. See also No. 481.

474. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 3 December 1952

Notes

1. Eytan reported that the Foreign Ministry was drafting a letter to the Three Powers concerning the confiscation of the cargo of meat in the Suez Canal by the Egyptians (see No. 462) and asked for Eban's opinion about raising the matter at the Security Council. (See Eytan to Eban, 2 December 1952, 130.09/2330/12.)
2. The Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951 concerning freedom of passage through the Suez Canal.
3. See No. 505.

475. G. Rafael (New York) to A. Eban. 3 December 1952

Copy: 130.02/2410/2

Rafael reports on his talks with Mahmud 'Azmi, who is leaving the Egyptian delegation to the UN and returning to take up another post in Egypt. 'Azmi said that the Egyptian delegation is most disturbed that Naguib is leading the anti-reparations campaign, particularly in light of the negative reverberations this campaign has had in the American press and public opinion. The delegation so reported to Cairo, but was instructed to raise the question of reparations in their speeches.'Azmi is not sure what led Naguib to place himself at the head of the campaign, but believes that he has fallen victim to a British stratagem designed to gain economic benefit from a Mideast boycott of Germany.

Rafael exploited the opportunity of 'Azmi's return to Cairo to give him three pieces of advice:

(1) It is in Egypt's interest to settle the Israel-Egypt conflict, since its continuation weakens Egypt in its primary struggle, that with Britain.

(2) The current UN debate can provide a suitable opportunity for initiating contacts with Israel. Hence the Egyptians should not deprecate it or adopt an extremist stance.

(3) In two days' time Ambassador Eban will submit a detailed peace plan to the Ad Hoc Committee. If the Egyptians examine it carefully they will find that it contains interesting ideas, including a reference to the overland link through the southern Negev.[2]

'Azmi said that he agrees entirely and identifies with those three counsels and will pass them on to the authorities as his own. Rafael suggested that 'Azmi remain in touch with Divon, if he considers it necessary and possible to report on reactions to these ideas.

Notes

1. Henri Haim, director-general of the Société orientale de publicité.
2. See No. 467.

476. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to K. P. S. Menon. 3 December 1952

Note

1. Menon wrote that he was sorry that Israel and India had not yet exchanged diplomatic representatives, and that he hoped that the exchange would take place within a number of weeks. He suggested that an Israeli representative get in touch with the Indian ambassador to the United States, Mrs. Pandit; he himself would do everything he could from his post in Moscow. (Menon's letter is in File 130.02/2413/29.)

477. Sh. Eliashiv (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 December 1952

Coded Tel. XA357; Inc.: 130.09/2330/18

Eliashiv sums up the situation at the UN in terms of relations with the Eastern bloc countries. In his opinion, no deterioration should be expected in relations with the Soviets. They are indifferent, did not ask for the floor, and abstained in the vote on the motion to allow a representative of the refugees to speak.[1] He has spoken with Zorin, the Soviet representative on the Ad Hoc Committee, who displayed disinterest in the various proposals on the agenda, since he does not foresee any practical results. A member of the Polish delegation told a journalist that they have not changed their position on Israel and their vote would come as a pleasant surprise for Israel. He added that nothing should be inferred about Poland from the Prague trial.[2]

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 306–307.
2. These remarks were confirmed in a direct conversation between Eliashiv and the Polish representative on the Ad Hoc Political Committee. Their final decision would depend on the role played by the Conciliation Commission in the resolutions. Hence it was already clear to them that they would oppose the Pakistani draft; as for the Eight Powers' draft, they would make up their mind after seeing the final text. (See Eliashiv to Sharett, XA367, 5 December 1952, 130.09/2330/18.)

Editorial Note

Announcement by the Government of Israel on the Release of Blocked Accounts of Arab Refugees

On 4 December, at the height of the Palestine debate in the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Government of Israel published its decision to release the blocked accounts of Arab refugees. In the first stage the total amount released would be IL 1 million; the exchange rate would be the historic exchange rate of the Israel pound against the pound sterling. Preference would be given to holders of small accounts. Arrangements were made to facilitate the submission of requests by banks in the refugees' countries of residence. The funds released would be transmitted to the countries where the refugees lived. (See Information to Israeli Missions Abroad, 8 December 1952, 93.03/116/10.)

478. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to N. Goldmann (London). 4 December 1952

Coded Tel. 357; Outg.; 130.02/2417/7

Sharett replies to Goldmann following his report on his visit to Germany.[1] Bonn should be informed that Israel expects the agreement to be ratified and shipments to begin: only then will it be able to discuss a solution to the Arab complaint along the lines proposed by Goldmann. The Germans must be told in advance that should it become clear that such an arrangement is not satisfactory to the Arabs, Israel will feel free to act publicly and to mobilize its influence against submitting the matter to the UN. Israel fears that even the slightest concession at this stage will simply encourage the Arabs to increase their pressure to obtain a full German retreat; hence Israel must not take the risk of concessions by Bonn as long as the firm foundation of a signed, ratified, and implemented agreement is lacking.[2]

Notes

1. At the end of November, Goldmann went to Germany to deal with the problems that had arisen concerning parliamentary ratification of the reparations agreement, *inter alia* as a result of Arab diplomatic pressure. During the course of his talks it was made clear to him that Germany drew a clear distinction between the reparations agreement and its relations with Arab countries, and in the latter area was willing to take steps to repair its relations with the Arab world and to develop trade relations with it. In one conversation Goldmann was told that if there were no other way out of the straitening of relations with the Arab countries the Bonn government might

ask the United Nations to supervise the goods sent to Israel as part of the reparations agreement and the goods sent to Arab states in accordance with commercial agreements with them. (See Goldmann's report, end of November 1952, 130.02/2417/6.) The present telegram was sent in the wake of Goldmann's telegram, which expressed astonishment that he had not received a response to his report (3 December 1952, File 93.04/43/11).

2. See No. 479.

479. N. Goldmann (London) to M. Sharett. 4 December 1952

Coded Tel. 10306; Inc.: 130.09/2319/3

Goldmann has spoken with Blankenhorn about ratification of the Reparations Agreement.[1] The Germans feel the need for a gesture towards the Arabs and cannot therefore delay their application to the UN until after parliamentary ratification of the Reparations Agreement. However, they offer the following proposal: (1) They will submit the agreement to parliament at once; this in itself is a decisive step attesting to an unswerving resolution to implement the agreement. Implementation will commence immediately upon ratification. (2) They will make it clear to the Arabs that this gesture is the last concession and there will be no more. (3) They will obtain an Arab guarantee to refrain from pressure and propaganda following the approach to the UN.

Goldmann suggests accepting the German proposal, since Germany is likely to act accordingly even without Israel's approval. Nor does such approval prevent Israel from asking its friends at the UN to help strike the topic from the organization's agenda.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 478.
2. See No. 488.

480. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 5 December 1952

Coded Tel. XA361; Inc.: 130.09/2330/18

In a personal telegram, Eban urges Sharett to take advantage of his planned February trip to Latin America to visit the United States. Israel must make a bold effort to gain the support of the new State Department team for a favorable Mideast plan, economic and military assistance for Israel, and speeding up peace with Egypt. This effort must be made before the State Department's Mideast policy becomes a matter of routine. At the current

session of the UN General Assembly he noted clear signs of international impatience with Arab rejectionism and full acceptance of Israel's existence and recognition of its needs; there is no doubt that an American equivalent of this climate of opinion can be created if Israel acts when policy is being evolved and before it takes final form. He has not yet conveyed this suggestion to anyone else and awaits a reaction addressed to his enclosed private address.

Note

1. The letter has not been found.

481. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban. (New York). 5 December 1952

Notes

1. See Nos. 439 and 471.
2. No. 473.
3. Eban replied that he would deal with the question of arms as soon as he returned to Washington. The matter should be dealt with both in the diplomatic arena and publicly; in his opinion Israel should make plain its fears to the public. Similar action should be taken in London, along with the opening of a simultaneous campaign with regard to free passage through the Suez Canal, a campaign that would buttress Israel's demand that weapons not be supplied to the aggressive Arab states. (See Eban to Sharett, X369, 6 December 1952, 130.09/2330/18.)

482. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 5 December 1952

483. A. Eban (Washington) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 6 December 1952

Copy: 93.08/355/28

Eban asks the staff of the Embassy in Washington to study the Government's peace plan closely, as presented in his address to the General Assembly, and especially to familiarize themselves with its details as outlined in the second part of his speech.[1] In talks with administration and public figures, it should be emphasized that now that Israel has presented this plan it cannot be accused of expansionist intentions, aggressive schemes, or unwillingness to integrate into the Middle East. In particular, it should be pointed out that the plan includes non-aggression guarantees,

promises of a free port at Haifa, arrangements for passage through the Negev for Egypt, payment of compensation to the refugees, the construction of joint water projects, and mutually acceptable border rectifications. In such conversations, it should be made clear that Israel is willing to make all these concessions in return for a comprehensive, all-embracing peace settlement, but under no circumstances in return for anything less. This settlement must be achieved as a package deal; the concessions involved must not be frittered away one by one, in a process that would eventually leave Israel in the position of having made all its concessions without receiving normal relations in return. Israel's plan was received favorably. It is obvious that world public opinion accepts as natural Israel's insistence that in return for the promised concessions the Arabs must establish peaceful relations. Henceforth, whenever anyone speaks of compensation, a free port, passage through the Negev, and so forth, he should be told that all this is possible, but only in the context of an overall peace accord.

Note

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 306–307, and No. 467.

484. Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia (Prague) to the Israel Legation in Prague. (6 December 1952)

Notes

1. The note protested the content and tone of the intervention of the Israel Legation in the detention and interrogation of the Israeli citizens Mordechai Oren and Shimon Orenstein (File 130.11/2513/3).
2. Joseph Büchler and Avraham (Adolph) Reich, Zionist activists in Czechoslovakia.

485. A. Eban (Washington) to W. Eytan. 7 December 1952

Notes

1. That is, the Latin American countries.
2. Moshe Tov, alternate member of the Israeli delegation to the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly.
3. Enrique Rodriguez Fabregat, permanent representative of Uruguay at the United Nations.
4. See No. 495 and Editorial Note, p. 331.

486. A. Eban [Washington] to E. Elath (London). 7 December 1952

Notes

1. No. 440.
2. See No. 485.

487. Israel Legation in Prague to the East European Division. 7 December 1952

Coded Tel. 932; Inc.: 130.09/2343/3

The Legation in Prague summarizes the local radio broadcast by the Education Minister,[1] in which he asserted that the Prague trial does not reflect antisemitism and that the Czechoslovak government and Communist Party will take action to counter antisemitism. But, he added, anti-Zionism is not antisemitism. Legation staff note that the Czechs are clearly extremely sensitive to charges of antisemitism, and that Israeli and Western opinion errs in thinking that the general public in Czechoslovakia accepts the trial at face value and believes in the truth of the charges. According to information available to the Legation, the overwhelming majority of the public reacted with sneers and derision and is amazed that the country has sunk so low as to have to make use of the weapon of antisemitism. The Legation staff asks that this point be stressed in all of the propaganda directed against the trial.[2]

Notes

1. Zdeněk Nejedly, Czechoslovak minister of education.
2. This telegram led to an exchange of memos in the Foreign Ministry. Sharett noted that the Legation's assessment contradicted that of Minister Kubovy, who asserted that Czechoslovak public opinion was not against the trial. Kubovy himself explained that there had apparently been a turnabout in public opinion since the day he had left. Arye Levavi, head of the East European Division, commented that it is difficult to discern trends in a regime such as that in Czechoslovakia; it is probable that there were negative reactions to the trial, but it should also be taken into account that the Czechoslovak authorities would continue to attempt to win over the public. (See Foreign Ministry internal memoranda, 9–10 December 1952, 130.09/2343/3.)

488. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to the Consulate-General of Israel in New York. 7 December 1952

Coded Tel. YA900; Outg.: 130.09/2330/12

Sharett sends an urgent telegram to Goldmann and Josephthal regarding the German compromise proposal on the Reparations Agreement. Sharett conveyed Goldmann's proposed plan of action to the Government, whose reaction was very negative. The Government opposes any negotiations with Bonn implying acceptance of Arab involvement and admission of their right to interfere, or recognition of the United Nations' authority to make any decision on the matter. The Government has decided to inform Bonn that this is an agreement between Germany, the Jewish people, and Israel, and no other parties are involved. If the agreement is not ratified and its implementation begun in the next few days, Israel will be forced to consider the whole matter as null and void. Thus far the Government's decision. Sharett adds clarifications: An important consideration was to avoid any precedent of Arab blackmail. So far, the Arabs have failed in such attempts, which were directed at the United States. An additional consideration was that submission of the matter to the UN prior to ratification of the agreement could provide a pretext for postponing ratification, since the German parliament could argue that it was awaiting the outcome of the UN debate.

In the light of these risks, the Government decided to request that Josephthal fly to Bonn at once in order to relay the Israeli position as outlined above. He is to explain that in Israel's evaluation, the Arabs are not trying to find an honorable way out of their entanglement in the matter, but wish rather to torpedo the entire agreement. They will not be impressed by Bonn's declaration that submission of the matter to the UN is a final concession and will strive to obtain further concessions. Sharett is aware that this line of action runs counter to Goldmann's opinion, but is sure that if the latter reconsiders the matter he will understand that this step is imperative and will mobilize his full influence to exert pressure in this direction. The Government considers it essential that Josephthal go to Bonn in order to ensure that the talks, if possible with Adenauer and other leaders, should achieve maximum effectiveness.[3]

Notes

1. See Nos. 478 and 479.
2. The convention of the United Jewish Appeal, scheduled to open on 14 December in New York.

3. No response to this telegram has been found; but see the report on contacts in Bonn (No. 499).

489. Sh. Divon (Paris) to R. Shiloah. 7 December 1952

Orig.: 130.15/3744/1

Divon analyzes the state of relations with the new regime in Egypt, by way of a sequel to his telegram of 15 November 1952.[1] Naguib's adoption of a more rigid policy stems from the regime's acute difficulties; there are no signs that at this stage Naguib or his followers would agree to talks or any rapprochement with Israel. For now they prefer preserving the status quo. They do not fear an Israeli attack and are confident that even should Israel wish to take military action the Great Powers would prevent it from doing so. At the same time, however, Naguib is also interested in reassuring Israel in order to prevent Israeli activity, primarily in the United States, that would detract from the status and sympathy he has gained there. Should Israel approach Naguib and request clarifications, it will almost surely receive an evasive answer that is likely to be damaging. Nor is there any point in making threats. The U.S. has frequently indicated its support for Israel-Egypt détente, so an American overture to the Egyptians would change nothing. It must be borne in mind that an overture that bears no fruits will not encourage the Americans to make further attempts in the future.

He proposes an immediate press campaign, particularly in the United States, with the objective of undermining the Egyptian regime's image of stability by indicating its deviations from realistic policies and emphasizing its anti-Israel manifestations. These articles should emphasize that a return to a realistic and moderate policy is necessary in order to help the Egyptians obtain vital economic assistance. Israel's representatives in major capitals should hold talks with government and public figures along these lines. Every possibility and all other options should be exploited to ensure that Naguib is made aware that Israel is capable of harming his standing. When such action has yielded results and Naguib realizes that Israel will not be satisfied with vague answers, it will be time to re-examine the most effective way for a new overture. All of the foregoing is based on the assumption that no major changes occur in Egypt after the prisoners are released.

Note

1. No. 443.

490. A. Eban [New York] to P. C. Jessup (New York). 8 December 1952

Note

1. This letter was sent in the wake of the Americans' inclination to accept the Arab proposal to remove the Palestine item from the agenda of the Ad Hoc Political Committee. The weakening in the American position followed the furious Arab reaction to the course of the Committee debate—see No. 485. (See Eban's telegram to Sharett, X374, 8 December 1952, 130.09/2380/18.)

491. G. Rafael (New York) to W. Eytan. 8 December 1952

Notes

1. Muhammad 'Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa, a member of the Egyptian delegation to the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly.
2. See No. 490 and n. 1 there.

492. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan. 8 December 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2410/9

Sharett comments on Sasson's letter concerning the corridor between Egypt and Jordan.[1] Sharett considers that Sasson's total rejection of the idea should be reexamined. There is no doubt that the Egyptian (and pan-Arab) demand for such a corridor is a basic position that will appear in the future as a condition, and probably as a *sine qua non*, in all peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt. This has deep roots, arising from the Arabs' feeling that Israel is a wedge between them, splitting the Arab continuum in twain. Given this situation, Sharett suggests not rejecting the idea out of hand and agreeing to the possibility that, in the course of negotiations, Israel might make concessions in this matter, whether by allowing free passage, accompanied by suitable guarantees on Israel's part, or, if this proposal is not acceptable, as a road fenced in on both sides, permitting free passage between Egypt and Jordan. Such an accord would have to be subject to two conditions: that the transit road be subject to certain restrictions—first and foremost, that it not be used for military purposes; second, that free access to Eilat not be impeded—this could be arranged by building an overpass in one direction or the other. Sharett points out that it is not his intention to hold practical discussions on the matter now, since in any case it is not currently on the agenda; rather, he wants to warn against

excessive rigidity, which would be unrealistic, and to open the door to flexibility in thought and tactics. He asks for reactions or alternative proposals on the topic.[2]

Notes

1. No. 455.
2. See Nos. 501 and 520.

493. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in Prague. 8 December 1952

Coded Tel. 228; Outg.: 130.09/2342/17

The legation in Prague is informed that the Government has decided to reject forcefully the Czechoslovak note declaring Kubovy *persona non grata*.[1] In the next few days a note will be presented utterly denying and refuting the charges made against him.[3] As for the substance of the matter, the two main charges made by the Czechoslovaks — interference in the country's domestic affairs and promoting immigration to Israel — are denied. As for the latter charge, it is pointed out that since its inauguration the legation has cooperated with the Czechoslovak government on the issue of immigration and that all permits and authorizations were received following negotiations and with the agreement of the Czechoslovak government.

Notes

1. No. 484.
2. Compare No. 497.
3. A note from the Israel Legation to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, dated 18 December 1952 (in File 130.09/2496/4).

494. R. Nall[1] (Warsaw) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8 December 1952

Coded Tel. WKA192; Inc.: 130.09/2306/5

Nall was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and handed a communiqué to the effect that Minister Kubovy has been declared *persona non grata*. When

he asked for explanations, he was told that Kubovy had engaged in hostile and warlike propaganda among the Jews and had twice been warned by the foreign minister to desist from such action.[3] Nall expressed his astonishment and indicated that he would pass the matter on to his government. He requests instructions.

Notes

1. Reuven Nall, first secretary and chargé d'affaires *a.i.* in the Israel Legation in Poland.
2. Edward Sluczański, director of the Eastern Department in the Polish Foreign Ministry.
3. Stanislaw Skrzeszewski, Polish foreign minister.

495. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 9 December 1952

Notes

1. See Nos. 485 and 490.
2. Lord Llewellyn, a member of the British delegation to the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly.
3. See *GAOR, Seventh Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee*, 37th Meeting, 9 December 1952, pp. 219–221.
4. Sharett replied that to Israel it seems that the option lies between two Arab defeats. The first priority for Israel is passage of the eight countries' resolution; hence Eban should oppose its being stricken from the agenda, on condition that it is guaranteed a two-thirds majority. In the worst case Israel should agree to striking all of the resolutions from the agenda, which is tantamount to removing the entire Palestine item from the General Assembly agenda. This was indeed Israel's original objective at the start of the session. He is aware of the difference between securing such a move beforehand and falling back on it due to Arab pressure; still, even now it would discomfit the Arabs and teach a lesson to all those concerned about Arab machinations. As for Eban's question about the Soviet Union, he approved his use of this argument. (See Sharett to Eban, Y913, 10 December 1952, 130.09/2330/12.)

496. Note from the Israel Ambassador in Washington to the U.S. Secretary of State (Washington). 10 December 1952

Note

1. The appendix has been omitted here.

497. Sh. Eliashiv (New York) to M. Sharett. 10 December 1952

Copy: 130.02/2492/17

Eliashiv writes that the Prague trial disturbs and preoccupies him. He cannot come up with an adequate explanation for this strange phenomenon—namely, the central role in the trial—quite out of all proportion—assigned to Zionism and the State of Israel. One possible hypothesis is that the Czechoslovaks are preparing the ground for closer ties with the Arab states and wish to demonstrate that the assistance granted Israel in the past was provided by traitors and criminals. A second hypothesis is that the Zionist issue was injected into the trial on instructions from above, but has got out of hand. Neither of these hypotheses has been confirmed by the behavior of the Soviet-bloc states at the General Assembly. There has been no deviation from their previous policy and positions, nor are there any signs of support for the Arabs, even in the resolutions summarizing the Palestine debate. They remain indifferent as in the past.

Given recent events, he also wishes to offer his opinion and suggestions with regard to future relations with Eastern European countries. First of all, staff members born in those countries, who have been in contact with local persons and circles, should be withdrawn from the Israel legations. The Poles should be required to provide a detailed explanation of their reasons for declaring Kubovy *persona non grata*. The scandalous bulletin issued by the Czechoslovak legation in Israel should not be passed over in silence; it might even be appropriate to expel the Czechoslovak minister from Israel. He recommends not sending new ministers to Prague and Warsaw for the present; as far as the latter capital is concerned, he recommends closing down the legation completely and leaving only the consulate, in line with the level of representation the Poles maintain in Israel.

Efforts to meet Vyshinsky during the General Assembly session were not successful. He requested a meeting three times, but received no answer. His impression is that the Russians were being evasive. He does not consider this to be a great loss; if so instructed he will request a meeting when he returns to Moscow.

Notes

1. See No. 477.
2. Jerzy Michalowski, Polish ambassador in London, member of the Polish delegation to the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly.
3. Ze'ev Shek, first secretary in the Israel Legation in Prague.
4. See No. 493.

498. E. Herlitz (Washington) to A. Eban. 11 December 1952

Copy: 93.08/358/2

Herlitz reports on her meeting, together with Minister Goitein, with Waller and Byroade, about withdrawal of the draft resolution on direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs.[1] Eban was supposed to have represented Israel at this meeting and to have handed over a diplomatic note, but bad weather stranded him in New York and the note was delivered orally from a text transmitted by Teletype.

After Israel's case had been presented, Byroade replied that in his opinion Israel had erred in its statements at the UN and in the text of its draft resolution by insisting on "a final and total peace settlement." It would have done better had it sought only a call for direct negotiations. He ascribed the demand for a comprehensive peace to the Israeli Prime Minister, adding that he is not sure that this is the way to soften Arab intransigence. He is not confident that passage of the resolution will change the Arabs' position, nor is there any certainty that Naguib will make use of the resolution. Naguib might have been able to adopt an independent stance a month ago, but now he is dependent on the Arab League. For his own part, Byroade fears that the Arab failure at the General Assembly plays into the hands of the Arab extremists. Israel may perhaps achieve a theoretical victory, but will arouse the Arabs against it and against the West as well. Arab opposition to the draft resolution stems from its apparent repeal of previous UN resolutions that the Arabs consider a guarantee of their rights. They (the Americans) are trying to introduce amendments (through Mexico) that will get the Arabs to vote for the resolution.

Byroade is convinced that a settlement between Israel and Arab countries will be achieved "in the field" and not at the UN. Furthermore, such a settlement will be achieved through various accords, step by step, and not through a comprehensive settlement. At the end of the conversation, Herlitz handed over a written, unofficial text of Eban's note, together with an accompanying letter.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 495, and Editorial Note, p. 331.
2. Robert L. Burns, an official in the Near East Department of the State Department, formerly acting political advisor to the Secretary of State's special representative in the Near East for Economic and Technical Assistance, stationed in Beirut.
3. No. 483.
4. Herlitz's letter and the text of the note are in File 130.03/1973/12.

499. Ch. Yahil (Cologne) to M. Sharett. 11 December 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2417/7

Yahil reports on conversations he and Giora Josephthal held in Germany on 10–11 December regarding the crisis in implementation of the Reparations Agreement.[1] These talks were disrupted by the constitutional crisis in that country, which preoccupied government leaders and also disturbed the timetable for government handling of the Reparations Agreement.

Their first meeting was with Böker,[2] a confidant of the chancellor and aware of the state of affairs. The Israelis explained their position, while Böker defended the German proposal to refer the matter to the UN. Such an action would not endanger Israel and would offer the Egyptians an honorable way out. The two parties failed to convince each other; it is obvious that the Germans have already decided to submit the question to the UN.

Their next meeting was with Blankenhorn, who explained the German position. Their support for the Reparations Agreement is unshaken and they have no intention of deviating from it, but they failed to assess correctly the Arab opposition. Conflict with the Arabs will cause them political and economic damage and stir up all those circles who previously opposed reparations, including the antisemites. Naguib is searching for an honorable way out, and the Germans are making the following proposals: (1) economic advantages that will strengthen Egypt no less than the reparations strengthen Israel; (2) a political solution based on submitting the matter to the UN, in the form of an appeal by an Arab country or some third party (such as Belgium or Pakistan), or by Germany itself—although this option is less desirable since Germany is not a member of the UN. Israel's representatives put forward their counterarguments: It makes a difference who submits the matter to the UN. Israel will not oppose an Arab appeal to that body, since the two sides would then fight it out in that arena. If Germany takes the initiative, however, Israel will find itself in conflict with Germany, with all the ensuing implications for Israeli and world public opinion. A German initiative would also set a dangerous precedent of submission to Arab threats; so far no country has flinched before Arab threats to the extent of going to the UN. Submitting the question to the UN would also undermine the stability of the agreement among economic circles and make it difficult to implement several of the purchases requiring long-term planning. Finally, they emphasized that the Arabs do not expect any political victory, but wish to gain economic advantages. In economic terms, the Germans hold all the trumps, because the Arabs need the Germans more than the Germans need the Arabs. To the Israelis' surprise, Blankenhorn totally withdrew from his position, saying that he had been

unaware of Israel's reasoning and that Germany would now propose to Egypt that the Arab states make their own appeal to the UN.

Blankenhorn's retreat surprised the Israelis and they feared that it would not last. In fact, their subsequent conversation with Hallstein was quite strained, although he promised that Germany would honor its commitments. The talk ended prematurely because Hallstein had other pressing business. He agreed to meet again the next day.

In the meanwhile, there was also an exchange with the German ambassador to Cairo, Pawelke. He was in total despair. From his talks with Goldmann he had understood that Israel would agree to Germany's referring the matter to the UN. But now Blankenhorn had told him that Israel's opposition to such a German initiative is justified. Hence he is returning to Cairo empty-handed and is afraid of what will ensue. Naguib is a great statesman, but faces problems. The Arabs will not take the case to the UN because they know that they would lose there. Naguib knows that nothing would come of a German appeal either, but this could have been presented as a victory and the boycott cancelled. It is true that Naguib is primarily interested in economic benefits, but he cannot negotiate on such matters only. He needs a political bridge, even if made of paper. He desires peace with Israel, but the propitious moment is not yet at hand. A way out of the reparations imbroglio would consolidate his position, and a few months hence the climate for negotiations would be more favorable.

The next day, the Israeli representatives were summoned to Bonn by Hallstein, who informed them that the Germans had decided not to submit the question the UN, but to suggest to Naguib that some third country do so. Yahil thinks that Israel has won a not inconsiderable victory; now, however, the question is how the Germans will react to Naguib's measures, when he hears the news. There is no certainty that they will not return to their earlier proposal or seek some other compromise. In the meanwhile, he is remaining in Bonn and awaiting developments in Cairo.[5]

Notes

1. See No. 488.
2. Alexander Böker, German diplomat, an official in the Foreign Office in Bonn.
3. Aschner, director of the West German Ministry of Economic Affairs.
4. Erich Ollenhauer, chairman of the West German Social Democratic Party.
5. In a later telegram, Yahil reported that Naguib had rejected the proposal to go to the United Nations, because it would not postpone ratification of the reparations agreement, and had announced that the Arab states would take punitive action in response. The feeling in Bonn is that there is no chance of an agreement with the Arabs and ratification of the reparations agreement should be proceeded with. (See Sharett to Goldmann, telegram 963, 22 December 1952, 130.09/2330/12.)

500. A. Eban [New York] to V. L. Pandit (New York). 14 December 1952

Notes

1. In the final vote on the eight powers' resolution on direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs, India joined the nays.
2. Mrs. Pandit replied that India had voted as it had chiefly because the draft submitted by the eight powers had omitted all mention of previous United Nations resolutions on Palestine; during her coming visit to Cairo she herself would make every effort to reconcile the parties. As for India-Israel relations, she noted that despite the sequence of events in the past it should be remembered that India had recognized Israel. (Vijaya Pandit to Abba Eban, 25 December 1952, 93.03/3010/5.)

501. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 14 December 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2410/1

Eytan replies to Sharett's letter on free passage for Egypt through the southern Negev.[1] He agrees with Sharett's line of argument, but wishes to add several comments: (1) In any negotiations, Israel must begin by expressing vigorous opposition to the very idea of a corridor, so that its later acceptance of free passage will be interpreted as a major concession. (2) The right of free passage along a road built expressly for that purpose (which can be called a "corridor" for the sake of argument) is not in fact such a major concession, since in peacetime it would not constitute an annoyance and in wartime it could be blocked with relative ease. (3) By contrast, the location of this corridor is of major importance and also involves some risk. The Arabs will not agree to just any road in the southern Negev connecting one tract of desert with another, without convenient access roads in Egypt and Jordan; hence they are likely to insist on a road either from Hebron to Auja, or from Ras al-Naqab to Aqaba. As things stand currently, for Israel such a corridor is an idea that arouses dread; the situation would be different were there peace, but then there would be no need whatsoever for a corridor and the problem of free passage could be solved through straightforward border procedures, something known as "small border passes," such as exist in various places throughout the world. In order to facilitate transit, a road could also be built to bypass Beersheba and carry through traffic.

Note

1. No. 492.

502. M. Jarblum[1] (Vienna) to M. Sharett. 16 December 1952

Coded Tel. 22; Inc.: 130.11/2492/12

Jarblum reports from the International Peace Conference.[2] His presence there has been useful, but no one is prepared to or dares speak about the Prague trial. Many wholeheartedly accept it at face value, and many others in part. The latter are Israel's old friends. Practically everyone subscribes to the claim that Zionism poses a threat to the Jews and singles them out from the public at large. It is likened to deviations such as Titoism and cosmopolitanism. Everyone denies that the trial has antisemitic intentions, although a few believe that it is fomenting antisemitic sentiments in certain circles.

His conclusion: No one will defend Zionism or the Jews. Yves Farges[3] told him that he would help Mapam make a statement in favor of Zionism, if it so wished, but without linking this to the trial. Jarblum passed on this information to Bar-Yehuda.[5] He will send a further report from Paris.

Notes

1. Marc Jarblum, French Zionist activist.
2. Jarblum was asked to work on behalf of the Israeli detainees in Prague during the international peace conference then taking place in Vienna.
3. Yves Farge, French socialist, president of the French Peace Council and member of the World Peace Council.
4. Artur London, one of the defendants in the Prague trial, formerly deputy foreign minister.
5. MK Israel Bar-Yehuda (Mapam). In the event it was MK Mordechai Bentov who registered to speak on behalf of Mapam, but the session was adjourned before he rose to speak. (See Eshel's telegram to Levavi, 16 December 1952, 130.11/2492/12.)

503. D. Goitein [Washington] to M. Sharett. 17 December 1952

Notes

1. No. 504.
2. See No. 467.
3. See Nos. 439 and 471.
4. The purchase of equipment and supplies for United States forces stationed in foreign countries.

5. The reference is to an incident in which Israel was forced to abandon in Jordanian territory military equipment intended for the besieged garrison on Mt. Scopus. The official Israeli story was that the equipment had been stolen by Jordanian infiltrators.

504. *Aide-Mémoire* by the Government of Israel (Washington, 17 December 1952)

Notes

1. See No. 503.
2. See No. 370.

505. E. Elath (London) to the British Commonwealth Division. 17 December 1952

Coded Tel. 10356; Inc.: 130.02/2450/1

Elath presented Bowker with an Israeli note on freedom of passage through the Suez Canal.[1] He explained that Israel intends to raise the matter at the Security Council, hoping to receive the support of the Three Powers for a Council demand that Egypt comply with the resolution of 1 September 1951. Bowker's attitude was sympathetic, but he said that he could not react before the note was discussed in the Foreign Office. The conversation then turned to the Ad Hoc Committee's resolution on the Palestine question.[2] Bowker said that the Arabs had in fact protested to the British about their support for the resolution, but Britain's position has not changed and it will vote for the resolution in the General Assembly plenum as well, unless other resolutions are submitted that they find acceptable. Elath was unable to ascertain whether he was referring to something specific. In the course of the conversation he emphasized the importance that Israel attaches to the Committee's resolution.

Notes

1. Concerning the detention of the Norwegian ship *Rimfrost*, en route from Eritrea to Haifa, see No. 474. Similar letters were sent to the United States and to France. The full text of the letter submitted to the British can be found in File 93.04/41/4; for a record of the conversation with Bowker, see PRO FO371/96998. See also No. 518.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 331.

506. G. Rafael (New York) to W. Eytan. 17 December 1952

Notes

1. The reference is to Ben-Gurion's interview with the special correspondent of the *New York Times*, Cyrus Sulzberger. In the interview, Ben-Gurion stressed Israel's desire to begin peace negotiations with the Arab countries and its willingness to participate with the Arabs in regional development enterprises, including assistance for resettlement of the refugees in Arab countries. He rejected territorial concessions on the part of Israel and emphasized that Jerusalem's future was not a subject for negotiation. (See *New York Times*, 15 December 1952.)
2. See also No. 482.
3. See Editorial Note below.

Editorial Note

Conclusion of the Palestine Debate at the Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly

On 18 December, the General Assembly Plenum considered the Palestine question. Before the Assembly were the resolution approved by the Ad Hoc Political Committee (see Editorial Note, pp. 306–307) and an amendment, submitted by the Philippines, which called for basing negotiations on previous General Assembly resolutions, including that on the internationalization of Jerusalem. Neither the Ad Hoc Political Committee's resolution nor the Philippine amendment received the required two-thirds majority. Among those opposed to the Committee's resolution were the Arab states, the Soviet bloc, and most of the Asian countries. The abstentions included a number of Latin American countries. In the end the Seventh General Assembly adjourned without passing any resolution on the Palestine question. (See *GAOR, Seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 406th Meeting, 18 December 1952.)

507. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 19 December 1952

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above, and No. 508.
2. See No. 506.

508. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 19 December 1952

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 331, and No. 507.
2. See No. 506.
3. Jessup mentioned Dulles' speech at the third session of the United Nations General Assembly, in November, 1948, in which Dulles had asserted that "the General Assembly does not have the power to command the parties or to lay upon them precise injunctions." The implication is that the solution must be agreed on by the parties and that the role of the General Assembly is to recommend to them negotiating methods and procedures. (See *GAOR, Seventh Session, Plenary Meetings,* 406th Meeting, 18 December 1952.)

509. M. Sharett (Jerusalem) to W. Eytan. 22 December 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2397/13

Sharett writes about the deplorable situation in the handling and coordination of immigration to Israel. At present, it is the province of the Jewish Agency, but several government ministries—such as the Finance Ministry, which covers the main costs of *aliya*, and the Ministry of Labour, which endeavors to find employment for new immigrants — are also involved; there is also the joint Jewish Agency-government coordinating agency. In fact, everyone focuses on current immigration, and no body deals with it from a long-term perspective, setting *aliya* policy for the future, examining Jewish communities throughout the world to ascertain their present situation and their desire to immigrate or remain where they are, to channel Jews towards *aliya*, and so forth. In his opinion, the government must not shirk its responsibility in this area, which is most sensitive and essential for the State of Israel. In the absence of a government ministry charged with this task, the Foreign Ministry must enter the field. To this end, he proposes the following plan:

(1) Every mission should examine the problems of *aliya* from the country in which it is posted—including the situation and needs of the Jewish community and the prospects for *aliya* — and submit a special report on this.

(2) Every mission should submit a report on the *aliya*-related activities of Jewish Agency representatives or the local Zionist movement and indicate the deficiencies, where these exist, and how to rectify them.

Collection of this material can provide a basis for centralized planning of methods for the near future.

510. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 23 December 1952

Stencilled communiqué: 130.02/2415/33

Eytan transmits guidelines for relations between Israel's representatives and those of the Communist countries, in the light of the trial in Prague. (1) When Israeli missions hold receptions to which all heads of missions are invited, the representatives of these countries should be invited as well. (2) In the case of private receptions or dinners, invitations should be issued to these representatives only if close personal ties exist between the Israeli host and his guest. Czechoslovak representatives should not be invited. (3) In other circumstances not described above, invitations should not be sent to representatives of the Communist countries. (4) Invitations from representatives of Communist countries should not be refused in the circumstances described in (1) or (2); it cannot be expected that Israel's representatives will be invited in other circumstances. In the unlikely event of a Czechoslovak invitation, an excuse should be found to refuse it. (5) With regard to invitations from third parties to occasions to which the representatives of these countries are also invited, cold courtesy should be exercised and conversations avoided. If, however, a conversation develops with such a representative, the opportunity should be exploited to express Israel's feelings about the Prague trial. Conversations with Czechoslovak representatives should be avoided, without infringing on basic civility.[1]

Note

1. In another circular, Eytan directed that the People's Republic of China and Bulgaria, which had not acted against Israel and had permitted *aliya*, be removed from these instructions. See Eytan to Israel Missions Abroad, 12 January 1953, 130.02/2415/33.

511. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Washington). 24 December 1952

Coded Tel. 917; Outg.: 130.09/2309/4

Sharett replies to Eban's telegram on the transfer of the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem.[1] It is utterly impossible today to move the Foreign Ministry. It has been firmly decided not to make a hasty move, and the transfer will be carried out as planned in the middle of March. He does not think that advancing the date would change anything. All of the missions accept the

move as a fact. Clearly the transition period will not be easy, but time will help ease things.

The President's Office has been opened in Jerusalem, but the Tel Aviv bureau has not been closed. The Turkish representative presented his credentials in Tel Aviv because he did not wish to be the first to do so in Jerusalem. Here, too, there will be a transition period, already reflected in the presence of foreign diplomats at the swearing-in of the President in Jerusalem and soon to be manifested in official visits to the President's Office in Jerusalem. It is not worth making a diplomatic incident of this issue.

Note

1. Eban suggested taking advantage of the last days of the Truman Administration to move the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem, since no one could know how much influence the Church would have on the new Administration. He also suggested making the transfer more or less in conjunction with the establishment of the President's office in Jerusalem, since foreign functionaries are notably hesitant to criticize acts involving a chief of state. (See his telegram dated 23 December, 93.01/2208/26.)

512. A. Eban [Washington] to M. Sharett. 25 December 1952

Notes

1. Herzog reported that according to informed sources the United States, in light of the threat that Naguib's regime would collapse, had decided to grant Egypt $12 million in non-reimbursable military assistance. The decision was taken at the initiative of the State Department, although the Department of Defense was opposed and noted that the only stable country in the Middle East is Israel. In addition to this assistance, Egypt was conducting negotiations on $200 million in reimbursable assistance. (The telegram, dated 23 December, is in File 93.01/2208/26.)
2. See No. 503.
3. Sharett responded that he would act as follows: (1) He would meet with Ambassador Davis. (2) He would report to the Government at its next meeting. (3) He would meet with the press after the Government meeting. He believes that action should be initiated in Israel and continued thereafter in the United States. Nevertheless, the following points should be remembered: (1) The Cominform had just begun a campaign against Israel. (2) The United Nations had failed in its efforts to impose peace on the Arab states. (3) They should avoid creating the impression that Israel was opening a front against both Egypt and the West together. (See his telegram MT52, 26 December 1952, 130.09/2377/1.) See also Nos. 513 and 516.

513. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 26 December 1952

Note

1. See No. 512 and n. 3 there.

514. Sh. Bendor [Tel Aviv] to A. Eban (Washington). 26 December 1952

Orig.: 93.08/359/26

Bendor congratulates Eban and the Israeli delegation on the impressive fashion in which they waged their campaign at the UN on the resolution calling for direct negotiations. "It is now possible to reveal" that after the vote in the Ad Hoc Committee there were discussions at the Foreign Ministry as to whether Israel should fight for endorsement of the resolution in the General Assembly plenum. He had been among the minority that felt that the discussion and passage of the resolution by the Ad Hoc Committee was sufficient. That resolution turned the tables on the Arabs and put them on the defensive, rather than the offensive. It also proved to the world that Israel desires peace and is prepared to engage in direct negotiations to that end. By contrast, endorsement of the resolution by the General Assembly plenum would commit Israel to enter into negotiations at a time when it is unprepared for them and is under American pressure to make concessions and appease the Arabs, primarily by accepting the repatriation of refugees. His conclusion is that Israel should not have fought tooth and nail for approval of the resolution, but that it would have been sufficient that the majority of the UN members voted for it. In the circumstances created by the interview in the *New York Times* and the Philippine amendment there may, however, have been no alternative to waging a determined campaign to guarantee the minimum desired by Israel. As for the interview, and for the historical record, he states that he knows nothing of any tacit agreement between Israel and the Catholic world over the Jerusalem question at this General Assembly session.[1]

Note

1. After the failure of the resolution in the General Assembly plenum, Eban sent a telegram "for the historical record" and argued that the Catholic countries' support for the resolution during the debate in the Ad Hoc Political Committee had been in accordance with the tacit agreement that Israel would avoid raising the question of Jerusalem in any fashion whatsoever and would make no attempt to modify the

internationalization resolution of 1949; in return, these countries would not raise the question of the transfer of the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem and would support the draft calling for direct negotiations. The interview published in the *New York Times* (see No. 506 and n. 1 there) had violated this agreement. (Telegram dated 22 December 1952, 93.01/2208/26.)

515. A. Eban (Washington) to D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett. 26 December 1952

Orig.: IMDEA 230/72/896

Eban refers to the General Assembly resolution recognizing the union of Ethiopia and Eritrea. This can serve as a precedent for solving the problem of Israel's eastern border. Certain elements on the West Bank favor secession from Jordan and annexation to Israel, with use of the latter's harbors and international and commercial ties. Such a union, on a federal basis, would allow the West Bank to manage its internal affairs through its legislative organs; the border between the two states would become an exclusively administrative boundary, like those between the various states in the United States. The concentration of political and security authority in Israel's capital, Jerusalem, would constitute a sort of *de facto* annexation of the West Bank by Israel, thus freeing Israel from the stranglehold of the current borders. He is aware that today this vision has utterly no prospect of realization, but it is worth devoting thought to in coming years, instead of allowing the existing frontiers to become permanent.[1]

Note

1. Shiloah, who was asked to read this letter, noted that in his estimation there was no serious and solid force in Jordan favoring union with Israel in accordance with the lines proposed by Eban, although systematic action by Israel could lead to the consolidation of such a force. He was aware that great dangers were latent in such a plan; nevertheless, and in light of Eban's letter, he deemed that the Israeli position on union should be reconsidered. (See Shiloah to Sharett, 27 January 1953, 130.02/2451/2.)

516. United States Division (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Embassies in Washington and London. 27 December 1952

Notes

1. See No. 512 and n. 3 there.

2. The plotters, led by Akram Khorani, head of the Socialist Party, did not have broad public support. The arrest of Khorani, along with a score or so of other politicians and officers, put an end to the rebellion.
3. See No. 517.

517. Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs at a Press Conference (Tel Aviv, 28 December 1952)

518. A. Eban [Washington] to the United States Division. 28 December 1952

Notes

1. See No. 505 and n. 1 there.
2. In the wake of the Israeli diplomatic action Egypt decided to release the ship and its cargo at the beginning of January 1953.

519. A. Eban (Washington) to M. Sharett. 29 December 1952

Coded Tel. WTE24; Outg.: 93.01/2208/26

Eban refers to the public and diplomatic campaign concerning Egyptian arms purchases. Sharett's statement[1] was published in the *New York Times* and other papers. Abe Feinberg met with the President, who was surprised to hear about the deal and swore that Egypt would under no circumstances receive unilateral military assistance, and without readiness to make peace would find it difficult to receive any arms whatsoever. He promised to investigate the situation. In the meanwhile, it has become clear that in light of the reaction of the President and the Mutual Security Administration, and perhaps also as a result of Israel's opposition, those who initiated the program are trying to supply arms to Egypt under the reimbursable military aid program. This would allow them to argue that Israel, too, is eligible to acquire arms under the same program. The report is also confirmed by sources in the British Embassy here, who emphasize the need to buttress Naguib's position. The Israeli embassy is taking the following action: a meeting with Acheson will take place shortly;[2] Eban will meet with journalists tomorrow; action in Congress; and a letter from the Jewish organizations to the Secretary of State, which will be published in the press.

Notes

1. No. 517.
2. At the meeting, which took place on 6 January, Acheson made it clear to Eban that the British arms deal with Egypt had surprised the United States, which intended to uphold the Three-Power declaration and avoid an arms race in the Middle East. At the same time, the United States wanted to strengthen the hand of Naguib, who had taken a number of positive steps in his foreign policy, both through economic assistance and through a modest program of military assistance – one that would strengthen his stand domestically and in the army but would not imperil Israel. (See Chaim Herzog to the United States Division, WTE29, 93.01/2209/2.)

520. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 29 December 1952

Orig.: 130.02/2436/6

Rafael refers to Sharett's proposal to give Egypt an overland corridor through the southern Negev.[1] He supports Sharett's proposal and stresses that Israel should get used to the idea that in return for peace with Egypt it will have to provide a *quid pro quo*, in the form of free passage through the Negev. This is why an allusion to the matter was included in the peace plan that Eban presented to the Ad Hoc Committee;[2] the Egyptian delegate present at the time made careful note of this. He also agrees with the last part of Sharett's proposal, concerning the need to lay down in advance which positions cannot be abandoned. From his negotiating experience he has learned that the Oriental method of haggling cannot generate the requisite atmosphere of mutual trust that is imperative for the success of any negotiations and for obtaining the support of the friendly powers.

Notes

1. No. 492.
2. See No. 467.

521. Local Commanders' Agreement between Israel and Jordan. 29 December 1952

Note

1. See Nos. 150 and 437.

522. Y. Shimoni [Washington] to the Asia Division. 31 December 1952

Copy: 93.03/3010/5

Shimoni analyzes the character and tendencies of the Afro-Asian bloc, particularly in light of its activities at the UN. In matters touching on the East-West conflict this bloc does not present a unified front. It includes a nucleus of neutral countries, such as India, Indonesia, Burma, Afghanistan, Iran, and in most cases also Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Some other countries are also partly neutral, but interpret their non-alignment in a slightly different fashion and sometimes vote with the West—Pakistan, and to some extent Iran and some of the aforementioned Arab countries. Iraq and Lebanon almost always vote with the West, as do the Philippines.

With regard to North Africa and everything touching on colonial affairs, the bloc presents a unified and aggressive front. It is here that its primary strength and influence reside; these issues are also a bridge linking it to several South American countries and certain streams in progressive public opinion throughout the world.

The bloc split this year on questions relating to Palestine. Burma supported Israel consistently and forcefully; India, too, did not vote consistently with the Arabs on all items. On the basis of information available, the attitude to Israel was a subject of controversy among the members of the Indian UN delegation. Indonesia, in contrast, and to some extent Iran also, unhesitatingly maintained their firm pro-Arab line, although their representatives told the Israel delegation that they personally consider this policy, the outcome of inescapable domestic considerations, to be wrong.

As for the coalescence of this bloc outside the UN, he has only one fairly fresh bit of information, from the Associated Press, which reported that countries from this bloc recently held consultations in Cairo on North Africa. In addition to the Arab countries, the participants included Iran, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Ethiopia. He has no further details.

Notes

1. V. K. Krishna Menon, a member of the Indian delegation to the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly.
2. Rajeshwar Dayal, Indian Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

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TO MAIN VOLUME AND COMPANION VOLUME

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Abbreviations
b. — born
IDF — Israel Defence Forces
n — note